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EDEXCEL AS AND A LEVEL HISTORY: QUESTIONS BY TOPIC

Option 1E: Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin

AS and A Level History · Paper 1 · Option 1E

85 questions · 1700 marks · Mark schemes included

Pearson Edexcel AS (8HI0) and A Level (9HI0) History, June 2016 - June 2025

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 Piccadilly Business Centre, Unit C, Aldow Enterprise Park
Blackett Street, Manchester, M12 6AE

HOW TO USE THIS BOOKLET

Questions are grouped by specification sub-topic; within each sub-topic they run from the lowest mark tariff to the highest.

Click any heading or question row below to jump straight to it.

On every question page, click ANSWER in the top-right corner to jump to its mark scheme.

Diagrams, graphs, tables and data are printed exactly as they appeared in the original papers.

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17 questions · 340 marks

49

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9 questions · 180 marks

67

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17 questions · 340 marks

77

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QUESTIONS

85 questions · 1700 marks · grouped by sub-topic, lowest tariff first



THEME 1

GOVERNMENT, LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL CONTROL, 1917–85

28 questions in this sub-topic · 560 marks · lowest tariff first



.....

- 1 Was state propaganda the main reason for the Soviet regime's control over its people in the years 1917–53?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



Q2

- 2 Was Khrushchev's limited reform of the Soviet government the main reason for the regime's growing political stagnation in the years 1964–82?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



- 1 Was the use of terror the main reason by which the Bolshevik regime was able to establish its control over the USSR in the years 1917-28?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



-
- 1 How accurate is it to say that the nature of government under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 4 How significant was the role of the secret police in maintaining communist control in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



-
- 1 Was Stalin's personality the main reason for the purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



-
- 1** How accurate is it to say that Stalin's use of terror in the 1930s was fundamentally similar to Lenin's use of terror in the years 1918–24?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 1 Were economic problems the main reason for the difficulties faced by the Soviet governments in the years 1917-28?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 Was Brezhnev's leadership the main reason for political stagnation in the USSR in the years 1964-82?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** To what extent did the role of the Soviet secret police change in the years 1917-85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



- 2 How accurate is it to say that Khrushchev's approach to government was fundamentally similar to Brezhnev's approach to government?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How significant was state control of the mass media and propaganda in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1917-85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 1** Was Stalin's industrialisation programme the main reason for the purges in the Soviet Union in the 1930s?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that the personality cults of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were different?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 1 Was Bolshevik propaganda the main reason for the establishment of Communist Party control over the Soviet Union in the years 1917–28?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 Were Stalin's policies of economic modernisation the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



- 4 How significant was the role of the secret police in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1953–85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



-
- 1 How accurate is it to say that the nature of Soviet government under Lenin and Stalin was fundamentally similar?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



-
- 1** Were the actions of the secret police the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917–28?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 Was Stalin's cult of personality the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



-
- 1 How accurate is it to say that Stalin's industrial and agricultural policies were the primary reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 How accurate is it to say that Khrushchev's attempts to reform Soviet government were largely successful?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



-
- 1 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1917–28, Bolshevik control of the mass media and propaganda was the main reason for the consolidation of the Soviet regime?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How significant was the role of the secret police in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1953–85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 1** Was Lenin's leadership the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917–28?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 Was Stalin's use of the media and propaganda, in the years 1928–53, the main reason for his control over the Soviet population?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



-
- 1 How accurate is it to say that the purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were primarily due to Stalin's personality?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 How accurate is it to say that Brezhnev's leadership was the main reason for political stagnation in the USSR in the years 1964–82?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



THEME 2

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY, 1917–85

14 questions in this sub-topic · 280 marks · lowest tariff first



- 3** How far, in the years 1953–85, did the priorities for Soviet industry and agriculture change?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



- 2 Were the failures of collectivisation the main reason for the economic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in the years 1929–41?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



- 2 How far do you agree that the benefits of Stalin's economic policies outweighed the costs in the years 1928–50?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



- 2 Was the failure of central planning the main reason for the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964–85?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



- 2 How far do you agree that the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1945–64?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



-
- 1** How far do you agree that the failures of Soviet economic policy outweighed the successes in the years 1917-53?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 Were the failures of the Five-Year Plans the main reason for the economic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in the years 1928–53?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



-
- 1 How accurate is it to say that the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime, in the years 1917–28, was the introduction of the New Economic Policy?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 How accurate is it to say that government policy failed to modernise Soviet agriculture in the years 1928–64?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



- 2 How far do you agree that the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1921–41?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



- 1 Was the Bolsheviks' poor handling of the economy the main reason for the difficulties faced by the Soviet regime in the years 1917–28?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



- 2 Was Brezhnev's leadership the main reason for the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964–82?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



- 2 How accurate is it to say that the failure of central planning played a significant role in the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964–85?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1953–85, the Soviet government's economic priorities did not change?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



THEME 3

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS: WOMEN, FAMILY, EDUCATION AND SECURITY

17 questions in this sub-topic · 340 marks · lowest tariff first



Q4

- 4 How far do you agree that the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1917–85 was the improved status of women?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1924-85 was the provision of social security?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that the status of women was transformed under Soviet rule in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that government educational policy improved the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How significant was employment for the promotion of a stable Soviet society in the years 1953–85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How significant were the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 To what extent did government attitudes towards the family as a social unit change in the years 1917-85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that Soviet government attitudes to the family did not change in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that the status of women in Stalinist society was essentially similar to that of women in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that the status of Soviet women changed little in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



- 4 How significant were the Soviet regime's attempts to improve the status of women in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that government educational policy failed to improve the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How successful were the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953–85?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that the status of women in Soviet society under Stalin was different from the status of women in Soviet society under Khrushchev and Brezhnev?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1917–85, the Soviet regime's attitudes towards the family as a social unit did not change?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1917–85, the most significant Soviet social development was the provision of education?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1924–85 was the provision of social security?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



THEME 4

RELIGION, THE ARTS AND CULTURE IN THE USSR

9 questions in this sub-topic · 180 marks · lowest tariff first



3 How far was government control over Soviet culture maintained in the years 1953-85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that Soviet leaders, in the years 1953–85, pursued similar policies on religion?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression remained unchanged in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that the Soviet leadership's hostility to religion remained remarkably consistent in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that the Soviet leadership's policy on the arts and culture remained remarkably consistent in the years 1953–85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that Soviet leaders, in the years 1953–85, pursued similar policies on the arts and culture?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that Soviet policy on religion under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different from Soviet policy on religion under Khrushchev and Brezhnev?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that the Soviet government's hostility towards religion did not change in the years 1917–85?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1917–85, Soviet government policy on the arts and culture changed?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS

WHAT EXPLAINS THE FALL OF THE USSR, C1985–91?

17 questions in this sub-topic · 340 marks · lowest tariff first



SECTION 3

Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your own knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that the Soviet Union collapsed because of Gorbachev's failure to deal with the challenge of nationalism?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From J. N. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History 1812-1992*, 4th edition published 1993.

Until the very end Gorbachev resisted the break-up of the USSR, but it was his insistence on *glasnost* and his reservations about the use of force that made this break-up possible. Multinational empires always present problems and this was made worse in the USSR's case by the absence of natural frontiers separating the nations within the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik solution of a confederation of national territories with small, varying degrees of self-government had proved to be workable so long as the central Soviet regime kept nationalist feelings under tight control. Under Gorbachev, *glasnost*, the preference for political rather than authoritarian solutions, and the election of genuine republican parliaments gave pent-up national feeling an opportunity of expression. Gorbachev did not foresee the extent to which *perestroika* would be undermined by nationalism. He foresaw friction but not the grinding, unrelenting movement towards independence from centralised Soviet power.

Extract 2: From Martin McCauley, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union*, published 2008.

After 1980 the Soviet economy went into rapid decline. This meant a drop in living standards for most people. Gorbachev's attempts at economic reform provoked a collapse. One of the reasons for this was that economic reform needs time to produce positive results, but Gorbachev was impatient and introduced more radical reforms to accelerate growth. He eventually wrecked the system because he was quite unqualified for the role he had to play. He had little understanding of economics. This meant he was influenced by economists who promised him success. When it did not happen, he listened to more radical economists. None of these economists had ever worked in a market economy, let alone industry. They were all theorists who assumed that the planned economy was endlessly flexible. Hence they had no understanding of the consequences of any of their reforms.

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Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the USSR's economic weaknesses?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From David Evans and Jane Jenkins, *Years of Russia, the USSR and the Collapse of Soviet Communism*, published 2008.

In the Soviet Union, the economic situation continued to decline and there were now strikes in various parts of the country. Gorbachev's failure to stimulate the country's sluggish economy and bring about an upturn led to a rapid decline in his popularity. After six years in office the radical reformers felt that his attempts at reform were too slow and the aims of *glasnost* and *perestroika* were not being achieved. Because of Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*, the Party had lost its control over the media and so was no longer able to cover up the country's economic and social problems. With production targets still not being met and projects left unfinished, Gorbachev's critics claimed his reforms were cosmetic. Rising inflation brought with it price increases, shortages and long queues for basic necessities. This led to a rapid decline in the quality of life of the Russian people.

5

10

Extract 2: From John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: the Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400–2000*, published 2008.

Gorbachev found that the transition from Soviet control to an 'informal empire' over Eastern Europe was not an easy option. To give up control and the threat of coercion was to take a big risk. Without other means to keep old client states loyal, it might even prove fatal. What Moscow could offer by way of economic rewards was poor indeed compared with the West. With dizzying speed East European reform turned into East European revolt. In November 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, pro-Soviet governments collapsed, the East European 'outer empire' vanished. This disaster devastated the authority and the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. The command economy broke down at home. In the following year (1990) the revolt spread quickly across the 'inner empire' of the Soviet Union. The Soviet republics – including Russia itself under Boris Yeltsin – now demanded their freedom.

15

20

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Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because Gorbachev's confidence in his reform policies 'proved gravely misplaced' (Extract 1, line 9)?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From Edward Acton and Tom Stableford, *The Soviet Union Volume 2 1939–1991*, published 2007.

The end of the Soviet Union was triggered by the new General Secretary appointed in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev. He changed the USSR's foreign policy. He attempted to accelerate industrial growth and later began to dismantle many of the structures of the command economy. He radically loosened the rigour of censorship and the scope for questioning the certainties of Marxism-Leninism. He instigated dramatic reform of the party and of the entire political system, introducing competitive elections both at the All-Union level and within each Republic. His confidence that the result would be the revitalisation of the Soviet Union proved gravely misplaced. 5

The attempt to reform society from above unleashed forces for change which the government proved wholly unable to control. It undermined the economy, turning stagnation into steep decline. It ignited a cultural and ideological revolution that swiftly stripped the regime of its legitimacy and ruptured the Communist Party. It set off an explosion which ripped apart the Soviet system and fractured the country along the fault-lines of the fifteen constituent Union Republics. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for so long a major fixture in international relations, disappeared into history. 10 15

Extract 2: From Raymond Pearson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire*, published 2002.

A complex interaction of overthrow from below – ‘people power’ – and collapse from above brought about the events of 1989 across the Soviet empire of Eastern Europe. This deadly combination of predominantly nationalist pressure and Soviet imperial withdrawal spread east to contaminate the USSR itself during 1990–91. 20

Another major shortcoming was the Soviet Union's inefficient and wasteful economic performance. By the time Gorbachev was promoting ideas on the desirability and practicability of a mixed economy in the late 1980s, a doomed atmosphere of ‘too little too late’ hung over the commitment to perestroika. By its last decade, the sprawling, outdated and dysfunctional economy of the Soviet Empire could neither deliver the welfare state by fulfilling the economic and social expectations of its population nor supply the warfare state by satisfying the spiralling financial and technological demands of the Cold War. 25 30

By 1990, financial bankruptcy ensured that the stricken Soviet Union could sustain neither role.

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Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the role played by Boris Yeltsin?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From J.N. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History 1812–1992*, 4th edition, published 1993.

By summer 1990, Yeltsin, now openly opposed by Gorbachev, was elected president of the Russian Republic. Strengthened by his new status and Lithuania's declaration of independence, Yeltsin got his parliament to declare Russian sovereignty. Other republics also made similar declarations of independence and it was clear that the central USSR government was losing authority. Yeltsin also led the opposition to the August 1991 attempted coup and was rightly seen as the hero of the hour. Over the next few days, he took the opportunity to crush the Communist Party, once and for all. He suspended the activities of the Communist Party in the Russian Republic. During the rest of 1991, the transfer of power from Gorbachev's USSR to the republics was unstoppable with Yeltsin setting the pace and Gorbachev fighting to preserve the union. At the end of 1991, with republics collecting and keeping taxes and the Ukraine voting for independence, it became clear that the USSR was coming to an end.

Extract 2: From Robert Service, *A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin*, published 2003.

Several of the principal features of communism in the USSR were being undermined by Gorbachev's reforming activity: the one party state, the ideological control, the militant atheism, the centralised administration and the state economic monopoly. Perestroika had become a project for total transformation. It was scarcely surprising that many senior Soviet figures, including several he had promoted, were shocked. Gorbachev was encouraging the disintegration of the existing Soviet system by his actions, if not by his deliberate purpose. His background prevented him from seeing clearly where his path of transformation was leading. While wanting a market economy, he did not think this would involve much capitalism. While approving of national self-expression, he opposed the idea of any republic breaking away from the USSR. While wishing to replace traditional communist officials with energetic newcomers, he often chose newcomers who had no serious commitment to reform.

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Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians: From Earliest Times to the Present*, 2nd edition, published 2012.

In 1990 Gorbachev loosened the electoral structure one stage further. He amended Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution to end the Communist Party's monopoly and legalised the formation of alternative political parties. At the time, elections to the Supreme Soviets of the union republics were imminent and these elections transformed the political scene yet again. For one thing, they fatally weakened the Communist Party's executive power: more or less since 1917 it had been the effective focus of state authority, coordinating and directing whatever was undertaken by public bodies. Its abdication of this function left a great vacuum at the centre of politics. Gorbachev attempted to fill it by creating the post of President of the USSR and having himself elected to it by the Congress of People's Deputies. But the new presidency had no real executive chain of command of its own. In any case, Gorbachev, never having been confirmed by popular election, lacked the legitimacy of, say, a US president. This lack of either symbolic or actual authority undermined him fatally over the next 18 months as economic crisis and inter-ethnic conflict engulfed his reform programme.

Extract 2: From Orlando Figes, *Revolutionary Russia 1891–1991*, published 2014.

Economically, perestroika had a lot in common with the NEP. It rested on the hopeful assumption that market mechanisms could be added to the structures of the planned economy to stimulate production and satisfy consumer needs. State controls on wages and prices were loosened by a 1987 Law on State Enterprises. Co-operatives were legalised in 1988, resulting in a NEP-like sprouting up of cafés, restaurants and small shops or kiosks, selling mostly vodka (now re-legalised), cigarettes and pornographic videos imported from abroad. But these measures failed to ease the shortages of food and essential household goods. Inflation increased, aggravated by the lifting of controls on wages and prices. Only the dismantling of the planned economy could have solved the crisis. But ideologically that was impossible until 1989, when Gorbachev began to break free from the Soviet way of thinking. Even then it was too radical for him to legislate until August 1990, when the 500-Day Plan for the transition to a market-based economy was at last introduced by the Supreme Soviet. But by then it was too late to halt the economic crash.

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Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the impact of the nationalist resurgence in the Soviet republics in the late 1980s?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.**Extract 1:** From Peter Oxley, *Russia 1855-1991: From Tsars to Commissars*, published 2001.

Perestroika, glasnost and democratisation all implied more self-government for the nationalities. Gorbachev seems to have failed to understand the national feeling in many of the republics. The first major signs of national tension were seen in Kazakhstan in 1986 but the most serious threat to the integrity of the USSR came from the Baltic republics in the years 1988-91. National feeling also produced a crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh and there were similar problems in Georgia. 5

The USSR was breaking up, but the Russian Federation, the largest republic, administered the kiss of death. Elections in 1990 to the Russian Federation Congress of People's Deputies produced a large following for the new Democratic Russia Party. Yeltsin won the important election for Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, making him head of the Russian Federation government. Like the other states, it declared itself sovereign, making its own ministers and laws superior to those of the USSR's government. 10

Extract 2: From P.M.H. Bell, *The World Since 1945: An International History*, published 2001.

Gorbachev staked everything on the reform of the Soviet system. He hoped that he could somehow introduce a socialist market economy without letting the market dominate, permit greater freedom to the nationalities without conceding independence, and delegate power in a centralised system without leading to disintegration. In 1990, it grew increasingly unlikely that he could succeed, as a threefold crisis developed within the Soviet Union – ideological, economic and nationalist. 15 20

The decision to repeal Article 6 of the constitution removed the directing role and political monopoly of the Soviet Communist Party. This change produced a profound ideological crisis regarding the purpose of communism but offered nothing to replace it. At the same time, the Soviet economy fell into actual decline, as gross national product fell significantly. Finally the movement of the nationalities towards independence or separation gathered pace in 1990. Gorbachev tried to hold the USSR together but in practice disintegration was setting in. 25

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Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of a nationalist resurgence in the Soviet bloc?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From Catherine Merridale, *Red Fortress: The Secret Heart of Russia's History*, published 2013.

Yeltsin was building an independent power-base by appealing to ethnic Russian patriotism. In 1989 and 1990, nationalist demonstrations dominated the news. These demonstrations culminated in unilateral declarations of independence in the Baltic and armed uprisings in the Caucasus. Gorbachev's creation of a new post, President of the USSR, was intended to strengthen the Soviet Union and hold the republics together by giving them a single figurehead. However, spurred by the success of their neighbours in Eastern Europe, Soviet citizens increased their demands. Lithuania's campaign for independence was particularly vocal. 5

Protesters in Moscow called on Gorbachev to 'Remember Romania!', linking him with the detested Ceauşescu*, who had been executed following a popular uprising in December 1989. This was unfair, for it was Gorbachev who had unleashed the popular tide in Europe in the first place. In January 1991, Soviet troops moved into the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius. The demonstrations there were suppressed at the cost of fourteen lives. Thanks to Gorbachev's earlier reforms, the violence was televised and images of Soviet tanks loomed once again across Europe. President Gorbachev – and the Soviet Union – had lost the moral argument forever. 10 15

*Ceauşescu - ruler of communist Romania

Extract 2: From Archie Brown, *The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age*, published 2014.

Gorbachev has been regarded by some as a 'weak' leader, or even a failure, because the country over which he presided – the Soviet Union – ceased to exist at the end of 1991. The USSR could have been held together for many more years had he not embarked on the liberalisation of the Soviet economy, the democratisation of the Soviet political system, and the transformation of Soviet foreign policy. The most dissatisfied Soviet nationalities – the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians – saw the peoples of Eastern Europe achieving independent statehood in 1989. This raised their aspirations from seeking greater freedom within a Soviet state to demanding full independence. 20 25

Gorbachev consciously sought to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet state but he was not prepared to resort to the kind of sustained use of force that would have been required to crush independence movements once expectations were aroused. The fact that the Soviet Union was dissolved largely peacefully was in some ways an achievement on Gorbachev's part, although it was very much an unintended consequence of changes to the system. Most fundamentally, it was Gorbachev's liberalisation and democratisation that made the pursuit of independence possible. His 'guilt' in relation to the break-up of the Soviet state lay in replacing fear by freedoms and in his strong dislike of bloodshed. 30 35

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- 5** Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of Gorbachev's failure to reform the political system?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev's Political Reforms*, published 2015.

Why did the Soviet system collapse so quickly and suddenly? The fundamental reason is Gorbachev's botched attempt to reform the political system. The Soviet Union would have continued if Gorbachev had not removed the vital element of the system – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its gigantic machinery of government.

5

Gorbachev came to power in 1985 to save, not destroy, the Soviet system of government. However as *perestroika* gathered pace his reforms became increasingly radical, and instead of simply reforming communism, Gorbachev attempted to create a new system which he defined as 'humane, democratic socialism'. This ended up provoking numerous contradictions. The overall aim was to create a socialist state with a proper legal system, decentralised powers and a genuine parliament. However, the system ended up trapped between a disrupted old Soviet system of government and a new system that could not be established. The steering mechanism of the state was destroyed but no effective alternative system was put in place, and by the end of 1991 the whole order collapsed.

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Extract 2: From Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, published 1993.

The death of the Soviet Union represented a failure of Gorbachev's triple revolution. The system fell because the leadership tried to dismantle the old practices of the command economy and Communist Party dominance and, at the same time, to construct a democratic multinational federation. Nations within the USSR, each with their competing interests and aspirations, tore that superpower into fragments. Gorbachev's programme fell victim to the economic collapse and the rise of powerful nationalisms. Once it became possible to break the imperial tie with Soviet Russia, nationalist leaders moved to take control of the destinies of their own peoples.

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The forces of nationalism undermined the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's plans for gradual economic and political reform initiated from above. These forces were an understandable reaction to the excessive centralism and bureaucratisation of the old Soviet system.

Acknowledgements

Extract 1 from: Richard Sakwa, 'Gorbachev's Political Reforms' in Robin Bunce et. al., *Communist States in the Twentieth Century* (Hodder, 2015)

Extract 2 from: Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (1993) quoted in Robin Bunce, *Russia 1917-91: From Lenin to Yeltsin* (2017)

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Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the challenge posed by Boris Yeltsin?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From George W. Breslauer, *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders*, published 2002.

No matter what Gorbachev proposed in domestic policy during his last years as leader, Yeltsin criticised him for his conservatism and half-measures. Yeltsin supported decentralising forces in the union republics when Gorbachev was trying to contain those forces through a combination of threats and rewards. Yeltsin argued that the Soviet authorities were the main obstacle to Russia achieving a decisive transition to a new political order. He initiated a 'war of laws', opposing or blocking the enforcement of Soviet laws on the territory of the Russian republic. He sponsored a declaration of Russian 'sovereignty' and supported other republics that were doing the same. He dictated terms for a proposed Union Treaty, which was being negotiated throughout 1990–91, that would have turned the USSR into a confederation of largely independent states. 5 10

Yeltsin, over time, became increasingly determined to destroy both Gorbachev's authority and the Kremlin's powers. Yeltsin may not have decided until November–December 1991 to work behind the scenes to dissolve the Soviet Union. But it was increasingly clear, by the autumn of 1991, that Gorbachev was finished as a serious political force and that the future of Russia would be shaped by the decisions of President Yeltsin. 15

Extract 2: From Christopher Marsh, *Unparalleled Reforms: China's Rise, Russia's Fall and the Interdependence of Transition*, published 2005.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, although not inevitable prior to the launching of *perestroika*, became increasingly likely as events unfolded and decisions were made about how to proceed. The first phase of collapse began between March and December 1989, from the initial elections to the Congress of People's Deputies to the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. By this time *perestroika* had run into trouble. Gorbachev attempted to reinvigorate his reform agenda by pushing ahead with democratisation. But, in so doing, Gorbachev gave the vote to a population largely in need of food. 20 25

During the second phase, from January 1990 to August 1991, Soviet collapse became an increasingly possible outcome of reform. Yeltsin's meteoric rise to power in Russia, and his call to the republics to grab as much sovereignty as they could was a lethal blow to the Soviet Union. The failure of the August 1991 coup attempt led the country into the final phase of collapse, which saw the Soviet Union crumble throughout the autumn of 1991. 30

While long term conditions contributed to the failure of Communism, the Soviet collapse was also due to the policy choices made by Gorbachev, particularly in regard to the pace and scope of reform. 35

Extract 1 from: George W Breslauer, 'Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders', Cambridge University Press 2002

Extract 2 from: Christopher Marsh, 'Unparalleled Reforms – China's Rise, Russia's Fall, and the Interdependence of Transition', Lexington Books 2005

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How far do you agree with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of Gorbachev's mistakes?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From Robin Bunce et al., *Communist States in the Twentieth Century*, published 2015.

Gorbachev's responsibility for the fall of the Soviet Union lay in his mistakes and miscalculations. His fundamental miscalculation was to believe that reform could save the Soviet Union. *Perestroika* aimed to revive the Soviet system and enable it to fulfil its potential but these reforms ultimately created a crisis from which the Soviet Union could not recover. Gorbachev also failed to anticipate the effects of *glasnost*, which undermined the Communist Party's claim to rule. Furthermore, Gorbachev failed to see the population's limited commitment to the Soviet Union. Instead, he believed the party's own propaganda that communism had created a new Soviet people who no longer felt the appeal of nationalism.

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In addition, Gorbachev's plans to restructure industry and increase production were confusing. He shifted from one economic plan to the next without allowing any of them to develop fully. Gorbachev also failed to win over the Communist Party, the only institution strong enough to introduce reform. The failure of his political and economic policies undermined his authority so he no longer had the power to hold the Soviet Union together.

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Extract 2: From Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism*, published 2009.

Various accounts of the end of communism in the Soviet Union have argued that nationalism only played a minor role, or that nationalism was a marginal influence on the key decision-makers. Instead these accounts focus on failed politics and ideologies, an economy in decline, the burden of military competition with the United States, and the corrupt Soviet ruling elite. Nationalism is often portrayed as merely a consequence of communism's fall, not as a cause of the collapse itself.

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However, the issues that mobilised populations within the Soviet Union during these years revolved precisely around nationalism. Certainly, issues of democratisation, labour unrest and consumer shortages played a role in ending communism, at times reinforcing the impact of nationalism. Nevertheless, the thousands of protest demonstrations throughout the Soviet Union during the *glasnost* period demonstrated that nationalism gained a powerful force and appeal. It had more force and appeal than other movements and grievances. Nationalist forces moved into the space created by *glasnost* and used it to overthrow the Soviet state.

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Acknowledgements

Extract 1 from: *Communist States in the Twentieth Century* Robin Bunce, Peter Clements & Andrew Flint © Hodder and Stoughton Educational Limited, 2015

Extract 2 from: *Nationalism and the Collapse of the Soviet Communism* By Mark R. Beissinger © Journal of Contemporary European History, 2009



Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5 In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because 'reform produced crisis' [Extract 1, line 1]?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)

Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, published 2010.

In the Soviet Union, reform produced crisis more than crisis forced reform. In 1985 neither the Soviet system nor the Soviet state were under threat. By 1989 both of them were. Gorbachev and his advisers wanted to dismantle the communist system but were strongly opposed to the breakup of the Soviet state. However, they were not prepared to sacrifice the liberalised and democratising political system in favour of the violent suppression of national separatism.

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Perestroika achieved a great deal. Fear of the state authorities was removed, liberty was introduced, competitive elections took place, and democratic accountability emerged in the USSR. It was no coincidence that these things happened shortly before the Soviet state itself ceased to exist. The task of holding together a democratised multinational state, in which each nation could point to a long list of grievances, was far harder than preserving the Soviet Union as a highly authoritarian state. Until the mid-1980s, it had been taken for granted that every demonstration of nationalism would be stamped out ruthlessly. It was when that ceased to be the case that expectations were raised and the Soviet state was called into question.

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Extract 2: From Lee Edwards, *The Collapse of Communism*, published 2013.

Resolving Soviet economic stagnation could only have been accomplished by tampering with the system, which carried obvious risks. It was common knowledge in the 1980s that the Soviet economy was in deep trouble. The US Central Intelligence Agency forecast virtually zero growth for the USSR. Even within the Soviet Union voices were heard calling for major changes in the way the economy was run. A heavy and unanticipated blow was the sudden drop in the price of oil, the country's leading export and main currency earner. The decline in earnings from oil forced Moscow to resort to heavy borrowing from abroad.

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In addition, the Soviet government preferred to ignore the nationalist tensions within the USSR. Consequently, the Soviet leadership did nothing and things soon got out of hand. The moment the politicians of the non-Russian republics sensed that Soviet authority was wobbling, they began to clamour for national rights and independence. Gorbachev made a desperate attempt to preserve the Soviet Union by drafting a new constitutional charter granting concessions to the republics, but he was overtaken by events.

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Acknowledgements

Extract 1 from: The Rise and Fall of Communism by Archie Brown © Vintage Books, 2010

Extract 2 from: The Collapse of Communism by Lee Edwards © Hoover Institution Press, 1999



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- 5** Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because the economy of the USSR was in crisis?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From John Laver, *Triumph and Collapse: Russia and the USSR, 1941–1991*, published 2009.

Although the economy was already approaching crisis in 1985 when Gorbachev came to power, it was still working. It was *perestroika* which appeared to have made things worse, so that the economy was close to collapse by 1991. There were a number of reasons for this. The actual reforms were not carefully planned or thought through because the people who made the reforms, including Gorbachev, were not economists. Several administrative reorganisations created confusion and lack of coordination at several levels. This enabled managers to ignore demands they did not like. 5

The economy was harmed by inflation and the collapse of the rouble. Production was affected by increasing unrest in the workforce. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe deprived the USSR of secure trading partners. On top of all this, Gorbachev inherited costly projects, particularly the war in Afghanistan and a commitment to match US defence spending. These costs could not be eliminated overnight. The Soviet economy, in its final months, appeared to be heading into meltdown. 15

Extract 2: From Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, published 2007.

Gorbachev was the destroyer of Soviet power. After the Soviet 'empire' in central Europe collapsed, the Soviet Union itself became vulnerable. Several problems demanded government action: growing domestic chaos, deepening economic crisis, the rise of nationalist separatists and the weakening of the existing state structures. 20

Yet Gorbachev continued to believe he could create a new democratic Soviet Union. His overconfidence let him down. In 1987 he refused to get rid of Boris Yeltsin, who had already emerged as a major troublemaker. He also kept hardliners in charge of the army, the KGB and the military industrial complex.

Without Gorbachev, the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union would not have occurred. At each stage Gorbachev made choices that destabilised and weakened the USSR. The unintentional destruction of the Soviet Union made him one of the most controversial figures in Russian history. 25

Acknowledgements:

Extract 1 from: *Triumph and Collapse: Russia and the USSR, 1941-1991*, John Laver, Nelson Thornes 2009

Extract 2 from: *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Vladislav M. Zubok, University of North Carolina Press 2007



Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5 In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the 'rise of the national question' [Extract 1, line 2]?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)

Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From David R Marples, *The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985–1991*, published 2004.

Gorbachev's most important failure was not to reconcile the results of *glasnost* with the rise of the national question in the Soviet Union. Problems in the republics emerged almost immediately upon his taking office and were only increased by the more tolerant atmosphere within the media. In the Baltic states, there were widespread protests. Arguably Gorbachev could have negotiated the departure of the three Baltic states from the USSR and still maintained the union. His hesitation ensured that the initiatives of the Baltic leaders, and particularly the popular fronts, spread to the other republics.

5

The rise in national sentiment in the republics received a significant boost from the downfall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In the first instance, Gorbachev's abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine led to the overthrow of the obsolete communist governments in Poland and East Germany, which had almost no popular support. When the Soviet Union did not respond to stop the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Soviet republics could act with more confidence.

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Extract 2: From John Keep, *A History of the Soviet Union 1945–1991*, published 1995.

Gorbachev's miscalculations were so enormous that some contemporary observers thought they might be 'deliberate mistakes'. In other words, that he was following a secret agenda and was working to bring down the Soviet regime. First, he authorised the spending spree of 1985–86, which undermined the country's financial stability. The financial stability of the Soviet Union was already more seriously threatened than he realised since his predecessors had treated financial matters as top-secret.

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Second, he underestimated the seriousness of nationalist tensions within the Soviet Union which could not be easily resolved by the rational, common sense methods he applied. Third, although he believed that the socialist option was irreversible, he weakened the party machinery that embodied it.

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Finally, in 1990, he refused to endorse the programme of his adviser Shatalin for transition to a free market. All of these miscalculations were rooted in a failure to appreciate the true nature of the Soviet political system, which, being totalitarian, was held together ultimately by coercion and deceitful propaganda.

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Extract 1 from: Russia 1917-91: From Lenin to Yeltsin By Robin Bunce & David R Marples © Hodder Education, 2017

Extract 2 from: A History of the Soviet Union 1945 – 1991 By John L. H. Keep © Oxford University Press, September 2002



Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the power of nationalism?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From Robert Hornsby, *The Impact of the Nationalist Resurgence*, published 2015.

Nationalism became a powerful force almost everywhere in the USSR in the late 1980s. This was partly due to the fact that so many leaders and elites in the different parts of the Soviet Union decided that their ultimate allegiance was not to the USSR but to their own Republic – Russia, Ukraine, Georgia or anywhere else.

5

Public demonstrations for independence in cities such as Minsk, Kiev and Tbilisi topped 100,000 people by the start of the 1990s. In the Baltic states around 2 million people held hands in a human protest chain for independence that stretched right across the region.

Nationalism was so significant because it was encouraged by a number of other issues: by economic decline, by limitations on religion and culture, by political issues, by local and national problems. It was also encouraged by the popular mood among the masses and the political manoeuvring of the local elites. One only needs to look at the 15 countries that emerged from the Soviet collapse as independent states to see that holding them together was a virtual impossibility without the use of force.

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Extract 2: From Anders Aslund, *Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed*, published 2007.

The sudden burst of activity in the Soviet Union during 1985–87 broke two decades of stagnation. Gorbachev's top priority was to revitalise the economy. His team tried all kind of measures, but economic growth did not improve. Shortages became worse because tax revenues declined with the anti-alcohol campaign, and a larger share of national wealth was diverted to inefficient investment. *Perestroika* fell miserably short of its main goal which was to boost economic growth.

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Glasnost started later than the other policies and took off much more gradually. It came into its own in 1987 and freedom of speech was attained in 1989. Gorbachev unleashed *glasnost* in order to undermine hard line Communist opposition to his reforms. But *glasnost* could not be controlled. It threatened not only the hardliners but the very foundations of the Soviet state, especially the state's ruthless policies against various nationalities. Rather than strengthen the Soviet state, *glasnost* eventually suggested that the Soviet Government was no longer sustainable.

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Acknowledgements:

Extract 1: *Communist States in the Twentieth Century* By Robin Bunce, Sarah Ward, Andrew Flint and Peter Clements © Hodder Education, June 2015.

Extract 2: *Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed* By Anders Aslund © Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2007.



Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of Boris Yeltsin's opposition to the Soviet government?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)

Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From J. N. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History 1812–1992*, published 1993.

By summer 1990, Yeltsin, now openly opposed by Gorbachev, was elected president of the Russian Republic. Strengthened by his new status and Lithuania's recent declaration of independence from the USSR, Yeltsin got his parliament to declare Russia a self-governing republic. Other republics also made similar declarations of independence and it was clear that the central USSR government was losing authority. These republics had some success when insisting that their laws took precedence over Soviet laws. 5

Yeltsin also led the popular resistance to the August 1991 attempted hard-line communist coup and was rightly seen as the hero of the hour. Over the next few days, he took the opportunity to crush the Communist Party, once and for all. He suspended the activities of the Communist Party in the Russian Republic. During the rest of 1991, the transfer of power from Gorbachev's USSR to the republics was unstoppable with Yeltsin setting the pace and Gorbachev fighting to preserve the union. At the end of 1991, with republics collecting and keeping taxes and the Ukraine voting for independence, it became clear that the USSR was about to collapse. 10 15



Extract 2: From Robert Service, *A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin*, published 2003.

The term 'reform' implies a series of modifications which leave the basic political, economic and social order intact. However, some of the principal features of communism in the USSR were being undermined by Gorbachev's reforming activity: the one-party state, the ideological control, the centralised administration and the state economic monopoly. Perestroika had become a project for total transformation. It was hardly surprising that many senior Soviet figures, including several he had promoted, were shocked by what was happening. Gorbachev, by his actions, if not by his deliberate purpose, was encouraging the disintegration of the existing Soviet system. 20 25

Gorbachev's communist background prevented him from seeing clearly where his path of transformation was leading the USSR. While wanting a market economy, he did not think this would involve much capitalism. While approving of national self-expression, he opposed the idea of any republic seceding from the USSR. While wishing to replace traditional communist officials with energetic newcomers, he often chose newcomers who had no serious commitment to reform. Although he did radicalise his proposals during these years, Gorbachev always lagged behind the deepening crisis affecting the economy, the republics and the personnel of the Soviet system. 30

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Acknowledgements:

Extract 1 from: *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History 1812-1992*, By J. N. Westwood, © Oxford University Press, April 1993

Extract 2 from: *A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin*, By Robert Service, © Penguin, September 2003



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- 5** Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that, in the years 1985–91, the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the nationalist resurgence in the communist states of Eastern Europe?

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From Robin Bunce et al., *Communist States in the Twentieth Century*, published 2015.

Gorbachev's reforms led to a rise in nationalism. The most significant change in this context was to redefine the relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European 'satellite states' it had controlled since the late 1940s. Gorbachev rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine in August 1989, thereby renouncing the Soviet Union's 'right' to intervene in the affairs of the East European socialist countries. 5
This allowed much greater freedom in these countries. As a result, during October and November 1989, communism collapsed in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Gorbachev allowed this to happen, refusing to use Soviet troops to restore communist rule in these states.

The nationalist revolutions in Eastern Europe clearly had implications for the Soviet republics. Across Eastern Europe, countries had regained their independence from the Soviet Union. Nationalists in the non-Russian republics within the Soviet Union hoped that they could do the same. 10
Indeed, from the late 1980s, there was growing nationalist unrest in the Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Russia and the Baltic states. Within these republics, nationalist leaders and movements were able to present themselves as the defenders of local traditions and opponents of Soviet oppression. 15

Extract 2: From Michael Oliver and Derek Aldcroft, *Economic Disasters of the Twentieth Century*, published 2008.

The economy of the Soviet Union suffered from various in-built flaws. As the USSR's command economy faced serious difficulties, Soviet citizens could see some of the attractions of western capitalism through increasing trade and the black market, providing hope of a better future for the Soviet population. 20

By the early 1980s, mounting economic problems forced the Soviet leadership to adopt radical new policies in an attempt to improve the situation. Under Gorbachev's overconfident leadership, however, the introduction of a mixture of political and economic reforms fatally undermined the Soviet system and ensured its ultimate collapse. 25

The de-escalation of the Cold War, and the fact that the Soviet government was no longer willing or able to make the economic sacrifices necessary to help sustain its dominance over Eastern Europe brought the Eastern Bloc crashing down. Two years later the Soviet Union followed. 30

Acknowledgements:

Extract 1 from: *Communist States in the Twentieth Century*, Robin Bunce, Peter Clements, Sarah Ward and Andrew Flint, Hodder Education 2015

Extract 2 from: *Economic Disasters of the Twentieth Century* By Michael Oliver and Derek Aldcroft © Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 1st Edition 2008

Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5** In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the impact of the nationalist resurgence in the communist states of Eastern Europe?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)



Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400–2000*, published 2008.

The principal aim of Gorbachev's *perestroika* was to make the Soviet economy and the economies of the Eastern Bloc more responsive to consumer demand and technological innovation. But this meant loosening Moscow's control over the East European satellite governments to permit moderate change.

Gorbachev, however, found that the transition from Soviet control to an 'informal empire' over Eastern Europe was not an easy option. To give up control, based on the threat of coercion, was to take a big risk. Without other means to keep the satellite states loyal, it might even prove fatal. What Moscow could offer by way of economic rewards was poor indeed compared with the West.

With dizzying speed East European reform turned into East European revolt. In November 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, pro-Soviet governments collapsed, and the East European 'outer empire' vanished. This disaster devastated the authority and the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. The command economy broke down at home. In the following year (1990), the revolt spread quickly across the 'inner empire' of the Soviet Union. The Soviet republics – including Russia itself under Boris Yeltsin – now demanded their freedom.

Extract 2: From Anders Åslund, *Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed*, published 2007.

The sudden burst of activity in the Soviet Union during 1985–87 ended two decades of stagnation. From the outset, Gorbachev's top priority was to revitalise the economy. His government team tried all kinds of measures, but economic growth did not improve. Shortages became worse because tax revenues declined with the anti-alcohol campaign, and a larger share of national wealth was diverted to inefficient investment. *Perestroika* fell very short of its main goal, which was to boost economic growth. According to official Soviet statistics, economic growth never exceeded 2–3 per cent a year, which probably meant economic stagnation in reality.

Glasnost started later than the other policies and developed much more gradually. It came into its own in 1987 and freedom of speech was attained in 1989. Gorbachev introduced *glasnost* in order to undermine hard-line Communist opposition to his reforms. But *glasnost* could not be controlled. It threatened not only the hardliners but the very foundations of the Soviet state, especially the state's ruthless policies against various nationalities. Rather than strengthen the Soviet state, *glasnost* eventually suggested that the Soviet Government was no longer sustainable.

Acknowledgements:

Extract 1 from: *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400–2000*, John Darwin, 1st Edition, © Penguin, 2008

Extract 2 from: *Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed*, Anders Åslund, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 2007



MARK SCHEMES

official Pearson Edexcel mark schemes



Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether state propaganda was the main reason for the Soviet regime's control over its people in the years 1917-53. The importance of state propaganda for the Soviet regime's control over its people should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • State propaganda (due to the regime's control of the mass media and its ability to restrict access to foreign sources of information) provided most of the USSR's population with its world view in the years 1917-53. • The personality cults built around Lenin and Stalin also functioned as important mechanisms to generate popular acceptance of the regime. • Soviet control of the arts and culture (e.g. Prolekult, avant-garde and Socialist Realism) was also deployed to establish popular endorsement of the new socialist society. The importance of other factors for the Soviet regime's control over its people should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Soviet regime's widespread use of violence and intimidation to retain political control (e.g. the Red Terror of 1918 and the purges of the 1930s and early 1950s) • The persecution of religious beliefs and practices to remove rival belief systems (e.g. religious repression during the Civil War and the 1930s) • The galvanising effect of victory in 1945 on the population and the Russian tradition of obedience to authority. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether Khrushchev's limited reform of the Soviet government was the main reason for the regime's growing political stagnation in the years 1964-82. The role played by Khrushchev's limited reform of the Soviet government in the regime's growing political stagnation in the years 1964-82 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The limitations of Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation programme encouraged political stagnation e.g. political criticism could still result in internal exile or confinement in a psychiatric hospital. • Khrushchev's limited reforms to restrict the tenure of high-ranking positions to three years left many conservatively-inclined senior party figures in post and deeply resentful of his attempts to change the system. • Khrushchev's initiatives to decentralise decision-making did little to shift power away from the conservative forces at the top of the Soviet system and the opposition of this 'anti-reform' faction contributed to his fall in 1964. The role played by other factors in the regime's growing political stagnation in the years 1964-82 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Brezhnev encouraged political stagnation by reversing several of Khrushchev's reforms e.g. limits on the tenure of office. • Under Brezhnev, by the early 1980s the party leadership had developed into a self-serving, ageing and conservatively-minded oligarchy only interested in preserving the status quo. • Brezhnev made no attempt to deal with the Stalinist legacy which also encouraged growing political stagnation Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the use of terror was the main reason by which the Bolshevik regime was able to establish its control over the USSR in the years 1917-28. The role played by the use of terror in the establishment of Bolshevik control over the USSR in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Bolsheviks established the Cheka to combat counter-revolution and sabotage ruthlessly in order to retain political control, e.g. the Red Terror starting in 1918 • The Bolshevik government's use of show trials in the early 1920s designed to discredit and intimidate political opponents, e.g. show trial of SRs in 1921 resulting in 11 executions • The persecution of religious beliefs and practices to remove rival belief systems e.g. repression of the Orthodox Church, including the execution of bishops and priests in the years 1921-23 • The regime use of the Urals-Siberian method (1928) coerced peasants into giving up grain to feed the cities. The role played by other factors in the establishment of Bolshevik control over the USSR in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bolshevik control of the press and radio ensured that the population was targeted with cheap and readily accessible pro-socialist propaganda, e.g. <i>Pravda</i> and <i>Izvestiya</i> • The Bolsheviks also used the arts and culture to secure popular endorsement of the new socialist society, e.g. through Prolekult and the avant-garde • The Bolsheviks were pragmatic, making concessions in order to retain and extend their power, e.g. Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918 • The Bolsheviks introduced the moderate NEP, based on incentives, which by the mid-1920s had boosted the economy, thereby dampening peasant resistance. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which the nature of government under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different. The extent to which the nature of government under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lenin's regime did not rely on a personality cult built around the leader in order to function but the Stalinist system developed a full-blown personality cult to help it maintain power • Under Lenin, the CPSU could still hold internal debates and consider different views, but under Stalin, the party was reduced to little more than a 'rubber stamp' for the leader's policies • Lenin's regime was prepared to abandon ideology in order to remain in power (e.g. the introduction of the NEP in 1921) but the Stalinist system was characterised by greater ideological inflexibility, e.g. collectivisation in the 1930s • Lenin attempted to weaken the grip of the party machine/bureaucracy, and increase internal democracy but the Stalinist system reinforced the power of the bureaucracy in both the party and the government. The extent to which the nature of government under Lenin and Stalin was not markedly different should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Both the Leninist and Stalinist regimes resorted to brutal methods to remove actual and perceived opposition, e.g. Lenin's Red Terror starting in 1918 and Stalin's purges of the 1930s • Both regimes centralised state power, e.g. Lenin did so partly in response to the pressures of the Russian civil war and Stalin concentrated power in order to develop a personal dictatorship • Both regimes dominated the Soviet population through their control of the mass media and other forms of propaganda, including the arts • To promote a Marxist popular culture, both regimes undermined religious beliefs/practices, e.g. Lenin's attack on the Orthodox Church in 1921-22 and Stalin's approval of religious persecution during collectivisation. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant the role of the secret police was in maintaining communist control in the years 1917-85. The significance of the role of the secret police in maintaining communist control in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Cheka played an important role in securing communist rule in the years 1918-22, e.g. the Cheka executed up to 200,000 opponents during the Red Terror in 1921-22 • Under Yezhov, the NKVD implemented the Great Terror (1936-38), which accelerated the 'arrest to imprisonment' process, increased executions and widened surveillance of the Soviet population • The NKVD under Beria presided over the expansion and running of the Gulag system, which helped to strengthen control by harnessing forced labour in support of industrialisation and greater economic productivity • Under Andropov (1967-82), the KGB employed more sophisticated techniques (including surveillance, harassment and hospitalisation) to keep dissident groups small, divided and suspicious of each other. The significance of other factors/ limited significance of the secret police in maintaining communist control in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • After Stalin's death, although official surveillance continued, the level of secret police terror declined considerably suggesting that from the 1950s it was less important as a method of social control • State propaganda (due to the regime's control of the mass media and its ability to restrict access to foreign sources of information) provided most of the USSR's population with its world view in the years 1917-85 • Soviet control of the arts and culture was also deployed to establish popular endorsement of the USSR, e.g. Prolekult, avant-garde and Socialist Realism • The impact of the expanding provision of social security benefits, housing and healthcare, particularly from the 1950s • The ingrained culture of apathy and disengagement among the Soviet population, e.g. alcoholism and absenteeism. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether Stalin's personality was the main reason for the purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union. The role played by Stalin's personality in the purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin was driven by intense suspicion of others, which reinforces claims that his personality was a key reason for the purges of the 1930s; as he admitted to Khrushchev 'I trust nobody, not even myself' • Vindictive and vengeful, Stalin used the purges to settle scores with Old Bolsheviks who had apparently crossed or belittled him in earlier years, e.g. the show trials of the 1930s • The unleashing of brutal purges fits with Stalin's instinctive reliance on violence and coercion to solve the Soviet Union's perceived problems (such as forcible collectivisation), e.g. the wider party purge from 1937 • Stalin's narcissistic self-image as the 'hero of the revolution' and the builder of Russian socialism could only be maintained by purging the 'traitors' who did not share his grandiose beliefs about himself. The role played by other factors in the purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The central party administration in Moscow used the purges to impose greater control and discipline over the regions, e.g. local party organisations regularly ignored or delayed implementing central party edicts • The purges were used to provide scapegoats ('saboteurs' and 'wreckers') for the failures of the Five Year Plans and to encourage worker criticism of managers and administrators in order to raise productivity • The NKVD's vigorous pursuit of the purges was designed to prove the value of the secret police to the regime and to enhance its power within the Soviet system, e.g. the NKVD's target fulfilment mentality in the 1930s • Stalin resorted to the purges because he faced real threats in the 1930s, e.g. the Ryutin Platform (1932), the 17th Party Congress (1934), and the growing Nazi menace raised the fear of overthrow in war. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Stalin's use of terror in the 1930s was fundamentally similar to Lenin's use of terror in the years 1918–24. The extent to which Stalin's use of terror in the 1930s was fundamentally similar to Lenin's use of terror in the years 1918–24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Both Lenin and Stalin used the purges to remove 'unreliable' elements from the party, and resorted to show trials of political opponents • Both Lenin and Stalin were prepared to use 'class war' terror tactics in order to ensure the survival of the communist regime, e.g. the Red Terror against the bourgeoisie in 1918 and the liquidation of the kulaks in the 1930s • Lenin established labour camps for oppositionists in the early 1920s and this was expanded into the gulag system under Stalin in the 1930s • Lenin created the communist secret police (the Cheka) to guarantee internal security from 1917 and Stalin expanded its role (as the NKVD) to safeguard the revolution in the 1930s. The extent to which Stalin's use of terror in the 1930s was fundamentally different from Lenin's use of terror in the years 1918–24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lenin's party purges were non-violent, involving the withdrawal of party cards; Stalin used terror at all levels inside the party which Lenin was against • Lenin would never have agreed to Stalin's show trials and executions of prominent Old Bolsheviks in the 1930s • Lenin's Red Terror launched in 1918 never reached the scale of Stalin's mass terror of the 1930s • Unlike Lenin, Stalin resorted to terror in the 1930s partly due to his pathologically suspicious personality and the need to maintain his narcissistic self-image as the 'hero of the revolution'. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether economic problems were the main reason for the difficulties faced by the Soviet governments in the years 1917-28. The role played by economic problems in the difficulties faced by the Soviet governments in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In 1917 workers' councils voted themselves huge pay rises and removed experienced managers and technical specialists, which undermined Bolshevik efforts to maintain production and lower inflation • By 1918 the economy was in a state of almost total collapse, which forced the Bolsheviks to embark on drastic interventionist measures collectively known as War Communism • The economic impact of the civil war (e.g. lower industrial and food production, broken transport/distribution networks) seriously increased popular discontent, forcing the Bolsheviks to replace War Communism with the NEP • Under the NEP (1921-28), the 'scissors crisis', the return of capitalist influences, and peasant hoarding of grain threatened to undermine the Bolshevik regime and its plans for an industrialised socialist society. The role played by other factors in the difficulties faced by the Soviet governments in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Political opposition to the Bolshevik coup in 1917, fuelled by outrage at the Brest Litovsk Treaty (1918), led to the civil war that directly challenged communist rule • Peace negotiations with Germany (1918) exposed Bolshevik military weakness and divisions among the senior communist leaders about how to leave the war • Resistance to the imposition of one-party rule contributed to serious revolts against the Bolshevik regime, e.g. the Kronstadt Mutiny (1921) and the Tambov Rising (1920-21) • The internal power struggle (1924-28) following Lenin's death intensified personal rivalries within the Soviet government. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether Brezhnev's leadership was the main reason for political stagnation in the USSR in the years 1964-82. The role played by Brezhnev's leadership in the political stagnation in the USSR in the years 1964-82 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • On coming to power, Brezhnev encouraged political stagnation by reversing several of Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation reforms, e.g. time limits on office tenure were scrapped • Brezhnev's approach to government was cautious and conservative, which also fostered political stagnation. He had little grasp of policy-making detail and preferred to leave his senior colleagues to get on with their jobs • Brezhnev turned the communist leadership into an ageing oligarchy by promoting old colleagues from his former Ukraine power base and this encouraged a culture of cronyism that lacked dynamism • Brezhnev himself symbolised the corruption and nepotism that were hallmarks of the stagnating Soviet system, e.g. he awarded himself medals and prizes, and collected luxury Western cars. The role played by other factors/Brezhnev's leadership did not play a role in the political stagnation in the USSR in the years 1964-82 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The rigid conservative political system that had developed under Stalin was so entrenched by the time Brezhnev became leader that Soviet government was very difficult to invigorate or reform • Under Brezhnev, communist membership increased to 17 million by 1980, suggesting that he was successful in widening mass participation in politics • The Soviet Constitution of 1977, passed under Brezhnev's leadership, guaranteed the right of citizens to criticise incompetent party officials, suggesting that he wanted a more responsive political system • Other senior communist leaders during this period, such as Suslov and Shelepin, controlled party networks with the clear aim of discouraging innovation and preserving the status quo. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which the role of the Soviet secret police changed in the years 1917-85. The extent to which the role of the Soviet secret police changed in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under Yezhov, the NKVD implemented the Great Terror (1936-38), which accelerated the 'arrest to imprisonment' process, increased executions and widened surveillance of the Soviet population • The NKVD under Beria presided over the expansion and running of the Gulag system in order to harness forced labour in support of industrialisation and greater economic productivity • After Stalin's death, although official surveillance continued, the level of secret police terror declined considerably suggesting that from the 1950s the secret police had a less important role in social control • Under Andropov's direction (1967-82), the KGB employed more sophisticated techniques (including surveillance, hospitalisation and internal exile) to keep dissident groups small, divided and suspicious of each other. The extent to which the role of the Soviet secret police did not change in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout the period 1917-85, the essential role of the Soviet secret police remained constant: to protect the communist regime and neutralise internal opposition • Until 1953, the secret police (Cheka, GPU, OGPU and NKVD) performed a particularly coercive role as the regime faced serious pressures associated with consolidation, forced modernisation, war and post-war recovery • The Soviet secret police quickly became and remained a powerful institution in the communist system, giving its chief considerable influence within the system, e.g. Beria and Andropov. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Khrushchev's approach to government was fundamentally similar to Brezhnev's approach to government. Arguments and evidence that Khrushchev's approach to government was fundamentally similar to Brezhnev's approach to government should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: - Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev's leadership relied on the support of the party oligarchy - Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev developed a cult of personality in order to assert their leadership and eclipse rivals such as Malenkov and Kosygin - Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev were determined to uphold key features of the Soviet system such as the one-party state, a centralised economy and the secret police; both avoided the Stalinist extremes of repression - Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev had a populist approach and attempted to widen mass participation in the system, e.g. party membership increased from 7 million (1956) to 11 million (1964), and by 1980 stood at 17 million. Arguments and evidence that Khrushchev's approach to government was not fundamentally similar to Brezhnev's approach to government should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: - Khrushchev made serious attempts to de-Stalinise the Soviet system but Brezhnev ignored the Stalinist legacy and renewed the focus on the unifying effects of the Great Patriotic War - Khrushchev tried to reform decision making in the party by decentralising to regional bodies, limiting tenure and splitting the party into industrial and agricultural departments; Brezhnev reversed many of these reforms - Increasingly, Khrushchev took decisions without consultation, e.g. launching a new attack on Stalin without discussion in 1962; Brezhnev adopted a consensual approach and rejected 'subjectivism' - Khrushchev's approach to government generated opposition particularly among party conservatives; Brezhnev's more consensual 'hands off' approach encouraged greater unity and stability within the party. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant state control of the mass media and propaganda was in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1917-85. Arguments and evidence that state control of the mass media and propaganda was significant in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From the early 1920s, the Bolshevik press emphasised the achievements of socialism and the regime; cheap and widely available, these papers had a high readership, e.g. Pravda had a circulation of 10.7 million in 1983 • The development of Soviet-controlled radio in the 1920s enabled the regime to convey its message to the illiterate section of the population (65 per cent); later, apartment blocks were wired to receive Soviet radio • The development of state television from the 1950s and the expansion of TV set ownership in the USSR provided an increasingly important mass propaganda channel for the regime • The personality cults created by the mass media around Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev; these personality cults built on traditional Russian attitudes by providing a figurehead popularly identified with the state. Arguments and evidence that other factors were significant and/or state control of the mass media and propaganda was not significant in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The regime's attacks on religion during this period attempted to preserve communist control by removing competing belief systems, e.g. the anti-religious campaigns of the early 1920s, the 1930s and the years 1958-64 • Throughout the period 1917-85, the Soviet secret police acted to protect the regime and neutralise internal opposition, e.g. the Red Terror, the Great Purges and the suppression of dissidents under Andropov • The impact of the expanding provision of social security benefits, housing and healthcare, particularly from the 1950s, helped to sustain the Soviet regime by addressing the issue of poverty • State propaganda wasn't always entirely successful at winning 'hearts and minds' and the population became more adept over time at reading between the lines, e.g. the rich variety of popular anti-Soviet jokes. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether Stalin's industrialisation programme was the main reason for the purges in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Arguments and evidence that Stalin's industrialisation programme was the main reason for the purges in the Soviet Union in the 1930s should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Soviet leadership resorted to the purges because they needed to find scapegoats for the failures of the Five-Year Plans and the economic downturn in the mid-1930s • The regime's determination to stifle workplace criticism of the Five-Year Plans and to control people so they continued to work on the industrialisation programme led to the purges and terror • The need to generate capital to buy Western technology meant the purges were used to expand the Gulag population, creating the slave labour force to undertake dangerous but lucrative work such as logging and gold mining • The growing pressure to increase armament production based on heavy industry due to external threats, notably Nazi Germany, also prompted the purges and use of terror to mobilise the workforce. Arguments and evidence that other factors were the main reason for the purges in the Soviet Union in the 1930s should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's personal characteristics including his narcissistic self-image as the 'hero of the revolution', his intense suspicion of others and his instinctive reliance on coercion all contributed to the purges of the 1930s • Stalin resorted to the purges because he faced real threats to his position in the 1930s, e.g. the Ryutin Platform (1932) and the 17th Party Congress (1934) • The central party administration in Moscow used the purges to impose greater control and discipline over the regions, e.g. local party organisations regularly ignored/delayed implementing central party edicts • The NKVD's vigorous pursuit of the purges was designed to prove the value of the secret police to the regime and to enhance its power within the Soviet system, e.g. the NKVD's target fulfilment mentality. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which the personality cults of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were different. The extent to which the personality cults of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were different should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's personality cult was more developed and on a far larger scale than those of his successors, partly due to the pathological and narcissistic nature of his character and length of time he was in power • Stalin's personality cult inspired fear and respect among the Soviet population but Khrushchev and Brezhnev's personality cults did not have the same effect • To build up his own personality cult, Khrushchev condemned Stalin's personality cult; neither Stalin nor Brezhnev attacked their predecessor in this way to build up their own personality cults • Whereas Stalin and Khrushchev used their personality cults to mobilise popular support for their favoured policies, Brezhnev's personality cult gave him the trappings of power without having to exercise it. The extent to which the personality cults of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were similar should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The personality cults of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev all venerated and linked themselves to Lenin in order to legitimise their authority, power and status • All three personality cults helped to stabilise the Soviet regime during difficult periods (e.g. the Five-Year Plans, the Second World War and the Cold War) by making the leader the focus for unity and loyalty • All three personality cults drew on and exploited traditional Russian culture by emulating the autocratic tradition of Tsarism and creating a secular 'religion' to replace the Orthodox faith • All three personality cults were used to reinforce the power of individual leaders and raise them above the collective leadership of the Politburo. Other relevant material must be credited.

1	1–4	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
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2	5–10	• There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation, and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
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4	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
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Section C

Target: AO3: Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–4	- Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. - Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the extracts. - Judgement on the view is assertive, with little or no supporting evidence
2	5–10	- Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. - Contextual knowledge is added to information from the extracts, but only to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. - A judgement on the view is given, but with limited support and related to the extracts overall, rather than specific issues
3	11–16	- Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences - Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. - A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation.
4	17–20	- Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised by comparison of them. - Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. - Discusses evidence in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.

Section A: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether Bolshevik propaganda was the main reason for the establishment of Communist Party control over the Soviet Union in the years 1917-28. Arguments and evidence that Bolshevik propaganda was the main reason for the establishment of Communist Party control over the Soviet Union in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bolshevik control of the press ensured that the population was targeted with cheap and readily accessible pro-communist propaganda, e.g. the mass circulation newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya • From the early 1920s, Soviet radio broadcast a mixture of propaganda and music in public spaces and workplaces; this enabled the illiterate to receive and understand the regime's message • The Bolsheviks used the arts and culture to secure popular endorsement of the new socialist society, e.g. Proletkult promoted an accessible proletarian culture based on collective values • Lenin's personality cult was used successfully to increase support for the regime, e.g. Lenin's death in 1924 led to a wave of popular support that the Soviet regime was able to exploit. Arguments and evidence that Bolshevik propaganda was not the main reason and/or other factors were the main reason for the establishment of Communist Party control over the Soviet Union in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Some aspects of Bolshevik propaganda were not effective in establishing communist control, e.g. avant-garde art was too sophisticated and obscure to mobilise popular support for the regime • The Bolsheviks were pragmatic, making concessions in order to retain and extend their power, e.g. the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918 and the introduction of the NEP in 1921 • The Bolsheviks created the Red Army as an effective fighting force, enabling the Communist Party to overcome domestic and foreign military threats during the civil war and extend its territorial control • The Bolsheviks established the Cheka to combat counter-revolution and sabotage ruthlessly in order to retain political control, e.g. the Red Terror starting in 1918. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether Stalin's policies of economic modernisation were the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928-53. The role played by Stalin's policies of economic modernisation in his power in the USSR in the years 1928-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's 'socialism in one country' (Five-Year Plans and collectivisation) was deemed more realistic than world revolution and this created a support base among the party rank and file and patriotic Soviet workers • Stalin's pre-war Five-Year Plans turned the USSR into a modern industrial state with an economic base strong enough to withstand the Nazi threat (1941-45) and therefore preserve his rule • Collectivisation in the 1930s strengthened Stalin's hold on power by imposing greater economic and political controls over the peasantry, a key source of opposition to communist rule • The Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans successfully restored the Soviet economy after the dislocation of war (e.g. urban living standards improved from 1948), thereby stabilising Stalin's power. The role played by other factors/Stalin's policies of economic modernisation did not play a role in his power in the USSR in the years 1928-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin relied heavily on terror, coercion and intimidation to retain power throughout this period, e.g. the purges of the 1930s and the use of similar tactics after 1945 • Stalin's control over the media and his promotion of socialist realist art strengthened his power by motivating the committed with a vision of the USSR moving towards the 'perfect' socialist society • During this period, Stalin's increasingly extensive 'cult of personality' propaganda campaign reinforced his personal power and contributed to his popular image as the saviour of socialism and Mother Russia in 1945 • Stalin's forced economic modernisation generated considerable popular opposition, e.g. state-imposed collectivisation led to famine in 1932-33 and many peasants resisted by destroying their farms and livestock. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the view that the status of Soviet women changed little in the years 1917-85. Arguments and evidence that the status of Soviet women changed little in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Early Soviet attempts to improve women's status had little real effect, e.g. the divorce decree of 1918 led mainly to male-initiated divorces and few women received financial support for their children from ex-husbands • Throughout the period, women were underrepresented at all levels in the Communist Party, e.g. in the 1930s only 16 per cent of party members and 10 per cent of congress delegates were women • Throughout the period, the 'double burden' put considerable pressure on women – the entrenched expectation that women should combine employment with family responsibilities • Although women had greater employment opportunities during these years, most females worked in relatively unskilled low paid jobs, e.g. routine factory work and agricultural labour. Arguments and evidence that the status of Soviet women did change in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From the outset, Soviet ideology was committed to improving the status of women, representing a significant break with the past, e.g. decrees on marriage, divorce, abortion and equality (1917-18) • Measures to improve female participation in higher education in the 1930s had a beneficial effect, e.g. by 1940 over 40 per cent of engineering students were women • Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the status of rural women improved as social provision was extended to the countryside, e.g. healthcare and maternity benefits • Female role models who excelled in a particular field epitomised an improved status and were endorsed by the regime to encourage other women e.g. Valentina Tereshkova (first woman in space 1963). Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the significance of the role of the secret police in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1953-85. Arguments and evidence that the role of the secret police was significant in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout the period 1953-85, the essential role of the Soviet secret police remained highly significant: to protect the communist regime and neutralise internal opposition • The KGB's security role was enhanced by Article 70 of the 1960 Soviet criminal code which gave the secret police the wide-ranging remit to act against anything considered to be 'anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda' • During this period, the secret police played a significant role in limiting the influence of four key groups of critics – intellectuals, political opponents, nationalists and religious dissidents/refuseniks • Under Andropov (1967-82), the KGB employed more sophisticated techniques, including electronic surveillance and hospitalisation, to keep opposition groups small, divided and suspicious of each other. Arguments and evidence that the role of the secret police was less significant/other factors were more significant in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • After Stalin's death, although official surveillance continued, the level of secret police terror declined considerably suggesting that from the 1950s it was less significant as a method of social control • State propaganda (due to the regime's control of the mass media and its ability to restrict access to foreign sources of information) provided most of the USSR's population with its world view in the years 1953-85 • Soviet control of the arts and culture was also deployed to establish popular endorsement of the USSR, e.g. censorship of experimental and abstract art under Khrushchev and Brezhnev • The beneficial impact of the expanding provision of social security benefits, housing and healthcare from the 1950s.
	Other relevant material must be credited.



Section C: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the nature of Soviet government under Lenin and Stalin was fundamentally similar. The extent to which the nature of Soviet government under Lenin and Stalin was fundamentally similar should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Both the Leninist and Stalinist regimes resorted to brutal methods to remove actual and perceived opposition, e.g. Lenin's Red Terror starting in 1918 and Stalin's purges of the 1930s • Both regimes centralised state power in the face of challenging circumstances, e.g. Lenin in response to the civil war and Stalin in response to the pressures of forced economic modernisation • Both regimes dominated the Soviet population through their control of the mass media and other forms of propaganda including the arts • Both regimes were prepared to be pragmatic in order to remain in power, e.g. Lenin's introduction of the NEP in 1921 and Stalin's concessions to the Orthodox Church during the Second World War • To promote a Marxist popular culture, both regimes undermined religious beliefs/practices, e.g. Lenin's attack on the Orthodox Church in 1921-22 and Stalin's approval of religious persecution during collectivisation. The extent to which the nature of Soviet government under Lenin and Stalin was fundamentally different should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lenin's regime did not rely on a personality cult built around the leader in order to function, but the Stalinist system developed a full-blown personality cult to help it maintain power • Under Lenin, the CPSU could still hold internal debates and consider different views but, under Stalin, the party was reduced to little more than a 'rubber stamp' for the leader's policies • Lenin's regime instigated non-violent party purges, involving the withdrawal of membership cards, but Stalin's regime used terror methods inside the party against leading Bolsheviks and other communists • Lenin attempted to weaken the grip of the party machine/bureaucracy and increase internal democracy, but the Stalinist system reinforced the power of the bureaucracy in both the party and the government. Other relevant material must be credited.

1	1–4	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
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2	5–10	• There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation, and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
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1	1–3	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
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2	4–7	• There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
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1. Finding the right level

The first stage is to decide which level the answer should be placed in. To do this, use a 'bestfit' approach, deciding which level most closely describes the quality of the answer. Answers can display characteristics from more than one level, and where this happens markers must use the guidance below and their professional judgement to decide which level is most appropriate.

For example, one stronger passage at L4 would not by itself merit a L4 mark, but it might be evidence to support a high L3 mark, unless there are substantial weaknesses in other areas. Similarly, an answer that fits best in L3 but which has some characteristics of L2 might be placed at the bottom of L3. An answer displaying some characteristics of L3 and some of L1 might be placed in L2.

3	8–12	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
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Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether Lenin's leadership was the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28. Arguments and evidence that Lenin's leadership was the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lenin decided to close down the Constituent Assembly in 1918 after the Bolsheviks had failed to secure a majority of seats, thereby preserving the Soviet regime and removing a potentially important opposition forum • Lenin supported Trotsky in creating a traditional Red Army against the opposition of other leading Bolsheviks; without Lenin's backing Trotsky would not have prevailed and the Bolsheviks may have lost the civil war • Lenin pushed through the signing of the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk against the opposition of the left communist Bolshevik faction because he realized that the regime needed peace with the Central Powers in order to survive • Lenin persuaded a reluctant party to accept the economic compromises of the NEP in March 1921; without this shift in economic policy, the Soviet regime may have been overthrown. Arguments and evidence that other factors were the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Trotsky played an important role in the regime's survival, e.g. during the civil war, his military intervention prevented Petrograd falling to the Whites when Lenin had resigned himself to losing the city • Bolshevik control/censorship of the press and radio provided cheap and accessible pro-socialist propaganda in order to win hearts and minds, e.g. Pravda, Izvestiya, Glavlit and, from 1924, Lenin's cult of personality • The Bolsheviks used the arts and culture to secure popular endorsement for the new socialist society, e.g. Proletkult and the cinema; by the mid-late 1920s, the NEP had brought greater economic and political stability • The weakness of the anti-Bolshevik opposition helped the Soviet regime to survive during this period, e.g. the White forces were divided during the civil war and the Kronstadt and Tambov revolts were isolated. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether Stalin's use of the media and propaganda, in the years 1928-53, was the main reason for his control over the Soviet population. Arguments and evidence that Stalin's use of the media and propaganda, in the years 1928-53, was the main reason for his control over the Soviet population should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin imposed rigid censorship to control the Soviet population, e.g. from the mid-1930s the works of opponents such as Trotsky were banned and Soviet history was rewritten to accentuate Stalin's role in the revolution • From 1928, Glavlit controlled access to Soviet economic data so the public had to rely on highly optimistic and inaccurate official statistics regarding industrial and agricultural production and living standards in the USSR • The media were not allowed to publish any type of bad news, such as industrial accidents and natural disasters, in order to create a positive image of Stalin's regime and leadership for the population • Stalin's cult of personality was an important instrument of social control because it portrayed him as Lenin's natural successor, a visionary socialist, a military genius despite making serious errors. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1928-53, other factors/developments were the main reason for Stalin's control over the Soviet population should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By the mid-1930s, the excesses of the personality cult and other propaganda were becoming counterproductive since some Soviet workers, intellectuals and party members were becoming cynical • Stalin's drive for economic modernization provided an important control mechanism because the Five-Year Plans and collectivisation created a support base among the party rank and file and patriotic Soviet workers • Stalin used terror, coercion and intimidation to control the Soviet population throughout this period, e.g. harsh factory discipline, forcible collectivization, the purges of the 1930s and similar tactics after 1945 • The existential threat to the USSR posed by the Nazi invasion of 1941 generated patriotic fervour for the defence of the country and popular support for the Stalinist regime, reinforced by ultimate victory in 1945. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were primarily due to Stalin's personality. Arguments and evidence that the purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were primarily due to Stalin's personality should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin was driven by intense suspicion of others, which reinforces claims that his personality was a key reason for the purges of the 1930s; as he admitted to Khrushchev 'I trust nobody, not even myself' • Vindictive and vengeful, Stalin used the purges to settle scores with Old Bolsheviks who had apparently crossed or belittled him in earlier years, e.g. the show trials of the 1930s • The unleashing of brutal purges fits with Stalin's instinctive reliance on violence and coercion to solve the Soviet Union's perceived problems (such as forcible collectivisation), e.g. the wider party purge from 1937 • Stalin's narcissistic self-image as the 'hero of the revolution' and the builder of Russian socialism could only be maintained by purging the 'traitors' who did not share his grandiose beliefs about himself. Arguments and evidence that the purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were primarily due to other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Moscow central party administration used the purges to impose greater control over the regions, e.g. local party organisations regularly ignored or delayed implementing central party edicts • The purges were used to provide scapegoats ('saboteurs' and 'wreckers') for the failures of the Five Year Plans and to encourage worker criticism of managers and administrators in order to raise productivity • The NKVD's vigorous pursuit of the purges was designed to prove the value of the secret police to the regime and to enhance its power within the Soviet system, e.g. the NKVD's target fulfilment mentality • Stalin resorted to the purges because he faced real threats in the 1930s, e.g. the Ryutin Platform (1932), the 17th Party Congress (1934), and the growing Nazi menace raised the fear of overthrow in war. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Brezhnev's leadership was the main reason for political stagnation in the USSR in the years 1964-82. Arguments and evidence that Brezhnev's leadership was the main reason for political stagnation in the USSR in the years 1964-82 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • On coming to power, Brezhnev helped encourage political stagnation by reversing several of Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation reforms, e.g. time limits on office tenure were scrapped • Brezhnev's approach to government was cautious and conservative, which also fostered political stagnation; he had little grasp of policy-making detail and preferred to leave his senior colleagues to get on with their jobs • Brezhnev turned the communist leadership into an ageing oligarchy by promoting old colleagues from his former Ukraine power base and this encouraged a culture of cronyism that lacked dynamism • Brezhnev himself symbolised the corruption and nepotism that were hallmarks of the stagnating Soviet system, e.g. he awarded himself medals and prizes, and collected luxury western cars. Arguments and evidence that other factors were/Brezhnev was not the main reason for political stagnation in the USSR in the years 1964-82 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Other senior communist leaders during this period, such as Suslov and Shelepin, controlled party networks with the clear aim of discouraging innovation and preserving the status quo • The rigid conservative political system that had developed under Stalin was so entrenched by the time Brezhnev became leader that Soviet government was very difficult to invigorate or reform • Under Brezhnev, communist membership increased to 17 million by 1980, suggesting that he was successful in widening mass participation in politics • The Soviet Constitution of 1977, passed under Brezhnev's leadership, guaranteed the right of citizens to criticise incompetent party officials, suggesting that he wanted a more responsive political system. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how far, in the years 1953–85, the priorities for Soviet industry and agriculture changed. The extent to which the priorities for Soviet industry and agriculture changed should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev attempted to focus on light industry, chemicals and consumer goods (rather than heavy industry) to broaden the Soviet economy e.g. the Seven Year Plan (1959–65) • Khrushchev's greater investment in agriculture, and his Virgin Lands scheme, helped to raise the status of agriculture, increased food production and raised farmers' income. • Brezhnev also accepted the need to boost consumer industries (e.g. the ninth Five Year Plan of 1971–75) and make greater investment in agriculture. How far the priorities for Soviet industry and agriculture did not change should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Soviet military-industrial complex, with its enduring attachment to heavy industry, remained a dominant influence in economic policy-making throughout this period. • After Khrushchev, the USSR reverted to the methods of the command economy established under Stalin e.g. the Brezhnev regime gave greater economic powers to Gosplan. • The Kosygin reforms launched in 1965 to improve production and give incentives for managerial initiative were effectively side-lined by conservative opponents by 1968. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the failures of collectivisation were the main reason for the economic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in the years 1929-41. The role played by the failures of collectivisation in the economic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in the years 1929-41 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The dislocation involved in the imposition of collectivisation had a disastrous impact on agricultural production levels and led to widespread rural famine, e.g. it took seven years to reach 1928 grain output • Collectivisation deliberately targeted the most efficient farmers (the kulaks) on ideological grounds – removing entrepreneurial initiative and resources from the agricultural sector • Valuable resources had to be diverted to agriculture because of the demands of collectivisation, e.g. materials and personnel because of the need to build large numbers of tractors. The role played by other factors in the economic difficulties faced by Soviet Union in the years 1929-41 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Five Year Plans of this period produced an unbalanced economy which was skewed in favour of heavy industry and neglected other sectors such as textiles and consumer goods • The emphasis on quantity rather than quality during the Five Year Plans meant that Soviet products tended to be shoddily made, unreliable and inferior to western goods • The purges of the 1930s had a negative impact by depriving the Soviet economy of much-needed skilled personnel, administrators and planners • Collectivisation increased state procurements of grain to sell abroad to help fund the Soviet industrialisation drive and facilitated the transfer of peasants to work in the new industrial centres. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far the benefits of Stalin's economic policies outweighed the costs in the years 1928-50. Arguments and evidence that the benefits of Stalin's economic policies outweighed the costs in the years 1928-50 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's pre-war Five Year Plans turned the USSR into a modern industrial state with an economic base strong enough to withstand the Nazi threat (1941-45) and overhaul major industrial rivals such as Britain • Some groups within Soviet society clearly benefited from Stalin's economic policies, e.g. the increased pay and privileges given to Stakhanovite workers in the 1930s • The centralised Stalinist economy proved effective in mobilising resources for the war effort and converting industrial sectors to military production • The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) was remarkably successful in restoring the Soviet economy, e.g. industrial production recovered quickly and urban living standards improved from 1948 • Collectivisation provided additional grain to sell on the international market to generate capital for industrial development. Arguments and evidence that the costs of Stalin's economic policies outweighed the benefits in the years 1928-50 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's policies produced a skewed and distorted Soviet economy which favoured heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods, and emphasised quantity rather than quality • Economic planning was often chaotic and unrealistic particularly during the First and Third Five Year Plans, which led to an enormous amount of waste and shortages of resources • Intimidation and fear permeated the Soviet economic system as managers and officials struggled to fulfil their targets and were evaluated on their performance. This resulted in falsified statistics and widespread corruption • The human cost of Stalin's Five Year Plans was enormous – a huge death toll, extensive use of forced labour, reduced living standards, shortages of essentials and the loss of personal liberty • Collectivisation proved to be a human disaster for the peasantry, e.g. millions died in the 1932-34 famine. Other relevant material must be credited

Section B: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the failure of central planning was the main reason for the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964–85. The role played by the failure of central planning in the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's centralised system of planning left a legacy of bureaucratic conservatism and inaccurate statistics, which hampered any initiatives to improve economic efficiency and product quality • Continued central control after 1964 stifled initiative and creativity in the economic system, e.g. new methods or techniques employed at local level were regarded as threats to the power of the central planners • The use of government-set prices and costs when planning and measuring economic performance did not help identify or solve issues of inefficiency • Production of everything from coal to shoes was decided by central planners who could not cope with changes in circumstances or trends in fashion. The role played by other factors in the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The regime-worker 'social contract' made the authorities unwilling to countenance factory closures or unemployment; this led to low levels of worker productivity • Although Khrushchev and Brezhnev increased agricultural investment, the sector remained seriously short of storage facilities, transport and reliable machinery during this period • The Soviet empire acted as an economic drain on the USSR, e.g. by the 1980s the Warsaw Pact countries received an annual subsidy of some \$3 billion from the Soviet Union • The continued dominance of the military-industrial complex during this period ensured that around 25 per cent of Soviet GDP was spent on defence, depriving consumer industries and agriculture of resources. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: Indicative content



Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1945–64. Arguments and evidence that the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1945–64 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946–50) was remarkably successful in restoring the Soviet economy after the war, e.g. industrial production recovered quickly and urban living standards improved from 1948 • Under Khrushchev greater emphasis was placed on light industries which led to the wider availability of consumer goods which raised living standards for many Soviet citizens • Farming incomes doubled between 1952 and 1958 and, over the 1953–58 period, food production increased by 51 per cent • During the 1950s the Soviet economy's annual growth rate was 7.1 per cent (USA – 2.9 per cent). Arguments and evidence that the failures of Soviet economic policy outweighed the successes in the years 1945–64 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In the immediate post-war period, Soviet agricultural production remained low, partly due to lack of manpower, e.g. in 1952 grain production was still below 1940 levels • The Liberman Plan, which attempted to boost the economy by decentralising economic decision-making and introducing market-based prices, was effectively shelved by conservative opponents in the Politburo • Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Scheme, introduced in 1954, experienced some serious setbacks, e.g. targets for grain production in Kazakhstan in 1959 were not met because the land was too dry and useful only for grazing • During this period, the military-industrial complex ignored or watered down economic initiatives which did not focus on the heavy or armament industries. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: Indicative content



Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the failures of Soviet economic policy outweighed the successes in the years 1917-53. Arguments and evidence that the failures of Soviet economic policy outweighed the successes in the years 1917-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By 1921 War Communism had left the Soviet economy in ruins (e.g. the transport system had collapsed and industrial and grain production had slumped) and the Bolshevik regime was forced to abandon the policy • Under the NEP, urban unemployment levels remained high, the 'scissors crisis' exposed economic weaknesses, and, by 1926, the Soviet economy had barely reached pre-war production levels • The human cost of Stalin's economic policies was enormous – a huge death toll, mass famine in the early 1930s, extensive use of forced labour, reduced living standards, shortages of essentials and the loss of personal liberty • Stalin's policies produced a skewed and distorted Soviet economy that favoured heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods, and emphasised quantity rather than quality. Arguments and evidence that the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1917-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From 1921, the NEP helped to consolidate the regime by improving living standards and offering rural Russia economic incentives that reduced peasant opposition to the Bolshevik regime • Stalin's pre-war Five-Year Plans turned the USSR into a modern industrial state with an economic base strong enough to withstand the Nazi threat (1941-45) and overhaul major industrial rivals such as Britain • The centralised Stalinist economy proved effective in mobilising resources for the war effort and converting industrial sectors to military production • The Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans successfully restored the Soviet economy after the war, e.g. industrial production recovered quickly and urban living standards improved from 1948. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the failures of the Five-Year Plans were the main reason for the economic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in the years 1928-53. The role played by the failures of the Five-Year Plans in the economic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in the years 1928-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Five-Year Plans (particularly 1928-41) created difficulties by producing an unbalanced economy that was skewed in favour of heavy industry and neglected other sectors such as textiles and consumer goods • The emphasis on quantity during the Five-Year Plans created difficulties because Soviet products tended to be shoddily made, unreliable and inferior to Western goods • The state's rigid adoption of a command economy during the Five-Year Plans led to chaotic implementation, failure to plan effectively at local level and poor use of resources • The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-50) contributed to the USSR's economic difficulties by failing to embrace new technological developments in plastics and chemicals. The role played by other factors/the Five-Year Plans did not play a role in the economic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in the years 1928-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The dislocation due to the imposition of collectivisation had a disastrous economic impact on agricultural production levels, led to widespread rural famine, and removed the most efficient farmers • The purges of the 1930s had a negative impact by depriving the Soviet Union of much-needed skilled personnel, administrators and planners; this resulted in an economic slowdown • The Second World War had a devastating economic impact on the USSR, e.g. one quarter of Soviet industry and almost 100,000 collective farms were destroyed • The pre-war Five-Year Plans provided the USSR with an economic base strong enough to withstand the Nazi threat (1941-45) and the post-war

	Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans successfully restored the Soviet economy. Other relevant material must be credited.
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Section B: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) was the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28. Arguments and evidence that the introduction of the NEP was the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime, in the years 1917-28, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The NEP, by abolishing grain requisitioning and removing the ban on private trade, offered rural Russia economic incentives, which reduced peasant opposition to the Bolshevik regime • The new class of 'NEP men' also assisted the regime in the short term by linking the towns with the countryside and by undertaking many economic tasks beyond the cumbersome and inefficient state planning system • Economic recovery under the NEP, in the years 1921-24, helped to consolidate the regime by improving living standards, e.g. by raising food production and increasing average wages for urban workers • The NEP enabled the Soviet regime to retain control over the 'commanding heights' of the economy (e.g. heavy industry), so the communists continued to dominate important industrial sectors. Arguments and evidence that the introduction of the NEP was not the main reason and/or other factors were the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime, in the years 1917-28, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The NEP was not introduced until 1921, alienated sections of the population and the party, and by 1925 had plateaued in terms of economic improvement • The Bolshevik regime relied heavily on coercion and repression to survive in the years 1917-28, e.g. Red Terror, crushing of the Tambov revolt, attacks on the Church • Propaganda and censorship were used extensively in the years 1917-28 to win over 'hearts and minds' and remove critics of the regime, e.g. Glavlit introduced pre-publication censorship and the cult of Lenin • The weakness of the anti-Bolshevik opposition helped the Soviet regime to survive during this period, e.g. the White forces were divided during the civil war and the Kronstadt and Tambov revolts were isolated. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that government policy failed to modernise Soviet agriculture in the years 1928-64. Arguments and evidence that government policy failed to modernise Soviet agriculture, in the years 1928-64, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Collectivisation failed to modernise Soviet agriculture because it had a disastrous impact on food production and livestock levels and caused widespread rural famine • In the immediate post-war period, government policy failed to modernise Soviet agriculture, e.g. in 1952 grain production was still below 1940 levels and the farming sector remained extremely labour intensive • Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Scheme, introduced in 1954, experienced serious setbacks in the drive to increase efficiency and output, e.g. uncertain crop yields and reliance on imported grain from the West • Khrushchev regularly reformed the ministries dealing with agriculture, leading to administrative confusion that had a negative impact on attempts to modernise the agricultural sector. Arguments and evidence that government policy did modernise Soviet agriculture, in the years 1928-64, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Collectivisation modernised Soviet agriculture in the sense that the farming sector was made part of the centralised command economy and party control was imposed over the rural population • Soviet policies saw farming incomes double between 1952 and 1958 • Over the 1953-58 period, Soviet food production increased by 51 per cent • Under Khrushchev, investment in agriculture increased from 3 per cent to almost 13 per cent of the Soviet budget, leading to a 40 per cent rise in artificial fertiliser production and a 30 per cent rise in tractor production. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1921-41. The extent to which the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1921-41 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From 1921, the NEP helped to consolidate the regime by improving living standards and offering rural Russia economic incentives that reduced peasant opposition to the Bolshevik regime • Stalin's pre-war Five-Year Plans turned the USSR into a modern industrial state with an economic base strong enough to expand its military capability and overhaul major industrial rivals such as Britain • Stalin's pre-war Five-Year Plans led to the growth of the transport infrastructure and increased worker efficiency, e.g. the Moscow Metro opened in 1935 and labour productivity improved in the late 1930s • Collectivisation successfully increased state procurements of grain to sell abroad to help fund the Soviet industrialisation drive and facilitated the transfer of peasants to work in the new industrial centres. The extent to which the failures of Soviet economic policy outweighed the successes in the years 1921-41 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under the NEP, urban unemployment levels remained high, the 'scissors crisis' exposed economic weaknesses, and, by 1926, the Soviet economy had barely reached 1913 production levels • The imposition of collectivisation had a disastrous impact on agricultural production levels, e.g. it took seven years to reach 1928 grain output and even longer to restore livestock levels • The human cost of Stalin's economic policies – a huge death toll, mass famine in the early 1930s, extensive use of forced labour, reduced living standards, shortages of essentials and loss of personal liberty • Stalin's Five-Year Plans produced a skewed and distorted Soviet economy which favoured heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods, and emphasised quantity rather than quality. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

1. Finding the right level

The first stage is to decide which level the answer should be placed in. To do this, use a 'best-fit' approach, deciding which level most closely describes the quality of the answer. Answers can display characteristics from more than one level, and where this happens markers must use the guidance below and their professional judgement to decide which level is most appropriate.

For example, one stronger passage at L4 would not by itself merit a L4 mark, but it might be evidence to support a high L3 mark, unless there are substantial weaknesses in other areas. Similarly, an answer that fits best in L3 but which has some characteristics of L2 might be placed at the bottom of L3. An answer displaying some characteristics of L3 and some of L1 might be placed in L2.



2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors: sections A and B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	5–10	• There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation, and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.

2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the uppermiddle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors: Sections A and B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	• There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1953-85, the Soviet government's economic priorities did not change. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1953-85, the Soviet government's economic priorities did not change should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Soviet military-industrial complex, with its enduring attachment to heavy industry, remained a dominant influence in economic policy-making throughout this period. • During this period, the USSR continued with the methods and priorities of the command economy established under Stalin, e.g. the Brezhnev regime gave greater economic powers to Gosplan • Conservative elements within the Soviet government stifled attempts to change economic priorities, e.g. the 1965 Kosygin reforms to improve production and encourage managerial initiative were side-lined by 1968 • The Soviet government-worker 'social contract' militated against changing economic priorities, e.g. the expectation of long-term full employment, which led to an unwillingness to tackle inefficiency and low productivity. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1953-85, the Soviet government's economic priorities did change should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev attempted to focus on light industry, chemicals and consumer goods (rather than heavy industry) to broaden the Soviet economy e.g. the Seven Year Plan (1959-65) • Khrushchev's greater investment in agriculture, and his Virgin Lands scheme, helped to raise the status of agriculture, increased food production and raised farmers' income • Khrushchev cut military spending to 9 per cent of GDP (1955-58) to improve living standards, then increased it to 11 per cent (1964); Brezhnev raised it to 13 per cent (1970) to match US nuclear capability • Brezhnev boosted consumer industries via the Ninth Five Year Plan (1971-75) so, by 1980, 85 per cent of families had televisions; he also allocated a greater share of overall investment to agriculture (26 per cent in 1976). Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1917-85 was the improved status of women. In considering the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1917-85, the improved status of women should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Soviet ideology was committed to improving the status of women e.g. decrees on marriage, divorce, abortion and equality (1917-18) and measures to improve female participation in higher education (1930s). • Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the status of rural women improved as social provision (e.g. healthcare and maternity benefits) were extended to the countryside. • Female role models who excelled in a particular field epitomised this rising status and were endorsed by the regime to encourage other women e.g. Valentina Tereshkova (first woman in space 1963). In considering the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1917-85, other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The impact of the growth of primary, secondary and higher education in the USSR in the years 1917-85 and the reduction in illiteracy. • The impact of full or almost full employment in the USSR since the 1930s. • The impact of the expanding provision of social security benefits (e.g. pensions), housing and healthcare, particularly from the 1950s. • The limits to women's improving status e.g. underrepresentation at all levels in the Communist Party throughout the period and the persistent expectation that women should combine employment with family responsibilities. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1924-85 was the provision of social security. In considering the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1924 - 85, the provision of social security should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The impact of full or almost full employment in the USSR since the 1930s, e.g. job security, the introduction of a minimum wage in 1956 and real wage increases in the 1960s and 1970s • The impact of the expanding provision of housing from the 1950s, e.g. Khrushchev's extensive housing programme which helped to more than double state-provided living space in the years 1951-61 • The impact of the expanding provision of social benefits and healthcare, e.g. cheap meals at the workplace in the 1930s, social benefits provided by the trade unions, continued healthcare and welfare expansion after 1950. In considering the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1924 - 85, other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The impact of the growth of education and reduction in illiteracy in the years 1924-85, e.g. universal compulsory education largely achieved by the 1930s, literacy levels raised to 98-99 per cent by 1959, expansion of higher education between 1965 and 1980 • The impact of Soviet measures to raise the status of women, e.g. measures to improve female participation in higher education in the 1930s and state endorsement of female role models, to encourage other women • The limits to the provision of social security, e.g. the poor working and housing conditions of the 1930s, post-war pensions were inadequate and the quality of healthcare after 1950 remained problematic. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which the status of women was transformed under Soviet rule in the years 1917-85. Arguments and evidence that the status of women was transformed under Soviet rule in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From the outset, Soviet ideology was committed to improving the status of women, e.g. 1917-18 decrees on marriage, divorce, abortion and equality • Measures to improve female participation in higher education in the 1930s had a beneficial effect, e.g. by 1940 over 40 per cent of engineering students were women • Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the status of rural women improved as social provision was extended to the countryside, e.g. healthcare and maternity benefits • Female role models who excelled in a particular field epitomised this improved status and were endorsed by the regime to encourage other women, e.g. Valentina Tereshkova (first woman in space 1963). Arguments and evidence that the status of women was not transformed under Soviet rule in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Early Soviet attempts to improve the status of women had little real effect, e.g. the divorce decree did not work as intended because men initiated most divorces and few women received financial support for their children from ex-husbands • Throughout the period, women were underrepresented at all levels in the Communist Party (e.g. in the 1930s only 16 per cent of party members were women) reinforcing the traditional notion of politics as a male preserve • Throughout the period the 'double burden' put considerable pressure on women – the entrenched expectation that women should combine employment with family responsibilities • Although women had greater employment opportunities during these years, most females worked in relatively unskilled low paid jobs, e.g. routine factory work and agricultural labour. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether government educational policy improved the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917–85. The ways in which government educational policy improved the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Compulsory education led to the almost complete eradication of illiteracy during this period, e.g. universal compulsory education by the 1930s with literacy levels raised to 98–99 per cent by 1959 • The development of adult education (rabfaki) as a 'second chance' provision from the 1950s enabled millions of Soviet citizens to study part-time for self-improvement and to enhance their job prospects • The expansion of Soviet higher education improved opportunities (in terms of promotion prospects and upward social mobility) for students from working-class backgrounds and women. The ways in which government educational policy did not improve the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lack of resources hindered the government's plans for a universal programme of compulsory education until the 1950s, e.g. limited state spending on education and low wages for teachers • Traditional rural, ethnic and cultural attitudes towards education were ingrained and ensured that some groups remained disadvantaged, e.g. rural children and Muslim females • The Soviet education system, at all levels, contained compulsory ideological content that to some extent reduced schools and universities to propaganda agencies, e.g. Stalin's 'Short Course' • The main route to high status jobs in the USSR – academic secondary education – continued to be dominated by the children of the Soviet white-collar and managerial elite. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: Indicative content



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the significance of employment for the promotion of a stable Soviet society in the years 1953–85. The significance of employment for the promotion of a stable Soviet society in the years 1953–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Since most Soviet citizens had a job, they benefited from real wage increases (50 per cent between 1967 and 1977) which contributed to greater stability by increasing savings and/or consumption • Stability was also promoted due to the low wage differentials among the working population which prevented social discontent over excessive inequality • The terms and conditions of employment for Soviet workers encouraged stability too, e.g. job security, a minimum wage (1956) and a shorter working week (1957) • For the vast majority, the state was their employer and means of promotion which encouraged loyalty to the system and thus stability, e.g. party membership increased from 6.9 million to 17 million in the years 1953–80. The significance of other factors/ limited significance of employment for the promotion of a stable Soviet society in the years 1953–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Full employment was no guarantee of contentment in the Soviet Union since many had undemanding, repetitive or essentially pointless jobs, e.g. annual labour turnover often reached 30 per cent • The extension of health care provision from the 1950s also had a stabilising effect since medical services were now readily available to the Soviet population, e.g. the spread of polyclinics and sanatoria • Soviet society was also improved by Khrushchev's extensive housing programme which increased the number of modern dwellings and offered better living conditions for many people • Between 1950 and 1980 state welfare spending increased by 500 per cent and the boost given to pensions, maternity benefits and the like also helped to stabilise society by addressing the issue of poverty. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: Indicative content



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the significance of the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85. The significance of the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The terms and conditions of employment for Soviet workers encouraged stability, e.g. job security, a minimum wage (1956), a shorter working week (1957) and real wage increases (50 per cent between 1967-77) • The extension of healthcare provision from the 1950s also had a stabilising effect since medical services were now readily available to the Soviet population, e.g. the spread of polyclinics and sanatoria • Soviet society was also stabilised by Khrushchev's extensive housing programme, which increased the number of modern dwellings and offered better living conditions for many people • Between 1950 and 1980 state welfare spending increased by 500 per cent and this helped to stabilise society by addressing the issue of poverty. The limited significance of the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Full employment was no guarantee of contentment in the Soviet Union since many had undemanding, repetitive or essentially pointless jobs, e.g. annual labour turnover often reached 30 per cent • Government 'stabilising' measures could not prevent serious worker unrest in Temirtau (1959), protests over food prices (1962), and strikes and riots over food shortages in Sverdlovsk (1969) and Gorki (1980) • Social problems persisted, which had a detrimental effect on social cohesion, e.g. alcohol consumption increased by 600 per cent in the years 1940-80 and, in 1979, 34 per cent of marriages ended in divorce. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which government attitudes towards the family as a social unit changed in the years 1917-85. Arguments and evidence that government attitudes towards the family as a social unit changed in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Family Code of 1918 attempted to undermine the 'bourgeois' idea of the family unit by making divorce easier and offering abortions; in 1927 the regime also acknowledged unregistered marriages • The social problems and family break-ups that followed the 1918 Family Code led to the 'Great Retreat' (1936) under Stalin, which aimed to restore the importance of the traditional family and the status of marriage • Under Khrushchev, government attitudes became more supportive, promoting improved conditions for families, e.g. increased provision of social benefits, including healthcare, housing and childcare • The Brezhnev regime showed a greater awareness of the social problems weakening the family unit and attempted to tackle some of them, e.g. the 1968 Family Code tried to address the high divorce rate. Arguments and evidence that government attitudes towards the family as a social unit did not change in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • After the 'Great Retreat' (1936) the Soviet government continued to adopt a traditional/socially conservative view of the family unit as central to society for the rest of the period • Soviet attitudes to the family, in practice, continued to impose the 'double burden' on women (domestic responsibilities and paid work) so that by 1960 49 per cent of the workforce were female • Soviet attitudes to the family continued to produce flawed and limited social policies, e.g. the unintended consequences of the radical measures of 1918 and the 1920s and Khrushchev's restricted social provision • Although the Brezhnev regime showed greater awareness of the social problems weakening the family unit, it essentially followed the pro-family social policies of the Khrushchev government. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the view that Soviet government attitudes towards the family did not change in the years 1917-85. Arguments and evidence that Soviet government attitudes towards the family did not change in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • For much of this period, the Soviet government continued to adopt a traditional/socially conservative view of the family unit as central to society • Soviet government attitudes to the family, in practice, continued to impose the 'double burden' on women (domestic responsibilities and paid work) so that by 1960 49 per cent of the workforce was female • Although the Brezhnev regime showed greater awareness of the social problems weakening the family unit, it essentially followed the pro-family social policies of the Khrushchev government. Arguments and evidence that Soviet government attitudes towards the family did change in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Family Code of 1918 attempted to undermine the 'bourgeois' idea of the family unit by making divorce easier and offering abortions; in 1927 the regime also acknowledged unregistered marriages • The social problems and family break-ups that followed the 1918 Family Code led to the 'Great Retreat' (1936) under Stalin, which aimed to restore the importance of the traditional family and the status of marriage • Under Khrushchev, government attitudes became more supportive, promoting improved conditions for families, e.g. increased provision of social benefits, including healthcare, housing and childcare • The Brezhnev regime showed a greater awareness of the social problems weakening the family unit and attempted to tackle some of them, e.g. the 1968 Family Code tried to address the high divorce rate. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the status of women in Stalinist society was essentially similar to that of women in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. Arguments and evidence that the status of women in Stalinist society was essentially similar to that of women in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Although women had greater employment opportunities during these years, most females worked in relatively unskilled, low paid jobs, e.g. routine factory work and agricultural labour • Throughout the entire period the 'double burden' put considerable pressure on women – the entrenched expectation that women should combine employment with family responsibilities • Throughout, women were underrepresented at all levels in the Communist Party, e.g. in the 1930s only 16 per cent of party members were women and the first female Praesidium member was appointed in 1957 • The wives of the Soviet elite under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev led similar lives, e.g. they did not have to enter the workforce and were encouraged to engage in 'social' or community work. Arguments and evidence that the status of women in Stalinist society was different from that of women in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev greater emphasis was placed on the provision of social benefits, such as healthcare, maternity arrangements and childcare, to improve conditions for women • Women were given access to abortion once again in 1955, thereby allowing females greater control over their own bodies; Stalin had made abortion illegal in 1936 • Brezhnev's Family Code of 1968 gave women greater protection by making it illegal to divorce a woman who was pregnant or with a child under the age of one • Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev female role models were more prominent, e.g. the astronaut Valentina Tereshkova, the actress Ludmila Savelyeva and the gymnast Ludmilla Tourischeva. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



3	11–16	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
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Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the significance of the Soviet regime's attempts to improve the status of women in the years 1917-85. The extent to which the Soviet regime's attempts to improve the status of women in the years 1917-85 were significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From the outset, the Soviet regime was committed to improving the status of women, e.g. decrees on marriage, divorce, abortion and equality in 1917-18 • Soviet economic modernisation from the 1930s significantly increased the number of females in paid employment, e.g. by 1955 49 per cent of the Soviet workforce were women • Soviet expansion of higher education gave women greater access to universities and the professions, e.g. by the 1960s 50 per cent of graduates were women and by 1985 a majority of doctors were female • The Soviet regime endorsed female role models who excelled in a particular field in order to encourage other women to achieve, e.g. cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova and gymnast Ludmilla Tourischeva. The extent to which the Soviet regime's attempts to improve the status of women in the years 1917-85 were not significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Early Soviet attempts to improve the status of women had little real effect, e.g. the divorce decree backfired because men initiated most divorces, often leaving ex-wives with children and no financial support • Soviet economic modernisation resulted in most women working in relatively unskilled, low-paid manual jobs with poor promotion prospects, e.g. during these years most of the lowest paid farm workers were women • The Soviet regime often explicitly endorsed the female 'double burden', e.g. Brezhnev's pro-natal campaign and official criticism of 'absent' working mothers in the 1970s • The Soviet regime did little to promote women within the party or government mainly due to entrenched chauvinistic attitudes, e.g. by the 1980s only 4 per cent of the Central Committee membership was female. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content

4	17–20	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
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Section C

Target: AO3: Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–4	• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the extracts. • Judgement on the view is assertive, with little or no supporting evidence
2	5–10	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the extracts, but only to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. • A judgement on the view is given, but with limited support and related to the extracts overall, rather than specific issues
3	11–16	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences • Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. • A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation.
4	17–20	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised by comparison of them. • Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. • Discusses evidence in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.

Section A: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the actions of the secret police were the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28. Arguments and evidence that the actions of the secret police were the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The secret police undermined the regime's opponents, e.g. the Cheka participated in the Constituent Assembly forced closure (1918), the Kronstadt naval base attack (1921) and the mass execution of priests • Under War Communism (1918-21), the Cheka requisitioned grain from the peasantry to ensure that the Red Army, then fighting in the civil war to defend the regime, had access to regular food supplies • From 1922 the secret police subjected potentially disloyal groups, such as ex-Tsarist army officers and intellectuals, to surveillance and hostage-taking to minimise the threat to the regime; some of these were deported • During the NEP (1921-28), the secret police combatted the potentially negative consequences of the NEP for the regime, e.g. organising the 1922 SR show trial and persecuting rich Nepmen and people with western tastes. Arguments and evidence that other factors/developments were the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bolshevik control of the press and radio ensured that the population was targeted with cheap and readily accessible pro-socialist propaganda in order to win hearts and minds, e.g. <i>Pravda</i> and <i>Izvestiya</i> • The Bolsheviks used the arts and culture to secure popular endorsement of their vision of a new socialist society, e.g. through <i>Proletkult</i> and the avant-garde • The Bolsheviks created the Red Army as an effective fighting force, enabling the Communist Party to overcome domestic and foreign military threats during the civil war and extend its territorial control • The Bolsheviks were pragmatic, making concessions in order to retain and extend their power, e.g. the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918 and the introduction of the NEP in 1921. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether Stalin's cult of personality was the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928-53. Arguments and evidence that Stalin's cult of personality was the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's cult of personality was important because it established him as Lenin's loyal disciple and natural successor, e.g. the 1920s slogan 'Stalin is the Lenin of today' used by some party members • In the 1930s, Stalin's personality cult underpinned his growing personal power (the <i>vozhd</i>) by rewriting Soviet history to inflate his importance and portraying him as a visionary socialist, e.g. the two 1938 official histories • Stalin's cult of personality peaked in the late 1940s, reinforcing his dominance following the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, e.g. his portrayal as Generalissimo – military genius and saviour of the USSR • By 1945 Stalin's personality cult had persuaded many Soviet citizens that he was the all-powerful saviour of socialism and protector of Russia; it also enhanced his power by engendering respect among his critics. Arguments and evidence that Stalin's cult of personality was not the main reason and/or other factors/developments were the main reason for Stalin's power in the USSR in the years 1928-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By the mid-late 1930s, the excesses of the personality cult were becoming counterproductive and some Soviet citizens, including workers, intellectuals and party members, were becoming cynical • Stalin's economic policies consolidated his power by appealing to ordinary communists and patriotic workers, controlling the peasantry, securing victory in the Second World War and facilitating post-war recovery • Stalin relied heavily on terror, coercion and intimidation to retain power throughout this period, e.g. the purges of the 1930s and the use of similar tactics after 1945 • Stalin's control over the media and his promotion of socialist realist art strengthened his power by motivating the committed with a vision of the USSR moving towards the 'perfect' socialist society. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which Soviet leaders, in the years 1953-85, pursued similar policies on the arts and culture. Argument and evidence that Soviet leaders, in the years 1953-85, pursued similar policies on the arts and culture should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all pursued policies on the arts and culture that attempted to prevent widespread nonconformity in Soviet society, e.g. banning <i>Dr Zhivago</i> (1954), expelling Solzhenitsyn (1974) and vetting rock groups (1980s) • Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all pursued conservative policies that promoted traditional Russian high culture, e.g. in music, literature and ballet • Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all pursued policies that permitted some limited freedom of expression as a way of distinguishing their regimes from Stalin's more hard-line approach to art and culture, e.g. Khrushchev's cultural 'thaws' and Andropov's partial toleration of underground art • Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all pursued policies on the arts and culture that failed to curb artistic and cultural rebellion, e.g. <i>samizdat</i> publications from the late 1950s, the Moscow Conceptualists in the 1970s and the influence of popular music on the younger generation in the 1980s. Argument and evidence that Soviet leaders, in the years 1953-85, pursued different policies on the arts and culture should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Unlike Brezhnev and Andropov, Khrushchev's policies on art and culture zig-zagged between 'thaw' and 'freeze', e.g. the temporary cultural liberalisation of 1953-54, 1956-57 and 1961-62 • Brezhnev's policies of cultural conservatism rejected Khrushchev's cultural liberalism on the grounds that the latter was undermining faith in the Soviet Union, e.g. the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial (1966) • Unlike Khrushchev and Andropov, Brezhnev pursued policies on art and culture that celebrated the achievements of the Stalinist period and focused on the Soviet victory in the Second World War. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that government educational policy failed to improve the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917-85. Arguments and evidence that government educational policy failed to improve the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lack of resources hindered the government's plans for a universal programme of compulsory education until the 1950s, e.g. limited spending on education, underfunded school transport and low wages for teachers • Traditional rural, ethnic and cultural attitudes towards education were ingrained and ensured that some groups remained disadvantaged, e.g. rural children and Muslim females • The Soviet education system, at all levels, contained compulsory ideological content which to some extent reduced schools and universities to propaganda agencies, e.g. Stalin's 'Short Course' and the 1958 reforms • The main route to high status jobs in the USSR - academic secondary education - was expanded by Khrushchev but continued to be dominated by the children of the Soviet white-collar and managerial elite. Arguments and evidence that government educational policy did improve the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Soviet regime established a system of universal compulsory education by the 1930s, raising the number of children who had access to the benefits of education from 14 million in 1929 to over 20 million in 1931 • State campaigns led to the almost complete eradication of illiteracy during this period, e.g. by 1939 94 per cent of Soviet citizens were literate and by 1959 the literacy rate had risen to 99 per cent • The development of adult education (<i>rabfaki</i>) as a 'second chance' provision from the 1950s enabled millions of Soviet citizens to study part-time for self-improvement and to enhance their job prospects • In the years 1953-80, student numbers in higher education increased from 1.5 million to 5 million; this expansion improved promotion/social mobility prospects for working class and female graduates. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



4	13–16	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
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4	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
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Section C

Target: AO3: Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–4	- Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. - Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the extracts. - Judgement on the view is assertive, with little or no supporting evidence
2	5–10	- Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. - Contextual knowledge is added to information from the extracts, but only to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. - A judgement on the view is given, but with limited support and related to the extracts overall, rather than specific issues
3	11–16	- Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences - Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. - A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation.
4	17–20	- Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised by comparison of them. - Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. - Discusses evidence in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.



Section A: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the Bolsheviks' poor handling of the economy was the main reason for the difficulties faced by the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28. Arguments and evidence that the Bolsheviks' poor handling of the economy was the main reason for the difficulties faced by the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Decree on Workers' Control (1917) led to huge worker pay rises and the removal of experienced managers and technical specialists which undermined efforts to maintain production and lower inflation • War Communism (1918-21) led to economic collapse and serious social discontent, e.g. by 1921 industrial production amounted to only 20 per cent of 1913 levels and there was widespread rural unrest • The introduction of the NEP in 1921 caused serious divisions within the Bolshevik party because of the concessions the policy made to capitalist practices, e.g. acceptance of private industry and private trade • The operation of the NEP (1921-28) threatened to undermine the Soviet regime and its plans for an industrialised socialist society, e.g. the 'scissors crisis' and peasant hoarding of grain. Arguments and evidence that the Bolsheviks' handling of the economy was not the main reason/other factors were the main reason for the difficulties faced by the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • War Communism facilitated the Bolshevik victory in the civil war; the NEP-led economic recovery of the mid-1920s dampened anti-Bolshevik opposition; the inherited negative economic legacy of the First World War • Political opposition to the Bolshevik coup in 1917, fuelled by outrage at the Brest Litovsk treaty (1918), led to the civil war that directly challenged communist rule • Peace negotiations with Germany (1918) exposed Bolshevik military weakness and communist divisions about how to leave the war; the Soviet leadership power struggle (1924-28) intensified personal rivalries • Resistance to the imposition of one-party rule contributed to serious revolts against the Bolshevik regime, e.g. the Kronstadt Mutiny (1921) and the Tambov Rising (1920-21). Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether Brezhnev's leadership was the main reason for the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964-82. Arguments and evidence that Brezhnev's leadership was the main reason for the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964-82 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Brezhnev's accession led to the adoption of a far less ambitious approach regarding the quantity and quality of the consumer goods the Soviet economy was expected to produce • Brezhnev increased military spending from 11 per cent of GDP (1964) to 13 per cent (1970) but this acted as a serious drain on the Soviet economy and led to growing economic problems • Brezhnev mostly resisted economic reform, largely accepted the Soviet economy as it was, attempted to lower public expectations regarding economic performance, and turned a blind eye to the black economy • Brezhnev's increasingly poor health in the later 1970s and early 1980s rendered him incapable of initiating much-needed economic reform. Arguments and evidence that Brezhnev's leadership was not the main reason/ other factors were the main reason for the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964-82 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Brezhnev accepted that some reform of the Soviet economy was necessary and was prepared to introduce measures in an attempt to improve economic performance, e.g. the Kosygin reforms of 1968 • Brezhnev was confronted by a Stalinist legacy of centralised planning and bureaucratic conservatism which hampered initiatives in the years 1964-82 to improve economic efficiency and product quality • Brezhnev inherited from his predecessor, Khrushchev, a Soviet economy which was increasingly dependent on grain imports from the West due to the inefficiency of the agricultural sector • The Soviet empire drained the USSR economically, e.g. by the early 1980s the Warsaw Pact received an annual subsidy of \$3 billion from the Soviet Union; Cuba and Vietnam also received significant aid and subsidies. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that Soviet government's hostility towards religion did not change in the years 1917-85. Arguments and evidence that the Soviet government's hostility towards religion did not change in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Marxist-driven Soviet government remained ideologically opposed to religion and its institutions throughout this period because such belief systems threatened to undermine socialist values and communist control • The Soviet government engaged in the persecution of religious personnel throughout the period, e.g. the targeting of priests and other religious figures under Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev • The Soviet government attempted to dismantle the infrastructure of organised religion during this period, e.g. the destruction or conversion of churches under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev • The Soviet government used propaganda and education to weaken public attachment to religion, e.g. the League of the Militant Godless under Stalin, the space programme under Khrushchev and science education under Brezhnev. Arguments and evidence that the Soviet government's hostility towards religion did change in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under Lenin, the Soviet authorities funded Islamic schools and encouraged Muslims to join the communist party; Lenin was less hostile to Islam because there had been no official link between Islam and the Tsarist system • Stalin made a pragmatic alliance with the Orthodox church during the Second World War to strengthen the war effort, e.g. anti-religious censorship and propaganda was ended and 414 churches were reopened • Under Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership was more tolerant of the Orthodox church, aware that religious persecution alienated Western opinion and complicated the conduct of Soviet foreign policy • Brezhnev supported Islam as a 'progressive, anti-colonial and revolutionary creed', potentially anti-American in orientation, e.g. the founding of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the status of women in Soviet society under Stalin was different from the status of women in Soviet society under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Arguments and evidence that the status of women in Soviet society under Stalin was different from the status of women in Soviet society under Khrushchev and Brezhnev should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev greater emphasis was placed on the provision of social benefits, such as healthcare, maternity arrangements and childcare to improve conditions for women • Women were given access to abortion once again in 1955, thereby allowing females greater control over their own bodies; Stalin had made abortion illegal in 1936 • Brezhnev's Family Code of 1968 gave women greater protection by making it illegal to divorce a woman who was pregnant or with a child under the age of one • Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev female role models were more prominent, e.g. the astronaut Valentina Tereshkova, the actress Ludmila Savelyeva and the gymnast Ludmilla Tourischeva. Arguments and evidence that the status of women in Soviet society under Stalin was similar to the status of women in Soviet society under Khrushchev and Brezhnev should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Although women had greater employment opportunities during these years, most females worked in relatively unskilled low paid jobs, e.g. routine factory work and agricultural labour • Throughout the entire period the 'double burden' put considerable pressure on women – the entrenched expectation that women should combine employment with family responsibilities • Throughout, women were underrepresented at all levels in the Communist Party, e.g. in the 1930s only 16 per cent of party members were women and the first female Praesidium member was appointed in 1957 • The wives of the Soviet elite under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev led similar lives, e.g. they did not have to enter the workforce and were encouraged to engage in 'social' or community work. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



4	13–16	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
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Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1917-85, the most significant Soviet social development was the provision of education. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1917-85, the provision of education was the most significant Soviet social development should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Soviet regime established a system of universal compulsory education by the 1930s, raising the number of children who had access to education from 14 million in 1929 to over 20 million in 1931 • Soviet provision of education led to the almost complete eradication of illiteracy during this period with literacy levels raised to 98-99 per cent by 1959 • The development of part-time adult education (rabfaki) as a 'second chance' provision from the 1950s offered self-improvement and enhanced job prospects; by 1964 over two million took such courses • From the 1930s, the expansion of Soviet higher education improved the prospects for promotion and upward social mobility for working class and female students; by 1980, 5.1 million students were in higher education. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1917-85, the provision of education was not the most significant Soviet social development/other social provision was more significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lack of resources hindered the government's plans for a universal programme of compulsory education until the 1950s, e.g. limited state spending on education and underfunded school transport • Up to the 1980s, traditional rural, ethnic and cultural attitudes towards education disadvantaged rural children and Muslim females, and compulsory ideological content reduced Soviet education to propaganda • Full or almost full employment in the USSR since the 1930s provided job security, the introduction of a minimum wage in 1956 and real wage increases in the 1960s and 1970s • The expanding provision of housing, social benefits and healthcare from the 1950s was significant for the Soviet population, e.g. state-provided living space doubled in the years 1951-61. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1924-85 was the provision of social security. Arguments and evidence that the most significant Soviet social development in the years 1924-85 was the provision of social security should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The impact of full or almost full employment in the USSR since the 1930s, e.g. job security, the introduction of a minimum wage in 1956 and real wage increases in the 1960s and 1970s • The impact of the expanding provision of housing from the 1950s, e.g. Khrushchev's extensive housing programme, which helped to more than double state-provided living space in the years 1951-61 • The impact of the expanding provision of social benefits, e.g. cheap workplace meals from the 1930s, social benefits provided by the trade unions, rising pensions in the 1960s and 1970s • The impact of the expanding provision of healthcare, e.g. rising numbers of doctors and hospital beds in the years up to 1940, growing availability of healthcare (polyclinics and sanatoria) in the years 1950 to 1980. Arguments and evidence that other factors were the most significant Soviet social development and/or the provision of social security was a less significant Soviet social development in the years 1924-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The impact of the growth of education in the years 1924-85, e.g. literacy levels raised to 98-99 per cent by 1959, expansion of higher education from 3 million to over 5 million students between 1965 and 1980 • The impact of Soviet measures to raise the status of women, e.g. increased female participation in higher education from the 1930s and state endorsement of female role models such as Valentina Tereshkova • The limits to the provision of housing, e.g. in the 1930s, 94 per cent of rented housing had just one room and, under Khrushchev, prefabricated housing was often poorly finished in order to meet targets • The limits to the provision of healthcare, e.g. the quality of healthcare after 1950 remained problematic, with some hospitals lacking heating or running water and some rural areas possessing primitive medical services • The limits to the provision of social benefits, e.g. by 1980, pensions were still inadequate (40 roubles per month), compelling many people of retirement age to take part-time jobs. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how far government control over Soviet culture was maintained in the years 1953-85. The extent to which government control over Soviet culture was maintained in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under Khrushchev, art and artists faced official restrictions, e.g. Boris Pasternak's novel <i>Dr. Zhivago</i> was banned and abstract art was condemned by the state • The Brezhnev regime implemented a cultural clampdown which included high profile cases, e.g. the trial and imprisonment of Sinyavsky and Daniel in 1966, and Solzhenitsyn's expulsion from the Soviet Union in 1974 • Under Andropov (1982-84), the Soviet regime continued to control popular culture, e.g. 'unofficial' songs were restricted to 20 per cent of radio air time and rock groups were vetted before being allowed to perform. The extent to which government control over Soviet culture was not maintained in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinisation loosened Soviet control over culture, e.g. works by Babel, Yevtushenko and Solzhenitsyn were published in the USSR • By the late 1950s the limits of Soviet control were also revealed by the development of a youth culture influenced by western pop music and fashion • Under Brezhnev, attempts by the regime to restrict the influence of popular music by controlling record production and radio airtime were undermined by the development of the cassette recorder which became widely available. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that Soviet leaders, in the years 1953–85, pursued similar policies on religion. The extent to which Soviet leaders, in the years 1953–85, pursued similar policies on religion should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev was deeply anti-religious and pursued a policy of active repression continued by subsequent leaders, e.g. 10,000 churches were closed within four years • Brezhnev and later leaders restricted the activities of religious groups such as Jews and Baptists • Under Andropov and Chernenko, the Soviet regime continued to keep religious groups (defined as dissidents) under surveillance to limit their influence. The extent to which Soviet leaders, in the years 1953–85, did not pursue similar policies on religion should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev's anti-religious policies were markedly more severe than those of his successors, e.g. destruction of religious buildings and imprisonment of thousands of religious activists • Brezhnev was prepared to make limited concessions to religious groups, e.g. he permitted formal Orthodox church services and welfare work, and, in 1972, allowed the New Testament to be published in Lithuania • Andropov used more sophisticated techniques, including technological eavesdropping, to monitor and control 'anti-Soviet' groups, including religious dissidents. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression remained unchanged in the years 1917–85. Arguments and evidence that Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression remained unchanged in the years 1917–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under Lenin, art and culture were expected to serve the political, social and economic objectives of the Soviet regime • For most of the Stalinist period, all artistic and cultural expression was expected to conform to Socialist Realism, i.e. conventional and idealised representations of life under socialism to serve as Soviet propaganda • Khrushchev, as leader of the USSR, also expected artists and writers to toe the government's official line, e.g. he banned Boris Pasternak's <i>Dr Zhivago</i> for its anti-Revolution content • The Brezhnev regime continued this policy by persecuting cultural and artistic nonconformity, e.g. the trials of Joseph Brodsky (1964) and Andrei Sinyavsky (1966), and the expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1974) • Andropov's government (1982–84) clamped down on popular culture by vetting rock groups prior to performance and restricting the output of songs not composed by official Soviet composers. Arguments and evidence that Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression did change in the years 1917–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Bolshevik government under Lenin permitted a certain amount of artistic and cultural freedom, e.g. 'fellow traveller' artists, the varied activities of <i>Proletkult</i>, and the promotion of the <i>avant-garde</i> • The last years of Stalin's leadership saw some relaxation in official attitudes, e.g. Boris Pasternak and Anna Akhmatova gave public readings of their unorthodox poetry in 1946 • Destalinisation in the 1950s encouraged a degree of artistic nonconformity and Khrushchev permitted the publication of previously banned books, e.g. works by Isaac Babel and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn • The Brezhnev and Andropov governments were unable to stem the influence of popular music on the younger generation, e.g. the emergence of guitar-poet Vladimir Vysotsky and the advent of the cassette recorder. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the Soviet leadership's hostility to religion remained remarkably consistent in the years 1917-85. Arguments and evidence that the Soviet leadership's hostility to religion remained remarkably consistent, in the years 1917-85, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Soviet leadership remained ideologically opposed to religion and its institutions throughout this period because such belief systems potentially threatened to undermine socialist values and communist control • The Soviet leadership engaged in the persecution of religious personnel throughout the period, e.g. the targeting of priests and other religious figures under Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev • The Soviet leadership attempted to dismantle the infrastructure of organised religion during this period, e.g. the destruction or conversion of churches under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev • The Soviet leadership used propaganda and education to weaken public attachment to religion, e.g. the League of the Militant Godless under Stalin, the space programme under Khrushchev and science education under Brezhnev. Arguments and evidence that the Soviet leadership's hostility to religion did not remain remarkably consistent, in the years 1917-85, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under Lenin, the Soviet authorities funded Islamic schools and encouraged Muslims to join the party; Lenin's regime was less hostile to Islam because there had been no official link between Islam and the Tsarist system • Stalin made a pragmatic alliance with the Orthodox Church during the Second World War to strengthen the war effort, e.g. anti-religious censorship and propaganda was ended and 414 churches were reopened • Under Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership was more tolerant of the Orthodox Church, aware that religious persecution alienated Western opinion and complicated the conduct of Soviet foreign policy • Brezhnev supported Islam as a 'progressive, anti-colonial and revolutionary creed' that was potentially anti-American in orientation, e.g. the founding of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
	Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the Soviet leadership's policy on the arts and culture remained remarkably consistent in the years 1953-85. The extent to which the Soviet leadership's policy on the arts and culture remained remarkably consistent in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout this period, the Soviet leadership expected writers to toe the official line, e.g. Pasternak's <i>Dr. Zhivago</i> was banned (1954), the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial (1966) and Solzhenitsyn's expulsion (1974) • Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all attempted to clamp down on non-conformist artwork, e.g. Khrushchev's denunciation of abstract art (1962), and official harassment of dissident artists under Brezhnev and Andropov • The Soviet leadership tried to preserve cultural conservatism in the musical arts, e.g. Khrushchev's 'permissible' dances, Brezhnev's promotion of traditional ballet and Andropov's vetting of rock groups • During this period the Soviet leadership permitted limited freedom of expression to distinguish their regimes from Stalinism, e.g. Khrushchev's cultural 'thaws' and Andropov's partial toleration of underground art. The extent to which the Soviet leadership's policy on the arts and culture did not remain remarkably consistent in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev's policies on art and culture zig-zagged between 'thaw' and 'freeze', e.g. the temporary cultural liberalisation of 1953-54, 1956-57 and 1961-62 • Brezhnev's policies of cultural conservatism departed from Khrushchev's cultural liberalism on the grounds that the latter was undermining faith in the Soviet Union, e.g. the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial (1966) • Brezhnev pursued policies on art and culture that placed greater emphasis on the achievements of the Stalinist period and the Soviet victory in the Second World War • From 1969, the Soviet policy of compulsory psychiatric treatment to control and confine dissident artists and political activists was rapidly expanded. Other relevant material must be credited.



3	11–16	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
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3	8–12	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
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3	11–16	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
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Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1917-85, Soviet government policy on the arts and culture changed. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1917-85, Soviet government policy on the arts and culture changed should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • After a short period of relative artistic and cultural freedom, Lenin's government imposed greater controls in the early 1920s, e.g. official supervision of Proletkult and the establishment of the Agitprop department • The last years of Stalin's leadership saw some relaxation in official attitudes, e.g. Pasternak and Anna Akhmatova gave public readings of their unorthodox poetry in 1946 • Destalinisation in the 1950s encouraged a degree of artistic nonconformity and Khrushchev permitted the publication of previously banned books, e.g. works by Isaac Babel and Solzhenitsyn • The Brezhnev and Andropov governments were unable to stem the influence of popular music on the younger generation, e.g. the emergence of guitar-poet Vladimir Vysotsky and the advent of the cassette recorder. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1917-85, Soviet government policy on the arts and culture did not change should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout the period, Soviet government policy on the arts and culture continued to serve the interests and propaganda needs of the communist regime, e.g. Socialist Realism under Stalin and Khrushchev's 'freezes' • Soviet government policy during these years continued to challenge artistic and cultural non-conformity, e.g. the 'popular oversight' campaigns (1955-63) and Brezhnev's promotion of cultural conservatism • Soviet government policy remained traditionally Russian and anti-Western, e.g. promotion of Russian folk music (Stalin) and the ballet (Brezhnev) and official anti-Western cultural campaigns (1970s-80s) • The Soviet government continued to censor and/or persecute those who strayed from official artistic and cultural policies, e.g. banning Dr Zhivago (1954), the Brodsky trial (1964) and Solzhenitsyn's expulsion (1974). Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the Soviet Union collapsed because of Gorbachev's failure to deal with the challenge of nationalism. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • Gorbachev's pursuit of <i>glasnost</i> and his reluctance to use force made the break-up of the Soviet Union possible • As a multinational empire, the USSR could only function as a single entity if the central government firmly held national feeling in check – this did not happen under Gorbachev. • Rising nationalism within the USSR undermined <i>perestroika</i>, took Gorbachev by surprise and generated a powerful momentum for independence from Soviet control. Extract 2 • Gorbachev did not allow sufficient time for economic reform to bring positive results and attempted unsuccessfully to force the pace of change with radical measures. • Lacking knowledge of economics, Gorbachev was influenced by economists who promised him success and those with more radical proposals. • Economists could not predict accurately the outcome of their reforms because they lacked practical experience of the market economy and industry and also wrongly assumed that the planned economy had great flexibility. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union happened because of Gorbachev's failure to deal with the challenge of nationalism. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's foreign policy towards the Eastern bloc (which promoted 'people power' and self-determination) and his insensitive treatment of national minorities within the USSR helped to fragment the Soviet Union. • The growth, and damaging impact, of nationalist sentiment in key parts of the USSR e.g. the Baltic republics • The nationalist demands of the non-Russian republics were encouraged by Yeltsin. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to address other conditional and/or contingent reasons which explain the collapse of

the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include:

- Gorbachev's initial reliance on the flawed 12th Five Year Plan to promote economic growth served only to underline the serious weaknesses of the Soviet system e.g. out of date technology, quantity not quality.
- Economic *perestroika* and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population.
- Major divisions over the 500 Days Programme (1989), designed to move rapidly to a market-led economy, resulted in an economic collapse which further weakened the Soviet system.
- The impact of *glasnost* and the failure to reform the Communist Party e.g. the repeal of Article 6 (1990).

Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the USSR's economic weaknesses. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • During the 1980s the USSR's economy continued to decline leading to strikes across the Soviet Union which indicated mounting discontent • Gorbachev's pursuit of <i>glasnost</i> and <i>perestroika</i> failed to strengthen the economy, alienated radical reformers and the public, and also prevented the regime from concealing social and economic problems • Inflation led to rising prices and shortages of essential goods which forced Russians to queue for basic items and sharply depressed Soviet living standards. Extract 2 • Gorbachev's decision to end Soviet control over the Eastern bloc Europe and attempt to establish a more informal relationship with Eastern Europe was a gamble because he gave up the power to coerce the satellite states and could not compete with the economic attractions of the West • The East European states used the shift in Soviet policy not to reform its relationship with the USSR but to break away altogether and abandon communism • The East European revolt seriously undermined the authority and legitimacy of the Soviet regime and encouraged the Soviet republics to demand independence from Moscow as well. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the USSR's economic weaknesses. Relevant points may include: • By the mid-1980s the Soviet economy was almost stagnant, e.g. annual industrial and agricultural growth rates were 1-2 per cent and the cost of the Soviet empire drained the USSR's economy • Gorbachev's initial reliance on the flawed 12th Five Year Plan to promote economic growth served only to underline the serious weaknesses of the Soviet system e.g. out of date technology, quantity not quality • Economic <i>perestroika</i> and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population • Major divisions over the 500 Days Programme (1990), designed to move rapidly to a market-led economy, resulted in an economic collapse which further weakened the Soviet system.

Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to address other conditional and/or contingent reasons which explain the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include:

- Gorbachev's foreign policy towards the Eastern bloc (which encouraged self-determination) and his insensitive treatment of national minorities within the USSR helped to fragment the Soviet Union
- The growth, and damaging impact, of nationalist sentiment in key parts of the USSR, e.g. the Baltic republics
- The role of Yeltsin in the collapse of the Soviet Union, e.g. undermining Gorbachev's and the central Soviet government's position and encouraging the demands of the non-Russian republics for independence.

Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because Gorbachev's confidence in his reform policies 'proved gravely misplaced'. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • In an attempt to revitalise the USSR, Gorbachev introduced a range of policies to reform the economy and the political system, change Soviet foreign policy, and reduce censorship • These measures, contrary to Gorbachev's expectations, triggered more radical changes including economic decline, the end of Communist Party control and the rise of nationalism • Gorbachev had not expected these developments and they were beyond the government's control. Extract 2 • A combination of popular protest and Soviet withdrawal liberated Eastern Europe in 1989 and this process then affected the USSR in 1990-91 • Gorbachev's perestroika reforms were both too modest and too late to rescue the Soviet economy, which by the 1980s was outmoded and underperforming • By the 1980s the failing Soviet economy could deliver neither the welfare state desired by the population nor the warfare state demanded by the Cold War. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because Gorbachev's confidence in his reform policies 'proved gravely misplaced'. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's foreign policy towards the Eastern bloc (which encouraged 'people power' and self-determination) and his insensitive treatment of national minorities within the USSR helped to fragment the Soviet Union [Extracts 1 and 2] • Gorbachev's pursuit of economic perestroika and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of goods for the Soviet population [Extracts 1 and 2] • The impact of glasnost on public attitudes and the failure to reform the Communist Party, e.g. the repeal of Article 6 (1990) [Extract 1]. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because Gorbachev's confidence in his reform policies 'proved gravely misplaced'. Relevant points may include:

Question	Indicative content
	• The growth, and damaging impact, of nationalist sentiment in key parts of the USSR, e.g. the Baltic republics [Extract 2] • The flawed 12th Five Year Plan to promote economic growth served only to underline the serious weaknesses of the Soviet system, e.g. out of date technology, quantity not quality [Extract 2] • Major divisions over the 500 Days Programme (1990), designed to move rapidly to a market-led economy, resulted in an economic collapse that further weakened the Soviet system [Extract 2] • Additional reasons, e.g. the Soviet economy was stagnating by the mid-1980s and the role of Yeltsin in undermining Gorbachev's and the central Soviet government's position.



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the role played by Boris Yeltsin. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • Yeltsin persuaded the parliament of the Russian Republic to declare sovereignty, which undermined Soviet authority and encouraged other republics to do the same • Yeltsin was <i>the</i> high profile opponent of the failed August 1991 coup attempt to reinstate a hard-line Soviet regime • Afterwards, Yeltsin suspended communist activity in the Russian Republic and encouraged the republics to weaken further central Soviet authority. Extract 2 • Gorbachev's reforms were meant to renew the Soviet system but they undermined key features of the communist regime • In reality, <i>perestroika</i> meant the complete transformation of the Soviet Union but Gorbachev's communist background prevented him from seeing this clearly • Gorbachev thought that the extent of economic change and the growth of nationalism within the Soviet Union could be limited. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the role played by Boris Yeltsin. Relevant points may include: • With Yeltsin's approval and backing, the parliament of the Russian Republic declared that its sovereignty took precedence over that of the Soviet Union – in short, it stood above the authority of the USSR • Yeltsin's encouragement of the nationalist movements of the non-Russian Republics was deliberately designed to undermine the authority of the central Soviet government • Yeltsin played a key role in foiling the August 1991 attempted coup; led by communist hard-liners this represented a last-gasp attempt to maintain the Soviet Union intact and preserve one party communist rule • Yeltsin undermined the new Union Treaty (1991) and organised the Commonwealth of Independent States, a decentralised structure with no Soviet government, which was implemented in December 1991.

Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to address other conditional and/or contingent reasons that explain the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include:

- Most of Gorbachev's policies had unintended results and indicated that he had not fully thought through the consequences of his actions, e.g. *glasnost* led to mounting public criticism of communist rule
- Gorbachev's reforms raised people's expectations, both materially and politically, but failed to satisfy them, e.g. *perestroika* and market mechanisms failed to deliver adequate food supplies and consumer goods
- In ending the Brezhnev Doctrine, Gorbachev had not anticipated the rapid collapse of communist states in the Eastern bloc in 1989, nor the impact this would have on nationalist groups within the USSR
- Gorbachev's handling of issues concerning the national minorities was insensitive and undermined central government-republic relations, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh (1988) and the Baltic republics (1990–91).

Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 - Gorbachev's amendment of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution weakened the Communist Party's executive power and coordinating functions which created a political vacuum - Gorbachev attempted to fill this vacuum by creating the post of President of the USSR, but, this position had no clear chain of command, and, as it was unelected, it lacked legitimacy - As President, Gorbachev lacked the authority to deal with serious economic problems and nationalist tensions in 1990–91. Extract 2 - Although <i>perestroika</i> stimulated some economic activity in the Soviet Union, it failed to ease the shortage of food and domestic goods - Removing controls on wages and prices was economically damaging since the result was rising inflation - Hampered by a Soviet mind-set, Gorbachev did not attempt to move to a market-based economy until August 1990 by which time it was too late to avert an economic crash. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms. Relevant points may include: - Gorbachev's amendment of Article 6 effectively ended the communist one party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections – a process which rendered the CPSU powerless by the end of 1990 [Extract 1] - Gorbachev's position as President of the USSR was weak, particularly as he refused to base it on a popular election in 1990; Yeltsin, in contrast, used elections to build up his power against Gorbachev [Extract 1] - Gorbachev's political reforms, and his promotion of <i>glasnost</i>, failed to establish a popular consensus behind his modernisation programme and weakened the central government's hold over the republics [Extract 1] - Yeltsin's encouragement of the nationalist movements of the non-Russian republics was deliberately designed to undermine the political authority of both Gorbachev and the central Soviet government [Extract 1]. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the

Question	Indicative content
	consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms. Relevant points may include: • Economic <i>perestroika</i> and the introduction of market mechanisms in 1987 undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population [Extract 2] • Inflation led to rising prices and shortages of essential goods which forced Russians to queue for basic items and sharply depressed Soviet living standards [Extract 2] • Major divisions over the 500 Days Programme (1990), designed to move rapidly to a market-led economy, resulted in an economic collapse which further weakened the Soviet system [Extracts 1 and 2] • Economic <i>perestroika</i> weakened the Soviet planning system, provided little control (e.g. corrupt officials/organised crime undermined the cooperatives) and contributed to the economic crisis [Extract 1 and 2].

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the impact of the nationalist resurgence in the Soviet republics in the late 1980s. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 - Gorbachev's reform policies seemed to assume more national self-government but he failed to grasp the state of national feeling in many Soviet republics - Serious nationalist tension in the Baltic states, Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia threatened the integrity of the USSR - Developments in the Russian Federation (the 1990 Congress elections, Yeltsin becoming head of the Russian government, and the Russian Federation declaration of sovereignty) effectively finished off the USSR. Extract 2 - Gorbachev attempted to reform the Soviet system but by 1990 an ideological, economic and nationalist crisis had developed in the USSR - The decision to end the one-party state created an ideological crisis for communism and produced a political vacuum - At the same time the Soviet economy contracted and independence and separatist movements gathered momentum. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the impact of the nationalist resurgence in the Soviet republics in the late 1980s. Relevant points may include: - The growth, and damaging impact, of nationalist sentiment in key parts of the USSR e.g. in the Baltic republics, 1988-91 - Gorbachev's handling of issues concerning the national minorities was insensitive and undermined central government-republic relations, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh (1988) and the Baltic republics (1990-91) - Prompted by Yeltsin, the Parliament of the Russian Republic declared that its sovereignty took precedence over that of the Soviet Union – in short, it stood above the authority of the USSR - Yeltsin's encouragement of the nationalist movements of the non-Russian republics was deliberately designed to undermine the authority of Gorbachev and the central Soviet government. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to

	address other conditional and/or contingent reasons which explain the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include: • Economic <i>perestroika</i> and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population • Most of Gorbachev's policies had unintended results and indicated that he had not fully thought through the consequences of his actions, e.g. <i>glasnost</i> led to mounting public criticism of communist rule • Gorbachev's amendment of Article 6 effectively ended the communist one-party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections – a process that rendered the CPSU powerless by the end of 1990 • By 1985 the Soviet economy was effectively stagnant (e.g. an annual growth rate of 1-2 per cent and the cost of the Soviet empire drained the USSR's economy), which led to mounting discontent. Other relevant material must be credited.
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Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of a nationalist resurgence in the Soviet bloc. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • In 1989-90, nationalist discontent within the USSR, spurred on by events in the Eastern Bloc countries and Yeltsin's activities, was undermining the cohesion of the Soviet Union • Gorbachev's actions had unleashed 'people power' in the Eastern Bloc and his attempt to hold the Soviet Union together by creating the 'unifying' post of President of the USSR did not have the desired effect • The heavy-handed suppression of demonstrations in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, in 1991 undermined Gorbachev and discredited the Soviet government. Extract 2 • The USSR would have continued to exist had Gorbachev not attempted to reform the economy, political system and Soviet foreign policy • The events of 1989 in Eastern Europe encouraged the most disaffected nationalities within the USSR (Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians) to demand independence • Gorbachev played a significant role in the dissolution of the USSR because he refused to use overwhelming force against the independence movements and his reforms facilitated the pursuit of independence. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of a nationalist resurgence in the Soviet bloc. Relevant points may include: • Yeltsin used the Russian republic as a nationalist power base to undermine Gorbachev and the central Soviet government's position; Yeltsin also encouraged the demands of the non-Russian republics for independence • The growth, and damaging impact, of nationalist discontent in key parts of the USSR, e.g. the Baltic republics, Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia • Gorbachev's foreign policy towards the Eastern Bloc encouraged 'people power' and self-determination rather than his desired 'socialist commonwealth' • Gorbachev's insensitive handling of the national minorities inside the USSR undermined central government-republic relations, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh (1988) and the Baltic republics (1990-91).

Question	Indicative content
	Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of a nationalist resurgence in the Soviet bloc. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's political reforms, notably the amendment of Article 6, effectively ended the communist one-party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections • Gorbachev's economic initiatives, such as <i>perestroika</i> and market reforms, undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population • By ending the Brezhnev Doctrine, Gorbachev ruled out Soviet armed intervention in the Eastern Bloc satellite states; for the most part, he adopted the same approach to independence movements inside the USSR • Gorbachev's promotion of <i>glasnost</i>, along with other reforms, assisted the development of internal nationalist movements that increasingly pressed for autonomy or independence.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of Gorbachev's failure to reform the political system. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • The collapse of the USSR was due to Gorbachev's removal of the Communist Party and Soviet system of government • As the pace of change quickened, Gorbachev, instead of seeking to reform communism, attempted to introduce a new 'democratic socialist' system • The ability of the state to direct affairs was undermined since the old Soviet system was weakened and a new system failed to develop, resulting in the collapse of the Soviet order. Extract 2 • The Soviet Union fell because of Gorbachev's failed triple revolution – namely abandoning the command economy, removing the communist monopoly of power and establishing a democratic multinational federation • Gorbachev's reform programme was undermined by economic problems and powerful nationalist forces within the USSR • The rise of nationalism was a response to the centralised and bureaucratic nature of the old Soviet political and economic system. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of Gorbachev's failure to reform the political system. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's amendment of Article 6 effectively ended the communist one-party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections – a process that rendered the CPSU powerless by the end of 1990

- Gorbachev's political reforms weakened the Communist Party by dividing it into factions with hardliners and moderates fearing and resisting change such as perestroika, and radicals demanding faster reform
- The consequences of glasnost discredited the Soviet system of government in the public's eyes, e.g. revelations about the state of the economy and the extent of the Stalinist terror
- Gorbachev's 'democratisation' programme from 1988 undermined the Soviet Union with the formation of the Inter-Regional Deputies' Group, the rise of nationalism and the emergence of Boris Yeltsin as a serious rival.

Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to address other conditional and/or contingent reasons which explain the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include:

- Economic perestroika and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population
- By 1985 the Soviet economy was effectively stagnant (e.g. an annual growth rate of 1-2 per cent and the cost of the Soviet empire drained the USSR's economy), which led to mounting discontent
- The growth, and damaging impact, of nationalist sentiment in key parts of the USSR, which undermined central Soviet authority, e.g. the Baltic republics, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh
- The role of Yeltsin in the collapse of the Soviet Union, e.g. undermining Gorbachev's and the central Soviet government's position and encouraging the demands of the non-Russian republics for independence.

Other relevant material must be credited.

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5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the challenge posed by Boris Yeltsin. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • Yeltsin was a polarising figure because he opposed Gorbachev's domestic measures by supporting the union republics, criticising the Soviet authorities and asserting Russian sovereignty • Yeltsin was central to negotiations for a Union Treaty (1990-91) that would have undermined the integrity of the USSR by establishing a confederation • By late 1991 Yeltsin had decided to work for the dissolution of the Soviet Union and by this stage Gorbachev was a spent political force. Extract 2 • Gorbachev's reform programme and decisions, specifically concerning perestroika and democratisation, made the collapse of the Soviet Union more likely • Yeltsin's growing political influence in Russia and his call for the republics to assume sovereignty fatally undermined the USSR • The events following the failed August 1991 coup attempt led to the collapse of the Soviet Union during the autumn of that year. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the challenge posed by Boris Yeltsin. Relevant points may include: • With Yeltsin's approval and backing, the parliament of the Russian Republic declared that its sovereignty took precedence over that of the Soviet Union – in short, it stood above the authority of the USSR • Yeltsin's encouragement of the nationalist movements of the non-Russian republics was deliberately designed to undermine the authority of the central Soviet government • Yeltsin undermined the new Union Treaty (1991) and organised the Commonwealth of Independent States, a decentralised structure with no

Question	Indicative content
	Soviet government, which was implemented in December 1991 • Yeltsin played a key role in foiling the August 1991 attempted coup; led by communist hardliners this represented a last-gasp attempt to maintain the Soviet Union intact and preserve one-party communist rule. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the challenge posed by Boris Yeltsin. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's economic initiatives, such as perestroika and market reforms, undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population • Gorbachev's moves towards democratisation and political reform, notably the abolition of Article 6, effectively ended the communist one-party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections • Yeltsin used elections to build up his power against Gorbachev and the USSR; Gorbachev's position as President of the USSR was weak, particularly as he refused to base it on a popular election in 1990 • Following the failed August 1991 coup, key events hastened the end of the USSR, e.g. the Democratic Reform Movement was established, the Union Treaty was killed off and the Communist Party was banned in Russia.

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5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of Gorbachev's mistakes. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • One of Gorbachev's major mistakes was his pursuit of <i>perestroika</i> which led to a crisis of the Soviet economic system rather than to its reform and revival • Gorbachev failed to appreciate how <i>glasnost</i> would damage the Soviet communist party's claim to govern the USSR • Gorbachev mistakenly believed that communism had rendered the Soviet people immune to the appeal of popular nationalism. Extract 2 • The Soviet Union fell because of several factors including political and ideological failure, economic decline, unsustainable cold war competition and a corrupt communist ruling class • Nationalism was the major mobilising issue during this period in the Soviet Union because its appeal was greater than that of any other form of popular discontent • Nationalist forces, by operating in the political space opened up by <i>glasnost</i>, were able to undermine the Soviet system. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of Gorbachev's mistakes. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's flawed pursuit of economic <i>perestroika</i> and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods • Gorbachev's pursuit of <i>glasnost</i> discredited communist party rule in the public's eyes, e.g. revelations about the state of the economy and the extent of the Stalinist terror • Gorbachev's promotion of <i>glasnost</i>, along with other reforms, assisted the development of internal nationalist movements that increasingly pressed for autonomy or independence • Gorbachev's insensitive handling of the national minorities inside the USSR undermined central government-republic relations, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh (1988) and the Baltic republics (1990-91).

Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to address other conditional and/or contingent reasons which explain the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include:

- By the mid-1980s, the USSR had a stagnant economy and faced the crippling costs of the Soviet empire and the cold war which led to mounting domestic discontent with the system
- The amendment of Article 6 effectively ended the communist one-party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections – a process which rendered the CPSU powerless by the end of 1990
- The growth, and damaging impact, of nationalist sentiment in key parts of the USSR which undermined central Soviet authority e.g. the Baltic republics, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh
- The role of Yeltsin in the collapse of the Soviet Union e.g. undermining Gorbachev's and the central Soviet government's position and encouraging the demands of the non-Russian republics for independence.

Other relevant material must be credited.

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5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because 'reform produced crisis'. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • In 1985 the Soviet system was not under threat but by 1989 the impact of Gorbachev's reforms posed a serious threat to the USSR • Having introduced measures to liberalise and democratise the Soviet system, Gorbachev was not prepared to jeopardise these reforms by forcibly suppressing nationalist movements • In the later 1980s, the USSR's experience of competitive elections, democratic accountability and greater liberty undermined the authoritarian Soviet state and increased popular pressure for change. Extract 2 • In the 1980s, the Soviet economy was stagnating, a problem compounded by the unexpected fall in oil prices • The Soviet leadership failed to address growing nationalist tensions within the USSR • Nationalist politicians, sensing that Soviet authority was wavering, pressed for independence and national rights. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because 'reform produced crisis'. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's political reforms weakened the communist party by dividing it into factions with hardliners and moderates fearing and resisting change such as <i>perestroika</i>, and radicals demanding faster reform • The consequences of <i>glasnost</i> discredited the Soviet system of government in the public's eyes, e.g. revelations about the state of the economy and the extent of the Stalinist terror • Gorbachev's 'democratisation' programme from 1988 undermined the Soviet Union with the formation of the Inter-Regional Deputies' Group, the rise of nationalism and the emergence of Boris Yeltsin as a serious rival • The market reforms of 1987-90 undermined the central planning system without creating an effective market alternative; this led to growing popular discontent, strikes and declining support for the communist party.

Question	Indicative content
	Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because 'reform produced crisis'. Relevant points may include: • By 1985 the Soviet economy was stagnant which led to mounting discontent, e.g. annual industrial and agricultural growth rates were 1-2 per cent and the economic drain of the Soviet empire • By the mid-1980s, oil accounted for 54 per cent of Soviet exports but between 1981 and 1988 the real value of crude oil fell by 90 per cent, deepening the economic crisis in the USSR • The Soviet authorities failed to contain the protests, disruption and violence associated with the growing nationalist crisis, e.g. Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and the Baltic 'popular front' movements in the late 1980s • Gorbachev's belated attempts to create a new union in 1990-91 failed to halt the nationalists' momentum, e.g. the Ukrainian vote for independence and the Minsk agreement.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because the economy of the USSR was in crisis. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • Gorbachev's policy of <i>perestroika</i> appeared to be responsible for the economic crisis that had developed by 1991 • The economic crisis had several causes including lack of expertise, administrative confusion and poor coordination, currency collapse, inflation and worker discontent • Foreign policy commitments, notably the Cold War and intervention in Afghanistan, placed major financial burdens on the Soviet Union and contributed to the economic crisis. Extract 2 • Gorbachev was responsible for the collapse of Soviet power because he failed to address major domestic problems such as the economic crisis and the rise of nationalism • Gorbachev was overconfident and made a number of important mistakes, such as keeping conservatives in key positions and retaining Yeltsin • Gorbachev bears personal responsibility for the Soviet collapse because he made choices that led to the rapid disintegration of the USSR. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because the economy of the USSR was in crisis. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's flawed pursuit of economic perestroika and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods • By 1990, intense competition between the various economic policy bodies contributed to the growing crisis of the Soviet economy, e.g. Gosplan, the State Commission, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Russian Federation • Gorbachev and his advisers believed, mistakenly, that market reforms could be grafted on to a command economy to create a successful socialist-capitalist hybrid, but this led to spiralling inflation • Fuelled by Soviet involvement in the cold war and intervention in Afghanistan, the USSR's military budget accounted for 25 per cent of GDP; this represented an unsustainable burden on the Soviet economy.

Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to address other conditional and/or contingent reasons which explain the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include:

- Gorbachev's failure to address issues concerning the national minorities sensitively, undermined central government-republic relations, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh (1988) and the Baltic republics (1990-91)
- Many of Gorbachev's policies had unintended consequences, e.g. *glasnost* led to mounting public criticism of communist rule; Gorbachev was also unlucky, e.g. the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986
- Gorbachev's failure to marginalise Yeltsin eventually enabled the latter to undermine Gorbachev's and the central Soviet government's position and encouraged the demands of the non-Russian republics for independence
- Gorbachev's decision to amend Article 6 effectively ended the communist one-party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections – this rendered the CPSU powerless by the end of 1990.

Other relevant material must be credited.

5	17–20	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.
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Section C

Target: AO3: Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the extracts. • Judgement on the view is assertive, with little or no supporting evidence.
2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the extracts, but only to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. • A judgement is given, but with limited support and related to the extracts overall, rather than specific issues.
3	8–12	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences. • Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. • A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation.
4	13–16	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by comparison of them. • Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. • Discusses evidence provided in the extracts in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.
5	17–20	• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors. • Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments. • Presents sustained evaluative argument, reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.



Section A: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Stalin's industrial and agricultural policies were the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53. Arguments and evidence that Stalin's industrial and agricultural policies were the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's 'socialism in one country' (Five-Year Plans and collectivisation) was deemed more realistic than world revolution and this created a support base among the party rank and file and patriotic Soviet workers • Stalin's pre-war Five-Year Plans turned the USSR into a modern industrial state with an economic base strong enough to withstand the Nazi threat (1941–45) and therefore preserve his rule • Collectivisation in the 1930s strengthened Stalin's hold on power by imposing greater economic and political controls over the peasantry, a key source of opposition to communist rule • The Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans successfully restored the Soviet economy after the dislocation of war (e.g. urban living standards improved from 1948), thereby stabilising Stalin's power. Arguments and evidence that other factors were the main reason/Stalin's industrial and agricultural policies were not the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin relied heavily on terror, coercion and intimidation to retain power throughout this period, e.g. the purges of the 1930s and the use of similar tactics after 1945 • Stalin retained power by creating and controlling a party-government machine that enforced a rigid culture of loyalty/obedience to the leader and removed real and perceived opponents • Stalin's control over the media and his promotion of socialist realist art strengthened his power by motivating the committed with a vision of the USSR moving towards the 'perfect' socialist society • During this period, Stalin's increasingly extensive 'cult of personality' propaganda campaign reinforced his personal power and contributed to his popular image as the saviour of socialism and Mother Russia in 1945 • Stalin's forced economic modernisation generated considerable popular opposition, e.g. state-imposed collectivisation led to famine in 1932–33 and many peasants resisted by destroying their farms and livestock. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Khrushchev's attempts to reform Soviet government were largely successful. Arguments and evidence that Khrushchev's attempts to reform Soviet government were largely successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev ended Stalinist government terror, e.g. 2 million political prisoners were released between 1953 and 1960; by 1961 half of those who had been executed under Stalin were posthumously rehabilitated • Through de-Stalinisation, Khrushchev succeeded in ending Stalin's system of personal rule and this enabled the party to gain a new level of authority in relation to the Soviet leader • Between 1953 and 1956, Khrushchev replaced 50 per cent of the regional party secretaries and 44 per cent of the central committee; these personnel changes created a more reform-minded senior Soviet leadership • Khrushchev's 'democratisation' reform increased party membership from 6.9 million (1954) to 11 million (1964); this raised worker-peasant membership to 60 per cent, strengthening the regime's 'proletarian' political base. Arguments and evidence that Khrushchev's attempts to reform Soviet government were not successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation measures were limited (e.g. no public rejection of Stalin's legacy or admission of his crimes) and created instability within the Soviet bloc, e.g. Poland and Hungary • Under pressure from Stalinists and some moderates in the party who objected to the scale/pace of de-Stalinisation, Khrushchev backtracked in 1957 and publicly acknowledged that all communists were Stalinists • Khrushchev's introduction of fixed three-year terms for senior communists created great resentment among party officials who feared for their power and privileges; this opposition contributed to Khrushchev's downfall in 1964 • Khrushchev's moves to decentralise decision-making by transferring powers from central ministries to regional councils provoked serious opposition from the 'Anti-Party Group' (1957), which attempted to oust him. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Soviet policy on religion under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different from Soviet policy on religion under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Arguments and evidence that Soviet policy on religion under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different from Soviet policy on religion under Khrushchev and Brezhnev should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lenin and Stalin were prepared to employ terror methods against religion to achieve communist objectives whereas Khrushchev and Brezhnev were not, e.g. priests were killed in the Red Terror of 1921-22 and the purges of 1936-39 • Unlike Lenin and Stalin, who were prepared to make pragmatic accommodations with religion when necessary, Khrushchev pursued a consistently harsh anti-religious policy throughout his leadership • Brezhnev was more tolerant of the Orthodox church than either Lenin or Stalin because he was aware that religious persecution alienated Western opinion and complicated the conduct of Soviet foreign policy • Unlike Lenin and Stalin, Brezhnev placed great emphasis on the philosophy of atheism and supported Islam as a 'progressive, anti-colonial and revolutionary creed' that was potentially anti-American in orientation. Arguments and evidence that Soviet policy on religion under Lenin and Stalin was similar to Soviet policy on religion under Khrushchev and Brezhnev should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As Marxists, all four leaders pursued policies that were ideologically opposed to religion and its institutions because such belief systems threatened to undermine socialist values and communist control • All four leaders engaged in the persecution of religious personnel throughout the period, e.g. the detention of Patriarch Tikhon (1918) and Father Yakunin (1979) and by 1939 only 12 bishops were at liberty • Before and after 1953, Soviet leaders attempted to dismantle the infrastructure of organised religion during this period, e.g. the destruction or conversion of churches under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev • Before and after 1953, Soviet leaders used propaganda/education to weaken public attachment to religion, e.g. the Militant Godless (Stalin), the space programme (Khrushchev) and science education (Brezhnev). Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how successful the attempts of the Soviet regime were to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85. Arguments and evidence that the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85 were successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The terms and conditions of employment for Soviet workers encouraged stability, e.g. job security, a minimum wage (1956), a shorter working week (1957) and real wage increases (50 per cent between 1967-77) • The extension of healthcare provision from the 1950s also had a stabilising effect since medical services were now readily available to the Soviet population, e.g. the spread of polyclinics and sanatoria • Soviet society was also stabilised by Khrushchev's extensive housing programme, which increased the number of modern dwellings and offered better living conditions for many people • Between 1950 and 1980 state welfare spending increased by 500 per cent and this helped to stabilise society by partly addressing the issue of poverty. Arguments and evidence that the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85 were not successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Full employment was no guarantee of stability in the Soviet Union since many had undemanding, repetitive or essentially pointless jobs and annual labour turnover often reached 30 per cent • In spite of increased investment in healthcare, the health of sections of the Soviet population declined, which undermined social stability, e.g. infant mortality rates increased from 3 to 7 per cent in the 1970s • Government 'stabilising' measures could not prevent serious worker unrest in Temirtau (1959), protests over food prices (1962), and strikes and riots over food shortages in Sverdlovsk (1969) and Gorki (1980) • Social problems persisted, which had a detrimental effect on social cohesion, e.g. alcohol consumption increased by 600 per cent in the years 1940-80 and, in 1979, 34 per cent of marriages ended in divorce. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the 'rise of the national question'. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • Gorbachev failed to deal with growing nationalist feeling in the republics which was fanned by a more tolerant media environment • Nationalist feeling in the Baltic states led to protests and the formation of popular front organisations which influenced the actions of other republics • The collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc, due to Gorbachev's non-intervention, boosted national feeling in, and the confidence of, the Soviet republics. Extract 2 • Gorbachev's spending in 1985-86 undermined Soviet financial stability; his policies failed to grasp the seriousness of the nationalist tensions within the USSR • He undermined the Communist Party but remained convinced that the Soviet Union could not abandon the socialist path; he failed to support the Shatalin programme in 1990 • Gorbachev failed to recognise that the Soviet system rested on compulsion and dishonest propaganda. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the 'rise of the national question'. Relevant points may include: • Popular nationalist agendas in the republics were strengthened by Gorbachev's cadre-change and anti-corruption initiatives which led to the appointment of Russian local leaders • By 1988 large popular front independence movements were growing in all three Baltic states; in 1990 the three Popular Fronts declared independence after each achieved a majority in Supreme Soviet elections • Centrifugal nationalist forces within the USSR were encouraged by the fall of communist regimes in Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia in 1988-90, facilitated by Gorbachev's 'Sinatra doctrine' • Nationalist demands were fuelled by <i>glasnost</i>, which exposed Stalin's treatment of non-Russian peoples, revealed higher Western living standards and permitted pro-nationalist/autonomy propaganda. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the 'rise of the national question'. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's 'acceleration' programme doubled the Soviet deficit, in GDP

Question	Indicative content
	terms, in 1985-86, weakening the economy; his rejection of the Shatalin programme (1990) blocked much-needed market economy reforms • Gorbachev's attempts to create a new union in 1990-91 were derailed by the nationalists' momentum, e.g. the Ukrainian vote for independence and the Minsk agreement • Although Gorbachev wanted to create a Soviet socialist 'commonwealth', his amendment of Article 6 led to multi-party politics and effectively rendered the CPSU powerless by late 1990 • As a product of the USSR, Gorbachev was too influenced by the Soviet system to undertake root and branch reform, e.g. his reluctance to abandon central planning and his limited conception of <i>glasnost</i>.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the power of nationalism. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 - Regional leaders placed allegiance to their own republics over loyalty to the USSR, making nationalism a powerful force - Large-scale public demonstrations for national independence took place in various parts of the Soviet Union including Kiev and the Baltic states - Nationalism was an important factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union because it was fuelled by other problems and issues, e.g. economic decline and constraints on religion and culture. Extract 2 - Gorbachev's reform measures in 1985-87 failed to boost the economy - Perestroika did not achieve its main objective which was to improve economic performance - Glasnost, which was introduced to overcome hard-line communist resistance to Gorbachev's reforms, went much further by attacking the very basis of the Soviet state. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the power of nationalism. Relevant points may include: - Gorbachev's initiatives (e.g. cadre change and anti-corruption) threatened the status of regional elites and the latter backed popular nationalist agendas to maintain public support and their privileged positions - By 1988 large popular front independence movements were growing in all three Baltic states; in 1990 the three Popular Fronts declared independence after each achieved a majority in Supreme Soviet elections - The growth of nationalism in the republics was fuelled by the failure of Gorbachev's economic reforms to improve living standards in the regions and his appointment of Russian local leaders - Demands for greater autonomy/independence were encouraged by glasnost which exposed Stalin's brutality to non-Russian peoples, revealed higher Western living standards and permitted pro-nationalist propaganda. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to address other conditional and/or contingent reasons which explain the collapse of



	the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's attempt to improve worker productivity by reducing state alcohol production by 50 per cent in 1985 failed and cost 67 billion roubles in lost government revenue • Gorbachev's initial reliance on the flawed 12th Five Year Plan (1986) to promote economic growth underlined the serious weaknesses of the Soviet system, e.g. out of date technology, quantity not quality • Economic perestroika and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies and distribution of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population • Glasnost (1986-88) led to extensive criticism of the Soviet system, which undermined public confidence in communist rule, e.g. Stalin's terror, the extent of rural poverty and inadequate education and healthcare. Other relevant material must be credited.
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5	17–20	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.
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Section C

Target: AO3: Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the extracts. • Judgement on the view is assertive, with little or no supporting evidence.
2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the extracts, but only to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. • A judgement is given, but with limited support and related to the extracts overall, rather than specific issues.
3	8–12	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences. • Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. • A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation.
4	13–16	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by comparison of them. • Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. • Discusses evidence provided in the extracts in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.
5	17–20	• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors. • Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments. • Presents sustained evaluative argument, reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.

Section A: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1917-28, Bolshevik control of the mass media and propaganda was the main reason for the consolidation of the Soviet regime. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1917-28, Bolshevik control of the mass media and propaganda was the main reason for the consolidation of the Soviet regime should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bolshevik control of the press ensured that the population was targeted with cheap and readily accessible pro-communist propaganda, e.g. the mass circulation newspapers <i>Pravda</i> and <i>Izvestiya</i> • From the early 1920s, Soviet radio broadcast a mixture of propaganda and music in public spaces and workplaces; this enabled the illiterate to receive and understand the regime's message • The Bolsheviks used the arts and culture to secure popular endorsement of the new socialist society, e.g. <i>Proletkult</i> promoted an accessible proletarian culture based on collective values • The government's handling of Lenin's death (preserved body, ritualised orations and personality cult) led to a wave of popular support that the Soviet regime was able to exploit. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that, in the years 1917-28, Bolshevik control of the mass media and propaganda was the main reason for the consolidation of the Soviet regime should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Some aspects of Bolshevik propaganda were not effective in establishing communist control, e.g. avant-garde art was too sophisticated and obscure to mobilise popular support for the regime • The Bolsheviks were pragmatic, making concessions in order to retain and extend their power, e.g. the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918 and the introduction of the NEP in 1921 • The Bolsheviks created the Red Army as an effective fighting force, enabling the Communist Party to overcome domestic and foreign military threats during the civil war and extend its territorial control • The Bolsheviks used coercion and repression during this period to retain political control, e.g. the Red Terror, show trials of political opponents and the persecution of religious beliefs and practices. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the failure of central planning played a significant role in the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964-85. Arguments and evidence that the failure of central planning played a significant role in the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's centralised system of planning left a legacy of bureaucratic conservatism and inaccurate statistics which hampered any initiatives to improve economic efficiency and product quality • Continued central control after 1964 stifled initiative and creativity in the economic system, e.g. new methods or techniques employed at local level were regarded as threats to the power of the central planners • During this period, the use of government-set prices and costs when planning and measuring economic performance did not help identify or solve issues of inefficiency • Production of everything, in the years 1964-85, from coal to shoes was decided by central planners who could not cope with changes in circumstances or trends in fashion. Arguments and evidence that other factors played a significant role in the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The regime-worker 'social contract' made the authorities unwilling to countenance factory closures or unemployment; this led to low levels of worker productivity • Although Brezhnev increased agricultural investment, the sector remained seriously short of storage facilities, transport and reliable machinery during this period • The Soviet empire acted as an economic drain on the USSR, e.g. by the 1980s the Warsaw Pact countries received an annual subsidy of some \$3 billion from the Soviet Union • The continued dominance of the military-industrial complex during this period ensured that around 25 per cent of Soviet GDP was spent on defence, depriving consumer industries and agriculture of resources • Soviet social controls and censorship bred apathy and cynicism among the workforce, which had a negative impact on economic output – 'we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us'. Other relevant material must be credited.



Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant the role of the secret police was in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1953-85. Arguments and evidence that the role of the secret police was significant in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout the period 1953-85, the essential role of the Soviet secret police remained highly significant: to protect the communist regime and neutralise internal opposition • The KGB's security role was enhanced by Article 70 of the 1960 Soviet criminal code which gave the secret police the wide-ranging remit to act against anything considered to be anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda • During this period, the secret police played a significant role in limiting the influence of four key groups of critics – intellectuals, political opponents, nationalists and religious dissidents/refuseniks • Under Andropov (1967-82), the KGB employed more sophisticated techniques, including electronic surveillance and hospitalisation, to keep opposition groups small, divided and suspicious of each other. Arguments and evidence that the role of the secret police was less significant/other factors were more significant in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1953-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • After Stalin's death, although official surveillance continued, the level of secret police terror declined considerably, suggesting that from the 1950s it was less significant as a method of social control • State propaganda (due to the regime's control of the mass media and its ability to restrict access to foreign sources of information) provided most of the USSR's population with its world view in the years 1953-85 • Soviet control of the arts and culture was also deployed to establish popular endorsement of the USSR, e.g. censorship of experimental and abstract art under Khrushchev and Brezhnev • The beneficial impact of the expanding provision of social security benefits, housing and healthcare from the 1950s, e.g. the spread of polyclinics and sanatoria and greater investment in social welfare • Rising living standards, due to the post-war economic recovery and wider availability of consumer goods, encouraged greater acceptance of the regime, e.g. household TV ownership increased in the years 1970-80. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1917-85, the Soviet regime's attitudes towards the family as a social unit did not change. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1917-85, the Soviet regime's attitudes towards the family as a social unit did not change should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • After the 'Great Retreat' (1936), the Soviet government continued to adopt a traditional/socially conservative view of the family unit as central to society for the rest of the period • Soviet attitudes to the family, in practice, continued to impose the 'double burden' on women (domestic responsibilities and paid work) so that, by 1960, 49 per cent of the workforce were female • Soviet attitudes to the family continued to produce limited social policies, e.g. the unintended consequences of the radical measures of 1918 and the 1920s and Khrushchev's restricted social provision • Although the Brezhnev regime showed greater awareness of the social problems weakening the family unit, it essentially followed the pro-family social policies of the Khrushchev government. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1917-85, the Soviet regime's attitudes towards the family as a social unit did change should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The social problems and family break-ups that followed the 1918 Family Code led to the 'Great Retreat' (1936) under Stalin that aimed to restore the importance of the traditional family and the status of marriage • Under Khrushchev, the government improved conditions for families by increasing the provision of social benefits, e.g. increased paid maternity leave from 77 to 112 days and expanded child care facilities • Under the Seven Year Plan (1958-65), the regime attempted to end the 'double burden' by introducing convenience foods and mass-produced clothing and making refrigerators more widely available • The Brezhnev regime showed a greater awareness of the social problems weakening the family unit and attempted to tackle some of them, e.g. the 1968 Family Code tried to address the high divorce rate. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of Boris Yeltsin's opposition to the Soviet government. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • Yeltsin persuaded the Russian parliament to declare the Russian republic a self-governing entity, which undermined Soviet authority and encouraged other republics to do the same • Yeltsin was the high-profile opponent of the failed August 1991 coup attempt to reinstate a hard-line Soviet regime • Afterwards, Yeltsin suspended communist activity in the Russian republic and encouraged the republics to weaken further central Soviet authority. Extract 2 • Gorbachev's reforms were meant to renew the Soviet system but they undermined key features of the communist regime • In reality, perestroika meant the complete transformation of the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev's communist background prevented him from seeing this clearly • Gorbachev thought that the extent of economic change and the growth of nationalism within the Soviet Union could be limited. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of Boris Yeltsin's opposition to the Soviet government. Relevant points may include: • With Yeltsin's approval and backing, the parliament of the Russian republic declared that its sovereignty took precedence over that of the Soviet Union – in short, it stood above the authority of the USSR • Yeltsin's encouragement of the nationalist movements of the non-Russian republics was deliberately designed to undermine the authority of the central Soviet government • Yeltsin played a key role in foiling the August 1991 attempted coup; led by communist hard-liners this represented a last-gasp attempt to maintain the Soviet Union intact and preserve one party communist rule • Yeltsin undermined the new Union Treaty (1991) and organised the Commonwealth of Independent States, a decentralised structure with no Soviet government, which was implemented in December 1991.



Question	Indicative content
	Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of Boris Yeltsin's opposition to the Soviet government. Relevant points may include: • Most of Gorbachev's policies had unintended results and indicated that he had not thought fully through the consequences of his actions, e.g. glasnost led to mounting public criticism of communist rule • Gorbachev's reforms raised people's expectations, both materially and politically, but failed to satisfy them, e.g. perestroika and market mechanisms failed to deliver adequate food supplies and consumer goods • In ending the Brezhnev Doctrine, Gorbachev had not anticipated the rapid collapse of communist states in the Eastern bloc in 1989, nor the impact this would have on nationalist groups within the USSR • Gorbachev's handling of issues concerning the national minorities was insensitive and undermined central government-republic relations, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh (1988) and the Baltic republics (1990-91).

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5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that, in the years 1985-91, the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the nationalist resurgence in the communist states of Eastern Europe. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion. In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • Gorbachev's resetting of the relationship between the USSR and the Eastern bloc encouraged the growth of nationalism within the Soviet Union • Gorbachev's non-intervention policy facilitated the collapse of communism in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany • Nationalists within the Soviet republics, such as Georgia, Russia and the Baltic states, were galvanised by the successful attempts of the East European states to break away from the USSR. Extract 2 • Increasing trade with the west and the availability of black-market goods offered the Soviet people a tempting economic alternative to the declining Soviet command model • Gorbachev's pursuit of radical economic and political reforms, which were designed to solve the USSR's problems, undermined the Soviet Union and led to its collapse • Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc collapsed because the USSR no longer possessed either the determination or the resources to maintain its control over Eastern Europe. Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that, in the years 1985-91, the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the nationalist resurgence in the communist states of Eastern Europe. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's foreign policy towards the Eastern bloc encouraged 'people power' and national self-determination rather than his desired objective of a 'socialist commonwealth' linking the USSR and the satellite states • Gorbachev's 'Sinatra Doctrine' gave the Eastern bloc the freedom to reject communism, e.g. the removal of Ceausescu in Romania (1989) and the election of the anti-communist Democratic Forum in Hungary (1990) • The success of the East European revolt undermined the authority and legitimacy of the USSR and emboldened the Soviet republics, e.g. the Baltic popular fronts demanding independence from the late 1980s.



Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that, in the years 1985-91, the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of the nationalist resurgence in the communist states of Eastern Europe. Relevant points may include:

- By 1990-91 some 2905 joint ventures with foreign firms had been established in the USSR raising public awareness of economic alternatives, e.g. McDonalds, symbol of US capitalism, opened a branch in Moscow
- Gorbachev's reforms weakened the USSR, e.g. glasnost led to mounting public criticism of communist rule and perestroika and market mechanisms failed to deliver adequate food supplies and consumer goods
- Gorbachev struggled to deal with the impact of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986), which exposed the bankruptcy of the Soviet system, increased public discontent and galvanised independence movements
- The cost of maintaining the Eastern bloc imposed a heavy burden on the Soviet economy, e.g. in the years 1981-86 the Warsaw Pact countries received an annual overall subsidy of \$3 billion from the USSR.

Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the impact of the nationalist resurgence in the communist states of Eastern Europe. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 - Gorbachev's pursuit of a more informal relationship with Eastern Europe was a gamble because he gave up the power to coerce the satellite states and could not compete with the economic attractions of the West - The East European states used this shift in Soviet policy not to reform their relationship with the USSR but to break away altogether and abandon communism - The East European revolt seriously undermined the authority and legitimacy of the Soviet regime and encouraged the Soviet republics to demand independence from Moscow as well. Extract 2 - Gorbachev's main aim was to reinvigorate the Soviet economy, but the reform measures implemented in 1985-87 failed to achieve this objective and shortages became more acute - Perestroika failed to improve economic performance significantly with official statistics reporting an annual growth rate of 2-3 per cent; the real situation was probably economic stagnation - Glasnost, which was introduced to overcome hard-line communist resistance to Gorbachev's reforms, went much further by attacking the very basis of the Soviet state. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the impact of the nationalist resurgence in the communist states of Eastern Europe. Relevant points may include: - Gorbachev's foreign policy towards the Eastern bloc encouraged 'people power' and national self-determination rather than his desired objective of a 'socialist commonwealth' linking the USSR and the satellite states - Gorbachev's 'Sinatra Doctrine' gave the Eastern bloc the freedom to reject communism, e.g. the removal of Ceausescu in Romania (1989) and the election of the anti-communist Democratic Forum in Hungary (1990) - The success of the East European nationalist revolts undermined the USSR's authority and legitimacy and emboldened the Soviet republics,



Question	Indicative content
	e.g. the Baltic popular fronts demanding independence in the late 1980s • The role of Yeltsin in the collapse of the Soviet Union e.g. undermining Gorbachev's and the central Soviet government's position and encouraging the demands of the non-Russian republics for independence. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the impact of the nationalist resurgence in the communist states of Eastern Europe. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's attempt to improve worker productivity by reducing state alcohol production by 50 per cent in 1985 failed and cost 67 billion roubles in lost government revenue • Gorbachev's initial reliance on the flawed 12th Five Year Plan (1986) to promote economic growth underlined the serious weaknesses of the Soviet system, e.g. out of date technology, quantity not quality • Economic perestroika and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies and distribution of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population • Glasnost (1986-88) led to extensive criticism of the Soviet system which undermined public confidence in communist rule, e.g. Stalin's terror, inadequate education and healthcare and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.