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EDEXCEL AS AND A LEVEL HISTORY: QUESTIONS BY TOPIC

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

AS and A Level History · Paper 2 · Option 2C.2

57 questions · 1032 marks · Mark schemes included

Pearson Edexcel AS (8HI0) and A Level (9HI0) History, June 2016 - June 2025

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HOW TO USE THIS BOOKLET

Questions are grouped by specification sub-topic; within each sub-topic they run from the lowest mark tariff to the highest.

Click any heading or question row below to jump straight to it.

On every question page, click ANSWER in the top-right corner to jump to its mark scheme.

Diagrams, graphs, tables and data are printed exactly as they appeared in the original papers.

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18 questions · 360 marks

67

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QUESTIONS

57 questions · 1032 marks · grouped by sub-topic, lowest tariff first



KEY TOPIC 1

TSARIST RUSSIA AND ITS OPPONENTS, 1894–1906

10 questions in this sub-topic · 188 marks · lowest tariff first



2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the spread of revolutionary activity in the Russian Empire in 1905?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)**Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924****Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From a report sent by a French diplomat based in Kharkov in the Ukraine to the French government, October 1905.

In Kharkov, work stopped everywhere: on the railways, factories, workshops, shops, the university, schools and offices. The whole population was on the streets, either as sightseers or demonstrators. People began to ransack military arms stores and smash the windows of large shops and the offices of conservative newspapers.

5

At the height of the troubles in late October students directed by lawyers, doctors and teachers and helped by workmen and Jews seized the district neighbouring the university and set up ten barricades. Rioters seized the law courts and threw legal documents into the streets. All the police could do was organise an ineffective demonstration with a portrait of the Tsar and the national flag, paying one rouble per person. The demonstration failed pitifully when faced with the students' revolvers – they tore the Tsar's portrait and the flags to shreds.

10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From a report by the Petrograd secret police on economic conditions in Petrograd, October 1916.

The economic condition of the masses is worse than terrible. Even if we estimate the rise in earnings at 100 per cent, the prices of products have risen, on average, 300 per cent. The impossibility of buying many food products and necessities, the time wasted standing idle in queues to receive goods, and the increase in disease due to malnutrition and unhealthy living conditions, have made the workers, as a whole, prepared to go to the wildest excesses of a hunger riot.

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If grain continues to be hidden and in short supply, the very fact of its disappearance will be sufficient to provoke the greatest disorders in the capital and in the other most populated centres in the empire. The mood of anxiety, growing daily more intense, is spreading to ever-wider sections of the population. Never have we observed such nervousness as there is now. The slightest incident is enough to provoke the biggest fights. This is especially noticeable in districts with shops, stores, banks, and similar institutions, where 'misunderstandings' occur almost daily.

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-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the Tsarist system survived the 1905 revolution due to the concessions made by Nicholas II?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the most important consequence of the 1905 Revolution in Russia was the creation of the дума?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** How far do you agree that the survival of the Tsarist system, in the years 1894-1906, owed more to the weaknesses of its opponents than to government policies?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



6 How significant was the opposition to Tsarism in the years 1894–1905?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How significant was revolutionary activity in the Russian empire during the 1905 Revolution?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the 1905 Revolution was due to the impact of Bloody Sunday?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 5 How significant was the spread of revolutionary activity in the Russian Empire during the 1905 Revolution?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



- 5 'The Russo-Japanese war, rather than domestic problems, was the main reason for the revolution in Russia in 1905.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the Tsarist system survived the 1905 Revolution due to the government's use of force?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



KEY TOPIC 2

TSARISM IN CRISIS: REFORM, WAR AND THE FALL OF THE TSAR, 1906–17

19 questions in this sub-topic · 308 marks · lowest tariff first



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 7.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into Nicholas II's attitude towards the Dumas?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Source for use with Question 2a.**

Source 3: From an official Tsarist public proclamation issued on 21 July 1906. In this document Nicholas II announced the dissolution of the First Duma.

A cruel disappointment has dashed Our expectations. The representatives of the nation, instead of applying themselves to the work of productive legislation, have strayed into spheres beyond their competence. They have been enquiring into the acts of local authorities established by Ourselves. They have also been commenting on the imperfections of the Fundamental Laws, which can only be modified by Our imperial will. In short, the representatives of the nation have undertaken illegal acts, such as the appeal by the Duma to the nation. We shall not permit illegal acts, and We shall impose Our imperial will on the disobedient by using all the power of the State.

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Source for use with Question 2b.

Source 4: From a newspaper article *What We Are Fighting For* published by the Kronstadt Temporary Revolutionary Committee on 8 March 1921. The committee represented the sailors and workers at the Kronstadt naval base.

The power of the Tsarist police state has passed into the hands of the Communists. They offer the workers the constant fear of falling into the torture chambers of the Cheka which, in their horrors, exceed many times the police administration of the Tsarist regime.

The glorious symbols of the workers and peasants – the sickle and hammer – have been replaced. The Communist authorities used the bayonet and the barred window to preserve the calm, carefree life of the new bureaucracy of Communist commissars and officials.

To the protests of the peasants, expressed in spontaneous uprisings, and of the workers compelled to strike due to their circumstances, the Communists answer with mass executions and bloodthirstiness. In this sea of blood the Communists are drowning all the great pledges and slogans of labour's revolution.

Here at Kronstadt the first stone of the new revolution has been laid, to break the last restraints on the working masses and open a new broad road for socialist creativity. This rebellion at last makes it possible for the workers to have their freely elected soviets and turn the state trade unions into free associations of workers, peasants and intellectuals. At last the oppression of the Communist autocracy has been broken.

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2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into Rasputin's relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From letters written by the Tsarina Alexandra to her husband Tsar Nicholas II in September and November 1915. The Tsar was then at Russian army headquarters near the military front.

Gregory* did beg you to name Protopopov as Minister of the Interior. You had such a good impression of Protopopov. He happens to belong to the Duma (and he is not on the political left) and so will know how to deal with them. God bless your new choice of Protopopov – our Friend* says you have done a very wise act in naming him.

5

I must give you a message from our Friend, prompted by what he saw in the night. He begs you to order the army to advance near Riga. He says it is necessary, otherwise the Germans will settle down firmly for the winter and it will cost endless bloodshed and trouble to make them move.

* Gregory/our Friend = references to Rasputin

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From R. H. Bruce Lockhart, *Memoirs of a British Agent*, published 1932. Lockhart served as a British diplomat in Moscow from 1912 to 1918. Here, he comments on the problems facing Kerensky's government in 1917.

It is important to realise that from the beginning the revolution was a revolution of the people. From the first moment neither the Duma nor the intelligentsia had any control of the situation. Secondly the revolution was a revolution for land, bread and peace – but above all for peace. There was only one way to save Russia from going Bolshevik and that was to allow her to make peace with Germany. It was because he would not make peace that Kerensky went under. It was solely because Lenin promised to stop the war that he came to the top.

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It will be argued that Kerensky ought to have shot both Lenin and Trotsky. The soldiers who put forward this view always ignore the psychological arguments. The old regime having broken down, the type of leader (i.e. a Kerensky) whom the first revolution threw up, was bound to be a man who would not shoot his opponents. It was the first stage of a natural process. Secondly, even if Kerensky had shot Lenin and Trotsky, some other anti-war leader would have taken their place and would have won through on his anti-war programme.

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You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the reasons for the February Revolution in 1917?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From Victor Chernov, *The Great Russian Revolution*, published 1936. Chernov was a founder member of the Social Revolutionary Party and served briefly as Minister of Agriculture in the Provisional Government. Here, he comments on the start of the February Revolution of 1917.

Neither the Bolsheviks, nor the Mensheviks, nor the Social Revolutionaries led the workers of Petrograd on to the streets. It was something mightier than they: hunger.

It began with ordinary food riots because the bakeshops lacked bread. The police restored order. The people demanded 'Bread!' and shouted 'Down with the police!' Then, there appeared the old slogans 'Down with the autocracy!' and 'Down with the war!' There were disorders but still no revolution. There was no leader, but every revolutionary and democratic group rushed headlong into the mass protest. These groups tried to attract as many people as possible and to inspire the discontented with definite and militant political slogans.

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Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From a speech made by Lenin to the Bolshevik Central Committee, 24 January 1918. Here, the Bolshevik leader considers the issue of peace terms.

It is now a question of how we must defend the homeland – the socialist republic. The army is utterly exhausted by war and the German military position is so good that, if they attacked, they could take Petrograd with their bare hands. If we continue war in conditions like this, we will strengthen German imperialism enormously and will have to make peace all the same, but the peace will be worse. This is a shameful peace which we are forced to conclude now, but if we embark on a war, our government will be swept away and another government will make peace.

15

What comrade Trotsky suggests – halting the war, refusing to sign a peace and demobilising the army – this is international political showmanship. The only thing we will achieve by this is handing Estonia* to the Germans.

20

By signing peace, we will, of course, be handing over independent Poland but we will keep Estonia and get a chance to consolidate what we have won. If the Germans start to attack, we will be forced to sign any peace at all and then, of course, it will be a worse one. To save the socialist republic, reparations of three billion roubles is not too high a price.

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*Estonia – a Baltic state close to Petrograd

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You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into Stolypin's policy of repression in the years 1906–11?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From Lenin, *Stolypin and Revolution*, published in a German revolutionary newspaper, 18 October 1911. At the time, Lenin was living in exile. Here Lenin is considering Stolypin's time in office.

Stolypin was the head of the counter-revolutionary Tsarist government from 1906 to 1911. He organised and carried out the coup of 3 June 1907 and prepared himself for office by organising massacres and the torturing of peasants.

Stolypin acted as the agent of Russia's feudal landed nobility. He was also minister when the entire liberal bourgeoisie held counter-revolutionary attitudes. Consequently, he was able to turn to the bourgeoisie for assistance, sympathy and advice.

5

Stolypin helped the Russian people learn a useful lesson: either march to freedom under the leadership of the proletariat by overthrowing the Tsarist monarchy; or sink deeper into slavery and submit to the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie.

10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From Walter Duranty, *I Write As I Please*, published 1935. Duranty, an Anglo-American journalist, spent long periods in the Soviet Union and was based in Moscow during the New Economic Policy (NEP). Here Duranty is considering the NEP in the early 1920s.

In Moscow, communists and proletarian leaders criticised the NEP but to the mass of workers it brought jobs that would be paid in real money rather than valueless paper or mouldy rations. To traders, the NEP meant opportunity and the dawn of better days. Ill-informed foreigners like myself naturally saw first the surface features of the NEP – its reckless gambling and corruption – which were not the whole truth but real enough. Gambling halls and night clubs had no difficulty getting licences so long as part of the money went to the state. The Moscow authorities received some 4 million gold roubles from these licences in 1922, which was used to fund much-needed repairs to streets, drains and lighting.

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All over Moscow, half-ruined buildings were being restored and house fronts were being cleaned and painted. Shops, cafes and restaurants were being opened everywhere. The city was full of peasants selling produce or transporting building materials. Suddenly goods that had been hidden or hoarded began to appear. In a single year the supply of food and goods increased from starvation point to being almost adequate and prices fell accordingly. This was the real heart of the NEP whereas gambling and corruption were just its surface features.

25

30



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Source 1 from: 'The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook' By Philip G. Dwyer and Peter McPhee, Routledge 2002

Source 2 from: 'Stanislas Fréron, A History of the Royalist Reaction and the Misfortunes of the South', published 1796 quoted in Philip G. Dwyer and Peter McPhee (eds) The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook, Routledge 2002

Source 3 from: 'Lenin, Stolypin and Revolution,' published in Social Democrat, 18 October 1911' quoted in Robin Bunce, 'Russia in Revolution 1894–1924' Hodder Education 2017

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You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the conditions experienced by workers at the Lena Goldfields in 1912?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From 'Our Demands', a document sent by the Lena Goldfields miners to the managers of the Lenzoloto Mining Company, 2 March 1912. The Lena Goldfields mines were controlled by the Lenzoloto Mining Company.

We demand:

1. Improvements to ventilation and lighting in living quarters. Unmarried people should have one room for two people and families should have one room.
2. An eight-hour working day and no compulsory work on Sundays and holidays. Overtime work must be paid at a higher rate. 5
3. Working hours should be recorded and totalled every month. This work record should be freely available for workers to inspect.
4. Workers should receive medical aid and sick pay.
5. Managers cannot sack workers as they please, but only with the agreement of a workers' commission. 10
6. No forced women's labour.
7. Workers and managers should be issued with the same food. All food should be handed out in the presence of a worker representative.
8. Managers must address workers politely. 15

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, published 1932. By the late 1920s, Trotsky had been expelled from the Soviet Communist Party and exiled from the USSR. Here he considers the role of the Military Revolutionary Committee in October 1917.

The Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) weakened the Provisional government with the pressure of the masses and with the strength of the Petrograd garrison. Initially, the MRC built up its strength without openly challenging the government, as the workers and the garrison prepared themselves for insurrection. The MRC was weakening the Provisional government before overthrowing it. It was possible to apply this tactic only because of the superiority of the MRC's forces and because its support was increasing hour by hour. 20

The Provisional government's attempt to suppress the newspapers, prosecute the MRC and cut the Petrograd Soviet's telephone lines demonstrated that the government was preparing a counter-revolutionary coup d'état. What a superb signal for battle! Telegrams to all districts and units of the garrison announced the event. The telegrams stated: 'The enemy of the people took the offensive during the night. The Military Revolutionary Committee is leading the resistance to the assault of the conspirators.' The conspirators were the institutions of the Provisional government. 25 30

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Source 1 from: <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/315>

Source 2 from: <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/393>

Source 3 from: 'Our Demands' quoted in 'Russia in Revolution 1894–1924', Robin Bunce, Hodder Publication 2017

Source 4 from: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1930/hrr/ch41.htm>



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the reasons for the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From the Act of Abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, March 1917.

By the Grace of God, I, Nicholas, Emperor of Russia, make known to all My faithful subjects:

In this terrible struggle against the foreign enemy, God has confronted Russia with a new and formidable test. Troubles at home endanger a Russian victory in this hard-fought war. Russia's future, the honour of Our heroic army and the welfare of the people demand the war should be carried to a victorious conclusion at any price.

5

In these decisive days, I should follow the voice of My conscience by enabling the closest co-operation of My people and the organisation of all their resources for the speedy achievement of victory.

10

For these reasons, in agreement with the дума, I think it My duty to abdicate the Crown and give up supreme power.

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From General William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure 1918–20*, published 1931. Graves commanded the American interventionist forces that supported the Whites in Siberia during the Russian Civil War. Here, he reflects on Admiral Kolchak and the White forces in Siberia.

There was never enough popular support behind Kolchak in Eastern Siberia for him to have lasted one month if all Allied support had been removed. Kolchak was suspected of being pro-Tsarist. Certainly, he did not favour democracy. He hated, and in return was hated by, the Socialist Revolutionaries who at that time were by far the largest political group in Siberia. From the start, his regime was distrusted and detested by everyone except the military group who created it. The common people were the most hostile and they viewed the White dictatorship with a mistrust and alarm that grew in intensity.

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Under this White dictatorship, all the old vices of the Tsarist regime came back. Floggings and shootings again became the basis of army organisation. The officers gambled, drank, and stole military supplies, while the men starved. Representatives of workers were no longer admitted to official receptions, and the Whites' agrarian policy plainly showed that the clock had been turned back to pre-revolutionary times. Meanwhile a White Terror began that was far worse than anything perpetrated by the Reds. Not merely those suspected of being Bolsheviks, but also Socialists of any kind, and Liberals and Democrats, were slaughtered in their thousands.

25



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Source 1 from: *The French Revolution*, By Leonard W. Cowie, © Macmillan 1st edition, 1987

Source 2 from: *The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook*, By Phillip G. Dwyer and Peter McPhee, © Routledge 1st edition, 2002

Source 3 from: *The Russian Revolution*, By Niall Rothnie, © Macmillan, 1990

Source 4 from: *America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920*, By William Graves, © Formate Printing, 2019



5 'The Tsarist government was transformed in the years 1906–14.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that Stolypin's policies restored stability to Russia in the years 1906–14?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



Open your notebook in readiness, for the test.

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924**Sources for use with Question 2.**

Source 3: From the Act of Abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, issued March 1917.

By the Grace of God, I, Nicholas II, Emperor of all the Russias, to all my faithful subjects make known:

In these days of terrible struggle against the foreign enemy, who has been trying for three years to impose its will upon our country, God has willed that Russia should be faced with a new and formidable trial. Troubles at home threaten to have a fatal effect on the ultimate course of this hard-fought war. The future of Russia, the honour of our heroic army, the welfare of the people and the whole future of our dear country demand that the war should be carried to a victorious conclusion at any price. 5

This cruel foreign enemy is making his supreme effort, but we must ensure that the moment is at hand when our courageous army, working with our glorious allies, will overthrow the enemy once and for all. 10

In these days, which are decisive for the existence of Russia, I think I should follow the voice of my conscience by enabling the closest co-operation of my people and the organisation of all their resources for the speedy achievement of victory. 15

For these reasons, in agreement with the Duma of the Empire, I think it my duty to abdicate the Crown and give up the supreme power.

Source 4: From Alexander Kerensky, *The Road to the Tragedy*, published 1935. Here he considers Tsar Nicholas II's abdication.

When looking at this living mask of a ruler, I began to understand why the reins of government had slipped so easily out of Nicholas II's hands. He bore 'the burden of power' until the end. But, he would not fight for it: he had no wish to rule. Power, like everything else that was earthly and consequently humdrum, bored him, tired him, and no longer thrilled. 20

He calmly laid aside his royal sceptre to take up a gardener's spade. He gave up the throne like handing over a troop of horses. He threw aside his imperial rule just as in his youth he tossed aside one splendid military uniform to put on another. And now, he found it an interesting experience to be without a uniform at all - just an ordinary citizen, free of all duties and obligations. Without any inner drama he stepped out into private life. 'It was God's will' he said. Indeed, all those who observed him closely during his 'captivity' assert unanimously that, throughout this period, the former Emperor was generally in a calm and even happy mood. 25 30

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-
- 5** 'Tsarist government in the years 1894-1905 was fundamentally similar to Tsarist government in the years 1906-14.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** How accurate is it to say that Tsarism remained a fundamentally stable system of government in the years 1894–1914?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** How accurate is it to say that the nature of Tsarist autocratic rule was transformed in the years 1894–1914?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



- 7 How accurate is it to say that the nature of Tsarist government changed little in the years 1906–14?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate Rasputin's relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina during the First World War?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From letters written by Tsarina Alexandra to her husband, Tsar Nicholas II, in the years 1915–16. The Tsar was then at Russian army headquarters near the military front.

Please listen to Our Friend, Grigory Rasputin. He has your interest at heart. God sent him to us, so we must pay attention to what he says.

Forgive me, but I do not like the choice of General Polivanov as Minister of War. He is Our Friend's enemy and that brings bad luck. Our Friend regrets you did not speak to him more about your ministers and the changes you were thinking of making.

5

I must give you a message from Our Friend, prompted by a vision he saw in the night. He begs you to order the Russian army to advance near Riga. He says it is necessary, otherwise the German army will consolidate its position for the winter and it will result in endless bloodshed and trouble to remove them. Our Friend says that the most essential thing now is for the Russian army to advance. He says we can, and we must advance, and I was to write to you about it at once.

10

Grigory did beg you to name Protopopov as Minister of the Interior. You had such a good impression of Protopopov. He happens to belong to the дума, is not on the political left, and so will know how to deal with the assembly. God bless your new choice of Protopopov – Our Friend says you have done a very wise act in appointing him.

15



Source 4: From the wartime diaries of Maurice Paléologue, published 1925. Paléologue served as the French ambassador to Russia in the years 1914–17. Here he comments on Rasputin's influence over the Tsarina and the Tsar in his diary entry for 12 October 1915.

Does Rasputin have the same power over the Tsar as over the Tsarina? No, there is a difference. As regards the relations between Tsarina Alexandra and the holy man, Rasputin, she lives in a kind of hypnosis. Whatever opinion or desire Rasputin expresses, she agrees and obeys at once. His ideas are implanted in her brain without rousing the slightest opposition on her part. 20

The Tsar's fascination with Rasputin is much less passive and complete. The Tsar certainly thinks that Rasputin is a 'Man of God'. However, to a large extent, Nicholas II retains his independence of judgment when dealing with Rasputin. He never allows Rasputin to take the initiative. The Tsar's independence of mind, compared to the Tsarina, is particularly marked when Rasputin intervenes in a political matter. Then, Nicholas II adopts a silent and reserved manner. He concedes only after a long period of consideration, but the Tsar's natural good sense very frequently wins the day. 25 30

However, on the ethical and religious side, the Tsar is profoundly influenced by Rasputin. Nicholas II draws much quiet strength from Rasputin. As the Tsar said to one of his aides: 'When I'm worried, I have only to talk to Grigory for five minutes and I feel myself immediately soothed and strengthened. He always manages to say what I need to hear, and the effect of his wise words lasts several weeks.' 35

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Acknowledgements:

Source 1 from: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON A sourcebook By Philip Dwyer © Routledge, 2002

Source 2 from: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON A sourcebook By Philip Dwyer © Routledge, 2002

Source 3 from: Russia: Revolution and Counter-Revolution 1917-1924 By John Daborn © Cambridge University Press, 1991

Source 4 from: <https://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/memoir/FrAmbRus/pal2-03.htm>



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that Tsarist rule in the years 1906–14 was similar to Tsarist rule in the years 1894–1905?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the February 1917 Revolution in Russia?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From Victor Chernov, *The Great Russian Revolution*, published 1936. Chernov was a founder member of the Social Revolutionary Party (1902) and served briefly as Minister of Agriculture in the Provisional Government. Here he is commenting on the start of the February 1917 Revolution.

In February 1917, neither the Bolsheviks, nor the Mensheviks, nor the Social Revolutionaries seized the initiative in Russia. They did not lead the workers of Petrograd on to the streets. The workers were driven by something mightier than all these political groups: hunger.

The February disorders began with ordinary food riots because the bakery shops lacked bread. Long queues, initially mainly of women and boys, took out their resentment on the bakers, suspecting them of hoarding flour in order to make money. The police restored order but the protesters greeted them with hostile shouting. The people demanded 'Bread!' but then began to shout 'Down with the police!' But, as soon as thousands of voices were shouting for 'Bread' and 'Down with the police', there appeared the old slogans 'Down with the autocracy!' and 'Down with the war!'

There were disorders but still no revolution. There was no leader, but every revolutionary and democratic group rushed to join the protests. These groups were trying to attract as many people as possible and to inspire them with definite and militant political slogans.

Source 4: From Leon Trotsky, 'On the Eve of a Revolution', published in *New World* newspaper, 28 February 1917. *New World* was a US-based, left-wing Russian language newspaper for Russian immigrants in America. Trotsky, then a Marxist journalist, was working in the United States at the time and wrote this article as the first news of the unrest in Petrograd reached America.

On the streets of Petrograd in February 1917, the masses are demanding bread, peace and freedom. Transport in the city has stopped running and newspapers have stopped appearing. The workers have put down their tools, left their factories and have moved onto the streets. Now, two forces face each other: the revolutionary workers and the army of the Tsar. This workers' protest movement has been mobilised by a lack of bread. 20

The war has exposed the inadequacy of Tsarism and its allies, the nobility and the bourgeoisie. People began to realise that the Tsarist system was unable to cope with even the most basic military, industrial and supply problems in war time. At the same time, the misery of the people increased and became more and more acute. This was a natural result of the war and the criminal incompetence of Tsarism under the influence of Rasputin. 25

Under the stress of these events, a profound bitterness has spread among the masses, many of whom probably have never been influenced before by political propaganda. So, we have a disorganised, compromised government and an utterly demoralised army. The propertied classes are dissatisfied, uncertain and afraid. The proletariat are angry, numerically stronger than ever, and embittered by events. All this indicates that we are witnessing the beginning of a Russian revolution. 30 35

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Acknowledgements:

Source 1 from: *Documents and Debates: The French Revolution*, By Leonard W. Cowie, © Macmillan, 1988

Source 2 from: *The French Revolution: Introductory Documents*, By D. I. Wright (ed), University of Queensland Press 1974 & *The French Revolution 1787-1804*, P. M. Jones, © Routledge, London 2007

Source 3 from: Victor Chernov, *The Great Russian Revolution (1936)* in *Documents and Debates: The Russian Revolution*, Niall Rothnie, © Macmillan 1990

Source 4 from: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1918/ourrevo/ch08.htm>



- 7 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1914–17, the actions of Nicholas II were mainly responsible for the collapse of the Tsarist system?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the way the workforce at the Lena goldfields was treated in 1912?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From the work contract signed by all miners who worked in the Lena goldfields in the years 1911–12. The mines in the Lena goldfields were controlled by the Lenzoloto Mining Company.

The workers should undertake, in good faith, any mining work at the Lenzoloto company mines or wherever the management decides to send them. In no case may the workers refuse to undertake the work assigned to them, or decide to change the designated work on their own initiative for other tasks.

From 1 April until 1 October, the working day must consist of 11.5 working hours and, from 1 October until 1 April, the working day must consist of 11 hours. Lunch breaks are scheduled by the management and are not included in the hours of the working day. 5

In the winter months, workers will receive days off, as required by law. During the summer months, the management will assign days off to workers at least twice a month. 10

No worker has the right to ask to leave this employment before the end of their work contract.

The management has the right to dismiss a worker for the following reasons:

- (1) incompetent work 15
- (2) absence from work three days in a row without an appropriate reason
- (3) laziness at work
- (4) foolish behaviour at work
- (5) contraction of an infectious disease
- (6) gathering together a crowd that poses a threat to peace and order 20
- (7) any violation of the employment contract by the worker.

Source 4: From 'Our Demands', a document sent by the Lena goldfields miners to the managers of the Lenzoloto Mining Company, 2 March 1912.

We, the miners, demand:

1. Workers' living quarters should be expanded and improved, with free lighting and better ventilation. Unmarried people should have one room for two people and families should have one room. 25
2. A standard eight-hour working day. No compulsory work on Sundays and holidays. Overtime work must be paid at a higher rate.
3. Completed working hours for each worker should be recorded and totalled every month. This work record should be freely available for workers to inspect on a daily basis. 30
4. Workers should receive medical aid on request. Workers suffering any illness caused by the Lenzoloto company must continue to receive pay at the normal rate. For any other illnesses, workers should receive sick pay at half the full pay rate.
5. Managers should not sack workers as they please, but only with the agreement of a workers' commission. 35
6. Women should not be subject to forced labour.
7. Workers and managers should be issued with the same food. All food should be handed out in the presence of a worker representative.
8. Managers must address workers politely at all times. 40

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Source 1 from: <https://alphahistory.com/frenchrevolution/british-reports-september-massacres-1792/>

Source 2 from: *The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook*, Philip G. Dwyer and Peter McPhee (eds), Routledge, 2002 1st Edition

Source 3 from: *Russia in Revolution 1894–1924*, Robin Bunce, 1st Edition, Hodder Education, 2017

Source 4 from: *Russia in Revolution 1894–1924*, Robin Bunce, 1st Edition, Hodder Education, 2017



- 5 'The differences between the Revolutions of 1905 and February 1917 in Russia far outweigh their similarities.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



KEY TOPIC 3

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE BOLSHEVIK SEIZURE OF POWER, 1

10 questions in this sub-topic · 176 marks · lowest tariff first



2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the weaknesses of the Provisional Government?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From Dorian Blair, *Russian Hazard*, published 1937. Blair was a British secret service agent who worked in Russia in 1917. Here he considers the Provisional Government.

During each day, the members of the Provisional Government and their supporters held hectic conferences to decide what should be done. Then, in the evenings, they boasted loudly at public meetings, telling the people how splendid it would all be when they had done it.

The majority of Provisional Government members were completely incompetent, of course. They lacked any experience of political control. There was simply no tradition to guide them. Furthermore, the government was a coalition without clear objectives. The parties involved were mistrustful of each other and they had achieved their only aim by removing the Tsar. The only point they were at all united on was to continue with the war.

5

10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, published 1951. Serge was a Russian revolutionary and writer who joined the Bolsheviks in 1919. Here he comments on the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921.

At the end of spring 1921, Lenin defined what the New Economic Policy (NEP) would be. It was really a partial restoration of capitalism and the establishment of a dictatorship within the Bolshevik party. Within a few months, the NEP was already producing marvellous results. From one week to the next, famine and speculation were decreasing noticeably. Restaurants were opening once again and, wonder of wonders, pastries that were actually edible were on sale for a ruble each. People were talking about the return of capitalism and prosperity.

15

On the other hand, there was widespread confusion among ordinary Bolshevik party members. For what did we fight, spill so much blood and agree to so many sacrifices, they asked bitterly. The market was coming back and these Bolshevik members felt that capitalism, their defeated enemy, was now making a come-back.

20

Personally, I was less pessimistic than many Bolsheviks. I was glad that the economic changes of the NEP had taken place. However, the reactionary side of the NEP – the complete removal of every trace of democracy – worried and distressed me. The Bolshevik regime, through its intolerance and its imposition of an absolute monopoly of power, was struggling in its work and spreading a sort of general paralysis throughout the country.

25



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Source 1 from: Revolutions in early modern and modern Europe By Alan White, Daniel Nuttall & Oliver Bullock © Pearson Education, 2015

Source 2 from: The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook By Philip G. Dwyer & Peter McPhee © Routledge, 2002

Source 3 from: The Russian Revolution By Niall Rothnie © Macmillan Education UK, 1990

Source 4 from: Memoirs of a Revolutionary By Victor Serge © New York Review Books, 1975



2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From Alexander Kerensky, *The Prelude to Bolshevism: The Kornilov Rebellion*, published 1919.

Without the Kornilov affair in August 1917, there would not have been a Bolshevik takeover in October 1917. The Kornilov affair, a great crime and unforgivable sin, was committed by naïve dreamers, skilful politicians and bold adventurers who attempted to save Russia by means of a 'White General'.

In his proclamation to the Russian people, General Kornilov stated that the Provisional Government was acting under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets. But, before the Kornilov rising, the Soviets were leaning politically to the right and there had not been a Bolshevik majority in a single Soviet. After the Kornilov rising, the Bolsheviks gained majorities in the Soviets everywhere. Using the motto 'All power to the Soviets', a fatal conflict then began between the masses and responsible leadership in Russia.

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet dissolving the Constituent Assembly, issued 8 January 1918. The Decree was written by Lenin and endorsed by the Petrograd Soviet.

From the beginning of the February Revolution the Soviets brought the exploited masses together and led them in the fight for full political and economic freedom. The Soviets have learned from experience that it was pointless to compromise with the bourgeoisie. They have learned about the deception of bourgeois-democracy. The Soviets came to the conclusion that it would only be possible to free working people by rejecting compromises with the bourgeoisie. The October Revolution was the final break with the bourgeoisie.

The Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of arrangements made before the October Revolution. It represents a compromise with bourgeois power. Working people have learned from experience that bourgeois parliaments, like the Constituent Assembly, have outlived their usefulness. To deny full power to the Soviets in favour of the Constituent Assembly would be a step backward and a death blow to the October Revolution.

In view of this, the Central Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet hereby decrees that the Constituent Assembly is dissolved.



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Source 1 from: Page 1 and 2, *The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook*, Philip G. Dwyer and Peter McPhee (eds), Routledge, 2002

Source 2 from: Page 98-99, *The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook*, Philip G. Dwyer and Peter McPhee (eds), Routledge 1st Edition 2002

Source 3 from: *The Russian Revolution*, Niall Rothnie, Macmillan, 1st Edition, 1990

Source 4 from: *Russia in Revolution 1894–1924*, Robin Bunce, Hodder Education, 1st edition, 2017



- 6 'The fall of the Provisional Government in 1917 owed more to its domestic policies than to its decision to stay in the war.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 7 How accurate is it to say that opposition from the Petrograd Soviet was the main reason for the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a letter written by Lenin to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, 14 September 1917.

On July 3-4* it could have been argued that the correct thing for the Bolsheviks to do was to take power, for our enemies would in any case have accused us of revolution and ruthlessly treated us as rebels. However, to have decided in favour of taking power at that time would have been wrong, because the conditions for the victory of the revolution did not exist. 5

(1) We still lacked the support of the working class that is the vanguard of the revolution. We still did not have a majority among the workers and soldiers of Petrograd and Moscow. Now we have a majority in both Soviets. It was created solely by the history of July and August, by the experience of the ruthless treatment handed out to the Bolsheviks, and by the experience of the Kornilov revolt. 10

(2) There was no country-wide revolutionary upsurge at that time. There is now, after the Kornilov revolt; the situation in the provinces and the assumption of power by the Soviets in many localities prove this.

(3) Therefore, an insurrection on July 3-4 would have been a mistake; we could not have retained power either physically or politically. We could not have retained it physically even though Petrograd was at times in our hands, because at that time our workers and soldiers would not have fought and died for Petrograd. We could not have retained power politically on July 3-4 because, before the Kornilov revolt, the army and the provinces could and would have marched against Petrograd. 20

*July 3-4 - the July Days



Source 4: From Alexander Kerensky, *The Prelude to Bolshevism: The Kornilov Rebellion*, published 1919. Kerensky was Prime Minister of the Provisional Government at the time of the Kornilov Affair.

The Kornilov adventure was the prologue to the Bolshevik coup. Had there been no Kornilov affair in August, there would not have been a Bolshevik takeover in October 1917. And that is really the great crime, the unforgivable sin against our native country of those naïve dreamers, skilful politicians and bold adventurers who undertook to save Russia by means of a 'White General'. In his proclamation to the Russian people, General Kornilov, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, stated that the Provisional Government acted under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets. Whether Kornilov himself laboured under a delusion, or lied, is of no importance. But, there was nothing, nothing whatever, of the kind at the time in the Soviets, which were clearly leaning to the right. 25 30

Before the Kornilov rising there had not been a Bolshevik majority in a single Soviet. Nevertheless, Kornilov proved himself to be a remarkable prophet. Within a week after the Kornilov rising, the Soviets were taken over by the Bolsheviks. Then everywhere Bolshevik majorities came into being, and there began under the motto 'All power to the Soviets' the fatal conflict of the unrestrained masses against responsible leadership and order in Russia. 35

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- 7 How accurate is it to say that the collapse of the Provisional Government in 1917 was due to the Kornilov affair?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 7 How accurate is it to say that the February 1917 Revolution and the October 1917 Revolution were similar?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 6 'The differences between the revolutions of February 1917 and October 1917 far outweigh their similarities.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 6 'Kerensky's flawed leadership was the main reason for the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 7 How accurate is it to say that problems in agriculture were the main reason for the weakness of the Provisional Government in 1917?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



KEY TOPIC 4

BOLSHEVIK CONSOLIDATION: CIVIL WAR AND ECONOMIC POLICY, 1918–24

18 questions in this sub-topic · 360 marks · lowest tariff first



- 7 How accurate is it to say that lack of unity was the main reason for the defeat of the White forces in the Russian civil war?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 8 How significant was the New Economic Policy in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1921–24?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Opinion from Russia in 1921, 1921, 1921.

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924**Sources for use with Question 2.**

Source 3: From Bernard Pares, *My Russian Memoirs*, published 1931. Pares was a regular visitor to Russia before 1914 and served as British Military Observer to the Russian Army during the First World War. He was also in Russia during the civil war. Pares was a prominent academic specialising in Russian history.

It was not a surprise to me when Lenin declared his New Economic Policy. Of course, a man of such determination would never have given the signal for 'economic retreat', which meant in plain words a retreat from Communism, until he was compelled to. There were already signs enough that the development of the country was going completely against his theory. This retreat came with the victory in war over the Whites and their allies. Until then, Soviet Russia was like a besieged city and could only have a hand-to-mouth policy in economics as in anything else. But directly they had won their war, the Communists had to recognise the complete economic breakdown caused by the total application of their theory. This fact was recognised very sincerely by the Commissar for Industry, Rykov, in a report to a Congress of National Economic Councils in Moscow in January 1920.

Though the system had been applied during a civil war, this was, and was meant to be, not merely War Communism, such as is appropriate to a besieged city, but instead pure Communism. Its failure was self-evident.

Source 4: From a speech by Lenin delivered at the 9th Congress of Soviets in December 1921.

So far, comrades, we have handled things very, very badly in this economic area, as we must frankly admit. We must recognise this shortcoming in policy and not try to cover it up. We must do everything possible to eliminate it and understand that the foundation of our New Economic Policy lies in the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. There are only two ways in which proper relations between the working class and the peasants can be established in future. If large scale industry is flourishing, it can immediately supply the small peasants with a sufficient amount of goods, or more than previously. In these circumstances, a proper relationship can then be established between manufactured goods and the supply of surplus agricultural goods coming from the peasants. Then, the peasants, including the non-Party peasants, will acknowledge, by virtue of this experience, that this new system is better than the capitalist system. We speak of a flourishing large-scale industry, which is able to supply all the goods the peasants are in urgent need of, and this possibility now exists.

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8 To what extent did Bolshevik economic policies change in the years 1917–24?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 To what extent did the Bolshevik government consolidate communist rule in Russia in the years 1918-21?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 How significant was the impact of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918–24?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 How far do you agree that the survival of the Bolshevik regime, in the years 1917-21, owed more to the weaknesses of its opponents than to the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that the failure of foreign intervention in Russia was the main reason why the Bolsheviks were able to consolidate power in the years 1918–21?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a confidential report by a British diplomat, based in Russia, to the British government, 22 December 1917.

I quite understand that our first objective is to help to establish some power or force in the south of Russia. This however raises the big question whether such assistance should be open or secret.

Open assistance would give great moral encouragement to all parties who are opposed to the Bolsheviks. The governing council of the Ukraine* would be more sympathetic to our point of view if the council was openly recognised. Cossacks might also come in, and many thousands of Russian officers would join the movement. It might secure us the Black Sea Fleet and upset the Bolsheviks. 5

But the disadvantages are that it recognises the break-up of Russia. It would mean open opposition to the Bolsheviks and give Lenin's party the excuse they may be looking for to abandon the Russian wartime alliance. The Bolsheviks would then openly oppose us and hand back to the Germans captured German guns and German prisoners. 10

We can provide secret assistance, chiefly in the form of money. Such funds can be used to buy supplies and be given to various secret organisations with whom we can get in touch. It does not commit us in any way. But we have no guarantee as to how far it will be used according to our wishes and is therefore a pure gamble. 15

*Ukraine – a territory that formed part of the Tsarist Empire until 1917



Source 4: From R H Bruce Lockhart, *Memoirs of a British Agent*, published 1932.
Lockhart worked as a British secret agent in Moscow in 1918.

On 4 August 1918 Moscow went wild with excitement. The Allies had landed at the port of Archangel. Rumour abounded that the Allies had sent up to 100,000 men and the Japanese were to send seven army divisions through Siberia. In despair, the Bolsheviks began to pack up, ready for departure. I saw the local Bolshevik leader, Karachan, and he told me that the Bolshevik cause was lost. For forty-eight hours I fooled myself with the thought that the foreign intervention might prove a brilliant success. 20 25

When I next saw Karachan, he was smiling. He now said that the situation was not serious as the Allies had actually landed only a few hundred men. We had committed the unbelievable error of landing at Archangel with fewer than 1,200 men. 30

In the absence of a strong lead from the Allies, the various counter-revolutionary groups began to quarrel and argue among themselves. The accuracy of my prediction, that the support we would receive from the Russians would be in direct proportion to the number of troops we sent, was speedily proved. The majority of the Russian people remained completely apathetic. 35

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- 7 How accurate is it to say that the closing of the Constituent Assembly was the main reason for the onset of the Russian civil war?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that the Bolshevik regime succeeded in imposing central control over the Russian economy in the years 1917–24?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the impact of War Communism in the countryside?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a speech made by Fyodor Dan to the Eighth All-Russian Soviet Congress, 23 December 1920. Dan was a leading Menshevik. Here he comments on the policy of War Communism in the countryside.

So, we have seen, first and foremost, the adoption of a purely coercive policy towards the peasants. Yesterday, we were given figures that showed that during the last year the government extracted more grain from the peasants than the Tsarist government did in the last year of its life. I have to say that a food policy based on violence is bound to fail. War Communism has forcibly seized 300 million *pudy**. This has led to a decrease in the sown area everywhere of almost 25 per cent, a reduction in livestock and profound agricultural decline. 5

We consider that this policy of ever-deepening coercion of the peasants will be fatal. We warn you that this policy of deeper and more intense coercion of the peasantry can only lead to an unbridgeable gulf between town and country. Then the peasants, no longer in fear of the Tsar and landowners, will become the basis for a bourgeois counterrevolution in Russia. Everyone who holds the interests of the revolution dear must protest against this coercion. We must demand that the working class be allowed greater initiative, and remember that it is far easier to build socialism with a willingly-involved peasant class. 10 15

**pudy* – plural of *pood*, a Russian unit of weight equivalent to 16.4 kilograms



Source 4: From Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, published 1951. Serge was a Russian revolutionary and writer who joined the Bolsheviks in 1919. Here he comments on the policy of War Communism in the countryside.

The social system in these years was called War Communism. Anyone who, like myself, went so far as to consider it purely temporary was looked upon with contempt. The system for providing food had to be maintained since it catered primarily for the starved and battered proletariat, the army, the navy, and the party activists. And so requisitioning squads were sent out into the outlying countryside, only to be driven away, or sometimes even massacred, by peasants wielding pitchforks. Savage peasants would cut open a commissar's belly, fill it with grain and leave him by the roadside as a lesson for all. 20

This was how one of my comrades, a printing worker, died. It took place not far from Dno*. I went there afterwards to explain to the desperate villagers that it was all the fault of the blockade by the interventionist powers. This was true, but the peasants continued, not unreasonably, to demand both the abolition of requisitioning and the legalisation of the free market. 25

No one dared admit that this War Communism system would not work. The party did not know that, in February 1920, Trotsky had asked the Central Committee to abolish requisitioning. Rozhkov, the Marxist historian, wrote to Lenin saying that we were heading for a catastrophe: there must be an immediate change in the economic relationship between town and countryside. 30

* Dno – a railway town in north-west Russia

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Acknowledgements

Source 1 from: <https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.66298/page/n7/mode/2up>

Source 2 from: Considerations on the Principal Events of the French Revolution By Germaine de Staël
© Liberty Fund Inc, 2008

Source 3 from: The Soviet Union: A Documentary Reader Vol 1 By Edward Acton and Tom Stableford
© University of Exeter Press, 2005

Source 4 from: Memoirs of a Revolutionary By Victor Serge © New York Review Books, 1951



8 How significant was Trotsky's role in the Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 How accurate is it to say that the weaknesses associated with foreign intervention were primarily responsible for the defeat of the Whites in the Russian civil war?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that the New Economic Policy had little positive impact on the Russian economy in the years 1921–24?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 How significant was the peace of Brest-Litovsk in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918–24?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1918–24, the Bolshevik economic policies of War Communism and the New Economic Policy were similar?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 How accurate is it to say that Lenin's actions and attitudes were the main reason for the survival of the Bolshevik regime in the years 1917–24?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



MARK SCHEMES

official Pearson Edexcel mark schemes



Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the spread of revolutionary activity in the Russian Empire in 1905. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It provides evidence that revolutionary activity in 1905 spread beyond the main centres such as St. Petersburg ('In Kharkov...') - It suggests that different social groups participated in the revolutionary activity ('The whole population was on the streets ... demonstrators.', 'students directed by lawyers ... workmen and Jews ...') - It indicates that the Tsarist authorities in some areas could not cope with the spread of revolutionary activity in 1905 ('All the police ... national flag.', 'demonstration failed ... flag to shreds.'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The author, as a French diplomat based in Kharkov, would be well informed about the spread of revolutionary activity in the area - As a report written by a French diplomat to the French government, there would be no obvious reason to exaggerate or underplay the spread of revolutionary activity in Kharkov - The report was written in October 1905 at the height of the revolutionary crisis affecting Russia, although the experience of Kharkov may not have been typical. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - Revolutionary activity took place across the Tsarist Empire in 1905, e.g. St Petersburg, Moscow, Poland, the Ukraine, the Baltic, Georgia, Armenia, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Nizhny Novgorod - Various groups, motivated by a range of grievances, participated in revolutionary activity in 1905, e.g. workers, peasants, nationalities, the middle class, students and troops - The scale and spread of revolutionary activity compelled the Tsarist regime to make concessions, e.g. the October Manifesto.



Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the economic problems facing Russia during the First World War. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The surveillance role of the Tsarist secret police within the autocratic system would make the report a potentially informed source regarding wartime economic problems - The credibility of the report (which lists serious economic problems) is potentially enhanced by the fact it was produced by a Tsarist organisation - The report's content is confined to economic conditions in Petrograd in October 1916. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It provides evidence that Russia faced major economic problems that had an acute impact on the industrial proletariat ('impossibility of ... necessities', 'rise in earnings ... 300 per cent.') - It indicates that, due to these economic pressures, the Petrograd working class had reached breaking point ('prepared to go to the wildest excesses of a hunger riot.') - It claims that if the peasantry continues to withhold food from the major urban areas, there will be serious widespread social disorder in the cities ('... greatest disorders'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - To help fund the war effort, the Tsarist government abandoned the gold standard and printed more money to maintain wages and trade but this created severe inflation, which caused prices to spiral - Food supplies to the cities were disrupted due to military priorities, the collapsing railway network and food hoarding because the peasants had little incentive to sell their produce as they had nothing to buy - Lack of essential supplies, rising prices and deteriorating conditions radicalised industrial workers, e.g. waves of strikes in 1915-16.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the Tsarist system survived the 1905 revolution due to the concessions made by Nicholas II. Arguments and evidence that the survival of the Tsarist system was due to Nicholas II's concessions should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Witte's October Manifesto, which introduced a constitution and offered the prospect of a representative government, drove a wedge between the liberals and the workers, thus weakening the anti-Tsarist forces • The government's decision to halve redemption payments immediately and scrap them entirely by 1907 dampened peasant unrest • Official pledges to improve military conditions reduced discontent in the armed forces. Arguments and evidence that the survival of the Tsarist system was due to other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The key disaffected groups (liberals, peasants, workers, nationalists, students and workers) challenged the Tsarist system at different times, had different aims and failed to work together • The bulk of the army remained loyal to the regime, giving Nicholas II the capability to crush hard-line opposition such as the Moscow uprising • Under Durnovo and Stolypin, the authorities unleashed an effective policy of repression to 'pacify' Russia including the use of special military tribunals to dispense summary justice • The end of the Russo-Japanese war (1905) enabled the regime to strengthen its position with the return of troops from Manchuria in early 1906. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the most important consequence of the 1905 Revolution in Russia was the creation of the дума. Arguments and evidence that the most important consequence of the 1905 Revolution in Russia was the creation of the дума should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The creation of the дума provided Nicholas II with an opportunity to build a broadly-based political system that enjoyed popular support due to the participation of social classes previously unable to vote • Members of the дума had the right of free speech and parliamentary immunity, and the right to question ministers on government policy, which encouraged greater scrutiny of the autocratic regime • The creation of the дума led to fundamental civil freedoms being granted to the population, e.g. freedom of conscience, speech, assembly and association • From 1906 and 1917, the дума provided a forum for multiparty politics and criticism of the regime; in this sense, the дума undermined the autocratic system and came to be seen as a possible alternative to it. Arguments and evidence that counter or modify the view that the most important consequence of the 1905 Revolution in Russia was the creation of the дума should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The 1905 Revolution led to the implementation of other important reforms, e.g. tax arrears were cancelled, redemption payments were abolished, and Stolypin introduced agrarian reform • The 1905 Revolution led to a prolonged period of state repression, e.g. government clamp-downs in St. Petersburg and Moscow, and troops were used to crush rural revolts in 1906-07 • Nicholas II limited the дума's powers, e.g. the Tsar could veto any laws, dissolve the дума and appoint all ministers; the дума also had limited power over the budget and was restricted by the State Council. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the survival of the Tsarist system, in the years 1894–1906, owed more to the weaknesses of its opponents than to government policies. Arguments and evidence that the survival of the Tsarist system, in the years 1894–1906, owed more to the weaknesses of its opponents should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Liberal opposition to the Tsarist system had little influence in this period due to the relatively small size of the Russian middle class and liberal fears of inciting an all-engulfing mass revolt against autocracy • Marxist opposition had little impact because it attracted few adherents (40,000 by 1904), partly due to limited industrialisation; the Bolshevik-Menshevik split of 1903 also reduced the Social Democrat threat • The loosely organised Populists and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) were unable to mobilise the scattered peasant population into a viable opposition force; moderate-extremist divisions also weakened the SRs • Fundamental divisions between these groups prevented cooperation, e.g. liberals and Marxists disagreed over capitalism and political violence, and the SRs and Marxists had different conceptions of socialism. Arguments and evidence that the survival of the Tsarist system, in the years 1894–1906, owed more to government policies should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Before 1905, the government ensured that opposition parties faced an inhospitable legal climate – they were illegal organisations, further hampered by laws restricting freedom of speech and assembly • The Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, successfully infiltrated and destroyed revolutionary networks; the army was also used to break up strikes and demonstrations in this period • The October Manifesto, issued in 1905, offered a range of concessions, including a Duma, basic freedoms and voting rights, that placated moderate opponents of the Tsarist system • The Tsarist regime pursued repressive policies to maintain control in the wake of the 1905 Revolution, e.g. Stolypin's 'pacification' of the countryside, beginning in 1906. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how significant the opposition to Tsarism was in the years 1894-1905. Arguments and evidence that the opposition to Tsarism was significant in the years 1894-1905 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By the early 1900s liberalism had strongholds in the universities and <i>zemstva</i> to press for constitutional and economic reform; this was reinforced in 1904 by the League of Liberation's banquet campaign • The SR Combat Organisation, formed in 1902, had some impact on the Tsarist regime through its campaign of political assassination, e.g. killing Interior Minister Plehve, the Tsar's closest adviser, in 1904 • Russia's disaffected groups (middle-class liberals, workers, peasants and national minorities) participated in protests and revolutionary activity in 1905, forcing the Tsarist regime to make concessions. Arguments and evidence that the opposition to Tsarism was not significant in the years 1894-1905 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Liberal opposition to the Tsarist system had little influence in this period due to the relatively small size of the Russian middle class and liberal fears of inciting an all-engulfing mass revolt against autocracy • Marxist opposition had little impact because it attracted few adherents (40,000 by 1904), partly due to limited industrialisation; the Bolshevik-Menshevik split of 1903 also reduced the Social Democrat threat • The loosely organised Populists and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) were unable to mobilise the scattered peasant population into a viable opposition force; moderate-extremist divisions also weakened the SRs • Fundamental divisions between opposition groups prevented cooperation, e.g. liberals and Marxists disagreed over capitalism and political violence, and the SRs and Marxists had different conceptions of socialism • Throughout the period, Tsarism was able to rely on repression to contain the opposition, e.g. the Okhrana's use of infiltration tactics and military action.
	Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how significant revolutionary activity was in the Russian empire during the 1905 Revolution. Arguments and evidence that revolutionary activity in the Russian empire was significant during the 1905 Revolution should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Revolutionary activity took place across the Tsarist Empire in 1905 (e.g. St Petersburg, Moscow, the Ukraine, Baltic, Georgia, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Nizhny Novgorod) making it a significant threat to the regime • Various groups, motivated by a range of grievances, participated in revolutionary activity in 1905 (e.g. workers, peasants, nationalities, the middle class, students and troops), forming an anti-tsarist 'coalition' • The sheer scale and extent of popular protest and revolutionary activity in 1905 forced the Tsarist regime to make concessions, e.g. the October Manifesto and reducing/abolishing redemption payments. Arguments and evidence that revolutionary activity in the Russian empire was not significant during the 1905 Revolution should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Key disaffected social groups across the Empire challenged the Tsarist system at different times, had different aims and failed to work together for greater impact; much discontent was economic not revolutionary • Fundamental divisions between opposition groups prevented cooperation, e.g. liberals and Marxists disagreed over capitalism and political violence, and the SRs and Marxists had different conceptions of socialism • Revolutionary activity did not spread significantly to one key group - the military; the bulk of the army remained loyal, giving Nicholas II the capability to crush hard-line opposition, e.g. the Moscow uprising • The October Manifesto, which introduced a constitution and the prospect of representative government, drove a wedge between the liberals and the workers, thereby undermining anti-Tsarist activity in late 1905. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the 1905 Revolution was due to the impact of Bloody Sunday. Arguments and evidence that the 1905 Revolution was due to the impact of Bloody Sunday should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Government military action on Bloody Sunday destroyed the traditional view of the Tsar as the population's caring 'little father', thereby removing an important stabilising mechanism of social control for the regime • Bloody Sunday triggered a large wave of working-class protests, e.g. by February 1905, some 400,000 workers were on strike in major urban centres in response to the massacre • Bloody Sunday radicalised liberals, creating a more uncompromising and united opposition to the Tsarist regime; educated society was repelled by the massacre and universities became centres of political agitation • Many of the surviving Bloody Sunday demonstrators were expelled by the authorities from St. Petersburg and scattered across Russia; this spread news of the massacre, generating widespread discontent with the regime. Arguments and evidence that the 1905 Revolution was due to the impact of other factors/developments should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Tsarist regime's inept handling of the Russo-Japanese war increased liberal demands for more representative government; economic disruption caused by the war intensified working-class discontent with the regime • The long-term grievances of Russia's industrial workers sharpened their opposition to Tsarist government, e.g. long hours, poor living and working conditions, and low pay • Peasant resistance to Tsarism, which was driven by the burden of redemption payments and high taxes, and the problem of insufficient land • Nationalities within the empire resented the Tsarist policy of 'Russification' (concerning language, culture and religion) and the regime's opposition to their demands for self-determination. Other relevant material must be credited.



5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. - The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the nature of the White Terror in the mid-1790s. Source 1 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • Fréron, as one of the organisers of the coup of Thermidor, was actively involved in contemporary French politics and was therefore potentially in a good position to provide an informed account of the White Terror • The partisan nature of the source is reflected in the negative description of White Terror violence ('ruthlessly hacked to pieces.', 'gangs of hired murderers', 'slaughtered in a murderous frenzy.') • Fréron's account of the White Terror was mainly confined to events in Marseilles. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the nature of the White Terror in the mid-1790s: • It indicates that, in Marseilles and other southern towns, those suspected of involvement in the Terror were rounded up and imprisoned ('The prisons ... specific charge.') • It suggests that the brutal murder of these suspects in Marseilles and elsewhere was driven by a public frenzy of revenge killings ('Everywhere ... massacres.', 'It was not hard ... terrorist.') • It indicates that royalists played a key role in the White Terror ('royalists rounded up anyone they suspected of being a Jacobin.', 'Some of those responsible ... Company of the Sun.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • The White Terror was a violent reaction against those seen as responsible for, or gaining from, the Terror of 1793-94; the bloodiest reprisals took place in the north-west and southern regions of France • The street killings and prison murders associated with the White Terror accounted for approximately 2,000 deaths in 1795 • Royalists were involved in the White Terror, but most participants were not royalists and simply wanted revenge against the popular societies, the watch committees and the beneficiaries of the revolution. Source 2 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences:

Question	Indicative content
	• Duval was an active member of the Gilded Youth in Paris and was therefore potentially in a good position to provide an informed account of the White Terror in the capital • The partisan nature of the source is reflected in Duval's use of language ('vulgar manners ... Jacobins.', 'the Jacobin masses ... were still a threat', 'our number was impressive.') • Duval's account of the White Terror was confined to the Gilded Youth's activities in Paris. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the nature of the White Terror in the mid-1790s: • It indicates that the main target of the White Terror in Paris was the Jacobins ('they formed an army in Paris to oppose the Jacobin masses', 'mocking the Jacobins', 'To the Jacobin Club!') • It indicates that the Gilded Youth attracted young people from upper-class backgrounds who had been adversely affected by the revolution/Terror and middle-class adherents ('The Gilded Youth ... bourgeois people.') • It suggests that the Gilded Youth's anti-Jacobin activities in Paris escalated ('Initially, we ... to the Jacobins!', 'we punished ... entered the hall.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • The Gilded Youth were vigilante anti-Jacobin gangs organised in Paris and south-eastern cities; numbering 2000-3000 in the capital, they attacked groups, symbols and institutions associated with the Terror of 1793-94 • The Gilded Youth attracted the sons of suspects and the executed, clerical workers in banking and law, actors, musicians and army deserters; initially they roamed the streets targeting <i>sans-culottes</i> and Jacobins • By early November 1794, the Gilded Youth had begun to attack Jacobin Club meetings and the group's assault on the Jacobin Club (12 November) gave the Convention the pretext to close the club down permanently. Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources suggest that the Jacobins and their supporters were the principal targets of the White Terror in the mid-1790s • Both sources suggest that the White Terror was a violent form of popular reaction against the Terror of 1793-94 • These points of agreement are reinforced due to the different positions of the authors (an organiser of Thermidor/government representative and a former member of the Gilded Youth).

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to shed light on Rasputin's relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina during the First World War. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The Tsarina was one of the three people involved and would thus be able to offer a first-hand account of the relationship between Rasputin and the royal couple • Its purpose and aims are evident from the tone of the language used by the Tsarina to try to persuade the Tsar to carry out Rasputin's wishes ('You had such ... Protopopov.', 'He says it is necessary ... remove them.') • The nature of the source (personal letters) suggests that the Tsarina is being candid about Rasputin's relationship with the imperial couple. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about Rasputin's relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina during the First World War: • It provides evidence of the close relationship Rasputin enjoyed with the Tsar and Tsarina through the personal references made to him in the letters ('Grigory did beg you', 'Our Friend') • It suggests that the Tsarina in particular was under the influence of Rasputin ('Our Friend says appointing him.', 'I must give you a message from Our Friend') • It provides evidence that Rasputin used his relationship with the royal couple to try to influence government decisions ('Grigory did beg you to name Protopopov', 'begs you to order the army to advance near Riga.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • From 1905, Rasputin enjoyed a personal relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina because of his apparent ability to control the bleeding of their haemophiliac son, Alexis • The Tsarina, as an extremely devout woman, held Rasputin, a self-styled 'man of God', in high regard and defended him against all criticism • Through the Tsarina, Rasputin influenced some of the Tsar's ministerial appointments during the war, e.g. the appointment of Khvostov and Protopopov as Minister of the Interior in 1915 and 1916 respectively. Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences:

Question	Indicative content
	- As a senior diplomat with access to government ministers and the imperial court, Paléologue was likely to be well informed about Rasputin's relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina during the First World War - The material in this source suggests that its main purpose was to draw a distinction between Rasputin's relationship with the Tsarina and his relationship with the Tsar ('No ... difference.', 'The Tsar's ... complete.') - The personal nature of the source (a private diary) suggests that Paléologue is being candid about the relationship between Rasputin, Nicholas and Alexandra. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about Rasputin's relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina during the First World War: - It suggests that Rasputin's relationship with the Tsarina was one of control and domination ('she lives in a kind of hypnosis.', 'she agrees and obeys at once.') - It claims that the Tsar, in his relationship with Rasputin, exercised more independence of mind, particularly on political issues ('He never ... initiative.', 'The Tsar's independence ... political matter.') - It indicates that Rasputin exerted a religious/ethical influence in his relationship with the Tsar ('However, on ... by Rasputin.', 'I feel myself immediately soothed and strengthened.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - During the period of 'Tsarina's rule' from September 1915, Alexandra depended heavily on Rasputin's personal advice to defend a 'pure' autocratic system; she also facilitated Rasputin's system of patronage - The Tsar did not always agree with Rasputin's views, regarding them as 'sometimes very strange', e.g. he ignored Rasputin's advice to order a military advance on Riga in 1915 - The Tsar chose to ignore evidence/reports of Rasputin's debauched lifestyle, preferring instead to view his religious demeanour when in the presence of the imperial family as a genuine sign from God. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both sources indicate that Rasputin's relationship with the Tsarina was based on his influence over her and her dependency on him - Both sources suggest that Rasputin attempted to use his relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina to influence important political and military decisions - The points of agreement are reinforced due to the different positions of the authors (one of the three people in the relationship and a foreign ambassador posted to Russia).

Section B: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1789–90, the status and authority of the French monarchy was not seriously undermined. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1789–90, the status and authority of the French monarchy was not seriously undermined should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In 1789, the National Assembly rejected the idea that the monarchy should be abolished, accepted that the King should keep 'supreme power' and upheld the hereditary principle in the male line • Louis XVI was granted 25 million <i>livres</i> to ensure that the King's family could continue to live in a manner befitting its royal status • Louis XVI retained his executive functions and was responsible for the appointment of his own ministers, ambassadors and military commanders • The King maintained some legislative power in the form of a suspensive veto, which allowed him to delay or suspend laws created by the National Assembly, for up to four years. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1789–90, the status and authority of the French monarchy was seriously undermined should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Louis XVI's royal status was effectively downgraded by his new title 'King of the French', which was intended to make clear that he did not own the kingdom of France and the French people were citizens, not his subjects • The Parisian crowd seriously undermined royal status/authority in the years 1789–90, e.g. the October Days (1789) forced the King to return to Paris and accept the August Decrees/Declaration of the Rights of Man • The National Assembly introduced measures that undermined crown patronage, feudal privilege and divine right, e.g. the August Decrees (1789) and the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790) • The National Assembly accepted the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), which introduced Enlightenment ideas that directly challenged the absolutist traditions of the French monarchy • Louis XVI's reluctance to accept these changes in 1789–90 clearly demonstrated that he considered they were seriously undermining his status and authority. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how significant the threat posed by the Vendée revolt was to the survival of the Republic in 1793. Arguments and evidence that the threat posed by the Vendée revolt to the survival of the Republic in 1793 was significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Convention was forced to divert 30,000 troops from the revolutionary war front to deal with the Vendée rebels, thus undermining the war effort and increasing the risk of defeat for the Republic • Pro-royalist and anti-revolutionary sentiment in the Vendée undermined the Republic's provincial authority, e.g. rebels killed government officials, constitutional priests and National Guard members in the region • The Vendée rebels opposed key policies of the Republic, such as conscription and the civil constitution, and the authorities felt compelled to combat such defiance by establishing the Committee of Public Safety • The Vendée revolt posed a significant threat because it united elements from all three estates in an 'anti-Paris' coalition which was determined to preserve their traditional way of life. Arguments and evidence that the threat posed by the Vendée revolt to the survival of the Republic in 1793 was not significant/the threat posed by other factors to the survival of the Republic in 1793 was significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Vendée revolt, as a very localised form of counter-revolution, failed to coordinate with the 'federalist revolts' elsewhere in France; this limited the threat posed by the revolt • The Vendée rebels were not a real threat to the survival of the Republic since they were poorly disciplined, not used to set-piece battles, and reluctant to move very far from their homes • The Republic was able to muster both the determination and the military resources to crush the revolt convincingly, e.g. the government's victory at Le Mans (Dec 1793), which left 15,000 rebels dead • Other factors posed more significant threats than the Vendée revolt, notably the foreign military threat to the Republic posed by the First Coalition in 1793. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how significant the spread of revolutionary activity was in the Russian Empire during the 1905 Revolution. Arguments and evidence that the spread of revolutionary activity was significant in the Russian Empire during the 1905 Revolution should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Revolutionary activity took place across the Tsarist Empire in 1905 (e.g. St Petersburg, Moscow, the Ukraine, Baltic, Georgia, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Nizhny Novgorod), making it a significant threat to the regime • Various groups, motivated by a range of grievances, participated in revolutionary activity in 1905 (e.g. workers, peasants, nationalities, the middle class, students and troops), forming an anti-tsarist 'coalition' • Revolutionary activity undermined the authority of the regime in the regions, e.g. by summer 1905, the Tsarist system had effectively lost control of about 15 per cent of rural Russia and many provincial towns • The significance of the scale/extent of popular protest and revolutionary activity forced the Tsarist regime to make meaningful concessions, e.g. the October Manifesto and reducing/abolishing redemption payments. Arguments and evidence that the spread of revolutionary activity was not significant in the Russian Empire during the 1905 Revolution should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Key disaffected social groups across the Empire challenged the Tsarist system at different times, had different aims and failed to work together for greater impact; much discontent was economic, not revolutionary • Fundamental divisions between opposition groups prevented co-operation, e.g. liberals and Marxists disagreed over capitalism and political violence, and the SRs and Marxists had different conceptions of socialism • Revolutionary activity did not spread significantly to one key group - the military; the bulk of the army remained loyal, giving Nicholas II the capability to crush hard-line opposition, e.g. the Moscow uprising • The October Manifesto, which introduced a constitution and the prospect of representative government, drove a wedge between the liberals and the workers, thereby undermining anti-Tsarist activity in late 1905. Other relevant material must be credited.

5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. - The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the rights of the French nobility before the 1789 revolution. Source 1 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • Mercier was an experienced observer of French society in the 1780s and thus was likely to possess informed views about the rights of the nobility • Mercier was clearly critical of the rights of the nobility as shown in his choice of language ('those arrogant noble gentlemen', 'oppress the poor despondent peasant') • Mercier's observations were published at the time, which suggests he was trying to influence literate French opinion in the 1780s. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the rights and privileges of the French nobility before the 1789 revolution: • It suggests that the nobility possessed significant rights in pre-revolutionary France ('rights over hunting, fishing and cutting wood', 'by imposing their own taxes') • It indicates that the nobles were constantly seeking to extend their rights ('begging ... for pensions, placements and positions.', 'want all ... for themselves') • It implies that the nobility used these rights to set themselves apart socially and economically ('effectively shut themselves away ... of France.', 'not allow common people ... reward') • It suggests that nobles were able to obtain influential positions within the French Church ('secure roles and paid positions within the Church.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Prior to the 1789 revolution, the French nobility had many rights, including exemption from military service and entitlement to various feudal dues

Question	Indicative content
	- The nobility was either exempt from taxation (notably the <i>taille</i> and the <i>gabelle</i>) or else minimised what they were expected to pay - Many ordinary people resented the nobles' rights, which derived from land ownership and tax exemption and considered the Second Estate was avoiding its fair share of the tax burden. Source 2 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - The <i>cahier</i> extracts are based on the concerns and fears of the French nobility and therefore potentially offer an informed view of their rights before the 1789 revolution - The source focuses on the position of the nobility in just two areas of northern France; since the king had requested this information, the nobility may have been more candid about their rights - The partisan nature of the source is evident from the language employed to reinforce points ('sacred rights of property', 'excessive and disproportionate.', 'prerogatives ... dignity'). 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the rights and privileges of the French nobility before the 1789 revolution: - It implies that the nobility wanted to defend their rights and that their position rested on the <i>ancien régime</i> ('preserve ... must belong to it', 'recognise ... the hereditary principle', 'distinction ... constitution.') - It suggests that the nobles were able to protect their own feudal interests by exercising judicial authority in their areas ('The seigneurial courts ... French justice system') - It suggests that some of the nobility considered that they were at a disadvantage regarding rights ('The concerns ... favours of the royal court.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The nobility, numbering 120,000-350,000 was the wealthiest and most privileged estate under the <i>ancien régime</i>; nobles usually inherited their titles, which bestowed rights - Seigneurial courts enabled nobles to appoint judges and officials and exert considerable coercive powers over vassals; in effect, nobles judged their own cases as all feudal obligation defaults were tried there - Provincial nobles were the poorest members of the Second Estate; they resented the greater wealth of the court nobles and their access to Louis XVI's court that facilitated royal patronage, e.g. land, offices and money.

Question	Indicative content
	Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources suggest that, before the 1789 revolution, the French nobility enjoyed extensive rights • Both sources suggest that the French nobility were determined to protect their rights • These points of agreement are reinforced due to the different positions of the authors (a contemporary critic of the nobility and members of the nobility in northern France).

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the reasons for the February 1917 Revolution in Russia. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a prominent participant in Russian politics at the time, Chernov was in a good position to provide an informed account of the reasons for the February Revolution - Although a senior SR, Chernov makes no partisan claims about the role of the Social Revolutionaries in triggering the February Revolution, which enhances the credibility of the account - Chernov's account was published almost twenty years after the event, which suggests he has had time to reflect on the reasons for the February Revolution. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the February 1917 Revolution in Russia: - It implies that the onset of the February 1917 Revolution was not politically motivated ('neither the Bolsheviks ... did not lead the workers of Petrograd on to the streets') - It suggests that the February Revolution was triggered by food shortages and then popular protest also targeted other discontents ('The people demanded 'Bread!', 'there appeared the old slogans') - It suggests that anti-tsarist groups tried to channel this popular discontent in order to gain support and give the protests political direction ('These groups ... militant political slogans.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - On 23 February 1917 thousands of women demonstrated in Petrograd against food shortages and the war; within two days, strikes involving 250,000–300,000 workers paralysed the city - The revolutionary parties played little part in the February Revolution, e.g. the Bolsheviks numbered no more than 10,000 at this time and virtually all their leaders were in exile - The amnesty that followed Nicholas II's abdication (2 March) encouraged anti-tsarist groups to attempt to fill the power vacuum created by the collapse of the autocracy.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • Since Trotsky was living abroad at the time, he may not have been in a good position to provide an informed account of the reasons for the February Revolution • The partisan nature of the source is reflected in Trotsky's use of language ('criminal incompetence of Tsarism', 'disorganised, compromised government', 'an utterly demoralised army.') • As the source was an article in a contemporary US-based Russian language newspaper, it was clearly designed to influence its immigrant readership's views regarding events in Russia in February 1917. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the February 1917 Revolution in Russia: • It suggests that the mass protests in Petrograd in February 1917 were motivated by hunger, war weariness and discontent with the regime ('the masses are demanding bread, peace, and freedom.') • It suggests that the February Revolution was sparked by the inability of the autocratic system to cope with the demands of the war, fuelling popular discontent ('People began ... problems in war time.') • It implies that the mass discontent in February was spontaneous rather than politically inspired by anti-tsarist groups ('a profound bitterness ... never been influenced before by political propaganda.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • By late 1916, popular discontent in Petrograd was mounting since the city was receiving only about one third of its food requirements due to transport disruption, military priorities and peasant hoarding • The Tsarist system's inept handling of the war alienated and radicalised sections of the Russian population, e.g. the failure to control inflation and the damaging role played by the Tsarina and Rasputin • The February Revolution in Russia was caused by mass economic and social discontent and driven by ordinary Russians, e.g. workers, students, army personnel and grass roots socialists. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources suggest that the February Revolution in Russia was caused by spontaneous mass discontent regarding economic and social conditions; it was not motivated by anti-tsarist political groups • Both sources suggest that the February Revolution in Petrograd was initially triggered by bread shortages that brought people out onto the streets in protest • These points of agreement are reinforced due to the different positions of the authors (a Social Revolutionary and a Marxist) although both were opposed to the Tsarist regime.



Section B: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the impact of war with Austria and Prussia was the main reason for the collapse of constitutional monarchy in France in the years 1791–92. Arguments and evidence that the impact of war with Austria and Prussia was the main reason for the collapse of constitutional monarchy in France in the years 1791–92 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Louis XVI's self-interested support for the onset of war and suspected support for the Austrian Emperor encouraged the belief that he was a threat to French security and secretly plotting to reinstate absolutism • The French retreat from the Austrian Netherlands in April–May 1792 due to military weaknesses led to accusations that Louis and the Austrian Committee had betrayed France and supported counterrevolution • Louis XVI's actions in June 1792 when France faced the threat of invasion undermined his position, e.g. royal vetoes regarding refractory priests and the <i>fédérés</i> and the dismissal of Girondin ministers • The Brunswick Manifesto (August 1792) issued by the Prussian army commander led 47 out of 48 Sections in Paris to call for the abolition of the monarchy and helped to trigger the <i>journée</i> of 10 August. Arguments and evidence that other factors/developments were the main reason for the collapse of constitutional monarchy in France in the years 1791–92 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The disastrous consequences of Louis' flight to Varennes in 1791 and his proclamation to the French people undermined the support of moderate politicians and caused popular resentment • France's economic problems in the early 1790s fuelled popular discontent that undermined the constitutional monarchy, e.g. poor harvests, shortage of imported goods, rising prices, and mounting unemployment • The role of the Cordeliers Club and the fraternal and popular societies in mobilising and politicising the Parisian <i>sans-culottes</i> against all forms of privilege, e.g. the <i>journées</i> of June and August 1792 • Church reform, notably the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, led to opposition from Catholic bishops, priests and parishioners, and political polarisation, which undermined constitutional monarchy. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the Terror of 1793-94 and the White Terror of the mid-1790s were markedly different. Arguments and evidence that the Terror of 1793-94 and the White Terror of the mid-1790s were markedly different should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Jacobin Terror and the White Terror were different since the latter represented a violent anti-Jacobin backlash after the collapse of Jacobin power following Robespierre's fall in July 1794 • In terms of scale, the Jacobin Terror was much more brutal than the White Terror, e.g. estimates for 1793-94 put the death toll at 150,000-200,000 whereas around 2,000 died due to the White Terror in 1795 • The Jacobin Terror and the White Terror were driven by different social groups; the <i>sans-culottes</i> were drawn from the working and lower middle classes whereas the <i>jeunesse dorée</i> tended to be more bourgeois • The <i>jeunesse dorée</i> developed their own sub-culture (based on dress, songs and ballads), which was deliberately designed to distinguish them from the appearance and outlook of the <i>sans-culottes</i> and Jacobins. Arguments and evidence that the Terror of 1793-94 and the White Terror of the mid-1790s were not markedly different should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Both the Jacobin Terror of 1793-94 and the White Terror of the mid-1790s were extreme expressions of popular radicalism and political violence, which involved a cross-section of the French population • Both the Jacobin Terror and the White Terror were most evident in the same parts of France, such as Paris, Lyon, Marseilles, Toulon and the Rhône valley • Both the Jacobin Terror and the White Terror were either promoted or accepted by the authorities at the time, e.g. the Committee of Public Safety and the Thermidorean Convention • Both the Jacobin Terror and the White Terror were justified by their proponents as necessary measures, which were designed to safeguard France against 'subversive' elements within society. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the Russo-Japanese war, rather than domestic problems, was the main reason for the revolution in Russia in 1905. Arguments and evidence that the Russo-Japanese war was the main reason for the revolution in Russia in 1905 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Tsarist regime's inept handling of the war angered liberal opinion and increased liberal demands for a more representative system of government, e.g. the holding of political banquets in November 1904 • The war disrupted Russia's economy, leading to rising unemployment and increased food prices, which intensified working class discontent with the regime • Defeat by the 'inferior' Japanese was viewed by the wider population as a national humiliation and completely undermined the Tsarist regime's strategy of quelling domestic opposition through an 'easy' military victory • The Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), which concluded the war, hardened domestic opposition to the autocracy by forcing Russia to abandon Port Arthur and give up its ambitions in Manchuria. Arguments and evidence that domestic problems were the main reason for the revolution in Russia in 1905 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The long-term grievances of Russia's industrial workers sharpened their opposition to Tsarist government, e.g. long hours, poor living and working conditions, and low pay • Peasant resistance to Tsarism, which was driven by the burden of redemption payments and high taxes, and the problem of insufficient land • Nationalities within the empire resented the Tsarist policy of 'Russification' (concerning language, culture and religion) and the regime's opposition to their demands for self-determination • The immediate impact of the events of 'Bloody Sunday' in January 1905, e.g. destruction of the autocrat's 'little father' image, large-scale strikes and protests in major cities and a radicalised liberal opposition. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the Tsarist system survived the 1905 Revolution due to the government's use of force. Arguments and evidence that the Tsarist system survived the 1905 Revolution due to the government's use of force should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The bulk of the army remained loyal to the regime, giving Nicholas II the capability to crush hard-line opposition, e.g. army units used artillery fire to defeat the Moscow uprising, leaving over 1,000 dead • Under Durnovo and Stolypin, the authorities unleashed an effective policy of military repression to 'pacify' Russia in 1906-07, including the use of courts martial to dispense summary justice; around 2400 were executed • The end of the Russo-Japanese war (1905) enabled the regime to strengthen its military position against its domestic opponents with the return of troops from Manchuria in early 1906. Arguments and evidence that the Tsarist system survived the 1905 Revolution due to other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Witte's October Manifesto, which introduced a constitution and offered the prospect of a representative government, drove a wedge between the liberals and the workers, thus weakening the anti-Tsarist forces • The government's decision to halve redemption payments immediately, and then scrap them entirely by 1907, dampened peasant unrest • The key disaffected groups (liberals, peasants, nationalists, students and workers) challenged the autocracy at different times, had different aims and failed to work together • The military could not be entirely relied on to defend the regime since, in the period October-December 1905, there were 211 separate mutinies in the army and, in June 1905, sailors on the battleship Potemkin revolted. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into Nicholas II's attitudes towards the dumas. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It provides evidence that Nicholas II considered the assembly was challenging his authority ('strayed into spheres beyond their competence') - It indicates that from the Tsar's view the Duma had inappropriately expanded its role in several ways ('enquiring into ... local authorities', 'commenting on ... the Fundamental Laws', 'appeal ... to the nation') - It provides evidence that Nicholas II was determined to maintain his authority by taking measures against the Duma and those influenced by the assembly's actions ('We shall impose Our imperial will ... the State'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The status of the source (an imperial proclamation) offers Nicholas II's perspective on the dumas - Its purpose and aims are evident from the formal tone of the language used to reinforce the primacy of the Tsar's authority ('dashed Our expectations', 'only be modified by Our imperial will') - The public nature of the document indicates that Nicholas wishes the Russian population to be fully aware of his displeasure with the dumas. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - Nicholas II's relationship with the First Duma foundered due to disagreements over a variety of issues, e.g. redistribution of land, a general political amnesty and factory reform - Nicholas II's dissolution of the First Duma prompted Kadet and Trudovik deputies to issue the Vyborg Manifesto, which called for popular resistance but most people ignored this appeal - By altering the electoral law to the duma in 1907 (to give greater influence to more affluent groups) Nicholas II revealed his critical attitude towards popular representation.

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into opposition to the Bolshevik regime in the early 1920s. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The Kronstadt Temporary Revolutionary Committee represented rebel sailors and workers and thus would be in a good position to provide an insight into opposition to Bolshevik rule in the early 1920s - The tone of the article suggests that the committee was seeking to justify the actions of the Kronstadt rebels ('Here at Kronstadt ... socialist creativity') - The source is confined to the early months of 1921 and essentially deals only with the Kronstadt revolt. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It provides evidence of opponents' objections to Bolshevik rule in the early 1920s ('offer the workers ... Cheka', 'the new bureaucracy ... officials', 'drowning all ... labour's revolution') - It provides evidence of some of the aims of the anti-Bolshevik opposition ('freely elected soviets ... intellectuals') - It suggests that other groups are discontented with Bolshevik rule ('the protests of the peasants ... their circumstances') - It indicates that the Kronstadt rebels viewed the Bolshevik regime as more oppressive than the Tsarist government ('exceed many times ... the Tsarist regime'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - The Kronstadt revolt embodied the deep disillusion with Bolshevik rule by the early 1920s because, in 1917, the Kronstadt sailors had been staunch supporters of the communist takeover in Russia - The Kronstadt rebels demanded an end to the one party communist state and the establishment of a democratic working-class government and guaranteed worker rights (e.g. freedom of speech, press, association) - The Bolsheviks also faced other forms of opposition in the early 1920s, e.g. the Whites and foreign interventionists in the civil war, peasant revolts in Tambov/Ukraine, and major demonstrations in Moscow and Petrograd.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99**

Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into Rasputin's relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It provides evidence of the close relationship Rasputin enjoyed with the Tsar and Tsarina through the personal references made to him in the letters ('Gregory did beg you', 'our Friend') - It suggests that the Tsarina in particular was under the influence of Rasputin ('our Friend says naming him', 'I must give you a message from our Friend') - It provides evidence that Rasputin used his relationship with the royal couple to try to influence government decisions ('Gregory did beg you to name Protopopov', 'begs you to order the army to advance near Riga'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The Tsarina was one of the three people involved and would thus be able to offer a first-hand account of the relationship between Rasputin and the royal couple - Its purpose and aims are evident from the tone of the language used by the Tsarina to try to persuade the Tsar to carry out Rasputin's wishes ('You had such a good impression of Protopopov', 'He says it is necessary ... make them move') - The nature of the source (private letters) suggests that the Tsarina is expressing her views candidly. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - From 1905, Rasputin enjoyed a personal relationship with the Tsar and Tsarina because of his apparent ability to control the bleeding of their haemophiliac son, Alexis - The Tsarina, as an extremely devout woman, held Rasputin, a self-styled 'man of God', in high regard and defended him against all criticism - Through the Tsarina, Rasputin was able to influence some of the Tsar's ministerial and other appointments in 1915-16 but his ability to do this was exaggerated by political opponents.

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the difficulties facing Kerensky's government in 1917. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - As a diplomat based in Russia at the time, Lockhart was in a good position to provide an informed account of the difficulties facing Kerensky's government in 1917 - The material in this source suggests that its main purpose was to assert that the fall of the pro-war Kerensky government was inevitable ('even if Kerensky had shot Lenin and Trotsky ... on his anti-war programme') - Since Lockhart's memoir was published in 1932, the passage of time may have influenced his recollections of the Kerensky government's difficulties e.g. knowledge of the outcome for the Provisional Government may have encouraged an 'inevitability' approach to the problem of the war. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It suggests that the political elites had little control over the revolutionary process in 1917 and that the initiative resided with the people ('from the beginning control of the situation') - It indicates that Kerensky's main difficulty arose from his insistence that Russia should continue to participate in the war ('It was because he would not make peace that Kerensky went under') and this facilitated the Bolsheviks' takeover - It indicates that shooting Lenin and Trotsky would not have eased the Kerensky government's difficulties because other anti-war opponents would have replaced them and taken power ('some other anti-war leader ... on his anti-war programme'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - The Provisional Government's authority was limited by its 'dual power' relationship with the popularly-based Petrograd Soviet; soviets were also created in all the major cities and towns across Russia as political vehicles for 'people power' - The Kerensky government had little choice but to adopt a pro-war policy because of upper and middle class demands for territory, Russia's treaty obligations to the allies and fear that a German victory would dismember the empire - Continued participation in the war led to mounting defeats (e.g. the June 1917 offensive), demoralisation and war-weariness which undermined Kerensky's government and led to growing support for the Bolsheviks' anti-war platform.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99**

Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the reasons for the February Revolution in 1917. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It implies that the onset of the February 1917 Revolution was not politically motivated ('Neither the Bolsheviks ... led the workers of Petrograd on to the streets') - It suggests that the February Revolution was triggered by food shortages and then popular protest also targeted other discontents ('The people demanded 'Bread!', 'there appeared the old slogans') - It suggests that anti-tsarist groups tried to channel this popular discontent in order to gain support and give the protests political direction ('every revolutionary ... militant political slogans'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - As a prominent participant in Russian politics at the time, Chernov was in a good position to provide an informed account of the reasons for the February Revolution - Although a senior SR, Chernov makes no partisan claims about the role of the Social Revolutionaries in triggering the February Revolution, which enhances the credibility of the account - Chernov's account was published almost 20 years after the event, which suggests he has had time to reflect on the reasons for the February Revolution. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - On 23 February 1917 thousands of women demonstrated in Petrograd against food shortages and the war; within two days, strikes involving 250,000-300,000 workers paralysed the city - The revolutionary parties played little part in the February Revolution, e.g. the Bolsheviks numbered no more than 10,000 at this time and virtually all their leaders were in exile - The amnesty that followed Nicholas II's abdication (2 March) encouraged anti-tsarist groups to attempt to fill the power vacuum created by the collapse of the autocracy.

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into Bolshevik views on making peace at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - As Bolshevik leader and a key figure in the peace debate, Lenin was in a good position to provide an informed account of Bolshevik views on making peace in 1918 - The main purpose of the speech was to win over the Bolshevik Central Committee to Lenin's strategy of accepting German peace terms immediately ('if we embark on a war ... be swept away') - The partisan nature of the source is reflected in the negative description of Trotsky's policy on peace ('international political showmanship', 'handing ... to the Germans'). - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It suggests that Lenin's policy of immediate peace was the only realistic option for the Bolshevik government in early 1918 ('the German military position is so good ... bare hands') - It implies that Trotsky's preferred strategy was naïve and ignored the realities of power politics ('international political showmanship', 'handing Estonia to the Germans') - It suggests that large concessions would have to be made to safeguard the socialist regime ('a shameful peace ... forced to conclude', 'handing over independent Poland', 'reparations of three billion roubles'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - Trotsky's 'neither peace nor war' approach to negotiations was completely undermined when the German army began advancing unopposed into Russian territory in February 1918 - Lenin's 'realist' position was then adopted and the regime accepted the draconian terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; Lenin also reasoned that a future German military collapse would render the treaty void - A third Bolshevik faction, the Left Communists (led by Bukharin), rejected the German peace terms and called for a revolutionary war against Germany to trigger a German working-class uprising.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99**

Question	Indicative content
2(a)	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into Stolypin's policy of repression in the years 1906-11. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It provides evidence of Stolypin's policy of repression in the years 1906-1911 ('He organised and carried out ... 3 June 1907') - It suggests that Stolypin was central to the Tsarist regime's repressive response to the events of 1905-06 in Russia ('head of the counter-revolutionary ... 1911') - It indicates that Stolypin carried out his repressive policies with the support of the nobility and the middle class ('Stolypin acted as the agent ... landed nobility.', 'he was able to turn ... advice.'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The author was then living in exile and so would have been in a position to offer a candid assessment of Stolypin - As a Marxist article, it shows how the Bolsheviks were attempting to use Stolypin's repressive policies to mobilise popular support against the Tsarist regime and its bourgeois supporters - The article was written in October 1911 and this enabled the author to consider Stolypin's repressive policies over the whole of the specified period. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - Stolypin introduced a new electoral law in June 1907 designed to favour groups the regime deemed most loyal and exclude those viewed as unreliable; in the short term this produced a more cooperative Duma - Under Stolypin's direction, the authorities unleashed an effective policy of repression to 'pacify' Russia after the 1905 Revolution, including the use of special military tribunals to dispense summary justice - The Octobrists and right-wing parties supported Stolypin's repressive policies; some liberals also endorsed his hard-line approach as they feared that otherwise Russia would descend into chaos.

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
2(b)	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the impact of the New Economic Policy in the early 1920s. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The author had extensive first-hand experience of the Soviet Union and was therefore likely to be well informed about the impact of the NEP in the early 1920s - The credibility of the source (which considers the positive and negative impact) is potentially enhanced by the fact that it was produced by an outsider rather than a Bolshevik author - The content of the source is confined to the NEP's impact in Moscow in the early 1920s. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It indicates that the introduction of the NEP was unpopular with some Bolsheviks and working-class leaders but it benefited most workers ('communists and proletarian mouldy rations.') - It indicates that the NEP had a negative impact by facilitating gambling and corruption through the licensing of gambling halls and nightclubs ('the surface features ... but real enough.') - It suggests that the positive impact of the NEP, notably an increased supply of food and goods, outweighed the negative features ('In a single year ... just its surface features.'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - The NEP was not popular with sections of the Bolshevik Party because it reintroduced capitalist competition and private property into the Russian economy and thus delayed the transition to socialism - The NEP had a negative impact by encouraging an increase in corruption, property speculation, prostitution and crime; there was also the conspicuous display of newly-acquired 'Nepmen' wealth

- Under the NEP economic recovery was evident by 1923 with food and goods flowing into the cities and cereal production and factory output up by 23 and 200 per cent respectively on 1920 figures.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99**

2	3–5	• Demonstrates some understanding of the source material and attempts analysis by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand or confirm matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and with some substantiation for assertions of value. The concept of utility is addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and may be based on questionable assumptions.
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2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors

Section A: Questions 1a/2a

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–2	• Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little if any substantiation. Concepts of utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	3–5	• Demonstrates some understanding of the source material and attempts analysis by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand or confirm matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and with some substantiation for assertions of value. The concept of utility is addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and may be based on questionable assumptions.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the Tsarist government was transformed in the years 1906-14. Arguments and evidence that the Tsarist government was transformed in the years 1906-14 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The establishment of the Duma introduced an elected national legislative body which had not existed before and which was prepared to criticise the Tsar's government • Nicholas coexisted (albeit uneasily) with the Duma and resisted calls from some of his ministers to strip it of its powers and turn it into a purely consultative body • The October Manifesto (1905) had granted the legal right to form political parties and these were, within limits, free to criticise the Tsarist government • By 1914 a relatively free press had been established in Russia which helped to transform public political debate. Arguments and evidence that the Tsarist government was not transformed in the years 1906-14 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Fundamental Laws of April 1906 preserved virtually all of the Tsar's autocratic powers e.g. Articles 4 and 87, creation of an unelected Imperial State Council, the Tsar had the right to 'hire and fire' ministers • The Duma's functions and composition were altered by the government to preserve the Tsarist regime's powers and tame the assembly e.g. the new electoral law of 1907 favoured groups most loyal to the regime • Throughout this period, the Tsarist regime continued to rely on repression to maintain control e.g. Stolypin's 'pacification' of the countryside, 1906–09, and the 1912 Lena goldfields massacre • Nicholas II remained temperamentally unsuited to the role of a modernising leader after the 1905 Revolution e.g. he held the Duma in disdain and was determined to pass on his autocratic powers to his son. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that Stolypin's policies restored stability to Russia in the years 1906-14. Arguments and evidence that Stolypin's policies restored stability to Russia, in the years 1906-14, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stolypin's agrarian reforms were designed to create a class of prosperous land-owning peasants who would support the regime to protect their property, e.g. some 1.2 million consolidated peasant farms by 1914 • Stolypin ended redemption payments in 1907, as pledged by the Tsarist regime in 1905, and this dampened peasant discontent • Stolypin introduced a new electoral law in June 1907 designed to favour groups the regime deemed most loyal and in the short-term this produced a more co-operative Duma • Under Stolypin, the authorities unleashed an effective policy of repression to 'pacify' Russia after the 1905 Revolution, including the use of special military tribunals to dispense summary justice. Arguments and evidence that Stolypin's policies did not restore stability to Russia, in the years 1906-14, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stolypin's reforms had little impact in the overcrowded central and south-eastern black earth provinces where land shortages and peasant discontent were at their worst • Stolypin's new land-owning peasants created additional tensions within the rural population since they disrupted the traditional work patterns of the villages • Stolypin said his agrarian reforms needed 20 years to have a stabilising effect but they operated for only nine, e.g. only 10 per cent of peasant households had consolidated by 1914 • Despite Stolypin's electoral manipulation, by 1911 even the Octobrists in the Duma were increasingly at odds with the Tsarist government. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the reasons for the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The status of the source (an imperial Act) offers Nicholas II's official position on the reasons for the abdication • As a document intended for public consumption, the Act is clearly designed to persuade the Russian people that the Tsar is acting in the national interest • The tone of the language used in the source emphasises that the abdication is the proper response to the great crisis facing Russia ('voice of my conscience', 'new and formidable trial', 'my duty to abdicate'). 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917: • It indicates that the Tsar's abdication was due to the pressures of war ('terrible struggle against the foreign enemy', 'cruel foreign enemy ... supreme effort') • It implies that the abdication was prompted by the need to improve the efficiency of the Russian war effort ('enabling the closest ... achievement of victory') • It implies that the abdication was a voluntary decision on Nicholas II's part ('I think it my duty ... the supreme power'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • By late 1916, military defeat and the regime's mismanagement of the war effort had alienated the Progressive Bloc and prominent moderates such as Guchkov and Lvov were considering the overthrow of the Tsar • By early 1917, the army high command and the bureaucracy concluded that a government of Duma politicians had a better chance of winning the war and preventing domestic disintegration than the Tsar • Nicholas II's abdication was not voluntary: the army high command overrode his instructions to regain control of Petrograd and pressed (along with senior Duma politicians) for his abdication.

Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a prominent politician in 1917, Kerensky was potentially in a good position to offer an informed view about the reasons for the abdication of Nicholas II in March 1917 - The purpose of Kerensky's account was to portray Nicholas II as an inadequate ruler, thereby reflecting the author's anti-tsarist political stance - The partisan nature of the source is evident from the use of language to reinforce points ('this living mask of a ruler', 'consequently humdrum ... no longer thrilled'). 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917: - It suggests that Nicholas II viewed the exercise of power as a great weight ('He bore 'the burden of power' until the end.', 'former Emperor ... calm and even happy mood.') - It claims that Nicholas II abdicated because he had no wish to hold on to power ('he would not fight for it: he had no wish to rule', 'free of all duties and obligations') - It indicates that Nicholas viewed his abdication as a form of divine intervention ('It was God's will', he said'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Nicholas II became increasingly fatalistic in the period immediately before his abdication, suggesting he had lost faith in his ability to protect the autocracy, e.g. his dismissal of Rodzianko's warning in late February 1917 - For Nicholas, abdication came as a relief since he was a reluctant Tsar and felt he lacked the attributes to take on such a role - Given Nicholas II's longstanding affection for the army, the withdrawal of the leading generals' support was critical; without their backing, the Tsar lacked the will to attempt to hold on to power. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both sources suggest that Nicholas II was unable to deal with the pressures and demands associated with the Tsar's role - Both sources suggest that the abdication occurred, in part, because Nicholas II was not prepared to cling to power regardless of the circumstances - These points of agreement are reinforced due to the contrasting positions of the authors (the Tsar and a prominent political opponent).



Section B: Indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99**



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how far Tsarist government in the years 1894–1905 was fundamentally similar to Tsarist government in the years 1906–14. Arguments and evidence that Tsarist government in the years 1894–1905 was fundamentally similar to Tsarist government in the years 1906–14 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout both periods, the Tsarist government relied on repression to maintain control, e.g. in 1901 the army was used 300 times to deal with strikers and Stolypin's 'pacification' of the countryside in 1906–09 • The autocratic government structure in the years 1906–14 was similar to that in the years 1894–1905, e.g. Nicholas rejected the 'senseless dream' of political reform (1895) and the impact of the 1907 electoral law • Before and after 1905 Nicholas II was temperamentally unsuited to leadership in the modern age, e.g. his enduring belief in divine right and autocracy, and his dislike of the Duma and reforming ministers • Before and after 1905, the government attempted to modernise Russia in order to strengthen the Tsarist regime, e.g. Witte's industrialisation programme (1893–1903) and Stolypin's agrarian reforms after 1905. Arguments and evidence that Tsarist government in the years 1894–1905 was not fundamentally similar to Tsarist government in the years 1906–14 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The establishment of the Duma in 1906 introduced an elected national legislative body that had not existed before and which was prepared to criticise the Tsar's government • Nicholas adopted a different attitude and coexisted with the Duma; he resisted calls from some of his ministers to strip the Duma of its powers and turn it into a purely consultative body • The October Manifesto (1905) granted the legal right to form political parties and these were, within limits, free to criticise the tsarist government; such a system did not exist before 1906 • From 1906 the tsarist regime had a constitution of sorts in the form of the Fundamental Laws and a freer press, which helped to encourage public political debate. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that Tsarism remained a fundamentally stable system of government in the years 1894-1914. Arguments and evidence that Tsarism remained a fundamentally stable system of government in the years 1894-1914 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout the period, Tsarism was able to rely on repression to maintain control and preserve the stability of the system, e.g. the Okhrana's use of infiltration tactics and Stolypin's 'pacification' policy in 1906-09 • The autocratic government structure remained largely intact during these years, e.g. the lack of reform before 1905, the Fundamental Laws of 1906 and the impact of the 1907 electoral law • Revolutionary parties committed to the overthrow of Tsarism, such as the Social Democrats, Populists and Social Revolutionaries, lacked support, were internally divided and failed to cooperate • Liberal opposition to Tsarism in the years 1894-1914 was hampered by the relatively small size of the Russian middle class and liberal fears of inciting an all-engulfing mass revolt against autocracy. Arguments and evidence that Tsarism did not remain a fundamentally stable system of government in the years 1894-1914 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Widespread disturbances among the peasantry, workers and nationalities in 1905 destabilised Tsarism and forced it to make concessions, e.g. the October Manifesto and the scrapping of redemption payments • The reforms that followed the 1905 Revolution meant that Tsarism had to operate in a much more overtly critical political environment, e.g. creation of the duma, the legal right to form political parties and a freer press • Attempts to modernise the Tsarist system did little to alleviate socio-economic tensions and increased popular discontent, e.g. Witte's industrialisation programme and Stolypin's agrarian reforms



	Nicholas II was a source of instability because he was inconsistent and unsuited to the role of a leader, e.g. he held the duma in disdain and wanted to pass undiluted autocratic power to his son. Other relevant material must be credited.

5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and



Level	Mark	Descriptor
		substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate Robespierre's role in the Terror. Source 1 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a former member of the Committee of Public Safety (CPS), Barère was potentially in a good position to provide an informed account of Robespierre's role in the Terror - The defensive nature of the source is reflected in the description of Robespierre's seemingly all-powerful role - Barère's recollections of Robespierre's role may have been influenced by a desire to limit or evade his own personal responsibility for the Terror. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about Robespierre's role in the Terror: - It implies that Robespierre was not reliant on the CPS or the Committee of General Security (CGS) and could act independently or with a few key allies ('the law was the work of Robespierre, Couthon and St-Just.') - It claims that Robespierre's prominent role in the Terror was based on Jacobin support and his organisation of revolutionary 'justice' ('support among the Jacobins ... the system of terror he had organised.') - It suggests that Robespierre's role in the Terror led to tensions with the Convention and divisions within the revolutionary government ('the forced silence ...their consent.', 'The Committees ... complained that...'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Robespierre was the most prominent CPS figure and played a major role in the Terror, e.g. he railroaded the Law of 22 Prairial through the Convention and this paved the way for the Great Terror (Jun-Jul 1794) - By spring-early summer 1794, Robespierre's seemingly dominant role was becoming less secure because he was starting to lose support, e.g. among Jacobin atheists and political pragmatists such as Barras

Question	Indicative content
	- Robespierre's failure to consult over the Law of 22 Prairial alienated the the CGS (which responded by wooing the right wing of the Convention) and persuaded other CPS members that he was a dictator. Source 2 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a well-educated and socially and politically well-connected contemporary, de Staël could potentially offer an informed view on Robespierre's role in the Terror - The critical nature of the source is reflected in de Staël's use of language ('appalling Committee', 'his political fanaticism', 'fond only of power') - The source was published in 1798 under the Directory, which enabled de Staël to express her views on Robespierre and the CPS candidly and without fear of retribution. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about Robespierre's role in the Terror: - It claims that Robespierre's fanaticism and ambition contributed to the execution of many opponents during the Terror ('However, his political fanaticism ... revolutionaries to the scaffold.') - It implies that Robespierre played the most important individual role in the Terror and that his prominence was based on his 'incorruptible' reputation ('No name ... except Robespierre.', 'Robespierre acquired ... self-interest.') - It suggests that Robespierre attempted to strengthen his dominant role by creating the cult of the Supreme Being, an alternative civic religion to the Catholic faith ('This was an attempt ... over his colleagues.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Robespierre's role was circumscribed by the fact that he was only one of 12 CPS members, all committee decisions were collective, and he personally signed only a small number of the Committee's decrees - Robespierre played a central role in the purge of the Hébertists and Indulgents, which enabled the CPS to pursue a policy of increasing terror and centralisation - Robespierre's promotion of the cult of the Supreme Being (May-June 1794) led many deputies and committee members to conclude he was seeking to transform his role into a personal dictatorship or pseudo-Pope. Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both sources suggest that Robespierre played a central role in the Terror and was the leading member of the CPS - Both sources suggest that Robespierre's role in the Terror alienated many of his

Question	Indicative content
	colleagues in the committees and the Convention • These points of agreement are reinforced due to the different positions of the authors (a former member of the CPS and an informed and well-connected French writer).

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the impact of War Communism in the countryside. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a leading Menshevik, Dan was likely to be well informed about the impact of War Communism in the countryside - Dan's speech was designed to persuade the Eighth All-Russian Congress that War Communism should be abandoned - Dan clearly intended to portray War Communism as having a negative impact in the countryside, as shown in his choice of language ('purely coercive policy', 'food policy ... bound to fail.'). 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the impact of War Communism in the countryside: - It indicates that War Communism had forcibly extracted a large quantity of grain from the peasants in 1920 ('the government extracted ... last year of its life.', 'has forcibly seized 300 million <i>pudy</i>.') - It indicates that War Communism had had a negative impact in the countryside in terms of agricultural production ('a decrease ... and profound agricultural decline.') - It suggests that War Communism would completely alienate the peasantry and seriously threaten the prospects for socialism in Russia ('unbridgeable gulf ... country.', 'far easier ... peasant class.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - During War Communism, around 150,000 Bolshevik activists and Cheka members formed requisition squads that went into the countryside to extract grain forcibly from peasant villages - Under War Communism, the peasants had no incentive to work since they were not paid for their grain or labour; consequently, by 1920, agricultural production had declined to just 60 per cent of its 1913 level - By 1920-21, the negative impact of War Communism in the countryside could be gauged from the fact that the Bolshevik regime had no effective control over rural areas in many southern and eastern provinces.

Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a Bolshevik and a writer, the author was therefore likely to be well informed about the impact of War Communism in the countryside - Although written by a Bolshevik, the credibility of the source is potentially enhanced by the fact that it considers the negative impact of War Communism in the countryside - Since Serge's account was published in 1951, the author had the advantage of hindsight in assessing the impact of War Communism in the countryside. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the impact of War Communism in the countryside: - It indicates that, under War Communism, the regime expected the peasants to provide for urban workers, the armed forces and Bolshevik activists ('The system for providing food ... and the party activists.') - It indicates that attempts by the Bolsheviks to requisition grain forcibly under War Communism led to significant peasant resistance ('driven away ... leave him by the roadside as a lesson for all.') - It suggests that very few influential Bolshevik figures were prepared to acknowledge that War Communism was having a disastrous impact in the countryside ('No one dared admit ... would not work.'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Lenin later admitted that requisitioning to supply the army and workers often took all the available grain from peasant villages; this contributed to rural famine which resulted in six million deaths - To resist requisition squads and Bolshevik authority in the countryside, peasants formed their own violent opposition groups or joined larger peasant armies such as Makhno's in the Ukraine and Antonov's in Tambov - In February 1920, Trotsky argued requisitioning had to be abandoned due to its disastrous impact on food production and rural society, but Lenin and other leading Bolsheviks would not consider a more flexible policy. Sources 3 and 4

Question	Indicative content
	The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources indicate that War Communism had a negative impact on the countryside because it led to widespread peasant resistance to grain requisitioning • Both sources suggest that War Communism had alienated rural society to such an extent that the Bolshevik regime/prospects for socialism were under threat • These points of agreement are reinforced due to the different positions of the authors (a senior Menshevik and a prominent Bolshevik writer).

Section B: indicative content

Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of the challenge to the <i>ancien régime</i> posed by rural poverty and urban food prices in France in the 1780s. Arguments and evidence that the challenge to the <i>ancien régime</i> posed by rural poverty and urban food prices in France in the 1780s was significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Poor harvests in the years 1781-87 increased rural poverty and urban food prices and led to rising tensions, as peasants and urban workers suspected tithe-owners and nobles of hoarding and speculating • The end of relative agricultural prosperity in the early-mid 1780s encouraged many peasants and urban workers to become politicised for the first time in their protests against the nobility • A disastrous harvest in 1788, due to extreme weather, increased bread prices by 50 per cent in Paris; this caused severe hardship among the capital's workers and hardened anti-government feeling • Rural poverty following harvest failure in 1788, the impact of the calling of the Estates-General and the fall of the Bastille, led to the peasant mass hysteria of the 'Great Fear' against landowners and 'brigands'. Arguments and evidence that the challenge posed by rural poverty and urban food prices was not significant/the challenge to the <i>ancien régime</i> posed by other factors/developments in France in the 1780s was significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Rural poverty and urban food prices were long-standing problems, which suggests other factors offered a more significant challenge to the <i>ancien régime</i>, e.g. harvest failures in 1781-82, 1785-86, 1787 and 1788 • Enlightenment ideas posed a fundamental challenge to the foundations of the <i>ancien régime</i>, radicalised informed Third Estate opinion and mobilised members of the younger nobility who were critical of the old system • Louis XVI's determination to preserve absolutist rule and his ill-judged decisions played a significant role in undermining the <i>ancien régime</i>, e.g. he exiled the Paris Parlement (1788) and dismissed Necker (1789) • Louis XVI's Finance Ministers, notably Turgot, Necker and Calonne, failed to address France's serious financial problems and, by 1788, France was facing bankruptcy, which sharpened divisions within French society • French involvement in the American War of Independence encouraged the spread of more liberal ideas, following the colonists' victory, which encouraged growing demands for reform in France • Office-holding in the royal bureaucracy was based on venality, which led to waste, corruption and incompetence, and also fed the resentment of those bourgeois professionals who were excluded from the system. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the role played by Sieyès was the main reason for the success of the coup de Brumaire in 1799. Arguments and evidence that the role played by Sieyès was the main reason for the success of the coup de Brumaire in 1799 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Sieyès' election as a Director (May 1799) gave a notable opponent an insider position; he worked from within to replace the Directory, fearing political instability would lead to a monarchist or radical seizure of power • Sieyès realised that many of the government's critics wanted a return to strong leadership; he also saw that, with the French armies achieving victories again and the Councils in confusion, a coup was feasible • Sieyès invited Napoleon to participate, since he knew that a successful coup required military support and a capable army officer who inspired loyalty within the ranks and popular support • Sieyès, and others, used the pretext of a Jacobin plot in the Council of the Five Hundred to persuade the Council of Ancients to move to Saint-Cloud, a location where the Ancients were more vulnerable to a coup attempt. Arguments and evidence that the role played by Sieyès was not the main reason for the success of the coup de Brumaire in 1799 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Napoleon's support for the coup was vital, since he provided the conspirators with a prominent and popular figurehead; this made it less likely that the coup would encounter significant resistance in the capital • Napoleon's participation ensured that a large proportion of the military supported the coup, e.g. Bonaparte took control of the Paris garrison containing approximately 100,000 men • Lucien Bonaparte saved the coup by demanding the expulsion of 61 deputies from the Council of Five Hundred, which facilitated the passing of laws to replace the Directory with a three-man executive • Other individuals made important contributions to the success of the coup, e.g. Director Barras acted as an 'inside' co-conspirator and Talleyrand introduced Sieyès to Napoleon and backed the coup • Influential groups in French society failed to rally to the Directory's defence in 1799 because of the impact of the government's economic measures, e.g. the forced loan and the Ramel liquidation • The Directory's war policy alienated broad sections of French society so that, when the coup took place, few were prepared to defend the regime, e.g. Jourdan's Law (1798) and the Law of Hostages (1799). Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the nature of Tsarist autocratic rule was transformed in the years 1894-1914. Arguments and evidence that the nature of Tsarist autocratic rule was transformed in the years 1894-1914 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The establishment of the duma in 1906 introduced an elected national legislative body, which had not existed before, and which was prepared to criticise the Tsar's government • Nicholas modified his attitude and coexisted (albeit uneasily) with the duma; he resisted calls from some of his ministers to strip the duma of its powers and turn it into a purely consultative body • The October Manifesto (1905) granted the legal right to form political parties and these were, within limits, free to criticise the Tsarist government; such a system did not exist before 1906 • From 1906, the Tsarist regime had a constitution of sorts in the form of the Fundamental Laws and a freer press that helped to encourage public political debate • From the early 1890s, the government attempted to modernise Russia in order to strengthen Tsarist rule economically and in terms of popular support, e.g. Witte's industrial measures and Stolypin's agrarian reforms. Arguments and evidence that the nature of Tsarist autocratic rule was not transformed in the years 1894-1914 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout the period, the Tsarist government continued to rely on repression to maintain control, e.g. in 1901, the army was used 300 times to deal with strikers and Stolypin's rural 'pacification' in 1906–09 • The autocratic structure of the government remained largely intact during these years, e.g. the lack of reform before 1905, the Fundamental Laws of 1906 and the impact of the 1907 Electoral Law • Throughout the period, Nicholas II was temperamentally unsuited to leadership in the modern age, e.g. his enduring belief in divine right and autocracy, and his dislike of the duma and reforming ministers • The revolutionary parties (Social Democrats, Populists and Social Revolutionaries) were too weak in the years 1894-1914 to exert significant political pressure to change the regime

- Liberal attempts to reform the Tsarist autocratic system during this period were hampered by the relatively small size of the Russian middle class and liberal fears of inciting an all-engulfing mass revolt against autocracy.

Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the nature of Tsarist government changed little in the years 1906-14. Arguments and evidence that the nature of Tsarist government changed little in the years 1906-14 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Fundamental Laws of April 1906 preserved virtually all of the Tsar's autocratic powers, e.g. Articles 4 and 87, creation of an unelected Imperial State Council, the Tsar had the right to 'hire and fire' ministers • The duma's functions and composition were altered by the government to preserve the Tsarist regime's powers and tame the assembly, e.g. the new electoral law of 1907 favoured groups most loyal to the regime • Throughout this period, the Tsarist regime continued to rely on repression to maintain control, e.g. Stolypin's 'pacification' of the countryside, 1906-09, and the 1912 Lena goldfields massacre • Nicholas II remained temperamentally unsuited to the role of a modernising leader after the 1905 Revolution, e.g. he held the duma in disdain and was determined to pass on his autocratic powers to his son. Arguments and evidence that the nature of Tsarist government did change in the years 1906-14 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The establishment of the duma introduced an elected national legislative body, which had not existed before and which was prepared to criticise the Tsar's government • Nicholas co-existed (albeit uneasily) with the duma and resisted calls from some of his ministers to strip it of its powers and turn it into a purely consultative body • The October Manifesto (1905) had granted the legal right to form political parties and these were, within limits, free to criticise the Tsarist government • By 1914, the Tsarist regime was more willing to tolerate a relatively free press in Russia than it had been in 1905-06, and this helped to transform public political debate. Other relevant material must be credited.

2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Tsarist rule in the years 1906-1914 was similar to Tsarist rule in the years 1894-1905. Arguments and evidence that Tsarist rule in the years 1906-14 was similar to Tsarist rule in the years 1894-1905 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Throughout both periods, the Tsarist government relied on repression to maintain control, e.g. in 1901 the army was used 300 times to deal with strikers and Stolypin's 'pacification' of the countryside in 1906-09 • The autocratic government structure in the years 1906-1914 was similar to that in the years 1894-1905, e.g. Nicholas rejected the 'senseless dream' of political reform (1895) and the impact of the 1907 electoral law • Before and after 1905, Nicholas II was temperamentally unsuited to leadership in the modern age, e.g. his enduring belief in divine right and autocracy, and his dislike of the duma and reforming ministers • Before and after 1905, ministers attempted to modernise Russia in order to strengthen the Tsarist regime, e.g. Witte's industrialisation programme (1893-1903) and Stolypin's agrarian reforms after 1905. Arguments and evidence that Tsarist rule in the years 1906-1914 was different from Tsarist rule in the years 1894-1905 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The establishment of the duma in 1906 introduced an elected national legislative body, which had not existed before and which was prepared to criticise the Tsar's government • After 1906, Nicholas adopted a different political attitude and coexisted with the duma; he resisted calls from some of his ministers to strip the duma of its powers and turn it into a purely consultative body • The October Manifesto (1905) granted the legal right to form political parties and these were, within limits, free to criticise the Tsarist government; such a system did not exist before 1906 • From 1906, the Tsarist regime had a constitution of sorts in the form of the Fundamental Laws and a freer press that helped to encourage public political debate. Other relevant material must be credited.

2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors: Section A

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	• Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little or no supporting evidence. Concepts of reliability or utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1914-17, the actions of Nicholas II were mainly responsible for the collapse of the Tsarist system. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1914-17, the actions of Nicholas II were mainly responsible for the collapse of the Tsarist system should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Nicholas II rejected cooperation with the Progressive Bloc and Zemgor (to improve the war effort) as a challenge to his authority; his stance convinced many moderates that the regime had to be removed • Nicholas II's absence from Petrograd (late 1915-early 1917) enabled the Tsarina and Rasputin to influence political affairs, which seriously damaged the regime in the eyes of the public • Nicholas II failed to appreciate the seriousness of the early stages of the February Revolution and delayed taking steps to defend the regime, e.g. he ignored the warning sent by Rodzianko on 26 February 1917 • By 1917, Nicholas II's inept wartime leadership had alienated key supporters of the regime (e.g. army high command) who decided only a duma-based government could bring victory and prevent domestic chaos. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1914-17, other factors were mainly responsible for the collapse of the Tsarist system should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Wartime inflation radicalised anti-regime discontent, notably among the workers of Petrograd and Moscow, as food and fuel prices quadrupled but average earnings only doubled in the years 1914-16 • By late 1916, the impact of war had undermined the army's willingness and ability to defend the regime, depriving the government of coercive power in Petrograd, e.g. the mutiny of the Volinsky regiment (1917) • The virtual collapse of the Russian railway network, due to wartime pressures, created shortages that intensified worker militancy and contributed to waves of strikes from 1915 in cities such as Petrograd. Other relevant material must be credited.



2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
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5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. - The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the nature of the September massacres in Paris in 1792. Source 1 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a diplomat based in Paris, the author was in a good position (and would be expected by his own government) to provide an informed account of the September massacres - The partisan nature of the source is reflected in the negative description of the violence ('massacred with shocking barbarity.', 'same cruelties were committed') - The diplomat's report on the September massacres was mainly confined to specific acts of violence. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the nature of the September massacres in Paris in 1792: - It indicates that the September massacres were triggered by news of the Prussian military threat, and refractory priests and prison inmates were the principal victims ('This announcement created ... prisoners there.') - It indicates that a large number of people were killed during the September massacres ('160 priests ... fell victim') - It suggests that this brutal episode was driven by a public frenzy of violence ('fury of the enraged crowd', 'The vengeance of the mob'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The September massacres were triggered by rumours that imprisoned counterrevolutionary suspects planned to escape, kill the Parisian population and hand the capital over to the Prussians - The September massacres lasted for five days and resulted in 1100-1400 deaths; most of the victims were imprisoned common criminals who posed no counterrevolutionary threat - The perpetrators of the violence were the sans-culottes of the Sections; no attempt was made to stop them, since this meant mobilising the National Guard and risking another Champ de Mars incident.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 2 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a writer living in the capital at the time, Restif was potentially in a good position to comment on the nature of the September massacres in Paris in 1792 - The partisan nature of the source is evident from the language employed to reinforce points ('What pointless cruelty! I had never witnessed such horror.') - Restif's account is confined to specific acts of violence on the second day of the September massacres. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the nature of the September massacres in Paris in 1792: - It implies that the defining feature of the September massacres was arbitrary mob violence ('Gros was thrown out ... through the night', 'one member of the mob ... by the others.') - It suggests that only a relatively small number of people participated in the bloodletting ('The number of people who actively took part in the killing was only about one hundred and fifty.') - It indicates that the mob violence was triggered by a determination to remove refractory priests ('The real reason is that the mob wanted only one thing: to get rid of refractory priests.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Most victims were forced to appear before makeshift 'people's tribunals', convicted of being counterrevolutionaries, and were then killed immediately; some suspects were acquitted and released - In total, an estimated 200-300 people were responsible for the killing; numerous districts in Paris did not experience violence during this period and many Parisians only learned of the September massacres later on - Refractory priests were targeted as they were regarded by radicals as counterrevolutionaries, e.g. around 200 refractory priests were murdered in the capital during the September massacres. Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both sources suggest that the September massacres in Paris were driven by arbitrary mob violence - Both sources suggest that refractory priests were singled out by the perpetrators as victims of the bloodletting - These points of agreement are reinforced due to the different positions of the authors (a Paris-based British diplomat and a French writer living in the capital).

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the way the workforce at the Lena goldfields was treated in 1912. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • As a formal employment contract, the document sets out the official Lenzoloto company policies for the treatment of miners at the Lena goldfields • The document stipulates terms of employment for 1911 and 1912 and therefore covers the treatment of workers at the Lena goldfields in the specified year • The main purpose of the document was to make workers aware of, and bind them legally to, their duties and responsibilities as Lenzoloto company employees. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the way the workforce at the Lena goldfields was treated in 1912: • It implies that the miners had little or no autonomy at the Lena goldfields, with management controlling all aspects of their working lives ('The workers should undertake, in good faith ... for other tasks.') • It indicates that the working day for miners was long and did not vary much according to the time of year ('From 1 April until 1 October ... the working day must consist of 11 hours.') • It suggests that the management had considerable discretion when it came to sacking workers, whereas miners were tied rigidly to their contracts ('No worker has the right ... by the worker.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • When the Lena mines failed to produce the anticipated amount of gold, the Lenzoloto management introduced cost-cutting measures, including 15-16 hour working shifts and wage reductions • The Lenzoloto management encouraged risky work practices and provided little safety equipment, resulting in up to 70 per cent of the workforce sustaining injuries at the Lena goldfields • In 1911, the Lenzoloto management began paying part of the workers' wages in coupons which could be redeemed only in the company's canteens, forcing miners to use these expensive eating places more often.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The author(s), being workers at the Lena goldfields, were potentially in a good position to offer an informed view of their treatment at these mines • As a set of demands sent to the management, it shows how the workers were attempting to persuade the Lenzoloto Mining Company to improve how they were treated • The document was written in March 1912 and so 'Our Demands' is valuable because it covers the treatment of the workforce at the Lena goldfields in the specified year. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the way the workforce at the Lena goldfields was treated in 1912: • It provides evidence of how the workforce was treated at the Lena goldfields in 1912 ('compulsory work on Sundays', 'Women should not...forced labour', 'living quarters ... better ventilation.') • It suggests that worker dissatisfaction with their treatment at the Lena goldfields was widespread ('We, the miners, demand') • It suggests that the management treated the workforce with little regard or respect ('Managers should not sack workers as they please', 'Managers must address workers politely at all times.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Workers at the Lena goldfields were housed in poor quality accommodation and provided with low grade food in the company canteen, including rotten horsemeat • The leaders of the miners were moderate, avoided violence and wanted to reach a compromise settlement with the Lenzoloto management regarding their treatment at the Lena goldfields • As part of their demands, the miners of the Lena goldfields called on the Lenzoloto management to improve their wages by 30 per cent. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources suggest that the miners at the Lena goldfields faced long working hours and had little control over their conditions of employment • Both sources suggest that the miners were subjected to arbitrary treatment by the Lenzoloto management • These points of agreement are reinforced due to the different positions of the authors (the Lenzoloto management and the miners' leaders).



Section B: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the failings of Louis XVI and his ministers in the 1780s were the main reason for the onset of the French Revolution in 1789. Arguments and evidence that the failings of Louis XVI and his ministers in the 1780s were the main reason for the onset of the French Revolution in 1789 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As a monarch, Louis XVI was perceived as indecisive, weak and dominated by his wife; Louis XVI's determination to preserve absolutist rule meant he was widely regarded as responsible for all of France's problems • Finance Minister Calonne's attempt to extend taxes to the nobility and clergy, who resented it, led to protests in the <i>parlements</i> that triggered the 1789 revolution • Louis XVI's ill-judged decisions contributed to the onset of revolution by undermining the <i>ancien régime</i>, e.g. he exiled the Paris <i>parlement</i> in 1788, called up the troops and abruptly dismissed Necker in 1789 • Louis XVI's Finance Ministers (Necker, Calonne and Brienne) all failed to address France's financial problems effectively and, by 1788, the state was facing bankruptcy, which sharpened divisions within French society. Arguments and evidence that other factors were the main reason for the onset of the French Revolution in 1789 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Louis XVI inherited a kingdom with serious structural weaknesses that undermined the stability of the <i>ancien régime</i>, e.g. huge crown debts, an unfair taxation system and entrenched social and political inequality • The Enlightenment promoted the spread of new ideas based on reason, logic and evidence that challenged the structure, inequalities and rationale of the <i>ancien régime</i> • French involvement in the American War of Independence also encouraged the spread of more liberal ideas (following the colonists' victory) that encouraged demands for reform in France • Marie-Antoinette's Austrian background, financial profligacy, predilection for gambling, association with scandal and avoidance of official duties increased public criticism of the <i>ancien régime</i> • A poor harvest in 1788 exacerbated rural poverty, substantially increased urban bread prices (e.g. bread prices increased by 50 per cent in Paris) and contributed to an economic downturn that led to popular protests • Office-holding in the royal bureaucracy was based on venality which led to waste, corruption and incompetence, and also fed the resentment of bourgeois professionals who were excluded from the system. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that, in the years 1795-99, the political and financial successes of the Directory outweighed its political and financial failures. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1795-99, the political and financial successes of the Directory outweighed its political and financial failures should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Directory's constitutional arrangements (based on the Directory of five, the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Ancients) prevented the concentration of power and avoided the extremism of 1793-94 • Until Fructidor (1797), the Directory provided a moderate 'representative' government, successfully steering a middle course between the restoration of the monarchy and the introduction of popular democracy • Two-thirds of the national debt was written off in September 1797 through the issue of bonds to government creditors, which reduced interest payments and stabilised French finances at least for a time • Finance Minister Vincent Ramel reformed the taxation system in 1798 (by introducing four new direct taxes and making tax collection more efficient), which enabled the government to balance its books • The profits of war plunder provided the Directory with much-needed income, e.g. defeated states in Germany paid 16 million livres in indemnities and those in Italy paid about 200 million livres. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1795-99, the political and financial failures of the Directory outweighed its political and financial successes should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The constitution of Year III, which established annual elections and provided no mechanism to resolve executive-legislature disputes or alter the constitution, failed to give the Directory political stability • In an attempt to preserve a non-Jacobin/Royalist majority, the directors interfered with elections (e.g. Law of 22 Floreal), which undermined respect for the political system • The Directory failed to deliver political stability, e.g. Babeuf's Conspiracy of Equals (1796), the Coup of Fructidor (1797), the Coup of Floreal (1798) and the Coup of Brumaire (1799) • Attempts to restore the Treasury's finances were not successful, e.g. the value of the assignat collapsed, the new currency became worthless, and the introduction of indirect taxes was unpopular • The monetary crisis of 1795-97 reduced purchasing power, which undermined economic stability; the bonds issued to write off government debt quickly slumped in value, which alienated government creditors. Other relevant material must be credited.



Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the differences between the Revolutions of 1905 and February 1917 in Russia far outweigh their similarities. Arguments and evidence that the differences between the Revolutions of 1905 and February 1917 in Russia far outweigh their similarities should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The autocracy was able to survive the challenge to its authority posed by the 1905 Revolution, whereas the February 1917 Revolution led to Nicholas II's abdication, thus ending the tsarist system in Russia • During the 1905 Revolution, important groups within the state apparatus (such as the army and the bureaucracy) remained loyal to the tsarist system whereas, in February 1917, they deserted the regime • During the 1905 Revolution, Nicholas II offered concessions, such as the October Manifesto, to 'buy off' sections of the opposition; in February 1917 the Tsar refused to give ground, e.g. he ignored Rodzianko's plea for a new government that commanded the confidence of the nation • Under the impact of the First World War, the February 1917 Revolution revealed a much more intense hostility towards the tsarist system across the whole of Russian society than was evident in the 1905 Revolution. Arguments and evidence that the similarities between the Revolutions of 1905 and February 1917 in Russia far outweigh their differences should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Both the 1905 and February 1917 Revolutions were fuelled by the impact of Russia's involvement in war, e.g. the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) and the First World War • Both the 1905 and February 1917 Revolutions were triggered by events in St. Petersburg/Petrograd, e.g. 'Bloody Sunday' (January 1905) and growing protests and strikes (late February 1917) • Both the 1905 and February 1917 Revolutions can be seen as popular revolts against authority, reflecting widespread public disillusionment with the failures or limitations of Tsarism • Both the 1905 and February 1917 Revolutions led to the announcement, and introduction, of elected assemblies, e.g. the duma and the Constituent Assembly. Other relevant material must be credited.

2	3–5	• Demonstrates some understanding of the source material and attempts analysis by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand or confirm matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and with some substantiation for assertions of value. The concept of utility is addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It claims that, due to the impact of the Kornilov affair, the Bolsheviks were able to seize power in October 1917 ('Without the Kornilov affair ... takeover in October 1917.') - It implies that the Kornilov affair was instrumental in enabling the Bolsheviks to secure majorities in the Soviets ('After the Kornilov rising ... gained majorities in the Soviets everywhere.') - It suggests that, after the Kornilov affair, the Bolsheviks were able to use their Soviet majorities to mobilise the masses to undermine the government ('Using the motto ... responsible leadership in Russia.'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - As Prime Minister of the Provisional Government at the time, Kerensky was potentially in a good position to offer an informed view about the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks - Kerensky's purpose was to dissociate himself and the Provisional Government from Kornilov's actions and their impact in boosting the political fortunes of the Bolsheviks - Since Kerensky's account was written in 1919, the author had the advantage of hindsight in assessing the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - After the Kornilov affair, the Bolsheviks were able secure a majority in the Petrograd Soviet and Trotsky became its President, giving the Bolsheviks an organisational base from which to plan the October coup - As a result of the Kornilov affair, the Bolsheviks were able to break the stranglehold the SRs and Mensheviks had over soviets in other cities in Russia - Following the Kornilov affair, in August-September 1917, Bolshevik membership increased, and Lenin's party performed strongly in the Petrograd and Moscow council elections - The Bolsheviks' role in the anti-Kornilov opposition enabled them to pose successfully as defenders of the revolution and Petrograd to

	increase their support.
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Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the reasons for the closing of the Constituent Assembly in 1918. 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: • As a leading figure in the Petrograd Soviet at that point, Lenin could potentially offer an informed view regarding the reasons for the closing of the Constituent Assembly in 1918 • As a public decree, the source represents the Petrograd Soviet's official explanation of why the Constituent Assembly was closed down • The partisan nature of the source is evident from the use of language to reinforce points ('outlived their usefulness.', 'a step backward and a death blow to the October Revolution.'). 2. The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: • It implies that only the Soviets (not the 'bourgeois' Constituent Assembly) can be seen as legitimate bodies for the advancement of working people's interests ('the Soviets brought ... economic freedom.') • It suggests that the arrangements for the election of the Constituent Assembly have been superseded by the October Revolution ('elected ... before the October Revolution.', 'October Revolution ... bourgeoisie.') • It claims that any Soviet compromise with the Constituent Assembly would undermine the October Revolution ('To deny full power to the Soviets ... the October Revolution.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: • Lenin maintained that the Soviets represented a purer form of democracy than the bourgeois Constituent Assembly and, post-October 1917, the Soviets best reflected the will of the workers • Lenin was determined to close down the Constituent Assembly because he knew that the SRs would use their election victory (380 seats and 41 per cent of the vote) to try to establish a rival government • The elections did not produce a Constituent Assembly dominated by bourgeois parties; collectively, the socialist parties (SRs, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) obtained 566 seats and 67.8 per cent of the vote.



Section B: indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99**



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917 owed more to its domestic policies than to its decision to stay in the war. Arguments and evidence that the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917 owed more to its domestic policies than to its decision to stay in the war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Provisional Government's refusal to legitimise land redistribution undermined its authority because peasants were then less willing to supply the cities with food and engaged in spontaneous land seizures • The Provisional Government failed to deal effectively with the growing internal threat posed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks from April 1917 • The Provisional Government's handling of the Kornilov Affair (August 1917) left the administration discredited in the eyes of the workers and boosted support for the Bolsheviks • The Provisional Government's status as an interim body weakened the executive by giving the impression it was riven with indecision and delay. Arguments and evidence that the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917 owed more to its decision to stay in the war than its domestic policies should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Provisional Government's war aims damaged its standing by bringing it into conflict with the Petrograd Soviet e.g. the Milyukov crisis of April 1917 • The failure of the June Offensive undermined the credibility of the Provisional Government and increased the attraction of the Bolshevik pro-peace and pro-soviet platform • The Provisional Government's pro-war policy during the period February to October 1917 increasingly ran counter to the growing war-weariness and demoralisation evident in the army and population as a whole • The Provisional Government's failure to reverse Russia's economic decline in 1917, which contributed to the radicalisation and alienation of the workers, was inextricably linked to continued involvement in the war. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that opposition from the Petrograd Soviet was the main reason for the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917. Arguments and evidence that opposition from the Petrograd Soviet was the main reason for the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From the outset, the Petrograd Soviet was potentially a major opponent of the Provisional Government, e.g. a popularly elected body that was supported by workers and the Petrograd garrison • The Petrograd Soviet's Order No.1 (March 1917) illustrated starkly where real power lay in the Dual Power relationship and demonstrated that the Provisional Government did not control the army • The Petrograd Soviet's Order No.2 (March 1917), which advocated a defensive military strategy without territorial gains, undermined the government's war effort and led to the damaging Milyukov or April crisis • The Bolsheviks' control of the Petrograd Soviet in September-October 1917 was an important factor in their successful overthrow of the Provisional Government. Arguments and evidence that opposition from the Petrograd Soviet was not the main reason for the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Provisional Government's status as an interim body weakened the executive by giving the general impression it was a temporary administration riven with indecision and delay • Kerensky's authority as Prime Minister of the Provisional Government was badly damaged by the impact of the Kornilov Affair (August 1917) • The failure of the June 1917 offensive, with its high casualty and desertion rates and loss of territory, increased the workers' and soldiers' disaffection with the Provisional Government • Initially the Petrograd Soviet did not want to take power from the Provisional Government, preferring a watchdog role instead; members of the Petrograd Soviet joined the Provisional Government to bolster it. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • As party leader, Lenin was potentially in a good position to offer an informed view about the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks • The purpose of Lenin's letter was to persuade the Central Committee that the Bolsheviks had made significant political progress recently mainly due to the Kornilov affair • The partisan nature of the source is evident from the use of language to reinforce points ('created solely ... August', 'before the Kornilov revolt ... marched against Petrograd'). 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks: • It indicates that any Bolshevik attempt to seize power before the Kornilov affair would have ended in failure ('before the Kornilov revolt ... marched against Petrograd.') • It implies that the failed Kornilov revolt was largely responsible for the Bolsheviks' improved political position ('Now we have a majority ... Kornilov revolt.', 'after the Kornilov revolt ... localities prove this.') • It implies that support for the Bolshevik party was growing before the Kornilov affair ('created solely by the history ... handed out to the Bolsheviks'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • The attempted Bolshevik coup during the July Days led to the arrest of several party leaders and government claims that the Bolsheviks were German agents which reduced support for the party • The Bolsheviks' role in the anti-Kornilov opposition enabled them to pose as defenders of the revolution and regain support; the Kornilov affair also suggested that the main threat came from the right not the left • Support for the Bolsheviks was rising again before the Kornilov affair, e.g. in the August elections to the Petrograd City Duma, the Bolsheviks came second with 33 per cent of the vote.

Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As Prime Minister of the Provisional Government at the time, Kerensky was potentially in a good position to offer an informed view about the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks - The purpose of Kerensky's account was to blame Kornilov for the growth and victory of Bolshevism, thereby deflecting attention away from his own responsibility and that of the Provisional Government - The partisan nature of the source is evident from the use of language to reinforce points ('the great crime, the unforgivable sin', 'naïve dreamers ... by means of a "White General"'). 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks: - It implies that, due to the impact of the Kornilov affair, the Bolsheviks were able to seize power in October 1917 ('Had there been no ... takeover in October 1917.') - It implies that the Kornilov affair was instrumental in enabling the Bolsheviks to secure majorities in the Soviets ('Within a week ... taken over by the Bolsheviks.') - It implies that, after the Kornilov affair, the Bolsheviks were able to use their Soviet majorities to mobilise the masses to undermine the government ('Then everywhere leadership and order in Russia.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - After the Kornilov affair, the Bolsheviks were able to secure a majority in the Petrograd Soviet and Trotsky became its President, giving the Bolsheviks an organisational base from which to plan the October coup - As a result of the Kornilov affair, the Bolsheviks were able to break the stranglehold the SRs and Mensheviks had over soviets in other cities in Russia - The Kornilov affair was not the only reason for the improved Bolshevik position, e.g. the Bolsheviks were better organised than their rivals, and Lenin's policies became progressively more popular during 1917. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both sources indicate that the Kornilov affair had a positive impact on the Bolsheviks - Both sources imply that, before the Kornilov affair, Bolshevik support and influence was limited - These points of agreement are reinforced due to the contrasting positions of the authors (the leader of the Bolsheviks and the former Prime Minister of the Provisional Government).

Section B: Indicative content**Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99**



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the collapse of the Provisional Government in 1917 was due to the Kornilov affair. Arguments and evidence that the collapse of the Provisional Government in 1917 was due to the Kornilov affair should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The left suspected that Kerensky had colluded with Kornilov's counter-revolutionary plans, seriously damaging the government's authority and the Prime Minister's credibility with the Petrograd working class • The right regarded Kerensky's handling of the Kornilov Affair as an unforgiveable act of political cowardice in the face of a growing socialist threat to order and discipline in Russia • The Bolshevik-led defence of Petrograd enabled the party to pose as the saviour of the revolution and thus renew its activity against the government after the July Days fiasco • The Kornilov Affair boosted Bolshevik membership and support so that by September the Bolsheviks had majorities in the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets, thereby providing a base from which to overthrow the government. Arguments and evidence that the collapse of the Provisional Government in 1917 was due to other factors or developments should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Provisional Government's failure to provide solutions to key domestic problems such as rising inflation and land redistribution undermined its authority, e.g. widespread peasant seizure of noble land • Continued participation in the war led to mounting defeats, demoralisation and war-weariness that undermined the Provisional Government and led to growing support for the Bolshevik anti-war platform • The authority of the Provisional Government was undermined from the outset by the rival Petrograd Soviet, e.g. Order No. 1 and No. 2 • The Provisional Government's status as an interim body (holding power until the Constituent Assembly was elected) also weakened the executive by giving the impression it was riven with indecision and delay. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the February 1917 Revolution and the October 1917 Revolution were similar. Arguments and evidence that the February 1917 Revolution and the October 1917 Revolution were similar should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Both revolutions in 1917 were fuelled by the economic and social consequences of Russia's involvement in the First World War, e.g. rising inflation, deteriorating living conditions and industrial dislocation • Neither the Tsar in February 1917 nor the Provisional Government in October 1917 offered much resistance at the critical point when their authority was being directly challenged • In both revolutions, the army was not prepared to defend the government under threat, making its downfall virtually inevitable, e.g. the military in Petrograd effectively abandoned the Tsar and the Provisional Government • Both revolutions can be seen as popular revolts against authority, reflecting widespread public disillusionment with the government of the day; Petrograd was central to events in both revolutions. Arguments and evidence that the February 1917 Revolution and the October 1917 Revolution were different should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • February 1917 represented a spontaneous popular protest against the failures of Tsarism whereas October 1917 amounted to a seizure of power by a small group of organised revolutionaries • February 1917 resulted in the Dual Power arrangement that constrained the authority of the Provisional Government; October 1917 led to the establishment of one-party government • February 1917 produced a 'honeymoon' period of political reform (e.g. an amnesty for political prisoners and freedom of speech and assembly) whereas October 1917 led quickly to political repression • February 1917 produced a cautious interim body that held power only until the election of the Constituent Assembly; October 1917 led to a government determined to hold on to power and implement radical change. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the differences between the revolutions of February 1917 and October 1917 far outweigh their similarities. Arguments and evidence that the differences between the revolutions of February 1917 and October 1917 far outweigh their similarities should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: - February 1917 represented a large spontaneous popular protest against the failures of Tsarism, whereas October 1917 amounted to a seizure of power by a small group of organised revolutionaries - February 1917 resulted in the Dual Power arrangement that constrained the authority of the Provisional Government; October 1917 led to the establishment of one-party government - February 1917 produced a 'honeymoon' period of political reform (e.g. an amnesty for political prisoners and freedom of speech and assembly), whereas October 1917 led quickly to political repression - February 1917 produced a cautious interim body that was to hold power only until the election of the Constituent Assembly; October 1917 led to a government determined to hold on to power and implement radical change. Arguments and evidence that the similarities between the revolutions of February 1917 and October 1917 far outweigh their differences should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: - Both revolutions in 1917 were fuelled by the economic and social consequences of Russia's involvement in the First World War, e.g. rising inflation, deteriorating living conditions and industrial dislocation - Neither the Tsar in February 1917 nor the Provisional Government in October 1917 offered much resistance at the critical point when their authority was being directly challenged - In both revolutions, the army was not prepared to defend the government under threat, making its downfall virtually inevitable, e.g. the military in Petrograd effectively abandoned the Tsar and the Provisional

	Government Both revolutions can be seen as popular revolts against authority, reflecting widespread public disillusionment with the government of the day; Petrograd was central to events in both revolutions. Other relevant material must be credited.
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Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that Kerensky's flawed leadership was the main reason for the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917. Arguments and evidence that Kerensky's flawed leadership was the main reason for the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As Prime Minister, Kerensky was unable to build a strong government and could only establish a fragile liberal-socialist coalition, which failed to provide either stability or dynamism • Kerensky failed to deal effectively with the growing internal threat posed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks from the summer of 1917 • Kerensky's authority, and that of the government, was badly damaged by continued Russian involvement in the war, e.g. the failure of the June Offensive with its high casualty and desertion rates and loss of territory • Kerensky's suspected collusion with Kornilov's counter-revolutionary plans (August 1917) seriously damaged his government's credibility with the Petrograd working class and boosted Bolshevik membership and support • Kerensky failed to provide solutions to key problems that undermined the credibility of the government, e.g. rising inflation and the issue of land redistribution. Arguments and evidence that Kerensky's flawed leadership was not the main reason for the fall of the Provisional Government in 1917 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lenin and the Bolsheviks were skilled, resourceful and ruthless opponents of the Provisional Government, e.g. effective propaganda on key issues, a concentrated activist base in Petrograd and an organised coup in October • The authority of the Provisional Government was undermined from the outset by the rival Petrograd Soviet, e.g. Order No. 1 and Order No. 2 • The Provisional Government's status as an interim body (holding power until the Constituent Assembly was elected) weakened the executive by giving the impression it was riven with indecision and delay • Kornilov's attempt to impose a military dictatorship in August 1917 exposed the weakness of the Provisional Government, since the latter had to rely on forces mobilised by the Petrograd Soviet to foil the coup • Kerensky's actions during the July Days protected the Provisional Government by



	averting a Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd, e.g. the arrest of 800 Bolshevik activists and the disarming of the Red Guard. Other relevant material must be credited.
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Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that problems in agriculture were the main reason for the weakness of the Provisional Government in 1917. Arguments and evidence that problems in agriculture were the main reason for the weakness of the Provisional Government in 1917 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Provisional Government's decision to postpone land reform until the Constituent Assembly had been elected, prompted illegal and often violent peasant land seizures, which undermined the government's authority • Government attempts to introduce a fixed-price grain monopoly in March and August alienated the peasantry who had little incentive to accept this form of 'institutionalised robbery' when consumer goods prices were rising • The government obtained less than half of Russia's grain requirements (March-October); rationing and lack of food in the cities radicalised urban workers who blamed the government for their predicament. Arguments and evidence that other factors/developments were the main reason for the weakness of the Provisional Government in 1917 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Provisional Government's war policy created serious industrial problems and increasingly ran counter to the growing war-weariness and demoralisation evident in the army and population as a whole • The authority of the Provisional Government was undermined from the outset by the existence of the rival 'watchdog' Petrograd Soviet, e.g. Order No. 1 and Order No. 2 • Kerensky's suspected collusion with Kornilov's counter-revolutionary plans (August 1917) seriously damaged his government's credibility with the Petrograd working class • The Provisional Government failed to deal with the growing internal threat posed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks from April 1917, e.g. their effective propaganda on key issues and an organised takeover of power in October. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that lack of unity was the main reason for the defeat of the White forces in the Russian civil war. Arguments and evidence that lack of unity was the main reason for the defeat of the White forces in the Russian civil war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Whites were made up of different groups who had entirely different aims and beliefs which made co-operation difficult and the formulation of an agreed political strategy impossible • The main White forces (under Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin/Wrangel) operated in different parts of Russia and this prevented the development of a unified military command and a co-ordinated fighting strategy • Kolchak arrested and executed many Socialist Revolutionary members even though the SRs had been part of a joint anti-Bolshevik government at Omsk; thereafter the SRs staged revolts against Kolchak • The lack of co-ordination between the Whites and the foreign interventionist forces. Arguments and evidence that lack of unity was not the main reason for the defeat of the White forces in the Russian civil war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Bolsheviks possessed a core support group of committed workers and soldiers who wanted to protect the gains of 1917 and who saw the Reds as the best chance of achieving this • Bolshevik control of the heavily populated central area, gave the Reds several advantages, including better transport links, access to the main armaments factories and a large pool of potential conscripts • Peasants were generally inclined to support the Reds partly because Lenin had legitimised their right to the land but many peasants were coerced into joining the Bolshevik cause and many deserted from the Red Army • Denikin helped landowners recover their estates, and he and other White leaders, including Kolchak, made it clear that the peasants would have to give back most of the land they had seized in 1917. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant the New Economic Policy was in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1921-24. Arguments and evidence that the New Economic Policy was significant in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1921-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The NEP by abolishing grain requisitioning and removing the ban on private trade offered rural Russia economic incentives which reduced peasant opposition to the Bolshevik regime • The new class of 'NEP men' assisted the regime in the short-term by linking the towns with the countryside and by undertaking many economic tasks that the cumbersome state planning system could not handle with efficiency • Economic recovery under the NEP helped to consolidate the regime by improving living standards e.g. by raising food production and increasing average wages for urban workers. Arguments and evidence that the New Economic Policy was not significant/other factors were more significant in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1921-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Certain features of the NEP alienated sections of the population, undermining attempts by the regime to consolidate its power e.g. worker disillusionment with the NEP as unemployment rose steeply in 1921-22 • The Bolshevik regime relied heavily on coercion and repression to consolidate its power e.g. crushing of the Tambov revolt, establishment of GPU, outlawing of Mensheviks and SRs, attacks on the Church • Propaganda and censorship were used extensively by the Bolshevik government to win over 'hearts and minds' and remove critics of the regime e.g. anti-regime writers and scholars were deported and Glavlit introduced pre-publication censorship. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to shed light on the reasons for the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • As a contemporary academic specialist in Russian history, the author was potentially in a position to offer an informed assessment of the reasons for the introduction of the NEP • The author's visit to Russia during the civil war may have exposed him to the conditions which gave rise to the change in policy • The account was written several years after the event and the passage of time may have influenced the author's discussion of the reasons for the NEP. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921: • It indicates that Lenin's decision to abandon War Communism was linked to the Reds' victory in the civil war ('This retreat came with ... and their allies') • It provides evidence that War Communism had brought about a total economic collapse in Russia making a new policy necessary ('This fact was recognised ... in January 1920') • It suggests that the introduction of the NEP was linked to the ideological problems associated with War Communism ('pure Communism ... failure was self-evident'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • By 1921 the Soviet economy was in ruins (e.g. the transport system had collapsed and industrial and grain production had slumped) which put the Bolshevik regime under enormous pressure to abandon War Communism • Peasant revolts in Tambov and elsewhere (due to grain requisitioning) in 1920-21 and worker protests against the harsh measures of War Communism made Lenin realise that concessions and economic liberalisation were essential for the regime's survival • Lenin became personally convinced that a new policy had to be introduced immediately following the Kronstadt mutiny of March 1921 which indicated that the Soviet regime was alienating its core ideological support. Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences:



Question	Indicative content
	- As leader of the Bolshevik regime at the time, Lenin was in a good position to offer an informed view about the reasons for the introduction of the NEP - As a party speech, Lenin's address was designed to offer the members present an official justification for the leadership's change of policy - As party leader, Lenin would not have wanted to engage in public criticism of previous Bolshevik economic policy unless he felt he really had to. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921: - It indicates that War Communism was a failure and should be recognised as such ('So far comrades ... must frankly admit it', 'we must recognise ... not try to cover it up') - It indicates that an alliance of the workers and peasants underpinned the NEP based on the production of, and need for, manufactured goods and food supplies ('the foundation of ... the peasantry', 'If large scale industry ... coming from the peasants') - It claims that, under these new arrangements, the peasants would appreciate the benefits of the NEP and realise that this system was superior to capitalism ('Then, the peasants ... than the capitalist system'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Red victory in the civil war, which removed popular fears of a White return, led to an explosion of urban and rural discontent in early 1921 against the harsh realities of War Communism - Lenin focused on incentives for the peasants because he regarded the widespread rural revolt against the regime in the early 1920s as a bigger threat than the White armies during the civil war - Lenin had to use his personal authority at the 10th Party Congress to ensure the NEP was adopted and the opposition of party members uncomfortable with the partial reintroduction of capitalism was overcome. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both sources indicate that the economic failures of War Communism led to the introduction of the NEP - Both sources suggest that the situation in 1920-21 required a new policy which was not rigidly based on communist principles - These points of agreement are reinforced due to the contrasting positions of the authors (an informed academic British visitor and the leader of the Soviet government).

Section B: indicative content

Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which Bolshevik economic policies changed in the years 1917-24. Arguments and evidence that Bolshevik economic policies changed in the years 1917-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under War Communism (1918-21), the economy was rigidly state controlled but the NEP (1921-24) promoted a mixed economy with a certain amount of private ownership • Under War Communism, compulsory requisitioning by food brigades was used to extract grain from the peasants but, under State Capitalism (1917-18) and the NEP, peasants were treated more leniently • Workers' control was established under State Capitalism but was abandoned in favour of 'one man management' under War Communism and limited private ownership under the NEP. Arguments and evidence that Bolshevik economic policies did not change in the years 1917-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Nationalisation and state control was an important feature of State Capitalism, War Communism and the NEP • The central objective of Bolshevik economic policy during these years was to keep the cities and the workers supplied with food • Throughout the period, Bolshevik economic policy remained pragmatic (rather than ideological) in the face of shifting circumstances • Throughout the period, Bolshevik economic policy was based on the assumption that raising the productivity of the agricultural sector held the key to long-term growth and stability. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which the Bolshevik government consolidated communist rule in Russia in the years 1918–21. Arguments and evidence that the Bolshevik government consolidated communist rule in Russia in the years 1918–21 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Treaty of Brest Litovsk (1918) enabled the Bolshevik government to leave the First World War and thus concentrate fully on consolidating its power by dealing with internal enemies • The forcible closure of the Constituent Assembly in 1918 helped to consolidate the Bolsheviks' position by removing a key forum for their political opponents • The Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war (1918–21) extended the communists' territorial control, removed the White threat and effectively ended any prospect of large-scale foreign intervention • The Red terror conducted by the Cheka in the years 1918–21, used coercion, torture and executions to stifle opposition and made communist rule more secure. Arguments and evidence that the Bolshevik government did not consolidate communist rule in Russia in the years 1918–21 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The policy of War Communism (1918–21) threatened to undermine the government by leaving the Soviet economy in ruins and sparking urban food riots and serious peasant revolts against grain requisitioning • By 1921 some areas were still not under Bolshevik control, e.g. in Tambov, a peasant army under Alexander Antonov held out against the Red Army for over a year • The Kronstadt rising and the Workers Opposition of 1921 clearly revealed that the party faced a major crisis with former staunch supporters revolting against the government and the Bolsheviks internally divided • Lenin's introduction of the NEP in 1921 was an economic concession, made from a position of weakness; it reintroduced elements of capitalism and thus represented an ideological retreat. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant was the impact of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918-24. Arguments and evidence that the impact of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was significant in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • If the Bolsheviks had not secured peace terms at Brest-Litovsk, then the new regime would have been unable to prevent a German invasion and the inevitable collapse of the fledgling communist government • Lenin and his party had promised war-weary soldiers, workers and peasants there would be peace and he needed to honour this pledge if the Bolsheviks were to retain credibility and avoid the fate of the Provisional Government • Brest-Litovsk gave the Bolsheviks a vital breathing space and enabled Lenin to focus on defeating the regime's internal enemies 'with both hands free'. Arguments and evidence that the impact of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was not significant/other factors or developments were more significant in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The draconian terms of Brest-Litovsk galvanised anti-Bolshevik groups in Russia and led to the civil war that threatened the existence of the communist regime • The Bolshevik regime relied heavily on coercion and repression to consolidate its power in the years 1918-24, e.g. the Red Terror, crushing the Tambov revolt, political show trials and attacks on the Church • From 1921, the NEP helped to consolidate the regime by improving living standards and offering rural Russia economic incentives that reduced peasant opposition to the Bolshevik regime • Propaganda and censorship were used extensively by the Bolshevik government to win over 'hearts and minds' and remove critics of the regime, e.g. Glavlit introduced pre-publication censorship. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the survival of the Bolshevik regime, in the years 1917–21, owed more to the weaknesses of its opponents than to the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky. Arguments and evidence that the survival of the Bolshevik regime, in the years 1917–21, owed more to the weaknesses of its opponents than to the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Mensheviks and SRs did not seriously oppose the Bolsheviks after the seizure of power in 1917, mistakenly believing that Lenin's government would quickly collapse and the Constituent Assembly would triumph • The White forces in the civil war were made up of different groups with different aims and beliefs, which made cooperation difficult and the formulation of an agreed political strategy impossible • Foreign intervention against the Bolsheviks during the civil war lacked real unity of purpose, was driven by national self-interest, and was also undermined by war-weariness • Major revolts against Bolshevik rule, such as Kronstadt and Tambov (involving 15,000 and 40,000 rebels respectively), failed to coordinate with other opponents of the regime. Arguments and evidence that the survival of the Bolshevik regime, in the years 1917–21, owed more to the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky than to the weaknesses of its opponents should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lenin was the driving force behind the forcible closure of the Constituent Assembly and acceptance of the Treat of Brest-Litovsk; both decisions helped the fledgling Bolshevik regime to survive • Lenin used his personal authority to gain Bolshevik acceptance of the NEP in order to create a vital 'breathing space' for the regime in early 1921; this policy change led to improved economic conditions • Trotsky's organisation, and leadership, of the Red Army was a critical factor in the Bolshevik victory in the civil war of 1918–20 • Trotsky led the Red forces against the rebels based at Kronstadt in March 1921; in crushing the mutiny he removed a serious threat to Bolshevik power. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the failure of foreign intervention in Russia was the main reason why the Bolsheviks were able to consolidate power in the years 1918-21. Arguments and evidence that the failure of foreign intervention in Russia was the main reason why the Bolsheviks were able to consolidate power in the years 1918-21 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Foreign interventionist forces rarely posed a direct military threat to the Bolsheviks, enabling the Red Army to consolidate communist power by focusing on their domestic White and Green opponents • Britain sent £100 million of supplies to the Whites but through incompetence and corruption some of this assistance ended up in Bolshevik hands, thereby boosting the resources the communists could deploy to consolidate power • Foreign intervention was counterproductive since it allowed the Bolsheviks to increase their support by portraying the communists as patriotic defenders of Russia and the Whites as the agents of foreign capitalism • Foreign intervention in Russia after November 1918 was uncoordinated, unpopular and confused; in the absence of a unified foreign military effort with clear aims, the prospect of communist consolidation was increased. Arguments and evidence that the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918-21 was due to other factors or developments should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Treaty of Brest Litovsk prevented a German invasion, honoured a Bolshevik pledge to take Russia out of the war and enabled Lenin to focus on defeating the regime's internal enemies 'with both hands free' • The Bolshevik regime relied heavily on coercion and repression to consolidate its power in the years 1918-21, e.g. the Red Terror, closing the Constituent Assembly and crushing the Kronstadt Mutiny • The switch to the NEP in 1921 helped to consolidate the regime by improving living standards and offering rural Russia economic incentives that reduced peasant opposition to the Bolshevik regime • Propaganda and censorship were used extensively by the Bolshevik government to win over 'hearts and minds' and remove critics of the regime, e.g. closing down rival newspapers in 1918. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The status of the source (a diplomat's report) offers an official British assessment of the problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover • As a confidential document, the report is likely to be candid in its assessment of the problems surrounding foreign intervention • The status of the author and date of the document are likely to make this government report an informed contemporary source. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover: • It indicates that open foreign intervention would provide the Bolsheviks with a pretext to abandon the wartime alliance and hand over military resources to the Germans ('give Lenin's party ... German prisoners.') • It suggests that the benefits of foreign intervention are speculative rather than guaranteed ('Cossacks might also come in', 'It might secure ... Fleet') • It indicates that secret British funding (of anti-Bolshevik groups) might not be used by the recipients as intended ('we have no guarantee ... pure gamble.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Foreign intervention was made more likely by Bolshevik-German peace negotiations, since the latter raised the prospect of German territorial and military gains, placing the Allies in a weaker position • Once the First World War was over, the rationale for foreign intervention was considerably weakened, since there was now no incentive to install a new government that was willing to fight Germany • Britain sent around £100 million of supplies to the White forces but, due to incompetence and corruption, some of these resources ended up in



Question	Indicative content
	Bolshevik hands. Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • As a British agent in Moscow in 1917-18, Bruce Lockhart was potentially in a good position to offer an informed view about the problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover • The purpose of Bruce Lockhart's account was to illustrate that small-scale foreign intervention in 1918 was a mistake, thereby endorsing the author's own critical stance • The partisan nature of the source is evident from the use of language to reinforce points ('unbelievable error', 'absence of a strong lead', 'remained completely apathetic.'). 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover: • It implies that large-scale foreign intervention would have galvanised anti-communist opposition in Russia and demoralised the Bolsheviks ('On 4 August ... excitement', 'In despair ... ready for departure.') • It claims that the small-scale nature of foreign intervention did not pose a real threat to the Bolsheviks ('He now said ... few hundred men.') • It claims that the lack of large scale committed foreign intervention led to divisions among anti-Bolshevik groups in Russia and encouraged apathy among the Russian people ('In the absence ... completely apathetic.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include:

Question	Indicative content
	- Only 200,000 foreign troops were sent to Russia and since these were deployed defensively across three main areas, the intervention did little to strengthen anti-communism in Russia - Allied intervention did not pose a major threat to the Bolsheviks since most foreign troops defended ports and arms depots and rarely engaged communist forces in battle - The temporary, limited and dispersed presence of foreign troops did little to hold the disparate White forces together or mobilise popular support, e.g. most British, French and US soldiers left in 1919. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both sources suggest that open foreign intervention in Russia (either in the abstract or in reality) had a negative impact on Russia - Both sources suggest that open foreign intervention (either in the abstract or in reality) benefited the Bolsheviks - These points of agreement are reinforced due to the contrasting positions of the authors (a British secret agent in Moscow and a British diplomat).

Section B: indicative content

Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774-99



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the closing of the Constituent Assembly was the main reason for the onset of the Russian civil war. Arguments and evidence that the closing of the Constituent Assembly was the main reason for the onset of the Russian civil war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many Russians viewed the closure as an act of political hypocrisy, since the Bolsheviks had previously called for Constituent Assembly elections; this hardened anti-Bolshevik opposition, making civil war more likely • Having secured just 22.5 per cent of the popular vote in the Constituent Assembly elections, the Bolsheviks were determined to hold on to power at any cost and by any means, and this brought civil war closer • The Socialist Revolutionaries, victors in the Assembly elections, afterwards headed anti-Bolshevik governments in other parts of Russia, which increased the momentum towards civil war, e.g. the Samara government. Arguments and evidence that the closing of the Constituent Assembly was not the main reason/other factors were the main reason for the onset of the Russian civil war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The closing of the Constituent Assembly did not provoke widespread public condemnation; radical workers preferred the Soviet government model and most peasants remained indifferent • The draconian terms of Brest-Litovsk (e.g. Russia lost 27 per cent of its farmland and 74 per cent of its iron ore and coal reserves) galvanised anti-Bolshevik/nationalist groups in Russia and led to the civil war • Foreign intervention, beginning in early 1918, contributed to the onset of the civil war, since it was designed to protect foreign interests in Russia and overthrow the Bolshevik regime • The Czech Army of Liberation posed a real threat to Bolshevik rule in mid-1918 by taking control of western Siberia and parts of east European Russia and then advancing towards Moscow, making conflict inevitable. Other relevant material must be credited.

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8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the Bolshevik regime succeeded in imposing central control over the Russian economy in the years 1917-24. Arguments and evidence that the Bolshevik regime succeeded in imposing central control over the Russian economy in the years 1917-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under state capitalism (1917-18), private companies were directed and monitored by the state, <i>Vesenkha</i> was created to supervise industry and manage the economy, and limited nationalisation took place • Under War Communism (1918-21), the Bolsheviks imposed compulsory requisitioning of grain, banned private trade and placed large-scale industry directly under state control to maximise the war effort • Under the NEP (1921-24), the Bolshevik regime imposed a 'tax-in-kind' on the peasants, payable in grain, and the 'commanding heights' of the economy (e.g. coal, transport, banking) remained under state control. Arguments and evidence that the Bolshevik regime did not succeed in imposing central control over the Russian economy in the years 1917-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under state capitalism, the Bolsheviks could not impose wide-ranging central economic control because they needed to maintain worker and peasant support, e.g. the Decrees on Land and Workers' Control (1917) • Under War Communism, Bolshevik attempts to centralise economic control were counterproductive, e.g. the development of a thriving black market in foodstuffs and urban workers abandoned the main cities • Under the NEP, Bolshevik central economic control was consciously diluted, e.g. peasants could sell surplus grain for profit on the open market and private ownership/trading of small businesses was legalised. Other relevant material must be credited.



2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
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6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the weaknesses associated with foreign intervention were primarily responsible for the defeat of the Whites in the Russian civil war. Arguments and evidence that the weaknesses associated with foreign intervention were primarily responsible for the defeat of the Whites in the Russian civil war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Only 200,000 foreign troops were sent to Russia and, since these were deployed defensively across three main areas, the intervention did little to strengthen anti-communism in Russia • Once the First World War was over, the rationale for foreign intervention was considerably weakened, since there was now no incentive to install a new government that was willing to fight Germany • Allied intervention did not pose a major threat to the Bolsheviks, since most foreign troops defended ports and arms depots and rarely engaged communist forces in battle • The temporary, limited and dispersed presence of foreign troops did little to hold the disparate White forces together or mobilise popular support, e.g. most British, French and US soldiers left in 1919 • Britain sent around £100 million of supplies to the White forces but, due to incompetence and corruption, some of these resources ended up in Bolshevik hands and so assisted their war effort. Arguments and evidence that other factors/developments were primarily responsible for the defeat of the Whites in the Russian civil war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Bolsheviks possessed a core support group of committed workers and soldiers who wanted to protect the gains of 1917 and who saw the Reds as the best chance of achieving this • Bolshevik control of the heavily populated central Moscow-Petrograd area gave the Reds several advantages, including better transport links, access to the main armament factories and a large pool of potential conscripts • Peasants were generally inclined to support the Reds, partly because Lenin had legitimised their right to the land; White leaders wanted the peasants to give back most of the land they had seized in 1917 • The Whites comprised different groups with different aims and beliefs; they could not agree on whether they were fighting for a monarchy, a republic, or a Constituent Assembly, e.g. Kolchak and the SRs • The main White forces (under Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin/Wrangel) operated in different parts of Russia and this prevented the development of a unified military command and a co-ordinated fighting strategy. Other relevant material must be credited.



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6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of the peace of Brest-Litovsk in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918-24. Arguments and evidence that the peace of Brest-Litovsk was significant in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • If the Bolsheviks had not secured peace terms at Brest-Litovsk, then the new regime would have been unable to prevent a German invasion and the likely collapse of the fledgling communist government • Lenin had promised war-weary soldiers, workers and peasants there would be peace and he needed to honour this pledge if the Bolsheviks were to retain credibility and avoid the fate of the Provisional Government • Lenin calculated that Brest-Litovsk would either prevent an even more draconian peace being imposed on the regime in the event of an eventual German victory or would lapse if the allies triumphed • Brest-Litovsk gave the Bolsheviks a vital breathing space and enabled Lenin to focus on defeating the regime's internal enemies 'with both hands free'. Arguments and evidence that the peace of Brest-Litovsk was not significant/other factors or developments were more significant in the Bolshevik consolidation of power in the years 1918-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The draconian terms of Brest-Litovsk galvanised anti-Bolshevik groups in Russia and led to the civil war that threatened the existence of the communist regime • The Bolshevik regime relied heavily on coercion and repression to consolidate its power in the years 1918-24, e.g. the Red Terror, crushing the Tambov revolt, political show trials and attacks on the Church • From 1921 the NEP helped to consolidate the regime by improving living standards and offering rural Russia economic incentives that reduced peasant opposition to the Bolshevik regime • Propaganda and censorship were used extensively by the Bolshevik government to win over 'hearts and minds' and remove critics of the regime, e.g. Glavlit introduced pre-publication censorship. Other relevant material must be credited.

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6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that Lenin's actions and attitudes were the main reason for the survival of the Bolshevik regime in the years 1917-24. Arguments and evidence that Lenin's actions and attitudes were the main reason for the survival of the Bolshevik regime in the years 1917-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lenin decided to close down the Constituent Assembly in 1918 after the Bolsheviks had failed to secure a majority of seats, thereby preserving the Soviet regime and removing a potentially important opposition forum • Lenin supported Trotsky in creating a traditional Red Army against the opposition of other leading Bolsheviks; without Lenin's backing, Trotsky would not have prevailed, and the Bolsheviks may have lost the civil war • Lenin pushed through the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk against the opposition of the left communist Bolshevik faction because he realised that the regime needed peace with the Central Powers in order to survive • Lenin persuaded a reluctant party to accept the economic compromises of the NEP in March 1921; without this shift in economic policy, the Soviet regime may have been overthrown • Lenin's authoritarian attitudes contributed to the regime's survival, e.g. his determination to establish one-party rule in 1921, and his acceptance of coercion and violence for political ends, e.g. the Red Terror (1918). Arguments and evidence that other factors were the main reason for the survival of the Bolshevik regime in the years 1917-24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Trotsky played an important role in the regime's survival, e.g. during the civil war, his military intervention prevented Petrograd falling to the Whites when Lenin had resigned himself to losing the city • Bolshevik control/censorship of the press and radio ensured the population was targeted with cheap and accessible pro-socialist propaganda in order to win hearts and minds, e.g. Pravda, Izvestiya and Glavlit • Bolshevik control of the Moscow-Petrograd area helped to ensure survival because it contained better transport links, the main arms factories and wartime arms dumps, and a large pool of potential conscripts • Foreign intervention did not pose a major threat to the Bolsheviks since only 200,000 foreign troops were sent temporarily to Russia, and the end of the First World War weakened the rationale for foreign involvement • The weakness of the domestic anti-Bolshevik opposition helped the Soviet regime to survive during this period, e.g. the White forces were divided during the civil war and the Kronstadt and Tambov revolts were isolated. Other relevant material must be credited.

