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EDEXCEL AS AND A LEVEL HISTORY: QUESTIONS BY TOPIC

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

AS and A Level History · Paper 2 · Option 2D.2

57 questions · 1032 marks · Mark schemes included

Pearson Edexcel AS (8HI0) and A Level (9HI0) History, June 2016 - June 2025

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HOW TO USE THIS BOOKLET

Questions are grouped by specification sub-topic; within each sub-topic they run from the lowest mark tariff to the highest.

Click any heading or question row below to jump straight to it.

On every question page, click ANSWER in the top-right corner to jump to its mark scheme.

Diagrams, graphs, tables and data are printed exactly as they appeared in the original papers.

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65

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QUESTIONS

57 questions · 1032 marks · grouped by sub-topic, lowest tariff first



KEY TOPIC 1

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GERMAN STATES, C1840-

7 questions in this sub-topic · 104 marks · lowest tariff first



2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the political challenges, in the years 1846–48, facing Frederick William IV, King of Prussia?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From the opening speech by King Frederick William IV to the United *Diet* of Prussia in April 1847. The United *Diet* was a meeting of representatives of the Prussian nobility, towns and peasantry called by the King.

No power on earth will succeed in moving me to transform the natural relationship between ruler and people into a legalistic or constitutional one. And I will never ever allow a written piece of paper to come between Our Lord God in Heaven and this country or to rule us with written paragraphs as a substitute for our old sacred loyalties. The simple, true, loyal people of Prussia do not want representatives to share in government or to see the genuine power of its kings broken.

5

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From an article published in the *Düsseldorfer Zeitung* newspaper in September 1843. Düsseldorf was an industrial city located in the Prussian Rhineland. The writer was a supporter of German nationalism.

The natural weakness of the current unification [the German Confederation] is found in the way we have only a diplomatic, but not a real political union. A confederation instead of a federal state. Instead of a single Germany, we have 38 German states, just as many governments, almost as many princely courts, and many assemblies of estates. We have 38 different laws and administrations, and ambassadors.

10

What an enormous saving it would be if all this would be taken care of by a central government. What a saving in money and officers would result if Germany maintained a single army! But much worse than the current waste of expenditure is the way that, among 38 different states, just as many special interests are at work disadvantaging daily business down to the last detail. No mail and no postage can be delivered, without it requiring agreements between states. No railway line can be proposed that won't be located in its own state for as much of its length as possible. And what help is it if the Confederation grants the freedom to move from one German state into another if this other state sternly turns away the poor emigrant?

15

20



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You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the impact of urbanisation on the social classes in Germany in the 1840s?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From Ernst Dronke, *Berlin*, published 1846. Dronke was a socialist writer and social investigator. He made observations and collected statistical material about the places he visited. Here he is writing about his experiences in Berlin in the 1840s.

Life in general in a big city is pleasant. The public life of the community is the pulse of this city. Out in the public streets everything roars chaotically. The noble and the lowly, rich and poor: no one is limited by the others.

In the residential areas the differences of class become apparent. The aristocracy live in certain parts of town. Their influence is small in that it consists of one and a half streets, and they even have to share these with the powerful middle-class. The shop-owners and industrialists have expanded further outwards. The working-class are found in the attics and cellars, and in the shacks next to the factories. Poverty makes itself visible outside the gates of the city. Misery, in its most terrifying form, is there because the chains of poverty are bound to crime.

5

10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From Bismarck's memoirs, *Reflections and Reminiscences*, written in the years 1891–98. Here Bismarck is describing his appointment as Minister-President of Prussia by William I in 1862.

His Majesty repeated that he could not govern without suitable ministers.

I replied that His Majesty had been acquainted ever since May with my readiness to enter the Ministry. With me on his side, I was certain that von Roon would remain as War Minister. And I did not doubt that we would succeed in completing the Cabinet, even if other members should feel themselves compelled to resign.

15

After a good deal of consideration and discussion, the King asked me whether I was prepared as Minister to argue for the reorganisation of the army. When I agreed, he asked me further whether I would do so in opposition to the majority in parliament and its resolutions. When I stated my willingness, he finally declared, 'Then it is my duty, with your help, to attempt to continue the battle, and I shall not abdicate.'

20

The King invited me to accompany him to the park. I succeeded in persuading him that, so far as he was concerned, it was not a question of Liberal or Conservative, of this or that shade, but rather monarchical rule or parliamentary government. And that the latter must be avoided at all costs, even if by a period of dictatorship.

25



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2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the obstacles to the growth of liberalism in the German Confederation in the 1840s?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Source for use with Question 2(a).

Source 3: From a comment made by the Austrian Chancellor, Metternich, to members of the Austrian State Conference in 1845. The State Conference was a group of ministers created to advise and guide the Austrian Emperor Ferdinand I on government policy.

Liberal political associations are springing up everywhere like weeds in a garden. If one studies these associations in a calm, unbiased manner, one can be easily convinced that their purpose is mostly in direct opposition to traditional good government. These associations have only the appearance of being useful organisations.

5

Common sense suggests the solution to the problem of these associations. The problem can be solved by upholding and applying those powers of strict control that belong to the government authorities. Before each association is set up, those in supreme authority must have knowledge of the basic ideas behind the association, and of the methods it intends to use. Liberal political associations should only be allowed to exist if they have first been authorised by the government.

10



Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From Carl Schurz, *Reminiscences*, published in the USA in 1908. Schurz was a well-respected politician. In 1848, Schurz had been a student living in Bonn, in the Prussian Rhineland, and a member of a student society that promoted democracy and German nationalism.

Toward the end of February 1848, a friend rushed into my room, exclaiming:

‘The French have driven away King Louis Philippe and proclaimed the Republic!’

We ran to the market square, the usual meeting place for the student societies. 15
It was already crowded with young men, talking excitedly. What did we want?
No one really knew. But since the French had acted, something of course must
happen here, too. We were overcome by a feeling that we had just felt the first
shock of a political earthquake.

In conversations next morning, certain ideas and catchwords began to spread 20
widely. Now, in Germany, the day had arrived for the establishment of ‘German
Unity’, and the founding of a great, powerful, national German empire. First, we
would demand a national parliament, then civil rights and liberties.

Great news came from Vienna! The university students were the first to demand 25
that the Emperor of Austria grant liberty and citizens’ rights to the people.
In the great cities of Prussia, there was also a mighty uproar. In the Prussian
capital, the masses surged upon the streets.

While such news rushed in upon us from all sides like a roaring hurricane, in 30
the little university town of Bonn, we were also busy preparing statements to
send to the Prussian King.

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Source 1 from: The Making of Modern Italy, 1800-71 By Vyvyan Brendon © Hodder Education, 1998

Source 2 from: <https://archive.org/details/autobiographyav00rossgoog/page/n184/mode/2up>

Source 3 from: Metternich and His Times By G.De Bertier De Sauvigny © Darton,Longman & Todd Ltd, 1962

Source 4 from: <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1848schurz.asp>



-
- 6** How far do you agree that the main reason for popular unrest in Germany, in the years 1846–48, was the growth of nationalism?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How far do you agree that economic developments were mainly responsible for the growth of German nationalism in the 1840s?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** How far do you agree that the most significant feature of the economic and social development of Germany in the 1840s was railway building?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** To what extent did the supporters of radical ideas make progress in Germany in the years 1840–47?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



KEY TOPIC 2

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–49 IN GERMANY

16 questions in this sub-topic · 308 marks · lowest tariff first



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the political impact of the failure of the 1848–49 German revolutions?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From a travel book written by an American visitor to Europe, published 1854. Here the author is commenting on his travels in the German states and the Austrian Empire in September 1851.

While we were travelling to Berlin, a German passenger informed us on many points concerning the present condition of the German Confederation. He spoke most disapprovingly of its political organisation, its chaotic rule, its corruption and its oppression. Like many Germans, he would probably have been a republican if he dared.

5

In Berlin, we saw the royal carriage with the Prussian King and the Prince of Bavaria, who had come to visit his royal friend.

Later, we also met a young Austrian army officer. He had fought in the recent revolutionary struggles. However, we found him not at all willing to speak on the subject. In Austria, to discuss government actions was among a number of unforgivable sins. All that people are required to do – is to be quiet and obey.

10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From the memoirs of Richard Wagner, *My Life*, published 1870. In 1848–49, Wagner was the conductor of music at the King of Saxony's court and also directly involved in revolutionary politics. Here he is commenting on the uprising of 3–9 May 1849 in Dresden, Saxony.

4 May. I could see that the Town Hall was becoming the centre of the revolution. Those people hoping for a peaceful understanding with the monarch were thrown into utmost dismay by the news that the King, acting on advice, had left the palace, and had gone to his fortress at Königstein.

15

News also arrived that, as arranged in a previous agreement, the King of Prussia's troops would arrive to occupy Dresden. A general outcry immediately arose for barricades to be built to prevent this entry of foreign troops. I encountered Bakunin* and he was unhappy with the amateur inefficiency of the measures that had been taken. He declared the revolt was being badly organised.

20

6 May. Prussian troops marched into the town.

8 May. I heard complaints about the complete absence of true revolutionary spirit shown by the revolutionary leaders. I learned that the provisional government had passed a resolution to abandon Dresden.

25

9 May. The Prussians received large reinforcements. The Prussian troops mostly avoided fighting in the streets by fighting from house to house by breaking through the walls. This had made it clear that all defence by barricades in the streets had become useless.

*Bakunin – a well-known revolutionary activist



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Source 1 from: A woman's first impressions of Europe being wayside sketches By Mrs. E.A. Forbes.

Source 2 from: The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy By D Beales and E F Biagini © Pearson Education Limited, 2002.

Source 3 from: Memories over the water: or, Stray thoughts on a long stroll By Henry Maney, 1854.

Source 4 from: Mein Leben by Cosima Wagner, 1870.



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the main reason for the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament (1848–49) was divisions within the Assembly?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 5 'The revolutions in the states of the German Confederation in 1848 had no single underlying cause.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the course of events during the revolution in Prussia, in the years 1848–49, was dependent on the actions of Frederick William IV?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** How accurate is it to say that it was the weaknesses of the revolutionaries rather than the revival of the forces of conservatism that caused the failure of the 1848-49 revolutions in Germany?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the outbreak of revolution in the German states in 1848?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a speech made by Prince Felix Lichnowsky to the Prussian United Diet, 1847. The United Diet was a meeting of representatives of the Prussian nobility, towns and peasantry called by King Frederick William IV, April 1847. Prince Lichnowsky was an aristocrat and elected representative to the Diet from Silesia.

In several regions, thousands of unfortunate linen weavers were forced to work with cotton because they were no longer able to support themselves by linen weaving. Consequently, there arose such an over-production of cotton that neither the employers nor their employees could survive. Numerous factories were forced to shut down, others went into bankruptcy. There were some well-intentioned factory-owners who, despite their increasing debts, were reluctant to exploit their workers. However, as competition for labour declined, the rights of the workers disappeared. Heartless manufacturers oppressed the poor workers; workers no longer had the choice of seeking employment with a more humane owner.

This is, perhaps, the cause of recent discontent. I believe such discontent to be the result of hunger, not socialist ideas. He who wants some joy in life must have more than just his daily bread. He must be able to look forward with a sense of security for himself and his family. When they were sure of an honest livelihood, none of the local Silesian weavers paid any attention to revolutionary agitation. They did not give up hope in themselves, their King or their God. But then, finally, it was hunger that aroused great despair among them.



Source 4: From *The Offenburg Programme of South-West German Democrats*, 12 September 1847. The Programme was a list of demands for political reform made by radical German democrats. The authors claimed that their demands were made in the name of the people of Baden.

1. We demand that our governments disassociate themselves from repressive Decrees that damage our basic rights as men and also those of the German Confederation and our state constitutions. 20
2. We demand freedom of the press. The right of men to communicate their ideas freely can no longer be withheld from us.
5. We demand personal freedom. The police must cease to degrade and harass the citizen. The right of the people to assemble and to free speech should be recognised. 25
6. We demand representation of the people at the German Confederation. The German people want a fatherland and a voice in its affairs and a guarantee of our existence as a nation.
8. We demand a fair system of taxation. Each should bear the burden of taxation that he can carry. 30
9. We demand that education be available to all.
10. We demand that the imbalance between workers and business be addressed. Society is responsible for protecting the worker.
11. We demand laws worthy of free citizens and trial by jury. Citizens will be judged by citizens. 35
12. We demand an elected state administration.
13. We demand the abolition of all privileges. Respect for a free citizen is the right of all.

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-
- 6** How far do you agree that the main reason for the initial success of the revolutions in the German states in 1848 was the situation in the Austrian Empire?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the failure of German nationalists in the 1848–49 revolutions?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From an American newspaper article written by Friedrich Engels, 27 February 1852. Engels was a German socialist political commentator. He actively supported the revolutions in Germany in 1848–49. In 1852 he was in political exile.

It was to be expected that, after the popular revolutionary victories in Vienna and Berlin, there should be a Representative Assembly for all Germany. This Assembly was consequently elected and met at Frankfurt.

In reality, what we had was the strange spectacle of an Assembly pretending to be the only legal representative of a great and sovereign nation. Yet it never possessed the will or the force to make its claims recognised. The debates of this Assembly were without any practical result. They were not even of any theoretical value, reproducing nothing but the most worn-out arguments.

The people of Germany felt deeply the need to do away with the intolerable territorial divisions that prevented effective national unity. For a time the German people had hoped the Frankfurt National Assembly would begin a new era for all Germany and give the nation a fair opportunity for action. But the childish conduct of that bunch of know-it-alls in the Assembly soon undermined the national enthusiasm. The disgraceful proceedings prompted by events in Schleswig-Holstein brought out popular indignation against the Assembly. The cowardly German people then helped to restore the former solid foundations of reactionary government upon which the present counter-revolutionary system is built.



Source 4: From '*A Word to my People*', a speech made by Frederick William IV, 15 May 1849. The speech was a public explanation of Frederick William IV's decision to reject the offer by the Frankfurt Assembly of the crown of a united Germany.

I was not able to submit a favourable reply to the offer of a crown on the part of the Frankfurt National Assembly because it does not have the right, without the consent of the German governments, to bestow the crown that was offered. It offered the crown upon the condition that I would accept a constitution. This constitution could not be reconciled with the rights of the German states. 20

I have tried in every way to reach an understanding with the Assembly. But now the Assembly has broken with Prussia. The majority of its members are no longer those men upon whom Germany looked with pride and confidence. The greater part of the deputies voluntarily left the Assembly when they saw that it was on the road to ruin. Yesterday, I ordered all the Prussian deputies who had not already left, to be recalled. The other governments will do the same. 25 30

A group that is in league with the extremists now dominates the Assembly. While they pretend to urge the unity of Germany, they are really inciting a war against monarchy.

Such crimes have put an end to the hope that the Assembly can bring about German unity but I have never lost hope. My government has taken up with the more important German States the work on the German constitution already begun by the Assembly. 35



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Option 2D.1: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the response of Frederick William IV of Prussia to the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From speeches made by Frederick William IV during a public procession through Berlin, 21 March 1848.

At the University

My heart beats proudly that it is in my capital city where such powerful opinion has expressed itself. This day is a great day. A day never to be forgotten. A decisive day.

Students make the greatest impression on the nation and the nation on students. In you, gentlemen, lies the beginning of a great future. These black, red and gold colours I wear do not belong to me. I do not mean to use them to take over anything. I do not want either another crown or another territory. I want liberty. I will have unity in Germany. I want good order. I swear it before God. I have seized the banner and placed myself at the head of the entire people. I believe that the hearts of the German Princes are with me and that the will of the people supports me.

At the Town Hall

Citizens, I know perfectly well where my strength lies. It is not found in my army, although my army is certainly strong and brave. Nor is my strength found in the money chests of my well-filled treasury. My strength is found only in the hearts and loyalty of my people. And I know that you will give to me those hearts and that loyalty. I desire nothing but good for you and Germany.

Source 4: From a private letter written by Frederick William IV to Baron von Bunsen, 13 December 1848. Bunsen was a diplomat and a trusted adviser. Bunsen wanted Frederick William to accept the crown of a united Germany from the Frankfurt Assembly, if it was offered.

Potsdam, 13 December 1848

My dearest friend. I want neither the consent of the Princes to an election nor the crown itself. Do you not understand these words? 20

I shall enlighten you on the subject as briefly and clearly as possible. First then, this crown is, in fact, no crown. Even if it were offered with the approval of the German Princes, a Hohenzollern could not accept a crown offered by an Assembly created by revolution. 25

A crown that is fit for a Hohenzollern to wear is a German crown that comes from the ancient tradition of German kingship and is confirmed 'by the Grace of God'. But the crown you unfortunately refer to dishonours me indescribably. It stinks of the Revolution of 1848; the silliest, most stupid and the wickedest Revolution of the century. Why would I accept such an illegitimate crown, made out of mud and clay, when I am already a legitimate King? 30

If the ancient crown of the German nation is going to be presented to anyone, it should be presented by the Emperor Francis Joseph, by myself, and by our equals. Bad luck will come to those who claim a right that is not their right to give! 35

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Acknowledgements

Source 1 from: Metternich and His Times By G de Bertier de Sauvigny © Darton, Longman and Todd, 1962

Source 2 from: The Making of Italy, 1797-1866 By Denis Mack Smith © Macmillan; Holmes & Meier, 1988

Source 3 from: Rhyme and Revolution in Germany By J G Legge © Brentanos New York, 1919

Source 4 from: Rhyme and Revolution in Germany By J G Legge © Brentanos New York, 1919



-
- 6** How far do you agree that the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament (1848–49) was mainly due to its lack of a military force?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 7 How far do you agree that the counter-revolution in Prussia was the main reason for the collapse of the 1848–49 revolutions in the German states?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate reasons for the success of German counter-revolutions in the years 1848–49?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a letter published in a Berlin newspaper, 9 May 1848. The newspaper supported the revolutionary constitutional reforms that were ongoing in Prussia. The letter came from an agricultural area of West Prussia and was a response to the revolutionary events in Prussia in the previous two months.

We peasants in West Prussia send a warning to you Berliners. If you do not soon restore order and decency in your stinking city, and restore our beloved Prussian King to his just rights, we peasants will come to his help in a way that will strike you scoundrels down. You are always talking big, but are too cowardly to tame your own rabble.

5

You villains in Berlin have also plundered the Prussian State treasury. You have maliciously destroyed Prussian national property that we peasants have contributed to. We will make you pay us back for what you have squandered.

Your barbarity has forced the King of Prussia to flee the country. If you don't make sure that he is restored to his rights and his country by 24 May, we can assure you that we West Prussians will be meeting with you in person. Your city of robbers' caves will be attacked in a hundred places at once. We peasants are not going to feed you any more or be ruined by you and your revolutionary brotherhood.

10

Remember 24 May, because then we peasants will make you regret following the lead of those tricksters in France.

15



Source 4: From a message sent by Major Huyn of the Austrian army to the Austrian Chancellor, Schwarzenburg, 7 March 1849. Here Major Huyn is reporting on the forced closure of the elected Austrian Parliament, which was established in Vienna in July 1848 and later moved to the town of Kremsier.

In obedience to the telegraph instruction sent from Vienna by you, which we received here in Kremsier early in the morning, the agreed command to dissolve the Parliament was given by the general to the President of the Parliament. 20

While these two gentlemen were in discussion, I ordered a company of soldiers to march into the castle. Most of the soldiers occupied the entrances to all the offices, and the rest were marched to the courtyard opposite the main entrance. The main gate was then closed, so that people could only pass through one at a time. There was now only one way in for the Members of Parliament who were about to arrive for the morning session. 25

A second company of soldiers was based in the barracks. They were strong enough in number to secure the gates of the town and to send frequent patrols through the side-streets. Notorious revolutionary characters were watched as much as possible. 30

The new constitutional manifesto of the Emperor Francis Joseph was then nailed to the gate of the castle.

Between 8 am and 9 am, the Members of Parliament arrived and were very astonished at the new look of the Parliament's place of assembly. A few Members were pleased, others bitterly angry, but all accepted the situation. Power had made its impression. 35

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Source 2 from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/60247842>

Source 3 from: *The Foundation of the German Empire*, By Helmut Bohme, translated by A. Ramm, © Oxford University Press, 1971

Source 4 from: *Rhyme and Revolution in Germany: A Study in german, History, Life, Literature and Character, 1813-1850*, By James Granville Legge © Cornell University Library, 2009



-
- 6** How significant was the constitutional crisis in Baden for the outbreak of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 7 To what extent did the response of Frederick William IV of Prussia to the revolutions in Germany change in the years 1848–49?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 5 How far do you agree that the economic crisis (1846–47) was the most significant short-term cause of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



- 6 'The Frankfurt Assembly (1848–49) had little significant long-term impact on the process of German unification.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



KEY TOPIC 3

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIAN DECLINE, 1849–66

15 questions in this sub-topic · 276 marks · lowest tariff first



2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the significance of the *Zollverein* in the process of German unification?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From John Bowring, *Report on the Prussian Commercial Union*, 1840. Bowring was a respected political economist and researcher. The Report was commissioned by the British government and intended to provide an independent survey of the development of the *Zollverein*.

In Germany this great Commercial Union is known by the name of *Zollverein*. Its first, and strongest influence, comes from its desire to get rid of the barriers to intercommunication across Germany. These barriers have been created by the separate economic legislation of the various German states.

In fact, the *Zollverein* is greatly symbolic of a feeling spreading widely in Germany - that of national unity. It has done wonders in breaking down petty and local prejudices. The *Zollverein* has become a foundation on which future laws, representing the common interests of the German people, may undoubtedly be based. If well directed in its future operation, the *Zollverein* will represent the common interests of the German people in one great alliance. Its popularity is extending and its further expansion may be confidently anticipated.

5

10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From an article in *The Times* newspaper, published in London in 1860. *The Times* was very supportive of British interests.

Prussia is always seeking assistance from other nations, always getting somebody to help her. Prussia is never willing to help herself. Prussia is always ready to consider carefully but never to decide. Prussia is present in international meetings, but absent in battles. Prussia is always speaking and writing about the questions of the day but never takes sides for or against. Prussia is ready to contribute numerous thoughts and opinions about events but fearful of committing to anything that might mean taking action.

15

Prussia has a large army, but notoriously one in no fit condition for fighting. Prussia produces plentiful diplomatic circulars and notes, but generally has little to say. No one counts her as a friend, no one dreads her as an enemy. History tells us how she became a great power in the past. Why she remains so, nobody can tell. Without allies Prussia would not be able to defend its borders on the River Rhine in the west or the River Vistula in the east for a month if invaded by her ambitious neighbours.

20

25



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Source 3 based on: <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.319510024547447;view=1up;seq=5>

Source 4: Bismarck and German Unification by D Hargreaves © Macmillan Education Ltd 1991

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You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the nature of German nationalism in the late 1850s?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From the founding statement and declaration of principles of the *Nationalverein*, published 14 August 1859.

1. We believe that the present international political situation brings great dangers for the independence of our German fatherland. These dangers have been increased, rather than decreased, by the peace concluded between Austria and France.
2. These dangers have their ultimate cause in the defective common constitution of the German Confederation. 5
3. It is necessary that the German federal Diet be replaced by a strong, stable, and permanent central government of Germany, and with a German national assembly.
4. At present, the most effective steps for the achievement of this objective can only come from Prussia. We should therefore strive to ensure that Prussia takes the initiative in this matter. 10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From a confidential memorandum written by Count von Rechberg, Austrian Foreign Minister, to the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, May 1864. The information provided was intended to help the Emperor to make a decision on the reduction of Austrian trade tariffs.

Prussia, despite having friendly political relations with Austria, has deliberately continued to make it impossible to create a joint German-Austrian Customs Union. According to the treaty of February 1853, this Union was to be the common aim of both Austria and Prussia. However, Prussia has been independently pursuing its own trade policies with some success. The recent achievement of the Franco-Prussian trade agreement has clearly won influence for Prussia over many of the other German states. The Prussian government has an uncompromising determination to use the expansion of the Zollverein as the foundation for Prussian power in Germany. Prussia thoroughly exploits this power against Austria. 15 20

Austrian trade tariffs have recently been proposed to the German states most friendly to us. These tariffs are not sufficiently low enough for these German states to remove their support for the Franco-Prussian trade agreement. Only a further considerable reduction in customs duties will persuade them that a German-Austrian Customs Union will be of economic benefit to all of Germany. We need to be able to prove that Prussia is acting purely for its own political motives. Prussia is attempting, at all costs, to exclude Austria from participation in the Zollverein and from leadership of the economic interests of Germany. 25 30

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Source 1 from: *HMS Hannibal at Palermo and Naples during the Italian Revolution, 1859-1860*, By Rear Admiral Sir Rodney Mundy, 1863

Source 2 from: *The Making of Italy, 1796-1866*, By Denis Mack Smith, © Palgrave Macmillan, April 1988

Source 3 from: *Bismarck and German Unification*, By David Hargreaves © Red Globe Press, September 1991

Source 4 from: *Bismarck and Germany 1862-1890*, By David G. Williamson, © Longman, November 1997



- 7 How significant was the development of the *Zollverein* in the growth of the Prussian economy in the 1850s?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



7 To what extent did Austrian influence in Germany decline in the years 1852–65?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



Option 2D.1: The unification of Germany, c1849–71

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate relations between Austria and Prussia in the early 1850s?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a report by the Austrian Minister of Trade, Baron von Bruck, to the Austrian Minister-President, June 1850. Bruck is reporting on Austrian attempts to establish an Austro-German Customs Union in the aftermath of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany.

Above all, Austria has to prevent the renewal of the *Zollverein*, which is due to expire at the end of 1852, before the Austro-German Customs Union is permanently settled. Such a renewal would bind all German states for twelve years longer to Prussia's will, in all national economic affairs. If Prussia were to see its supremacy assured for so long a time, it would be unlikely to be persuaded to enter the Customs Union with Austria – even though the Customs Union offered the most convincing economic advantages. Also Prussia would be unlikely to agree to share, to that degree, its supremacy with Austria. 5

However, the matter would appear very differently if the renewal of the *Zollverein* were questioned by several of its member states or if renewal were made dependent upon the achievement of a Customs Union with Austria. Rather than endanger the economic supremacy that Prussia has gained through the *Zollverein*, Prussia would then prefer to share that supremacy with Austria. 10 15

The advantages that Germany might expect from an Austro-German Customs Union would include honest trading throughout the union, close political links, a large market and greater standing abroad. Finally, it would fulfil the wishes and expectations of German unity without the dangerous disadvantages of the particular interests of certain individual states. 20

Perhaps it might also be suggested that Austria, even with political differences with Prussia still outstanding, will offer its hand to help advance this unity.



Source 4: From an article in the *Constitutionelle Zeitung* newspaper, published April 1852. The newspaper was based in Berlin and supported the views of Prussian National Liberals.

Prussia was able to give up the Erfurt Union and return to the Confederation because the Confederation is nothing more than an international association. An association of states in which a state of Prussia's power and standing may hope to be able to assert its independence. 25

Prussia, however, can never agree to the Austrian demands for greater union in commercial policy. This would mean denying the whole political position Prussia has held up to now, and would mean consenting to being absorbed into a larger state. Prussia must, therefore, make it her purpose in commercial policy to maintain the *Zollverein's* power of free self-government, independent of any Austrian veto. 30

In this question of political life or death, Prussia will be obliged, quite decisively, to prefer a north-German, but independent, *Zollverein*, to a greater Customs Union dependent upon Austria. This is necessary however painful Prussia may find this separation from the Confederation. 35

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- 7 How far do you agree that the political situation in Germany in 1851 was no different from the political situation before the 1848–49 revolutions?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



8 To what extent did Prussia strengthen its position in Germany in the years 1852–62?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** How far do you agree that, from 1850 until its defeat in the Seven Weeks' War in 1866, Austria maintained a dominant position over the German states?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** How far do you agree that, in the 1850s, Prussia made significant progress in strengthening its position as a leading German state?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



- 5 How far do you agree that the development of the *Zollverein* was the most significant factor in the rise of Prussia in the years 1852–67?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



- 7 How far do you agree that, in the years 1852–66, the most significant economic development in Prussia was the expansion of the railways?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 6 How far do you agree that the political situation in Germany in 1851 was very similar to the political situation in Germany in 1840?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 5 'Economic factors were more significant than political factors in explaining the declining power of Austria in Germany in the years 1852–66.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that there was little challenge to Austrian leadership of the German states in the years 1849–65?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the significance of Prussian economic development in the 1850s?

Explain your answer using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a report written by senior officials in the Württemberg Department for Industry and Trade, December 1851. The report was written to convince the Minister of Finance to sign the upcoming renewal of the *Zollverein* agreement between the southern state of Württemberg and Prussia.

We are sure that Württemberg should renew its *Zollverein* agreement with Prussia.

Prussia rules long distances of the land on both sides of the River Rhine. The route along the River Rhine to the North Sea is the main trading route for Württemberg, Baden and the industrial part of Bavaria. We know that the Rhine shipping-route is a free trade route. But we also know that, without signing the agreement with Prussia, our trade could be hindered by all sorts of interference from the Prussian police and tax officials. 5

During the almost eighteen years that the *Zollverein* has existed, many trade contacts have been made and the interests of businessmen have become closely joined together. Any attempt to break it up would bring the most damaging financial losses to trade and industry. 10

Recently, even more significant trading activity has developed between the south German states and Prussia. Our great merchants trade along the Rhine, and great loads of grain and flour are transported along the river. Considerable quantities of luxury clothing, fine metalware and chemicals are sent across all the Prussian territories. Without a market in northern Germany, our famous paper manufacturing industry would collapse. It is easy to cooperate with Prussia because, unlike Austria, Prussia recognises the mutual advantages to our economy as well as to its own industrial export markets. 15 20

Source 4: From an article in *The Times* newspaper, written by a British journalist based in Prussia, published 18 April 1853. *The Times* was a British national newspaper that had a reputation for being suspicious of Prussia, as an economic rival of Britain. Here the journalist is commenting on the development of the Prussian railways.

The Prussian Parliament has passed the first stage of a proposed law for taxing railways. It is now believed that the general prosperity of the railway companies is sufficient for them to be taxed. I was overcome by a feeling of astonishment on hearing that the tax will mainly be used by the Government to buy shares in the railways. As the railways come under state ownership, the Government intends to reduce ticket prices and use the railways for the public good. 25

According to Prussian statistics, the value of its railways and the length of railway lines laid is greater than those of railways in all other countries, including Great Britain and the USA. 30

There is some prospect of a night train starting next month to run between Berlin and the city of Hamburg. Commercial traders are looking forward to wool markets being held in both cities.

The Prussian military newspaper has complained about the movement of troops by railway. It is concerned that, once seated on a moving train, a commanding officer will lose his ability to command, as he would be unable to communicate with, or have authority over, the civilian train driver. It proposes that officers be given the opportunity to learn to drive a railway locomotive at the cost of the State. 35

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Source 1 from: <https://archive.org/details/unitedstatesmini0000unse/page/18/mode/2up>

Source 2 from: *Austria in 1848–49*, W H Stiles, © Arno Press & The New York Times, 1852

Source 3 from: *Foundation of the German Empire: Selected Documents By Helmut Böhme*, translated by A. Ramm, © Oxford University Press, July 1971

Source 4 from: © *The Times*, 18 April 1853



KEY TOPIC 4

BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNIFICATION, 1862–71

19 questions in this sub-topic · 344 marks · lowest tariff first



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 71.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into Bismarck's attitude towards the use of war in achieving foreign policy aims?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Source for use with Question 2a.

Source 3: From a speech made by Bismarck to the Prussian Landtag (Parliament) in December 1850. In the speech, he outlines his views on going to war.

It is unworthy of a great state to fight for something which does not advantage its own interest. Gentlemen, show me an objective worth a war and I will go along with you. It is easy enough for a statesman to ride the popular wave from the comfort of his own fireside. He can make thunderous speeches from the platform, let the public sound the trumpets of war, and leave it to the soldier to settle whether policies end in glory or failure. Nothing is simpler – but woe to any statesman who, at such a time, fails to find a cause for war which will stand up to scrutiny once the fighting is over.

5

Source for use with Question 2b.

Source 4: From a report written in December 1851 by the Württemberg Central Office for Industry and Trade. The report was written to persuade the Württemberg Ministry of Finance to support the renewal of the *Zollverein* agreement with Prussia. Württemberg was one of the four main states of southern Germany.

The alternatives are self-evident: whether it is advisable for Württemberg to renew the *Zollverein* with Prussia or to strive for a Customs Union with Austria.

10

Loss of the tariff links with Prussia, who rules much of the [River] Rhine would cause the most damaging disturbance of trade. During the 18 years that the *Zollverein* has existed, contacts in trade have become many and the interests of businessmen have interlocked with each other. The tearing apart of these countries, which have economically grown together, would be accompanied by the most damaging effects upon industry and trade.

15

There is also consideration of commercial politics. If Austria were to enter the *Zollverein*, with her population of 38 million she would be stronger than Prussia and the other German states taken together. It could easily, therefore, happen that those states which broke away from Prussia and attached themselves to Austria would decline in matters of commercial influence.

20

It is different in relation to Prussia. The medium-sized and small states of Germany have a population of only 15 million – only half a million less than that of the whole Prussian state. This will guarantee them a stronger influence on the conduct and the course of the *Zollverein's* affairs.

25



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2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the significance of Prussia's victory over Austria in the Seven Weeks' War?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From the Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Austria and Prussia, signed 26 July 1866. This Treaty brought to an end hostilities in the Seven Weeks' War.

I. With the exception of the Italian states, the territories of the Austrian Emperor remain intact.

II. The Emperor of Austria recognises the ending of the German Confederation, and consents to a new organisation of Germany without the participation of the Austrian Empire. He promises to recognise the closer Union of the states located north of the River Main, which will be established by the King of Prussia. The Emperor also declares that he consents to the German states of the south entering into a Union.

5

III. The Emperor transfers to the King of Prussia rights over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.

10

IV. The Emperor undertakes to pay the King of Prussia the sum of 40 million thalers* to cover part of the Prussian war expenses.

*thalers – silver coins



Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From a letter written by Bismarck to King William I of Prussia, 9 March 1870.

The letter recorded comments that Bismarck had made in an earlier conversation with the King.

I trust your Majesty will permit me to summarise the motives, which in my modest opinion, favour the acceptance of the Spanish Crown by the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern. 15

I am of the opinion that it would serve Prussian and German political interests.

Acceptance of the Spanish Royal Crown, by a Prince of Your Majesty's own illustrious dynasty, would strengthen existing sympathies between two nations who have no conflicting interests because they are not neighbours. The Spaniards would feel a sense of gratitude if Germany were to rescue them from the threat of anarchy. 20

For Prussia and Germany, it is desirable to have, located on the other side of France, a country on whose sympathy we can rely and whose feelings France will be obliged to take notice of.

French peacefulness towards Germany will always be changeable in proportion to the likelihood of war with Germany. To preserve peace in the long run, we must not look to the goodwill of France but to the impression created by our position of strength. 25

The reputation of the Hohenzollern dynasty and the justifiable pride with which Prussia regards it, is important in strengthening our political self-confidence. It is, therefore, in Germany's political interests that the Prince should accept a position of such high standing. 30

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2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into Prussia's relationship with the other German states after the defeat of Austria in 1866?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Source for use with Question 2(a).

Source 3: From a private diplomatic dispatch sent from Bismarck in Berlin to the Prussian representative in Bavaria, 22 January 1867.

Prussia's own security demands that the relationship between ourselves and the North German states should be made as tight as possible within the federal situation. We should have unconditional control over our own military forces and those of the other states of the North German Confederation.

We Prussians are able to view the South German states in a different, perhaps more favourable, light than how we view the North German ones. We do not need the same strict form of union. We need only a clear assurance that we all have the same common interests for Germany. We need an assurance that gives us the confidence that the Southern states will never be tempted by foreign Powers or into hostility towards North Germany. We also need to be confident that the economic interests of Germany will be assured through common institutions already in existence.

5

10



Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From a public lecture given in the USA by Charles Sumner, 26 October 1870. The lecture was about the events leading to the Franco-Prussian War. Sumner was a US politician with expertise in foreign policy. He made frequent visits to Europe.

At the beginning of July, there was peace. In Berlin, the Parliament was not in session. Count Bismarck was at his country home and the King enjoying himself at Ems. Then, suddenly and unexpectedly, circumstances changed. By 14 July, because of the forces of new technology, everything had moved so rapidly that war was inevitable. 15

France's Prime Minister blamed the outbreak of war on a telegram from Prussia.

However, what right did France have to interfere with Spain's decision to choose a foreigner for the candidature of its Crown? Beginning with an outrage against Spanish independence, the French then committed a further outrage against Prussia. France presumed to suggest that an 'insignificant German prince' could not be permitted to accept the invitation and was plainly acting unjustifiably. When I say it was none of its business, it might appear I am giving the mildest of condemnations. But this was, in fact, the first step in France's monstrous *blunder-crime*. 20 25

In defying Prussia over the Hohenzollern candidature, the French government selected its own grounds for war. The war was declared because the French Emperor thought himself ready. A pretext was found in the affair of the Ems telegram. 30

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Source 1 from: *The Making of Modern Italy, 1800-71*, Vyvyan Brendon, Hodder & Stoughton 1998

Source 2 from: *The Making of Italy*, D. Mack Smith, Macmillan 1968

Source 3 from: *Bismarck and German Unification*, David Hargreaves, Macmillan Education Limited 1991

Source 4 from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/60234316>



- 8 How far do you agree that military strength was responsible for the Prussian success in unifying Germany in the years 1862–71?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the importance of Prussia in the *Kleindeutschland* solution to German unification?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From the diary of the Crown Prince of Prussia, heir to King William I, 17 January 1871. Here, he is describing a discussion between himself, King William, Bismarck and another Minister concerning the specific details for a newly-proposed unified German state.

For three hours, in an overheated room, we discussed the title of the Emperor and role of the army. Count Bismarck acknowledged that, in discussions, the Bavarian representatives had not wished to permit the title 'Emperor of Germany'. And Bismarck, without asking His Majesty, had finally given way and agreed that the title should be 'German Emperor'. This title, with which no real idea is associated, displeased the King. Count Bismarck remained firm. He showed that the expression 'Emperor of Germany' signified a territorial power that we did not in any way possess in Germany. So, alas, we had to submit. 5

The more clearly the consequences of adopting the titles of 'Emperor' and 'Empire' became evident, the more enraged the king became. Finally, he broke out in words to the effect that he was taking on only a shadow empire, and nothing more than another title for 'President'. He said he must accept, now that things had gone so far, but he would not hear of an 'Imperial Army'. He could not tolerate Prussian troops being asked to accept German names and ranks. Further, he said he could not describe how desperate he felt at having to take leave of the old Prussia. Sobs and tears interrupted his words. 10 15



Source 4: From the Constitution of the German Empire, 1871. This is a selection of articles from a much longer document. The German Empire consisted of twenty-five states in total. The Constitution was enacted on 16 April 1871.

His Majesty, the King of Prussia, in the name of the North German Confederation, with the King of Bavaria, the King of Württemberg, and the Grand Dukes of Baden and Hesse, hereby establish an everlasting federation. A federation for the protection of its territory and laws, and the maintenance of the welfare of the German people. This federation shall bear the name *German Empire*. 20

Article 2. The Empire holds the right of legislation within the federation, and imperial laws take precedence over state laws.

Article 6. The Bundesrat* is composed of state representatives, and voting shall be as follows: Prussia, 17 votes; Bavaria, 6; Saxony, 4; Württemberg, 4. Total, 58 votes**. 25

Every member can name as many delegates to the Bundesrat as it has votes, but all delegations must cast their votes as a unit.

Article 8. The Bundesrat shall organise committees for (1) the Army; (2) the Navy; (3) customs and taxes; (4) trade and communication; (5) railroads, post, and telegraph. 30

Article 11. The head of the federation shall be the King of Prussia, who shall bear the name *German Emperor*. The Emperor shall represent the Empire in international affairs. 35

The consent of the Bundesrat is required for a declaration of war, with the exception of a response to an attack upon the territory or coasts of the German Empire.

*The Bundesrat – the Federal Council

**58 votes – In addition to those named, all other states had 1, 2 or 3 votes

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- 6 How significant was Bismarck's contribution to the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



8 The Ems Telegram was released to the press on 14 July 1870.

How significant was the Ems Telegram in the outbreak of the Franco–Prussian War?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 How far do you agree that the process of German unification, in the years 1862–71, resulted in the creation of an enlarged Prussia rather than a unified Germany?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



...

6 'In the years 1862-71, Bismarck was the master-planner of German unification.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 7 How far do you agree that the main reason Prussia was able to defeat Austria in the Seven Weeks' War (1866) was Prussian military strength?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 8 How significant was the role of Napoleon III in the breakdown of relations between Prussia and France in the years 1866–70?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 'The Prussian defeat of Austria in 1866 was the decisive turning point in the process of German unification in the years 1862–71.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 7 How successful was Bismarck in overcoming Prussia's political problems in the years 1862–66?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 8 How far do you agree that the main reason for Prussia's success in unifying Germany, in the years 1866–71, was the favourable international situation?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 How accurate is it to say that France was more responsible than Prussia for the breakdown in relations between Prussia and France in the years 1866–70?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 To what extent was Bismarck responsible for shaping the process of German unification?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Option 2D.1: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons why Prussia was successful in unifying Germany in the years 1866–71?

Explain your answer using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a letter written by Wilhelm von K gelgen to his brother, 5 July 1866. K gelgen was a government official in a small north German state that was allied to Prussia. Here he is commenting on the Prussian victory at K niggr tz (also known as Sadowa) in the Austro-Prussian War.

Since yesterday, news has spread of a new and decisive Prussian victory at K niggr tz. The postal service has received news that eight Prussian army corps had participated in the battle and also that Prague has been taken by Prussian forces. My son told me that, on his travels through several Prussian cities, he saw nothing but fluttering flags and immense rejoicing.

5

The newspaper has just arrived, reporting the telegraph message sent by the Prussian King to the Prussian Queen on 3 July: 'Great triumph over the Austrians. All eight army corps were under fire for eight hours. Austrians completely defeated. Our gains from victory cannot be underestimated. Our losses are significant, but We are all well.'

10

This victory represents an incredible mobilisation of Prussian power. The army has exhibited an excellence that had not been anticipated on either side. Even the much-praised Austrian cavalry was beaten by the Prussian cavalry in every engagement.

Bismarck is now the most popular man in Prussia. Everyone sings his praises, even the Democrats. I hope he manages to bring us a unified Germany. These victories were not easy; a lot – a whole lot – of blood was shed. Our house has been full of visitors from all classes. Wishing all of you well.

15



Source 4: From a private statement made by Prince Jerome Napoleon of France to the British ambassador in Berlin, 7 March 1868. Although supposedly on a private visit to Berlin, the Prince was actually visiting Prussia as a representative of his cousin, Napoleon III. Here the Prince is commenting on the political situation in Germany.

I am of the opinion that the federal reconstruction of Germany in the north and the absorption of the smaller northern states into Prussia is irreversible. 20

But, it is clear that the unification under Prussia is still in progress. The *Zollverein* parliament is a step closer to the absorption of southern Germany. The admission of the southern states into the parliament is inevitable – it is only a matter of time. At present, there are 30 million people united under Prussian influence. When the southern states join, it will have an additional eight million. 25

You British have chosen to withdraw yourselves from the political arena of Europe. You pretend to abstain from interfering in European affairs except on questions that directly affect your interests.

And where is this all to end? Can France look quietly on and witness this process of absorption passively? It is all very well to say that Germany is not an aggressive Power now, but it may become so in the future. And what if Germany may someday attempt to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine from France with force? 30

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Acknowledgements:

Source 1 from: The Making of Italy 1796-1866 By Denis Mack Smith © Macmillan Press, 1988

Source 2 from: The Making of Italy 1796-1866 By Denis Mack Smith © Macmillan Press, 1988

Source 3 from: https://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1816

Source 4 from: The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus By Lord Augustus Loftus © Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1894



8 Prussia defeated Austria in the Seven Weeks' War in July 1866.

How far do you agree that the most significant consequence for Prussia of the defeat of Austria was Prussian territorial expansion?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 6 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1866–67, Prussia achieved complete domination over Germany?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



MARK SCHEMES

official Pearson Edexcel mark schemes



Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the political challenges, in the years 1846-48, facing Frederick William IV, King of Prussia - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It indicates that the King of Prussia felt threatened by new political ideas, particularly liberalism ('No power on earth will succeed in moving me to transform...legalistic or constitutional') - It provides evidence that the King felt the need to react to the forces of liberalism in Prussia ('And I will never ever allow a written piece of paper...') - It suggests that the King was facing an element of popular pressure ('The...loyal people of Prussia do not want representatives to share in government...'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The speech indicates the viewpoint of the King; it makes clear his belief in the authority of his rule and in doing so highlights the political challenges he faces - The King's speech was being made in front of the representatives of all the Prussian classes and so was intended to be a public pronouncement - The tone of the language used was confrontational and provocative suggesting the perceived weight of the challenge of new ideas by the King ('No power on earth...I will never ever'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - Prussian liberals wanted the Prussian king to pass constitutional reforms like those introduced in Baden in 1846 - Prussian liberals hoped that the United Diet would lead to the creation of a national assembly for Prussia - The King of Prussia's attitudes towards liberalism and nationalism were widely misunderstood by the supporters of political reform and created unrealistic expectations of change in Prussia - The King failed to gain support from the United Diet and the political situation worsened; in 1848, facing revolution in Berlin the King gave in to some opposition demands before later regaining control.



Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the political and economic organisation of the German Confederation in the 1840s. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The intention of the author appears to be to inform; to provide readers with an overview of the political and economic working of the German Confederation - The article is written by a supporter of German nationalism and as such may be critical of the Confederation - Based in Düsseldorf, the newspaper may reflect the viewpoint of the urban middle-classes or business community. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It states that the German Confederation has organisational weaknesses both political ('...not a political unification...') and economic ('...current waste of expenditure...') - It provides evidence of political administrative inefficiency ('We have 38 different laws...') - It provides evidence of economic ineffectiveness ('special interests ...disadvantaging daily business down to the last detail') - It states that the German Confederation would work more effectively if it was more centrally organised ('...all this would be taken care of by a central government'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - The German Confederation was created in 1815 to protect the smaller German states from expansionist powers - it was not intended to lead to political or economic union - The Rhineland had come under threat from French expansionist ambitions during the crisis of 1840 which led to some questioning of the strength of the Confederation - While many German liberals and nationalists saw the Confederation as a possible springboard to unification, the German rulers were mostly supportive of the status quo.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830-70**

Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the impact of urbanisation on the social classes in Germany in the 1840s. 1. The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: • It provides evidence that, in the public arena, urban life brought the social classes into greater contact with each other ('rich and poor: no one is limited by the others.') • It provides evidence that it affected the poor most acutely ('shacks next to the factories'; 'chains of poverty are bound to crime') • It suggests that the middle-classes have benefited the most from urbanisation ('share these with the powerful middle-class'). 2. The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: • Dronke is writing an account of his own experiences in Berlin during the 1840s • As a social investigator the purpose of his book was to provide an insight into urban life • As a socialist he had a particular interest in the effects of urbanisation on social class. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: • Berlin, as capital of Prussia, was one of the largest cities in German and reflected the major changes which were taking place as a result of urbanisation • The growth of German towns and cities brought people of all classes together in their daily life, work and in recreational activities; people became more aware of the lives of other classes • A shortage of housing, poor conditions and low wages meant that the working classes were often marginalised within urban areas resulting in increased crime rates and a life of extreme poverty.



Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840-71

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the reasons why Bismarck was appointed Minister-President of Prussia in 1862. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - Bismarck is writing his own personal account of the events in which he was involved - Bismarck's purpose in writing his memoirs was precisely to provide a record of events from his own perspective - Bismarck is using the advantage of hindsight, and particularly his knowledge of subsequent events, to explain why William appointed him. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It provides evidence for the constitutional crisis which necessitated Bismarck's appointment ('opposition to the majority in parliament'; 'I shall not abdicate.') - It provides evidence that Bismarck was willing to deal directly with the problems facing William I ('argue for the reorganisation of the army.') - The language used throughout the source implies that Bismarck engineered his own appointment ('readiness', 'no doubt' 'persuading'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - In 1862 William I was faced by a constitutional crisis which threatened his position as ruler of Prussia - William I disliked Bismarck and it was von Roon who persuaded William to consider the appointment of Bismarck - As Minister-President, Bismarck tackled the problems brought about by the constitutional crisis; he enabled the King to defy the Prussian Diet, introduce military taxes without its consent and reform the army.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830-70**

2	3–5	• Demonstrates some understanding of the source material and attempts analysis by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand or confirm matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and with some substantiation for assertions of value. The concept of utility is addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the main reason for popular unrest in Germany, in the years 1846–48, was the growth of nationalism. Arguments and evidence that that the main reason for the growth of popular unrest in Germany, in the years 1846–48, was the growth of nationalism should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many people felt that the problems faced by the states of the German Confederation in the 1840s could be solved by establishing greater political and economic union; the <i>Zollverein</i> became a symbol of such potential • There was resentment of Austrian domination and, particularly, the repressive methods used by Metternich against political opposition • The Schleswig-Holstein situation of 1846 created a popular outcry based on nationalist ideas of a Danish threat to the German Fatherland. Arguments and evidence that the main reason for the growth of popular unrest in Germany, in the years 1846–48, was not the growth of nationalism and/or that other reasons were more important should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Support for nationalism was relatively small and often centred on cultural rather than political identity • The influence of liberalism, in particular, the desire of the middle-classes for constitutional government and parliamentary representation • Agricultural crisis: economic and social grievances emerged in reaction to harvest failures, e.g. potato blight in Prussia (1847), bread shortages and increases in the price of food • The impact of industrialisation and urbanisation: economic and social grievances caused by overproduction, unemployment, overcrowding • The impact of specific events, e.g. the constitutional crisis in Baden, the February Revolution in France (1848). Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether economic developments were mainly responsible for the growth of German nationalism in the 1840s. Arguments and evidence that economic developments were mainly responsible for the growth of German nationalism in the 1840s should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The creation and success of the <i>Zollverein</i> demonstrated the potential strength of a united Germany, which was an aim of German nationalists • Railway building began to link the German states more effectively both economically and politically, highlighting the potential benefits of working together as a 'nation' • German nationalists took advantage of the growth of the railways and telegraph communications to spread their political ideas more rapidly and more widely • Industrialisation and urbanisation led to increased population movement and migration across the German Confederation, emphasising common cultural practices and shared socio-economic experiences. Arguments and evidence that other factors were responsible for the growth of German nationalism in the 1840s should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Growing demands for political freedoms encouraged opposition to the Austrian hegemony over the German states; many German liberals were also nationalists • The German Confederation provided a blueprint for future German political and territorial unification • A revival of German cultural nationalism brought together intellectual and populist ideals of a German nation, e.g. Heppenheim meeting 1847 • German nationalism was fuelled by various international threats to the security of the German Confederation, e.g. the Rhine crisis (1840) and Schleswig-Holstein crisis (1846). Other relevant material must be credited.



5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. - The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the role of Cavour in the months before his appointment as Prime Minister of Piedmont in November 1852. Source 1 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • As a leading player in Piedmontese politics at the time of Cavour's appointment, Rattazzi had witnessed and been directly involved in events • Rattazzi is recalling the events specifically to provide a record of what happened at the time and so the information provided is quite detailed • Writing in 1870, with knowledge of the role that the <i>connubio</i> played in Italian history, Rattazzi may have been trying to give more credit to his own colleagues than to Cavour. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the role of Cavour in the months before his appointment as Prime Minister of Piedmont in November 1852: • It implies that Cavour was involved in political intrigue ('At that meeting, we agreed the basis of this fusion. We then decided... opportunity') • It indicates that Cavour worked on his own with the Centre Left ('The whole plan had already been agreed by we four men... No-one else had known') • It claims that the Centre Left, rather than Cavour, particularly Michel Castelli, was responsible for the successful creation of the <i>connubio</i> ('Castelli, I remember that the praise...should largely be yours.') • It indicates that initially Cavour was not trusted by some of those on the Centre Left ('I still felt somewhat distrustful...You...were in a position to know...him better than I was.') 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Cavour was a Centre Right politician but had particular concerns over the role of the Church in civil life. During 1851, he began to clash openly with those in government opposed to the introduction of the Siccardi Laws • In 1851, Cavour began to look for an opportunity to realign the political situation in Piedmont and opened discussions with Rattazzi, the leader of the Centre Left, which led to the <i>connubio</i> • New repressive press laws were introduced to parliament by the d'Azeglio government as part of a compromise to retain the support of the right; Cavour and Rattazzi used this as the moment to declare the <i>connubio</i> • Cavour was not a particularly trusted politician; he was seen as being too liberal by the right and as being self-serving and not truthfully committed to Italian nationalism by the left.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 2 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • D'Azeglio, as Prime Minister of Piedmont at the time, was directly involved in, and affected by, the events and so is in an excellent position to provide evidence • D'Azeglio is writing in May 1852, in the midst of the political crisis, and giving a commentary of events as they happened • It is clearly a private letter written to an ally outside of Italy who can be trusted with the information being provided; it is an intensely personal view of events happening at the time. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the role of Cavour in the months before his appointment as Prime Minister of Piedmont in November 1852: • It claims that Cavour intrigued behind the back of his own Prime Minister ('Just imagine! My own Cabinet colleague...without a word to me.') • It claims that Cavour arranged the <i>connubio</i> ('whole intrigue had been planned by four individuals.') • It suggests that Cavour took advantage of divisions amongst his own colleagues ('did not want...public...know of our internal...division.') and d'Azeglio's own weaknesses ('my ill-health prevented me from resisting') • It implies that, in May 1852, d'Azeglio will not be able to remain in power much longer ('I can't go on much longer.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Cavour was appointed to d'Azeglio's Cabinet in October 1850 and, by 1852, was Minister for Finance, Commerce, Agriculture and Shipping because of his liberal economic position • D'Azeglio was appointed Prime Minister in 1849 with a conservative agenda, but he found it difficult to control the right and the volatile situation led to several different governments under his control • Cavour resigned from the Cabinet in May 1852 before he was formally dismissed by d'Azeglio • The <i>connubio</i> created continued problems for d'Azeglio and when his government fell in November 1852, over the introduction of civil marriage, the King appointed Cavour as Prime Minister. Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • The sources are written by men directly involved in the politics of the time and from the opposing political groups involved in the events • The sources agree that there was an organised attempt to undermine d'Azeglio's government in spring 1852 and that Cavour was central to the proceedings • The sources corroborate each other that there were four key individuals involved in the political intrigue surrounding the <i>connubio</i> • Source 1 suggests that Cavour's participation was encouraged by the Centre Left, while Source 2 suggests that Cavour was the mastermind behind the intrigue.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the reasons why Prussia was successful in unifying Germany in the years 1866-71. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • It is a private family letter and so is likely to give a genuine account of the situation in northern Germany at the time of the Prussian victory • It was written two days after the decisive battle of Königgrätz specifically to inform von Kugelgen's brother of events as they were happening • The tone and language of the source reflects the immediate response to the situation but is also reflective of the wider consequences. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons why Prussia was successful in unifying Germany in the years 1866-71. • It claims that, with the victory at Königgrätz, Austria was no longer the dominant German power ('Great triumph over the Austrians...cannot be underestimated.') • It indicates the strength of the Prussian military ('represents an incredible mobilisation of Prussian power.'; 'army has exhibited an excellence') • It indicates that there was nationalistic support for Prussia in northern Germany ('fluttering flags and immense rejoicing.'; 'full of visitors from all classes.') • It claims that Bismarck was now in a position to unify Germany ('now the most popular man in Prussia. Everyone sings his praises, even the Democrats.'; 'I hope he...bring...a unified Germany'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Prussian victory in the Austro-Prussian War resulted in Austria being permanently excluded from political power in Germany and the collapse of the German Confederation • The Seven Weeks' War proved that the Prussian military reforms of the early 1860s had created the most efficient and technologically-advanced army in continental Europe • Although Bismarck still encountered political opposition in Prussia, support for his unification policies increased after the victory in 1866 • German nationalism grew in the wake of the victory in 1866 and was central to the events leading to the war with France in 1870-71.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • It provides a perspective of the situation in Germany in 1868 from the point of view of someone from outside of Germany and who is able to provide a wider perspective of events • Prince Napoleon may have made the statement with a specific political agenda with regard to relations between Prussia, France and Britain, as in 1868 there was tension between France and Prussia • The tone of the statement suggests that the Prince is providing a measured view of Prussia's role in Germany at the time, despite his concerns about Prussian behaviour in the future. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons why Prussia was successful in unifying Germany in the years 1866-71. • It indicates that Prussia took political control of northern Germany ('federal reconstruction...in the north and the absorption of the smaller northern states into Prussia') • It suggests that Prussia used its economic power ('The <i>Zollverein</i> parliament is a step closer to the absorption of southern Germany.') • It indicates that France was worried about future hostilities with a Prussian-led Germany ('reclaim Alsace and Lorraine from France with force.') • It suggests that Prussia profited from a favourable international situation ('of the opinion that absorption...northern states...irreversible'; 'British have chosen to withdraw yourselves from the political arena of Europe.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • In 1866-67, Prussia became the dominant political power in northern Germany, taking leadership of the North German Confederation and aggressively annexing Austria's north German allies • In 1867-68, Prussia took advantage of its economic power in Germany to constitute the <i>Zollparlament</i>, which the southern German states felt compelled to join • Prussia benefitted from a favourable international situation in the years 1866-78, with Britain and Russia not willing to become involved in the affairs of the German states • The final unification of the northern German states with the four remaining independent southern German states came with the victory over France in the war of 1870-71 and the creation of the German Empire. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Source 3 is a private commentary written from a German perspective while Source 4, although recording a private statement, reveals the thoughts of a foreign power • Sources 3 and 4 together cover a wide range of reasons why Prussia was successful, e.g. military, economic, political, diplomatic • Source 3 is commenting on the event that kick-started the process by which a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> was created while Source 4 reflects on subsequent events.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that there was little significant challenge to the restored order in Italy in the years c1830-47. Arguments and evidence that there was little significant challenge to the restored order in Italy in the years c1830-47 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The revolutions of 1830-31 were limited in geographical scope and ambition. Initial success was rapidly undermined by internal division and Austrian military intervention • Italian nationalists were weakened by competing visions of Italian unification, e.g. of Mazzini, Balbo, Gioberti • Attempts by Mazzini to organise insurrection were an abject failure, e.g. the Bandieri brothers in 1844, and secret societies, such as the Carbonari, struggled to harness discontent • Conservative rule was enforced by repressive political policies and influenced by Austria. Austria rigorously enforced the Metternich System in its northern provinces • The majority of the population of Italy, particularly the Italian peasantry, was apathetic to new political ideas • Outside of northern Italy, slow rates of industrialisation and the presence of a very small middle class meant that liberal ideas were slow to take hold. Arguments and evidence that there was significant challenge to the restored order in Italy in the years c1830-47 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In 1830-31, the rulers of Modena, Parma and the Papal States were successfully challenged by revolutionaries demanding constitutional reforms; the Duchess of Parma was even forced to flee • Italian nationalism was a growing force, particularly an interest in the cultural <i>Risorgimento</i> and appeals to the glory of the ancient Roman Empire • Increasing industrialisation, urbanisation and the growth of modern communications in northern Italy was instrumental in the rapid growth nationalist and liberal political views • In the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, resentment of foreign rule manifested itself in the growth of political societies and acts of passive resistance • In Sicily, separatist groups actively worked against the Bourbon rulers of The Two Sicilies in Naples with the aim to gain independence for the island • The election of Pope Pius IX in 1846 boosted revolutionary ideas; his initial introduction of some liberal reforms brought hope to many for a more liberal Italy and, for some, of a united Italy under Papal rule. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the suggestion that the unification process in the north of Italy in the years 1859-60 was very similar to the unification process in the south of Italy in the years 1860-61. Arguments and evidence that the unification process in the north of Italy in the years 1859-60 was similar to the unification process in the south of Italy in the years 1860-61 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Piedmontese army played a major role in the unification of both the north and south; in the Second War of Independence and in the invasion of the Papal States • Cavour played a major role in unification events in both north and south; it was Cavour's diplomacy that resulted in the Second War of Independence and Cavour's decision to intervene in the Papal States • Garibaldi played a role in both the north and south; in the north, he was a rallying figure for the Second War of Independence and in the south, he was the driving force • The unification process in both north and south was completed and validated by the use of plebiscites • Both the north and south were unified under the leadership of the constitutional monarchy of Victor Emmanuel II. Arguments and evidence that the unification process in the north of Italy in the years 1859-60 was different to the unification process in the south of Italy in the years 1860-61 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The success in the north was dependent on an alliance with a major foreign power, France, while the unification of the south was mainly driven by Italian nationalists led by Garibaldi • Cavour was proactive in achieving unification in the north but was less supportive of events in the south; he tried to prevent Garibaldi's initial expedition and reluctantly intervened in the Papal States • In the north, France played a constructive role in the unification process through its prosecution of war with Austria but in the south, it played a more negative role in its determination to maintain the Pope in Rome • Piedmont had more control over the process in the north than in the south; events were dictated by Garibaldi and it was his decision to 'give' the south to Victor Emmanuel • Piedmont's role in the process was more accepted in the north than in the south, where there was a reluctance to replace the domination of Bourbon rule with Piedmontese rule. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the most significant feature of the economic and social development of Germany in the 1840s was railway building. Arguments and evidence that railway building was the most significant feature of the economic and social development of Germany in the 1840s should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In the 1840s, there was a rapid expansion of the railway system across all of the German states, which meant that by the end of the decade it was possible to travel continuously west-east and north-south by train • The building of the railway network itself encouraged new industrial growth, e.g. steel production, locomotive production, and new railway-related occupations • The railway network encouraged the industrial development of Germany as a whole by transporting raw materials and finished products and encouraging international trade, e.g. through access to the Rhine ports • The railway network encouraged urbanisation by transporting people from rural areas to the towns and cities, and facilitated urban living by providing access to agricultural produce • Railway building led to social improvement and social change, e.g. it facilitated developments in education and culture, the growth of the middle classes and challenges to rural conservatism. Arguments and evidence that there were other more significant features/the impact of railway building was limited in the economic and social development of Germany in the 1840s should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The specific development and modernisation of Prussian industry and agriculture led to Prussia becoming the dominant economic power in Germany • The Prussian <i>Zollverein</i> was the predominant agent of economic development: the customs union facilitated internal trade across Germany and encouraged international free trade so boosting farming and industry • Industrialisation affected economic growth and social change; new manufacturing technologies put Germany at the forefront of centralised production and helped create an urban working and middle class • Urbanisation had a profound effect on the social structure in Germany, as city life undermined the social control of the <i>Junker</i> class, and on social interaction, providing increased opportunities and experiences • Economic division between rich and poor was a key feature, leading to new class divisions and the rise of social discontent; this was particularly evident in the economic crisis of the mid-1840s • Railway building only economically benefited significantly a small number of the middle classes and the presence of a railway network was not able to prevent the disastrous food shortages of 1846-47. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement extent to which the supporters of radical ideas made progress in Germany in the years 1840-47. Arguments and evidence that the supporters of radical ideas made progress in Germany in the years 1840-47 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From 1846, liberals, socialists and nationalists were able to take advantage of the social and economic discontent caused by economic distress to gain greater popular support and influence the outbreak of demonstrations • Liberals made some constitutional progress, e.g. the Grand Duke of Baden introduced a liberal constitution in 1846 • Liberals became more confident in spreading their ideas. Liberals in Offenburg and Heppenheim published manifestos in 1847 and liberal newspapers were established, e.g. <i>Die Deutsche Zeitung</i> • Nationalist sentiment increased across the German Confederation during the Rhine Crisis with France in 1840 and again over Schleswig-Holstein in 1846, and the Prussian <i>Zollverein</i> was viewed as symbolic of nationalist potential. Arguments and evidence that the supporters of radical ideas did not make progress in Germany in the years 1840-47 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The conservative rulers of Germany, particularly Austria and Prussia, were determined to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas, particularly the threat of liberalism, by repressive measures and censorship • The 'Metternich System' was successfully employed to undermine revolutionary organisations through the use of espionage and the use of saboteurs • On his accession in 1849, Frederick William IV of Prussia showed some interest in moderate reforms but this was not maintained. He dissolved a disastrous <i>Landtag</i> meeting in 1847 in the face of liberal demands • Support for radical organisations remained small, with many supporters coming from the middle-classes and students. The German peasantry showed particular antipathy and even opposition. Other relevant material must be credited.



2	3–5	• Demonstrates some understanding of the source material and attempts analysis by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand or confirm matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and with some substantiation for assertions of value. The concept of utility is addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate is it to say that the main reason for the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament (1848-9) was divisions within the Assembly. Arguments and evidence that divisions within the Assembly was the main reason for the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Divisions over the constitutional framework of a new German state delayed the production of a draft constitution so preventing the Parliament from establishing its authority over Germany • Disagreement over a Habsburg-led Grossdeutschland or Prussian-led Kleindeutschland resulted in the collapse of offers of leadership to both Archduke John (1848) and Frederick William IV of Prussia (1849) • Divisions within the Assembly between radicals, moderates and conservatives, and, liberals and nationalists delayed the production of a bill of rights and led to working-class discontent. Arguments and evidence that divisions within the Assembly was not the main reason and/or that other reasons were more important for the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The majority of representatives held similar middle-class liberal views and under the Presidency of von Gagern decisions began to be implemented • The lack of an army made the Parliament dependent on the goodwill of the German princes, particularly Prussia, to protect Germany from external attack • The loss of power experienced by the German princes in 1848 was only temporary and within six months counter-revolution across the German states, including Austria, began to undermine the Parliament • External popular protest, fuelled by a lack of lower-class representation in the Parliament, undermined its legitimacy. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that the revolutions in the German Confederation states in 1848 had no single underlying cause. Arguments and evidence that the revolutions in the German Confederation states in 1848 had no single underlying cause should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • There was a different trigger in each state where revolution occurred e.g. a political scandal in Bavaria, a revolt against the Metternich System in Baden • The timing of the outbreak and immediate impact of the revolution in each state was different e.g. February disturbances in Bavaria led to abdication while the March revolution in Austria saw the resignation of Metternich • Underlying political influences were varied in nature including radical demands, communist and socialist influences, and moderate liberal constitutionalism • Underlying causes were intertwined e.g. short-term economic and social grievances combined with the long-term political grievances in 1848 to create a revolutionary situation • Nationalist hopes of a united Germany and the Frankfurt Assembly developed parallel to the events in the individual states. Arguments and evidence that suggest that there was a single underlying cause of revolution in the German Confederation states in 1848 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The revolutions were part of a wider European political upheaval which were primarily triggered by the February revolution in France • Political challenge: the autocratic rulers of the German Confederation states faced widespread political unrest in 1848 with many being forced to grant political reforms • Nationalism: the nationalist-inspired meeting at Heidelberg took place before the general outbreak of revolution, this led to the calling of the Vorparlament and to the creation of a 'united' assembly at Frankfurt • The revolutions were caused by underlying economic and social problems across Germany in 1848; the recent economic downturn and widespread harvest failures led to poverty and hunger which fuelled unrest. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the suggestion that the course of events during the revolution in Prussia, in the years 1848-49, was dependent on the actions of Frederick William IV. Arguments and evidence that that the course of events during the revolution in Prussia, in the years 1848-49, was dependent on the actions of Frederick William IV should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The initial success of the revolution was aided by Frederick William's withdrawal of troops during the March Days in Berlin • Frederick William established constitutional government through his proclamation 'to my people and the German nation' (21 March 1848) • At the end of 1848, Frederick William replaced his liberal ministers with conservatives, dissolved the new Prussian Assembly and brought Prussian troops back into Berlin • Frederick William's rejection of the offer of the German crown from the Frankfurt Assembly in 1849 extinguished revolutionary hopes in Prussia. Arguments and evidence that the course of events during the revolution in Prussia, in the years 1848-49, was not dependent on the actions of Frederick William IV should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Success was dependent on the strength of the Austrian Empire; in a weakened position in March 1848 Austria regained strength by late 1848 • The strength of the revolutionary forces in Berlin during the March Days was so great that Frederick William was forced to react or lose his throne • The ineffectiveness and growing radicalism of the Prussian Assembly weakened the authority of the newly established constitutional government so allowing Frederick William to regain control • The failure of the new constitutional system to address the economic and social causes of the March Days weakened the support of industrial workers. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it was the weaknesses of the revolutionaries rather than the revival of the forces of conservatism that caused the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany. Arguments and evidence that the weaknesses of the revolutionaries caused the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Frankfurt Assembly was unable to make quick or effective decisions leading to a power vacuum that was easily challenged, e.g. differences of opinion over <i>Grossdeutschland</i> or <i>Kleindeutschland</i> unification • The Frankfurt Parliament was unable to organise an effective military force to enforce decisions or to defend itself • Revolutionaries across Germany, in both Frankfurt and the individual states, were not unified in their aims or objectives leading to easily exploited division • There was a lack of genuine leadership amongst the revolutionaries • Most of the 'revolutionary governments' were moderate in nature and unprepared for government or for the demands of radicals. Arguments and evidence that it was the revival of the forces of conservatism that caused the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In many of the states, e.g. Prussia, rulers were able to reposition and take control of the counter-revolution as quickly as they had granted constitutional government • In most states the armed forces remained loyal to the hereditary rulers • The revival of Habsburg power in Austria from late 1848 encouraged the counter-revolution in the German states • Frederick William IV's rejection of the offer of an Imperial title by the Frankfurt Assembly (March 1849) was bolstered by the Habsburg revival • The rump of the Frankfurt Assembly was forcibly broken up by Prussian soldiers in June 1849. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to shed light on the reasons for the outbreak of revolution in the German states in 1848. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The purpose of the speech was to explain the reasons why workers in German states had become involved in discontent • As an aristocrat with no apparent connection to the industrial developments he is describing, Prince Lichnowsky's viewpoint might be seen as objective • As a member of the ruling classes, Prince Lichnowsky might be trying to play down the role of radical political ideas in the growing discontent in Germany; 1847 was a year of growing political tension. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the outbreak of revolution in the German states in 1848: • It provides evidence that problems in the industrial sector were causing hardship for the working-classes in the German states ('Heartless manufacturers oppressed the poor workers') • It claims that hunger and not political ideas was the root cause of discontent ('I believe...the result of hunger, not socialist ideas.') • It suggests that the economic crisis being described might have led to some middle-class businessmen having reason to be discontented ('factories were forced to shut down...bankruptcy') • It suggests by its dismissal of any political cause of working-class discontent ('none...paid any attention to revolutionary agitation.') that political ideas were actually a source of tension in the German states. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • In the years 1846–47, problems in manufacturing industry led to an intense economic crisis, which was exacerbated by harvest failures that created severe social distress as food prices rose and availability declined • From 1844, when many Silesian weavers revolted against their employers, Silesia was at the forefront of working-class discontent in Germany • The United Diet became a forum for political discussion and debate on the problems facing Prussia in 1847 before Frederick William IV closed it down • The revolutions took place in 1848 at a time when the economic and social problems facing the German states were beginning to improve.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a political programme, it outlines not only the democrats' constitutional hopes for the future but also indicates the reasons for political discontent the year before the outbreak of revolutions across Germany - It was produced by radical democrats based in South-West Germany and so may only be representative of the more extreme proponents of political reform and/or from a specific region of Germany - It was produced in September 1847 at the beginning of the constitutional crisis in Baden. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the outbreak of revolution in the German states in 1848: - It suggests that many in Germany were dissatisfied with the present political situation ('Decrees that damage our basic rights') - It provides evidence of the desire to be free from repression ('The police must cease to degrade and harass'; 'The right...to free speech should be recognised.') - It provides evidence of a belief in German nationalism ('a guarantee of our existence as a nation.') - It implies that socio-economic problems were present in the German states ('fair system of taxation'; 'imbalance between workers and business'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Austria, through the Metternich System, and Prussia had imposed a repressive system of control across the German Confederation for decades - German nationalism was a key feature of the 1848 revolutions, e.g. the creation of a national assembly in Frankfurt - The desire for moderate constitutional liberal reform was a key feature of the 1848 revolutions rather than radical liberal or socialist reform - Baden was a centre of radical politics in Germany; the September constitutional crisis was seen as the forerunner of events in 1848 and the revolution in March 1848 attempted to create a republic. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - They provide evidence of a range of possible underlying causes for the outbreak of revolution including economic and social distress (Source 3) and political discontent (Source 4) - Both Sources provide evidence for radical political influences in the German states - Both Sources refer to the inequalities between workers and business as a cause of discontent in the German states - Source 4 could be used as evidence to counter Source 3's view that political ideas were not an influential cause of discontent.



Section B: Indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70**



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the main reason for the initial success of the revolutions in the German states in 1848 was the situation in the Austrian Empire. Arguments and evidence that the main reason for the initial success of the revolutions in the German states in 1848 was the situation in the Austrian Empire should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The success of the revolution in Austria and the fall of Metternich (13 March 1848) were both a symbolic and physical encouragement to revolutionaries across Germany • The rulers of other German states lost their confidence as a result of the news of revolution in the leading German state, e.g. Frederick William IV in Prussia • Austrian counter-revolutionaries prioritised putting down nationalist revolutions in the eastern Empire during the later months of 1848, so allowing the revolutions in the German states to thrive. Arguments and evidence that another factor was the main reason for the initial success of the revolutions in the German states in 1848 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The scale and intensity of revolutionary activity caused by a specific combination of political, social and economic crises in early 1848 • The swift capitulation of the German rulers to the demands of the revolutionaries, particularly in Prussia • The popular and wide-ranging support for the revolutions, including influential middle-class liberals and some Prussian Junkers • The organisational ability of nationalist and liberal political networks; the <i>Vorparlament</i> met in March 1848 and the Frankfurt Assembly was in session by May 1848. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the failure of German nationalists in the 1848-49 revolutions. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - Engels is writing in hindsight and is likely to be commenting on events in light of his own political and personal perspective of what happened - The article was published outside Germany and so Engels is in a position to be frank about his views on the failures - As a socialist and radical political commentator he may lack objectivity in regard to the actions of the mainly liberal politicians of the Frankfurt Assembly; his tone is derisory. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the failure of German nationalists in the 1848-49 revolutions: - It claims that the Frankfurt Assembly failed to take advantage of the favourable position created in 1848-49 ('never possessed the will or the force to make its claims recognised') - It claims that the Frankfurt Assembly alienated the German people by their behaviour and actions ('childish conduct...disenchanted') - It suggests that German nationalists were the architects of their own failure ('disgraceful proceedings prompted by events in Schleswig-Holstein') - It provides evidence of popular support for the restoration of the German rulers ('German people...former solid foundations'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Long debates over the nature of a future united Germany (<i>Grossdeutschland</i> v <i>Kleindeutschland</i>) meant the Frankfurt Assembly gained a reputation as a talking-shop - The Frankfurt Assembly claimed executive power over Germany but this was undermined when the 'crown' of Germany was offered to an Austrian Habsburg (1848) and to Prussia (1849) and was rejected by both

Question	Indicative content
	- In August 1848, the Assembly accepted a disadvantageous armistice with Denmark that had been agreed by Prussia; the Assembly was reliant on Prussia to provide an armed force during the Schleswig-Holstein action. Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - The speech provides an explanation for why Frederick William felt unable to further the cause of German liberal nationalism and, in particular, accept a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution to German unity - The purpose of the speech is to justify Frederick William's actions to the Prussian people and to Austria; as a result, the speech may exaggerate the nature of the radical threat and highlight the illegitimacy of the offer - The speech was made in May 1849, as the revolutionary period was coming to an end, so providing a context for the failure of the Frankfurt Assembly. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the failure of German nationalists in the 1848-49 revolutions: - It suggests that the nationalists in the German Assembly did not have legitimacy in the eyes of the Prussian king ('it does not have the right') - It claims that the German nationalists were undermined by the growing radicalisation of the revolutionaries ('such crimes have put an end to the hope that...can bring about German unity') - It implies that the failure of German nationalists in 1848-49 was due to the withdrawal of the goodwill of the German princes ('Prussian deputies...to be recalled...other governments will do the same'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - There was a final attempt by German nationalists to create a united Germany by offering the crown to Frederick William IV in April 1849 - The complete resurgence of the Austrian Empire by the spring of 1849 made any attempt to create a united Germany unlikely - Increasing working-class and radical attacks in 1849, including against the Frankfurt Assembly, undermined the liberal nationalist gains of 1849 - After May 1849, Prussian troops brought the revolutions to an end across Germany and the Assembly physically dispersed in June 1849. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Source 1 emphasises the structural weakness of German liberal nationalism in 1848-49 whereas Source 2 emphasises the power of the

Question	Indicative content
	forces of conservatism • Both Sources blame, to some extent, the German nationalists for their own failure; Source 1 for lack of courage and Source 2 for becoming too radical • Both Sources suggest that the nationalists in the Frankfurt National Assembly failed to live up to the early expectations of both the public and the German rulers • Each Source is written from an ideologically opposed standpoint.

Section B: Indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830-70**



2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament (1848–49) was mainly due to its lack of a military force. Arguments and evidence that the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament (1848–49) was mainly due to its lack of a military force should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Frankfurt Parliament was forced to rely on the armed forces of the rulers of the German states to carry out functions, such as collecting taxes • The Frankfurt Parliament was unable to defend Schleswig-Holstein from Danish attack without the offer of Prussian military intervention • A lack of a military force meant that the Frankfurt Parliament was unable to defend the sovereignty of Germany from claims to land from non-German nationalities, such as the Poles and the Czechs • The Frankfurt Parliament had no means to deal either with internal challenges from radical revolutionaries or the counter-revolutionary resurgence of the German princes and Austrian Empire. Arguments and evidence that the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament (1848–49) was due to other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Lengthy internal disagreements over the nature of German unification and the new German constitution within the Assembly undermined the consolidation of the Parliament • Internal divisions between middle-class liberal and radical deputies within the Assembly weakened the legitimacy of the Parliament. Legitimacy was further weakened by a lack of working-class and peasant representation • The role of Prussia and the Prussian king undermined the authority of the Parliament, particularly Frederick William IV's rejection of the leadership of the new <i>Kleindeutschland</i> constitution • The recovery of Habsburg authority by the end of 1848 signalled the resurgence of conservative forces within Germany. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the counter-revolution in Prussia was the main reason for the collapse of the 1848-49 revolutions in the German states. Arguments and evidence that the counter-revolution in Prussia was the main reason for the collapse of the 1848-49 revolutions in the German states should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Within eight months of the Prussian revolution, Frederick William IV had regained the initiative and, by December 1848, had effectively brought it to an end; this gave optimism to rulers in other states • Any semblance of the Frankfurt Assembly using the Prussian army as a defence force was destroyed by the military takeover of Berlin in December 1848 • The counter-revolution gave Frederick William IV the confidence to reject outright the offer of the leadership of a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> by the Frankfurt Assembly and, in so doing, effectively brought the Assembly to an end • In 1849, Prussian troops were at the forefront of the counter-revolution in other states, e.g. intervention by force in Saxony and the Palatinate. Arguments and evidence that there were other reasons for the collapse of the 1848-49 revolutions in the German states should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The revival of Habsburg power in Austria • Divisions amongst the revolutionaries in the Frankfurt Assembly slowed down the decision-making process so preventing the revolutionaries from taking advantage of the potential to create a united Germany • The lack of sustained popular support; initial support had been often fuelled by social and economic grievances that the new governments were not in a position to remedy and harvests were better in 1848-49 • Many middle-class revolutionaries, who had often led the initial stages of the revolts, became disillusioned at the development of more radical activity and were tempted by the promises of reforms from counter-revolutionaries. Other relevant material must be credited.

2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors: Section A

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	• Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little or no supporting evidence. Concepts of reliability or utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of the constitutional crisis in Baden for the outbreak of the 1848-49 revolutions in Germany. Arguments and evidence that the constitutional crisis in Baden was significant for the outbreak of the 1848-49 revolutions in Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The granting of a liberal constitution by the ruler of Baden in 1846, after considerable pressure from liberals and radicals, indicated to opponents of conservatism in other states that political change was possible • The political changes in Baden attracted radical liberals from across Germany, so that Baden became the focus of those advocating radical change and revolutionary ideas • The radical Offenburg manifesto (September 1847), outlining democratic and human rights for all, became the basis of the demands made by revolutionaries across Germany in 1848, including the Frankfurt delegates • The outbreak of revolution in Baden in February 1848 saw the first significant acts of violence against the 'old order' and was the signal for many of the radicals in the smaller German states to take action. Arguments and evidence that the significance of the constitutional crisis in Baden for the outbreak of the 1848-49 revolutions in Germany was limited/other factors were more significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • There was a general upsurge in liberal and nationalist activity in many of the German states in the years 1846-48, of which Baden was only one example. Even in Prussia, the King had contemplated some liberal reform • The revolution in France in February 1848 'kick-started' the revolutionary activity in Germany. Baden was the first German state to react to the events in France • The economic crisis of 1846-47 negatively affected both rural and urban populations, so triggering revolutionary activity across Germany. It was the peasants in Baden who attacked noble estates in February 1848 • The fall of Metternich (March 1848), and the subsequent rapid loss of power of the Austrian Empire, so early in the events of 1848-49, encouraged revolutionaries in the German Confederation states. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which the response of Frederick William IV of Prussia to the revolutions in Germany changed in the years 1848-49. Arguments and evidence that the response of Frederick William IV of Prussia to the revolutions in Germany changed in the years 1848-49 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • After his initial reluctance to address the revolutionary activity in Prussia, in March 1848, through a mixture of force and pragmatism, Frederick William agreed to major liberal reforms and did not oppose national developments • In the autumn of 1848, Frederick William oversaw events that overturned his willingness to work with the newly-formed National Assembly, resulting in its disbandment and a full-scale counter-revolution • On 5 December 1848, Frederick William announced that a new Prussian constitution would be introduced that would originate from his own perception of a constitutional monarchy • Having allowed Prussian delegates to attend the Frankfurt Assembly, and the use of Prussian troops, in spring 1849, Frederick William withdrew the delegates and rejected the offer of the crown of a <i>Kleindeutschland</i>. Arguments and evidence that the response of Frederick William IV of Prussia to the revolutions in Germany did not change in the years 1848-49 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Frederick William remained a firm believer in the divine authority of the monarchy throughout the revolutionary period, citing such authority in rejecting proposals for him to become leader of a united Germany • From his base in Potsdam, Frederick William maintained a conservative outlook across the period, initially attempting to pre-empt liberal demands and later re-establishing his authority at the earliest opportunity • Frederick William maintained personal control of the Prussian army throughout the revolutionary period, so allowing him to bide his time in reasserting his conservative agenda from the autumn of 1848 • Frederick William continued to support the power of the Habsburg monarchy in Germany and to acknowledge the symbolic pre-eminence of the Austrian Emperor in Germany. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the economic crisis (1846–47) was the most significant short-term cause of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany. Arguments and evidence that the economic crisis (1846–47) was the most significant short-term cause of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The failure of the grain harvests in 1846–47 combined with the spread of potato blight across Germany led to agitation in rural areas that threatened the landowning classes in Germany • Food shortages led to a rise in food prices resulting in food riots in the major cities of the German states that highlighted the tinder box nature of the political situation of the late 1840s • The agricultural crisis of 1846–47 undermined the already fragile nature of the industrial economy, with a downturn in demand leading to business failure, increased unemployment and working-class protests • Business failures and difficult trading conditions led to an increase in middle-class discontent and the call for liberal economic and political reforms • Discontent with the response of the ruling elites to the economic crisis created a revolutionary atmosphere across Germany in the early months of 1848. Arguments and evidence that another factor was the most significant short-term cause of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By the time of the full-scale revolutionary activity in 1848, the economic crisis had abated and was not a trigger factor for specific revolutionary activity • The peasantry, one of the social groups hardest hit by the economic crisis, were generally unsupportive of the revolutions of 1848, and many actively participated in the counter-revolutionary reaction • In the late 1840s, there was a resurgence in middle-class political liberal and nationalist sentiment; nationalists were spurred on by events in Schleswig-Holstein, and liberals convened constitutional meetings • The constitutional crisis in Baden in the autumn of 1847 acted as a focus for political discontent and it was events in Baden in both urban and rural areas in February 1848 that seemed to act as kindling for the revolutions • The overthrow of the monarchy, and declaration of a republic, in France in February 1848, was the catalyst for unrest in the major German cities and in Austria, particularly amongst the urban masses and students. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that the Frankfurt Assembly (1848-49) had little significant long-term impact on the process of German unification. Arguments and evidence that the Frankfurt Assembly (1848-49) had little significant long-term impact on the process of German unification should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Frankfurt Assembly lasted little more than a year, was riven by division and eventually was easily overcome by counter-revolutionary forces • The lengthy decision-making process, and the divisions among the delegates, meant that the German liberalism and nationalism, that had developed in the 1840s, lost influence on the process • The Fifty Articles (published December 1848) that formed the basis of a liberal constitution for a united Germany was abandoned in 1849 and not resurrected • The main process of unification was carried out through the prosecution of war by a conservative German state rather than as a political process involving representatives of the majority of the German-speaking states. Arguments and evidence that counter the statement that the Frankfurt Assembly (1848-49) had little significant long-term impact on the process of German unification should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Frankfurt Assembly brought together representatives of the majority of the German states at a time of great political and social instability showing that a future politically unified Germany was a real possibility • The Frankfurt Assembly's decision to organise a united Germany around a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution with the Prussian king at its head created the future potential for a united Germany without Austria • Liberal Nationalism, with an emphasis on support for a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution based on Prussian strength, emerged from the ashes of the liberal and nationalist failures of 1848-49 • Prussian political leaders recognised that, although democratic populism had failed in 1848-49, there was potential to harness popular nationalism, e.g. Schleswig-Holstein (1864), the 'watch on the Rhine' of the late 1860s • The collapse of the popularly elected Frankfurt Assembly and restoration of conservative rule meant that any future unification process was less likely to involve democratic participation • The Frankfurt Assembly's inability to wage war and to protect itself from military attack showed that any successful process of unification would require access to military force, as it did under Prussia from 1862-71. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2(a)	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the significance of the <i>Zollverein</i> in the process of German unification. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It indicates that the <i>Zollverein</i> brought economic unity to its members ('get rid of barriers to intercommunication...separate economic legislation') - It claims that the <i>Zollverein</i> is an effective vehicle for the advancement of national unity ('It has done wonders in breaking down petty and local prejudices.') - It identifies the <i>Zollverein</i> as the potential basis for a future nation-state ('one great alliance'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The author was a respected expert who had witnessed the impact of the <i>Zollverein</i> for himself - The Report was written in 1840 so suggesting that the <i>Zollverein</i> was a significant influence on events in Germany from an early stage in the unification process - The interest of the British government suggests that the <i>Zollverein</i> was a significant development. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - The <i>Zollverein</i> flourished under the leadership of Prussia during the 1840s, having been founded in 1834 - Metternich believed that the <i>Zollverein</i> had the potential to challenge Austrian dominance of the German states - German nationalism was flourishing in the 1840s and the <i>Zollverein</i> was seen by many nationalists as a blueprint for bringing the German people together.

Question	Indicative content
2(b)	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the strength of the Prussian state in 1860. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The article provides an outsider's view of Prussia at the time and so may be reflecting a more honest opinion of the situation than might be found in Prussia itself - The tone of the article is particularly critical and belittling suggesting that the writer was being extremely partial, particularly as <i>The Times</i> was known to promote British interests - The strength of the criticism in the article reflects the particularly poor light in which Prussia was held internationally in 1860. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It suggests that Prussia acts and looks like a powerful state but has no right to claim great power status ('large army', 'plentiful diplomatic circulars and notes', 'no one dreads her as an enemy', 'nobody can tell') - It claims that Prussia is diplomatically weak and isolated ('never willing to help herself', 'No one counts her as a friend') - It indicates that the government is ineffective and indecisive ('seeking assistance from other nations', 'never sides for or against') - It claims that the Prussian army is incapable of defending Prussia ('in no fit condition for fighting', 'without allies...would not be able to defend its borders'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - In 1859, Prussia failed to take advantage of war between France and Austria either by supporting Austria as a German state or by standing up to French expansionism - Prussia had gained the support of the German Confederation for non-intervention in the Crimean War (1854) and maintained a strong leadership of the <i>Zollverein</i> - The army was in desperate need of reform; recruitment was outdated, nepotism was rife and in 1859 an attempt to mobilise had been disastrous

- | | |
|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• In 1860, Prussia was in a period of political uncertainty; King William IV's brother, William, was acting as regent due the King's mental incapacity after a stroke. |
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Section B: Indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70**



2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors

Section A: Questions 1a/2a

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–2	• Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little if any substantiation. Concepts of utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	3–5	• Demonstrates some understanding of the source material and attempts analysis by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand or confirm matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and with some substantiation for assertions of value. The concept of utility is addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and may be based on questionable assumptions.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant the development of the Zollverein was in the growth of the Prussian economy in the 1850s. Arguments and evidence that the development of the Zollverein was significant in the growth of the Prussian economy in the 1850s should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Prussian industry and commerce benefited from the internal customs' union established through the Zollverein • The Zollverein agreements enabled the expansion of railways and roads to connect the different economic regions of Prussia • The expansion of a unified currency area and the use of common weights and measures facilitated Prussian economic growth • External trade agreements negotiated by the Zollverein boosted Prussian export opportunities. Arguments and evidence that the development of the Zollverein was not significant/or that other factors were more significant in the growth of the Prussian economy in the 1850s should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Prussian economic growth was fuelled by plentiful reserves of coal, iron and other natural resources e.g. for the chemical industry • The Prussian economy benefited more from the investment of key industrialists and businessmen, such as Krupp • The Prussian state boosted growth through investment in the communications infrastructure and demand for military supplies • The Prussian education system encouraged training in skills beneficial to the economy • The Zollverein alliances did not provide protection for Prussian industry. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which Austrian influence in Germany declined in the years 1852-65. Arguments and evidence that Austrian influence in Germany declined in the years 1852-65 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • After the death of Schwarzenberg in 1852, the Austrian political leadership was less self-assured in its dealings with the German states, e.g. the attempt to reform the German Confederation (1863) • After 1857, Austria influence was adversely affected by the impact of economic depression at home and nationalism in the wider Empire • Austria's economic influence declined across the period; from the failure of the <i>Mitteleuropa</i> plan to complete rejection from the <i>Zollverein</i> • After 1862, Bismarck's manipulation of the international situation significantly eroded Austria's political influence in Germany, e.g. the war with Denmark and the Gastein Convention. Arguments and evidence that Austrian influence in Germany did not decline in the years 1852-65 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Austria retained its post-Olmütz political influence across the period; Austria was the leading state in the German Confederation • In 1865, the majority of German states were ready to support Austria in a military conflict against Prussia • Austria's political power was balanced by Prussia's growing economic power • Austria had the largest military force in the German Confederation. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate relations between Austria and Prussia in the early 1850s. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • It is an official report written by a Cabinet Minister to the head of the Austrian government • It outlines candidly attitudes towards Prussia and the wishes of the Austrian trade ministry • It is being written in the midst of negotiations to sign an Austro-German Customs Union before the imminent renewal of the Prussian <i>Zollverein</i>, and would be expected to reflect the Austrian position. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about relations between Austria and Prussia in the early 1850s: • It provides evidence that Austria's ambition is to reduce Prussia's economic power within Germany ('renewal would bind all German states for twelve years longer to Prussia's will, in all national economic affairs.') • It suggests that Austria is concerned about the potential power the renewal of the <i>Zollverein</i> would bring to Prussia but listing the benefits of its own Customs Union • It implies that Austria still feels superior to Prussia within Germany ('rather than endanger...Prussia would then prefer to share that supremacy with Austria.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Prussia had established and consolidated the <i>Zollverein</i> from 1834 but the agreements were due for renewal by 1852 • Austrian worries over the potential political power of the <i>Zollverein</i> were not new; Metternich had expressed concern in the 1830s • After Olmütz (1850), the Austrians were determined to consolidate their political power, and re-establish their commercial power, over Germany at the expense of Prussia. Source 4 2. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • It was published in 1852 when negotiations for both the Austro-German Customs Union and the renewal of the <i>Zollverein</i> had yet to be agreed • It reflects the viewpoint of Prussian National Liberals whose favoured position with regard to German nationalism was, if possible, a



Question	Indicative content
	<i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution under Prussia • Its purpose is to persuade readers that Prussia could consider political as well as commercial independence from Austria within Germany. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about relations between Austria and Prussia in the early 1850s: • It suggests that Prussia gave up very little power in 1850 with the reassertion of the German Confederation under Austria (‘nothing more than an international association...Prussia...able to assert its independence.’) • It provides evidence of a strong resentment of Austria by some Prussians (‘can never agree to Austrian demands...would mean denying...political position Prussia has held up to now’) • It argues that there is some ambition in Prussia for greater independence from Austria (‘prefer a north-German, but independent, <i>Zollverein</i>’; ‘however painful Prussia may find separation from the Confederation.’). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Prussia had been forced to give up its attempt to increase its political power within Germany with the failure of the Erfurt Union • It became increasingly obvious in the 1850s that Prussia was developing economically more rapidly than Austria; the 1848–49 revolutions had left Austria short of money while Prussia had tax surpluses to invest • After the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions in Germany the National Liberals increasingly looked to Prussia to fulfil nationalist hopes. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources suggest that the political agreements of 1850 had not brought Austrian-Prussian rivalry to an end • Both sources provide evidence that the key to future relations between Austria and Prussia was the outcome of the battle for commercial power 1850–52 • Both sources suggest that there were elements of resentment and dislike within the relationship.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement as to whether the political situation in Germany in 1851 was no different from the political situation before the 1848–49 revolutions. Arguments and evidence that the political situation in Germany in 1851 was no different than it had been before the 1848–49 revolutions should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The dominance of Austria within Germany continued; the balance of power with Prussia had been restored with the capitulation of Olmütz (1850) • The German Confederation was reconstituted and restored in 1851 • The traditional rulers of the individual German states had been restored • Support for liberalism and German nationalism was generally limited and political opposition under control. Arguments and evidence that the political situation in Germany in 1851 was different than it had been before the 1848–49 revolutions should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Austrian power had been undermined by the successes of the 1848–49 revolutions and it had taken until 1851 to renegotiate its dominant position • The potential political power of Prussia had been highlighted during the events of 1848–49, e.g. the offer of leadership of a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> to Frederick William IV by the Frankfurt Assembly, the Erfurt Union • The Frankfurt Assembly had left a political legacy, e.g. constitutionalism, a <i>Grossdeutschland</i> v <i>Kleindeutschland</i> debate • Moderate national-liberalism may have suffered a setback but many conservatives had been awakened to the potential power of National Liberalism. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which Prussia strengthened its position in Germany in the years 1852–62. Arguments and evidence that Prussia did strengthen its position in Germany in the years 1852–62 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Prussia became the dominant economic power in Germany through its development and expansion of the <i>Zollverein</i> • Prussia represented the <i>Zollverein</i> states internationally; acting as the chief negotiator in trade treaties with Piedmont, Holland, Belgium and France • The development of an arms industry, e.g. Krupps and a state-controlled railway system enhanced Prussian military capabilities. This was further enhanced by the army reforms overseen by von Roon and von Moltke • Prussia was able to take advantage of the political and economic weaknesses emerging in Austria, e.g. Austrian rejection from the <i>Zollverein</i>. Arguments and evidence that Prussia did not strengthen its position/its position was limited in Germany in the years 1852–62 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As leader of the German Confederation, Austria continued to hold political and moral authority over Germany • Prussia was not politically stable enough to challenge for political power, e.g. regency of William I and the constitutional crisis • It was not until Bismarck's appointment in 1862 that Prussia would really be able to start to strengthen its political position in Germany, e.g. solving the constitutional crisis and facilitating army reforms. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that, from 1850 until its defeat in the Seven Weeks' War in 1866, Austria maintained a dominant position over the German states. Arguments and evidence that, from 1850 until its defeat in the Seven Weeks' War in 1866, Austria maintained a dominant position over the German states should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The 'capitulation of Olmütz/Olomouc' reasserted the Austrian position within Germany after the upheavals of the years 1848–50 • The German Confederation was re-established in May 1851 with the acknowledgement of Austria's political leadership and senior position within the duality of power • The majority of the German states continued to accept Austria as the predominant power and the Austrian Emperor as the legitimate spokesman for Germany throughout the period • Prussia was not in a strong enough position to directly confront Austria militarily until 1866 and, at the beginning of the war, on paper Austria had the stronger military force • Most German rulers, even under considerable pressure from Prussia, chose to fight on the side of Austria at the outbreak of war in 1866. Arguments and evidence that, from 1850 until its defeat in the Seven Weeks' War in 1866, Austria did not maintain a dominant position over the German states should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Olmütz/Olomouc merely restored the pre-1848 balance of power in Germany between Austria and Prussia; Austria's presidency of the German Confederation and Prussia's leadership of the <i>Zollverein</i> • Early attempts by Austria to expand the German Confederation by including its eastern territories and to create a Mitteleuropa economic union were resisted by the other German states • Attempts by Austria to undermine the <i>Zollverein</i> were resisted throughout the period and Prussia remained the dominant force in trade relationship between the German states • In the years 1862–65, Prussia increasingly challenged Austrian dominance in the political sphere, e.g. Austrian-Prussian diplomacy over Schleswig-Holstein, William I's refusal to attend the Assembly of Princes (1863) • By 1866, Prussia had positioned itself as a viable alternative to Austria for the leadership of Germany – economically, politically and militarily. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the 1850s, Prussia made significant progress in strengthening its position as a leading German state. Arguments and evidence that, in the 1850s, Prussia made significant progress in strengthening its position as a leading German state should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Prussia maintained its dominance over the <i>Zollverein</i> and decisively overcame Austrian attempts to create a <i>Mitteleuropa</i> economic union (1853) • Prussia made advances in the extraction of resources (iron, coal) and industrial production (steel), which made it into an advanced industrial power • The expansion of, and state investment in, the railway network gave Prussia dominance in the communication infrastructure of Germany • Manteuffel's reforms strengthened Prussia's economic and social resilience, e.g. advances in technical education, tax reform • German nationalists began increasingly to identify Prussia as the potential leader for a unified Germany; though not officially supported, the creation of the <i>Nationalverein</i> (1859) was significant in advancing this view. Arguments and evidence that, in the 1850s, Prussia did not make significant progress in strengthening its position as a leading German state should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Austria remained the dominant political power within Germany and retained the influence regained at Olmütz over the German Confederation • Prussia was not in a position to influence European affairs, remaining neutral during the Crimean War, and unwilling and unable to challenge Austrian power in the Italian War of 1859 • The Prussian army was in need of reform, e.g. recruitment, officer training and equipment, as proven by the difficulties encountered in mobilisation in 1859 • Prussia's wider political influence within Germany became stagnant because of the uncertainty of the regency under Prince William from 1857 • By the end of the 1850s, Prussia was on the verge of a constitutional crisis, as a resurgence in liberalism and the need to finance military reform created political tensions and weakened its influence.

	Other relevant material must be credited.
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5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.



5	17–20	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and
Level	Mark	Descriptor
		substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.

Section A: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, 1830-70**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the reasons why there was little progress in challenging the restored order in Italy in the years 1830-47. Source 1 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • Metternich, as the most powerful politician in the Italian peninsula in his role as Austrian Chancellor, is in a privileged position to comment as both insider and outsider • The private nature of the letters means that Metternich can be as candid as he wishes in expressing his opinion of matters of Italian politics • Metternich is writing at the beginning of the 1830s, at a time of particular upheaval in Italian politics, and so is commenting on events unfolding at the time. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons why there was little progress in challenging the restored order in Italy in the years 1830-47: • It implies that most Italians were either uninterested or too self-interested to challenge the existing order ('go quietly about their lives', 'do not have...the necessary seriousness', 'unity...created by strangers') • It claims that Metternich himself was responsible for the lack of progress ('representative system...So, I have not given them such a system.') • It implies that Italians were too divided to instigate change ('hate each other...only real patriotism...town where they were born.') • It implies that Italians who did want change were not energetic enough or capable enough to make a successful challenge ('layabouts who waste their days talking politics', 'promises of the political societies are false.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Metternich controlled the Austrian Empire and influenced the whole of the

	Italian peninsula through the 'Metternich System' of repression, censorship and military deployment • Localism was a significant feature of life in the Italian peninsula, e.g. the failure of revolutionary leaders in Modena and Parma to join together in the 1830 revolutions • Italian society was generally very conservative; the majority of the population were peasants, and the Catholic Church – the Pope being a restored ruler himself – had a significant influence
Question	Indicative content

- Italian revolutionaries were often based outside of Italy, e.g. Mazzini, which hampered both their understanding of grassroots politics and their ability to organise insurrection.

Source 2

- The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences:

- In 1846, Cavour was a member of the Italian political élite, but not yet in public office, and so is writing from his own specific point of view rather than with an overtly political agenda
- Written in May 1846, Cavour is in a position to give an overview of political progress in Italy throughout the period from 1830 onwards
- The article was published in France allowing Cavour to write more candidly on political progress and the Italian rulers; censorship of published material by restored rulers was universal across the Italian peninsula.

- The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons why there was little progress in challenging the restored order in Italy in the years 1830–47

- It claims that the main reason for a lack of progress was Italian divisiveness ('rivalries for each other', 'mistrust divides our rulers from those they rule.')
- It claims that political movements in Italy are incapable of attracting mass support ('relying solely on republican ideas and rabble-rousing passions', 'no great support', 'gaining little influence')
- It claims that Italians are unwilling to countenance change ('common people...deeply attached to the old institutions', 'Political activity...middle class...upper class...only wish to defend their own interests.')
- It suggests that there is little chance of revolution breaking out in Italy at any time soon ('stormy passions...now calmed down...traces are almost destroyed...returned to their natural course.').

- Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include:

- The majority of the restoration states in Italy were either directly ruled, or substantially influenced, by the Austrian Empire; for either liberalism or nationalism to progress, Austria would need to be



challenged effectively

- In 1830-31, revolutions in Modena, Parma and the Papal States, influenced by the July Revolution in France, broke out and were relatively quickly put down by Austrian troops at the request of the restored rulers
- Young Italy was founded by Mazzini, in the wake of the 1830-31 revolutions, but Mazzini had little interest in encouraging popular support and actively discouraged his followers from engaging the peasantry
- In 1846, economic and social discontent was brewing in Italy, leading to signs of discontent and the potential for revolutionary activity to re- emerge; harvest failures in 1847 exacerbated the situation.



Question	Indicative content
	Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources are written by members of the political élite connected to Italy but Source 1 is written by a representative of a foreign power ‘with influence’ in Italy and Source 2 is written by an Italian • The sources together give an overview of the period; Source 1 being written in the early 1830s and Source 2 in 1846 • Both sources agree that a lack of progress is due to the weaknesses of the Italians themselves, e.g. internal divisions, lack of interest, self-interest, fear of change • Source 1 indicates, and Source 2 suggests, the strength of the restored order in Italy.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, 1840-71

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the response of Frederick William IV of Prussia to the 1848-49 revolutions in Germany. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The speeches reflect the public response of Frederick William IV to the ongoing situation in Berlin in March 1848 • Frederick William IV is speaking on 21 March at the height of the March Days of revolutionary activity in Berlin and this reflects his immediate response to events • The tone and language suggest that the purpose of the speeches is to reassure the public in regard to his support for the revolutionary events taking place in Prussia and Germany as a whole. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the response of Frederick William IV of Prussia to the 1848-49 revolutions in Germany: • It indicates that Frederick William IV has accepted the events of the revolution ('proudly...my capital city...powerful opinion has expressed itself.') and is aware of its significance ('A decisive day.') • It suggests that Frederick William IV is uncertain of the reaction to the procession ('colours I wear do not belong to me.', 'I do not want...another crown or another territory.') • It indicates that he is willing to work in future with supporters of the revolutions ('Students...In you...beginning of a great future.', 'seized the banner', 'Citizens...I desire nothing but good for you and Germany.') • It suggests that Frederick William may not be as supportive as he appears. He may be trying to prevent events escalating ('I want good order.') and biding his time ('my army is certainly strong and brave'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include:



- 18-21 March 1848 was the high point of the Revolution in Prussia; on 19 March, violence broke out after Prussian troops fired on a crowd at the Castle and Frederick William was forced to view the bodies of those killed
- Frederick William IV refused the wishes of his generals to withdraw from Berlin to Potsdam and, on 21 March, agreed to a public procession in solidarity with the revolutionaries in a bid to save the monarchy
- Frederick William IV agreed to a meeting of the Prussian United Diet on 2 April 1848, which resulted in the creation of an elected Prussian National Assembly designated with establishing a Prussian constitution



Question	Indicative content
	- University student associations were at the forefront of the demonstrations of 1848 across all of the German states and were influential in the initial events on the ground. Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - Frederick William IV is writing a private letter to someone he clearly trusts and so would not expect the letter to become public - In December 1848, Frederick William IV was in a position to be candid about his feelings as he had recently retaken control of the situation in Prussia at the expense of the Prussian National Assembly - The King may have hoped that Bunsen would use the information to signal to the new Emperor of Austria that he had no interest in accepting the leadership of a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> from the Frankfurt Assembly. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the response of Frederick William IV of Prussia to the 1848-49 revolutions in Germany: - It claims that Frederick William IV has no intention of working with the revolutionary Frankfurt Assembly to accept leadership of Germany ('I want neither the consent...nor the crown itself.') - It claims that the Frankfurt Assembly is not legitimate ('crown...is not one offered...created by revolution.', 'a right that is not their right to give!') - It indicates that Frederick William IV views the 1848-49 revolutions with utter contempt ('stinking as it does', 'silliest, most stupid and wickedest Revolution of the century.') - Frederick Williams's concern over the legitimacy of his actions ('crown that is fit for a Hohenzollern to wear', 'presented by the Emperor... by myself, and by our equals.') suggests that he wants to underline his conservatism. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Frederick William IV agreed that Prussian representatives could be sent to the Frankfurt Assembly; many of these representatives were conservatives and supportive of a united Germany under the Prussian king - In November 1848, the Prussian military regained control of Berlin and on 5 December 1848, from his military stronghold at Potsdam, Frederick William IV unilaterally declared a new conservative constitution

- The abdication of the Austrian Emperor in favour of his nephew, Franz Joseph, on 2 December 1848, provided a foundation stone from which the Austrian authorities were able to re-establish their authority
- Frederick William IV had a genuine desire to take a leadership role in a united Germany but, as a believer in 'divine right', was never comfortable with challenging Habsburg power.

Sources 3 and 4

Question	Indicative content
	The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • The speeches in Source 3 reflect Frederick William IV's public response, whereas Source 4 probably more clearly reflects his private feelings • The speeches in Source 3 were made at the very beginning of the revolutionary period, whereas Source 4 was written later in the revolutionary period • Both Sources reflect views about Frederick William IV's attitude towards his potential leadership of Germany • Source 3 is supportive of the revolutionaries but at a time of great pressure, whereas Source 4 is dismissive of the revolutions at a point when Frederick William IV was more confident of his position.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, 1830-70**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that Piedmont was in a better position to lead Italy towards unification in 1858 than it had been in 1848. Arguments and evidence that Piedmont was in a better position to lead Italy towards unification in 1858 than it had been in 1848 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under the rule of Victor Emmanuel, Piedmont had developed into the most stable Italian state; moderate liberal nationalists had more confidence in Victor Emmanuel than in his less predictable predecessor, Charles Albert • By 1858, many of the Mazzinian nationalists, who had rejected the leadership of Piedmont in 1848, had been won over by Cavour and had become instrumental in developing the Piedmont-based National Society • In 1858, Piedmont had a more developed modern economic and industrial infrastructure than in 1848 and one which was increasingly capable of supporting further expansion • In 1858, as a result of Cavour's diplomacy, Piedmont was increasingly being seen in Europe as a driving force behind support for Italian nationalism, whereas in 1848 there was little support for Charles Albert • In 1858, Cavour was sufficiently confident to be able to broker an agreement with France (the Pact of Plombières) to form an alliance in a future war to liberate northern Italy from Austrian rule. Arguments and evidence that Piedmont was not in a better position to lead Italy towards unification in 1858 than it had been in 1848 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As in 1848, many nationalist supporters, particularly radical Mazzinian nationalists, still did not trust the intentions of the Piedmontese élite, seeing them as expansionists rather than supporters of Italian unity • As in 1848, the Papacy was resistant to the cause of Italian independence. In 1858, the Papacy was particularly hostile to Piedmont's potential leadership of Italy, with Piedmont's anticlerical laws • In 1858, the ambitions of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour were to force Austria out of the peninsula and create a kingdom of the North; the Piedmontese economy was not developed enough to unite with the South • As in 1848, Piedmont was not strong enough to pursue Austria alone; the Plombières negotiations indicated that Napoleon III was the dominant

partner and Piedmont was dependent on France

- In 1858, as in 1848, the British were willing to give vocal support to Italian independence and unity but were not willing to provide physical support.

Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that that it was mainly the actions of Italians themselves that shaped Italian unification in the years 1858-70. Arguments and evidence that it was mainly the actions of Italians themselves that shaped Italian unification in the years 1858-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • It was Victor Emmanuel and Cavour who were the driving force behind the Second War of Italian independence 1858-59 against Austria. • Cavour was responsible for manipulating and organising the plebiscites that led to the annexation of the central Italian states in the years 1859-60 • Garibaldi's invasion of Sicily and southern Italy created the circumstances that led to his meeting with Victor Emmanuel at Teano in 1860 and the declaration of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861 • Victor Emmanuel and Cavour took the decision to send military troops south to counter Garibaldi's attempt to take Rome in 1860 • In 1866 and 1870, Italian military action contributed to bringing <i>irredenta</i> territory, Venetia and Rome, into the Kingdom of Italy • The actions of Pope Pius IX, as both ruler of Rome and the Catholic Church, prevented Rome from becoming the capital of the Kingdom of Italy until 1870. Arguments and evidence that it was the actions of others that shaped Italian unification in the years 1858-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Napoleon III was the dominant partner in the Franco-Piedmont alliance against France in 1858-59; Napoleon brokered the Pact of Plombières with Cavour and agreed the armistice at Villafranca without informing Cavour • It was French troops that did most of the decisive fighting in 1858-59 and the failure of the Italian navy at Lissa in 1866 almost led to Italy failing to regain Venetia in 1866 • It was the belief that British naval ships were protecting Garibaldi that allowed Garibaldi to invade the Neapolitan mainland in 1860 • The French occupation of Rome influenced the actions of Piedmont in only partially invading the Papal States in 1860 and the reaction of Victor Emmanuel to Garibaldi's attempts to take Rome in 1862 and 1866-67 • It was Prussian diplomacy that saw Napoleon III cede Venetia to Italy as part of a Franco-Prussian agreement on the Prussian defeat of Austria in 1866 • Victor Emmanuel's entry into Rome in 1870 was as a result of the withdrawal of the French garrison due to the need for French reinforcements in the Franco- Prussian War.

Other relevant material must be credited.



Option 2E.2: The German Democratic Republic, 1949–90

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that the development of the <i>Zollverein</i> was the most significant factor in the rise of Prussia in the years 1852-67. Arguments and evidence that the development of the <i>Zollverein</i> was the most significant factor in the rise of Prussia in the years 1852-67 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Prussian domination of the organisation of the <i>Zollverein</i> was a clear indication that Prussia was potentially capable of leading a future <i>Kleindeutschland</i> political entity • Prussia's success in renewing the <i>Zollverein</i> in 1852, at the expense of the Austrian plan for a <i>Mitteleuropa</i> Customs Union, highlighted Prussia's continued economic dominance in Germany despite Olmütz • Prussia negotiated international trade deals on behalf of the <i>Zollverein</i>, including with Austria, Belgium and particularly France, so raising its diplomatic presence and status amongst other European powers • Free trade and common regulations enabled economic development, as well as the internal strengthening, of the Prussian state by creating more secure and effective links between its eastern and western regions • Prussia used the <i>Zollverein</i> as a means to exclude Austria from 'German' economic interests; the commercial treaty of 1865 with Austria was a final indication that 'German' economic unity would not include Austria • The creation of the <i>Zollparlament</i> in 1867 created a formal economic tie between the new North German Confederation and the remaining independent southern states, reinforcing Prussia's economic dominance. Arguments and evidence that other factors were more significant in the rise of Prussia in the years 1852-67 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The <i>Zollverein</i> did not enable Prussia to increase its political influence within Germany; most German states still looked to Austria for political leadership, e.g. Confederation reform 1865, Austro-Prussian War 1866 • Prussian political developments, e.g. the handling of the constitutional crisis from 1862 by the newly appointed Minister-President Bismarck enabled Prussia to challenge Austrian political power in Germany • The development of the Prussian economy as a whole, particularly state support for railway building, established Prussia as the major mainland European economic power

- The reform and development of the Prussian military: Prussia was able to defeat Austria in war in just seven weeks in 1866
- The growing belief amongst German liberal-nationalists, particularly in the late 1850s, that Prussian leadership was the solution to creating a unified Germany
- Austrian weaknesses.

Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether, in the years 1852-66, the most significant economic development in Prussia was the expansion of the railways. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1852-66, the most significant economic development in Prussia was the expansion of the railways should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Heavy industry benefitted from railway expansion; railway building itself created a demand for heavy industrial goods, such as steel, and the railways could transport raw materials for heavy industry, such as coal • The railway network allowed the transportation of agricultural produce and consumer goods across the disparate Prussian lands, bringing increased availability, which in turn stimulated demand • The railway system expanded by 4,000 miles during this period, bringing a reduction in transport costs, which, in turn, brought down the cost of manufacturing and manufactured goods • Railway expansion was predominantly state funded, which created a strong relationship between the Prussian government and Prussian industry. Arguments and evidence that other economic developments in Prussia, in the years 1852-66, were more significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The continued expansion of the <i>Zollverein</i> among the German states at the expense of Austria provided a large internal free market. The <i>Zollverein</i> could negotiate trade agreements with foreign powers • The development of the banking industry provided a financial infrastructure for both private and state investment in economic ventures • Growth in industrialisation led to increased availability and consumption of goods; traditional heavy industries introduced new technologies and newer industries, e.g. chemicals, food processing were developed • Increased state intervention in the economy as a whole encouraged economic growth, e.g. direct investment, beneficial tax incentives, agricultural reform. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the political situation in Germany in 1851 was very similar to the political situation in Germany in 1840. Arguments and evidence that the political situation in Germany in 1851 was similar to the political situation in Germany in 1840 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In both 1840 and 1851, the German states were mainly ruled by hereditary rulers from the same ancestral line or were governed by the same ruling group • In both 1840 and 1851, Austria was the dominant German political power with German rulers deferring to the Austrian Emperor. Austria had made its position clear in the humiliation of Prussia at Olmütz in 1850 • In both 1840 and 1851, the German states were only united politically through membership of the German Confederation • In both 1840 and 1851, there was a belief amongst some, mainly the educated classes, in Germany that a unified German nation was a desirable ambition • The political representation that did exist in 1840 and 1851 remained in the hands of a small elite, mainly from higher social classes, who were unwilling to share power and were politically conservative. Arguments and evidence that the political situation in Germany in 1851 was different to the political situation in Germany in 1840 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As a result of the upheavals and demands from political revolutionaries in the 1848-49 revolutions, in 1851 many of the German rulers governed through some form of constitution, even if it was very conservative • Austrian dominance was not as certain in 1851 as it had been in 1840; the events of 1848-49 has shaken Austrian confidence and the events at Erfurt in 1850 were an indication of Prussian ambition • As a result of the 1848-49 revolutions, the German Confederation had had to be reconstituted and was a different re-iteration of the Confederation than in 1840 • In 1840, Metternich was the linchpin of Austrian and conservative control over Germany but in 1851 he was no longer in power, having been ousted during the 1848-49 revolutions • When he came to power in 1840, Frederick William IV had suggested that he might consider future political reform, but in 1851, having been profoundly impacted by the events of 1848-49 and forced to accept some elements of constitutionalism, he was determined to lose no more power • In 1840, most nationalists and liberals looked to constitutionalism and popular representation as the main way to achieve their aims. In 1851, the crushing failure of 1848-49 meant that many looked to different ways, in particular many nationalists began to look to Prussia to unify Germany. Other relevant material must be credited.

5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. - The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate Cavour's response to Garibaldi's expedition to the south in 1860. Source 1 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The letters were written by Cavour and so give a clear indication of Cavour's thoughts on the 1860 expedition • The letters were written at the time the events under investigation were happening • As a close friend of Cavour, Cavour could be frank about the situation with Nigra but, as a representative of Cavour in France, Cavour was also indicating his public response to events. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about Cavour's response to Garibaldi's expedition to the south in 1860: • It claims that Cavour is working tirelessly to prevent Garibaldi's expedition being successful ('doing everything possible', 'everything in my power', 'Yesterday, I gave...orders to stop Garibaldi's ships') • It claims that Cavour is not actually working with Garibaldi to capture the south ('We are not conspiring with Garibaldi') • It suggests that Cavour may have lost control of events ('disappointed... taken place', 'in no condition to deal with', 'My only hope') and indicates that he is fearful for the future ('save us from revolution') • It suggests that Cavour is willing to be ruthless in his response ('the King must not receive the crown', 'take over the government', 'snatch out of Garibaldi's hands'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • In 1860, Garibaldi, heartbroken by events at Villafranca and the loss of his birthplace, Nice, to France, was determined to find a cause that would reinvigorate Italian unity. The Sicilian uprising occurred in April 1860 • Cavour had to be mindful of both ongoing events in the north, including the Piedmontese elections and the role of the French, and the generally positive relationship between Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel • There were suggestions in Italy and Europe that Cavour was publicly indignant over events, while working secretly with Garibaldi to further Victor Emmanuel's leadership of a united Italy • Cavour was particularly worried about the potential for Garibaldi to invade the mainland; although Garibaldi proclaimed unity under Victor Emmanuel, many of his followers were republicans.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 2 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The author was a political opponent of Cavour and, from the tone of the language, clearly a supporter of Garibaldi • The pamphlet was written purposefully to put a negative light on the actions of Cavour, but the fact that it was banned might also suggest that there is some truth in what was being written. • The pamphlet was published at the time of the events and the commentary was clearly written while the invasion of Sicily was ongoing. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about Cavour's response to Garibaldi's expedition to the south in 1860: • It uses language that suggests Cavour's response to the expedition was vindictive and emotive ('spoke brutally', 'strenuously opposed', 'passionately desired...failure', 'diminishing...brilliance', 'plotting...stirs') • It claims that Cavour had taken practical measures to prevent the expedition reaching Sicily ('Cavour had Garibaldi's heroic group pursued by Piedmontese naval ships...representatives...to prevent the invasion.') • It indicates that Cavour is actively trying to prevent Garibaldi taking Naples ('raises a fresh obstacle', 'plotting with... the Bourbon government') • It suggests that Cavour is striving to prevent Garibaldi's success for his own motives ('to make Italy as he wants it to be.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Cavour was privately convinced that the expedition could not succeed – he refused to provide arms for the expedition and made plans with the navy to try to intercept the 'Thousand' before they reached Sicily • Cavour sent Farini as a representative to both Sicily and Naples in an attempt to hinder Garibaldi's actions • Cavour used a variety of methods to prevent Garibaldi from reaching Naples, including a letter from Victor Emmanuel commanding Garibaldi to desist, a blockade of ships from Sicily and plotting a coup d'état in Naples • Cavour's vision of the pace and nature of Italian unification differed greatly from Garibaldi's; in 1860, Garibaldi was determined ultimately to complete unification by taking Rome, which was Cavour's greatest fear. Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both Sources were written at about the same time, but Source 1 gives a personal account of Cavour's response to events and Source 2 provides an opponent's view • Both agree that Cavour used the navy in attempting to prevent Garibaldi reaching Sicily, and that Cavour was determined to prevent Garibaldi reaching Naples • Source 1 implies that Cavour was selflessly working for Italy and Victor Emmanuel, while Source 2 implies that his response was selfishly for his own political ends • Both Sources suggest that Cavour needed to take into consideration the French reaction to events.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate reasons for the success of German counter-revolutions in the years 1848–49. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The fact that a letter so critical of the revolution in Berlin was published in a newspaper supportive of the events of the revolution suggests that there may be some truth in what is being claimed • The purpose of the letter is clearly to outline grievances while the revolutions are still ongoing, and so give an indication of immediate challenges to the revolutions • The letter claims to come from a specific group of peasants in West Prussia and so may only be indicative of problems with and/or facing the revolutionaries in one specific revolution – that in Prussia. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about reasons for the success of German counter-revolutions in the years 1848–49: • It claims that the revolutionaries are corrupt ('villains...plundered the...treasury.') and that Berlin is under physical threat from regional peasants ('24 May...attacked in a hundred places at once.') • It implies that the peasants of West Prussia felt exploited by the revolutionaries ('not going to feed you any more') and suggests that the Prussian King might be able to harness their anger ('will come to his help') • The use of language implies peasant contempt for the revolutionaries ('your stinking city', 'You are always talking big', 'Your city of robbers' caves') • It suggests that not all ordinary people were welcoming or supportive of the revolutionary movements sweeping Germany at the time ('we peasants will make you regret following...those tricksters in France.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • The revolutionary movements were essentially urban phenomena that failed to address the concerns of the largely rural populations of the German states, creating resentment and discontent • The German peasantry were renowned for their conservatism and were broadly supportive of the monarchical rulers of the German states • Peasant violence was a feature of the destabilisation and overthrow of the German revolutions, e.g. in Prussia, in the declining fortunes of the Frankfurt Assembly • The situation in West Prussia was very specific and complex. German nationalism in conflict with Polish nationalism led to violent confrontations that the peasantry blamed on the new government in Berlin.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The purpose of the message was to give a formal account of counter-revolutionary events from the point of view of those who carried out the events to their superiors in the Austrian government • The message was sent very soon after the counter-revolutionary events occurred while still fresh in the mind • The tone of the message suggests that Major Huyn was unsympathetic to liberal revolution. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about reasons for the success of German counter-revolutions in the years 1848–49: • It implies that the base of the elected Parliament was easily taken control of by the Austrian army ('march into the castle.', 'based in the barracks. They were strong enough in number to secure the gates of the town') • It indicates that the Austrian government had a well organised plan to shut down the elected Parliament and resume full power in Austria ('agreed command', 'only one way in', 'new constitutional manifesto') • It suggests that the revolutionaries and elected members of Parliament were easily subdued ('all accepted the situation.') and even divided ('A few Members were pleased, others bitterly angry') • It claims that the deployment of military strength was sufficient to bring down a revolutionary assembly ('Power has made its impression.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • At the onset of revolution, most of the German rulers removed themselves from the turmoil of revolutionary activity or compromised, so giving themselves the time and opportunity to plan a counter-revolution • Most of the revolutionary governments had no military organisation to protect their position, and the national Frankfurt Assembly had to rely on the Prussian army when dealing with external problems • The German counter-revolutions were successful because of the use of military force, often from Austria or Prussia, including the final dissolution of the Frankfurt Assembly • Disagreements, and often incompetent leadership, meant that the new revolutionary governments were often riven with internal division and soon folded when faced with military forces. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both Sources are written from the viewpoint of opponents of the revolutionaries • Source 3 reflects counter-revolutionary views from those 'below', while Source 4 reflects the counter-revolutionary views of those from 'above' • Both Sources were written during the ongoing events of the revolutions • Both Sources provide a sense that the revolutionaries were ineffectual in power.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1830–58, Italian liberals and nationalists had as much success as they had failure. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1830–58, Italian liberals and nationalists had much success should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In 1830–31, Italian revolutionaries were able to stage revolutions in several states, which required the intervention of Austrian forces to put down • In the 1830s and 1840s, nationalist ideas underpinned the cultural developments of the <i>Risorgimento</i> and inspired new-found belief in the concept of a united Italy • In the 1840s, the growth of liberalism persuaded the rulers of several Italian states to contemplate constitutional and political reforms, e.g. Pope Pius IX in the Papal States, Charles Albert in Piedmont • Revolutions spread across the whole of the Italian peninsula in 1848–49 and were initially very successful, particularly with the establishment of the Mazzinian republic in Rome and the Venetian republic under Manin • In 1848–49, Piedmont became the state most likely to lead Italy to unity, with Charles Albert's agreement to the <i>Statuto</i> and his declaration of the First War of Independence from Austria • Post-1849, many Italian nationalists came to accept Piedmont as the likely leader of a united Italy. In 1857, the National Society was formed and began to establish a relationship with Cavour, particularly in 1858. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1830–58, Italian liberals and nationalists had more failure than success should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The 1830–31 revolutions were limited in extent, were undermined by a lack of co-operation between states and were easily put down by force by the Austrian army • In the 1830s and 1840s, nationalists and liberals struggled to make ground in the face of a lack of popular support and severe repression. Radical groups were not helped by the secret nature of their organisations • The 1848–49 revolutions were ultimately a failure, with all the previous rulers or dynasties returning to power, often aided by Austrian military might • The hope invested in Pope Pius IX by the liberals and Giobertian nationalists in 1846 was short-lived, as he became reactionary in his response to the Roman Republic and denounced the War of Independence • Italian popular liberalism was particularly affected by the failures of 1848–49. The constitutions that emerged in some states, including the <i>Statuto</i>, were limited and 'liberalism' became the politics of the elites • Mazzinian nationalism was all but destroyed by his failures in leadership and the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions to unite Italy. By 1858, many of his followers looked to Victor Emmanuel, including Garibaldi. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1861–70, internal factors were a greater obstacle to the consolidation of the Kingdom of Italy than were external factors. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1861–70, internal factors were a greater obstacle to the consolidation of the Kingdom of Italy than were external factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The domestic policy of 'Piedmontisation' caused resentment in those regions that had been brought under control by annexation or through 'plebiscites'; government was often perceived as elitist and corrupt • In the south, resentment of Piedmont developed into the 'Brigands' War'; a brutal civil war encouraged by the Bourbon government-in-exile in Rome, which brought disruption internally and disapproval internationally • The unwillingness of the Pope to give up his temporal power over Rome, and his forthright criticism of Victor Emmanuel and the new Kingdom, weakened the legitimacy of the new state in the eyes of many Italians • The relative underdevelopment and financial situation in the south, relative to the north, meant that the new Kingdom faced difficult economic circumstances • The regionalism of Italy and a culture of parochialism meant that it would take some time for the new Kingdom to create a clear Italian identity • External factors aided the consolidation of the Kingdom; Britain was a supporter of Italian unity under a constitutional monarchy and Prussia was crucial in uniting Venetia (1866) and Rome (1870) under Italy. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1861–70, external factors were a greater obstacle to the consolidation of the Kingdom of Italy than were internal factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Austria remained in control of Venetia until 1866. Austria, therefore, had to be considered in the foreign policy decisions of the new Italy • A French garrison remained stationed in Rome 'protecting' the Pope until 1870; such a physical presence on 'Italian soil' meant that Italian foreign policy and, even domestic policy, had to consider the French response • The existence of '<i>irredenta</i>' territories, such as Venetia and Nice, meant that Victor Emmanuel was under constant pressure to bring them 'into' the new Kingdom, particularly from Garibaldi • The 'occupation' of Rome by the French was seen by many as depriving the Kingdom of its true capital, so undermining the legitimacy of Victor Emmanuel and weakening the new state • Internally, the north was essentially stable throughout the period and Italy established itself as a nation-state with a constitutional monarchy, representative government and legal and administrative structures. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether economic factors were more significant than political factors in explaining the declining power of Austria in Germany in the years 1852–66. Arguments and evidence that economic factors were more significant than political factors in explaining the declining power of Austria in Germany in the years 1852–66 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The financial cost of overcoming the 1848 revolutions put Austria in severe debt, so weakening its ability to develop a strong economy to underpin the restoration of its political power • In trade, both the rejection by other German states of Austrian attempts to create a Customs Union and Austrian exclusion from the <i>Zollverein</i> were fundamental factors in Austria's declining power • The Austrian Emperor had little interest in economic matters or investing in the economic infrastructure of Austria, so hampering Austrian economic development • Prussian consolidation and growth of its economic power created a rival power base for influence over Germany. The Prussian economy flourished and developed in stark contrast to that of Austria • It was Prussian investment in the arms industry and railways that was the decisive factor in Austrian defeat in the Seven Weeks' War; rapid mobilisation and superior arms overcame greater troop numbers • Until defeat in the Seven Weeks' War, Austria, as head of the German Confederation, remained the preeminent political power in Germany. Most German states sided with Austria at the outbreak of war in 1866. Arguments and evidence that political factors were more significant than economic factors in explaining the declining power of Austria in Germany in the years 1852–66 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Austrian leaders were not as influential as they had been in the past. The death of Prince Schwarzenberg in 1852 saw a consolidation of absolutist rule and reactionary government under Emperor Franz Joseph • Austrian attempts to create <i>Mittel-Europa</i> - a <i>Grossdeutschland</i> solution to the German question encompassing all of Germany and the Habsburg territories – failed, having been met with suspicion by the German states • After the appointment of Bismarck as Minister-President of Prussia in 1862, Prussia began to challenge the political power of Austria, particularly over Austrian plans to reform the German Confederation • Austria's international 'great power' status was being challenged by its diplomatic and military failures, e.g. the Crimean War, the 1859 war with Italy, at a time when Prussian international status was growing • The Austrian economy was not in terminal decline and saw healthy growth during the period, and Prussia was not in total economic control of the German states, e.g. French trade treaty negotiations, 1863. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that there was little challenge to Austrian leadership of the German states in the years 1849-65. Arguments and evidence that there was little challenge to Austrian leadership of the German states in the years 1849-65 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The punctation of Olmütz (November 1850) saw Austria establish itself as the post-1848-49 political leader of the German States, with Prussian agreement and the reconstitution of the German Confederation • Austria remained both the symbolic and direct 'head' of the German Confederation throughout the period, taking the lead in political developments, e.g. the reforms of the Confederation, 1863 • The strength of the Austrian military provided the basic underpinning for the security of the German states, e.g. Prussia preferred to act against Denmark in 1864 with the support of the Austrian army • The Austrian Emperor represented the German states, as the leader of the German Confederation, in international matters and was accepted as the international spokesman for 'German' affairs. Arguments and evidence that Austrian leadership of the German states was challenged in the years 1849-65 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • For much of 1849-50, Prussia was in a good position to challenge Austria, with the establishment of the Erfurt Union (June 1849) and in an agreement for joint leadership from September 1849-May 1850 • Prussia established itself as the economic leader of Germany with its enhancement of the <i>Zollverein</i>, both internally and internationally. Austria was humiliated by the rejection of its <i>Mitteleuropa</i> plan • Austria did not always receive the support of the German rulers in Confederation business and, in 1863, received direct challenges from both Prussia and Saxony during attempts to reform the Confederation • Prussian involvement in international affairs challenged Austrian pre-eminence, e.g. Crimean War, Italy in 1859, relations with Russia and the Gastein Convention (1865). Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the significance of Prussian economic development in the 1850s. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The report was written from the perspective of a non-Prussian participant member state of the <i>Zollverein</i> with first-hand experience of its impact • The report was written in 1851 to give a snapshot overview of the direct impact of the Prussian <i>Zollverein</i> but also provides evidence of the impact of general economic developments • The report was intended to persuade the government of Württemberg to maintain the <i>Zollverein</i> and so might exaggerate its benefits. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the significance of Prussian economic development in the 1850s: • It indicates that, through the <i>Zollverein</i>, Prussia is able to control the vast majority of trade across Germany ('free trade route. But...without signing...interference'; 'significant trading... the south...and Prussia.') • It implies that the Prussian economy drove the economy of Germany as a whole ('attempt to break it up...damaging capital losses', 'without a market...paper manufacturing industry...collapse.', 'export markets.') • It suggests that Prussian domination of trade and industry will give it political as well as economic power in Germany ('It is easy to co-operate with Prussia because, unlike Austria'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • The <i>Zollverein</i> agreement was due to be renewed in 1853. Austria mooted its own <i>Mitteleuropa</i> version at the same time but this was rejected. The <i>Zollverein</i> was renewed and expanded • The <i>Zollverein</i> provided the basis by which Prussia was able to maintain a balance of power with Austria in Germany and to create the foundations to challenge Austria for its leadership • Prussia's geographic extent, access to natural and built communication routes and primary resources enabled it to become the pre-eminent industrial power in Germany. Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The article was published in a British newspaper, and so provides an outsider's perception of economic developments in Prussia • The article was published in April 1853 and so is able to provide up-to-date information regarding the impact of the building of the railway network in Prussia

Question	Indicative content
	- The article provides credible first-hand observations about a range of economic developments connected to railway building in Prussia, despite its slightly questioning tone. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the significance of Prussian economic development in the 1850s: - It indicates that the Prussian state was both actively exploiting the railways ('general prosperity...sufficient for them to be taxed.') and intervening in their development ('buy shares...reduce ticket prices') - It states that Prussia claims to be the leading railway building state in the world ('According to...value of its railways...length of railway lines...is greater than all other countries') - It indicates that the growth of the railway network is beneficial to Prussian commerce ('prospect of a night train...Commercial traders are looking forward to wool markets') - It suggests that railway building might be used by Prussia to enhance its political and military power ('railways come under state ownership', 'movement of troops by railway.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The Prussian government was involved in direct intervention in railway building and maintenance from the 1840s and, despite its conservatism, willing to establish the railways as an apparatus of the state - In the years 1850–60, the length of the Prussian network grew by c3000km, dividends paid out on average c5.5 per cent and the net domestic product quadrupled - The dispersed nature of the Prussian territories meant that Prussia effectively controlled railway lines stretching from east-west and north-south across Germany, so giving it a powerful presence - The Prussian military understood the benefits of railways for troop mobilisation from an early stage and the High Command built troop movements by rail into their war strategy from the 1850s. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - The Sources provide evidence about two of the key features of Prussian economic development in the 1850s; Source 3 considers the <i>Zollverein</i> while Source 4 considers railway building - Both Sources indicate the scale of the commercial and industrial growth of Prussia in the 1850s, and the extent of state intervention in the economy - Both Sources provide an outside perspective but both also have a vested interest in events in Prussia at the time - Both Sources provide evidence to suggest that Prussia benefitted politically from economic developments.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70



Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into Bismarck's attitude towards the use of war in achieving foreign policy aims. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It suggests that Bismarck was willing to go to war to further the interests of foreign policy ('show me an objective worth a war and I will go along with you') - It indicates that he did not believe that popular support for war alone was enough reason to go to war ('It is easy enough for a statesman to ride the popular wave') - It provides evidence that Bismarck believed that a declaration of war required a justifiable reason ('fails to find a cause for war which will stand up to scrutiny'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - Bismarck made the speech in 1850 indicating that he had long-held beliefs on the role of war in the achievement of foreign policy aims - Bismarck's speech was a matter of parliamentary record and was, therefore, a public declaration of his beliefs - The purpose of the speech was to outline the conditions under which Bismarck believed politicians would be right to make the decision to prosecute a war. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - The wars of German unification against Denmark, Austria and France were fought to further Prussian foreign policy interests - Bismarck used a breach of the Gastein Convention to justify the breakdown in relations with Austria and intervention in Holstein (1865-6). - Despite encouraging widespread popular Prussian nationalism and anti-French rhetoric in the late 1860s, Bismarck used the Ems Telegram to justify the war with France 1870-71.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1848-30

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the development of the <i>Zollverein</i> in the 1850s. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The report is written from the perspective of an influential southern German state – it provides a non-Prussian view of the benefits of the <i>Zollverein</i> - It is an official report written from one government department to another – suggesting that the information could be based on the impartial use of evidence - The Central Office for Industry and Trade is attempting to persuade the Finance Ministry that maintaining links with the <i>Zollverein</i> would be the preferred choice – it may highlight the advantages of the <i>Zollverein</i>. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It suggests that the Prussian control of the Rhine necessitated membership of the <i>Zollverein</i> for southern states ('loss of the tariff links...would cause the most damaging disturbance of trade') - It provides evidence of the extent to which the <i>Zollverein</i> had already created economic interrelationships which would be difficult to break ('interests of the businessmen have interlocked with each other') - It suggests that individual states have a greater impact on the decisions of the <i>Zollverein</i> than an Austrian Customs Union ('guarantee them a stronger influence'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - Württemberg and other German states renewed their previous <i>Zollverein</i> agreements in the 1850s and new states joined - The economic strength of the <i>Zollverein</i> states grew in relation to Austria, which failed to establish an effective customs union - Prussia dominated the commercial politics of the <i>Zollverein</i>.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830-70**

Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the significance of Prussia's victory over Austria in Seven Weeks' War. 1. The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: • It provides evidence to suggest that Prussia was now the dominant political force in Germany ('closer Union of the states located north...established by the King of Prussia', 'rights over the Duchies') • It indicates through the language used the scale of the victory over Austria ('consents', 'promises to recognise', 'transfers', 'undertakes') • It indicates that any future unification would reflect a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution ('without the Austrian Empire'). 2. The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: • It is an official document agreed between Austria and Prussia • The terms of the Preliminary Treaty were unlikely to change significantly in the final version of the Treaty • The purpose of the Treaty was to bring an end to hostilities and so reflects the position of the two sides on 26 July 1866. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: • The scale of the Prussian victory at the Battle of Sadowa, 3 July 1866, so soon after the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian war, forced the Austrians to agree to peace negotiations • Following Austria's defeat, a North German Confederation under Prussia was organised, a military agreement with the southern states was established and Prussia annexed some German states • Bismarck hoped that leaving the majority of the Austrian Empire intact would prevent the need for Austria to gain revenge in the future and allow Prussia to pursue a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution to German unification.

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the significance of the Hohenzollern candidature for Prussia's relations with France. 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: • Bismarck was the Foreign Minister of Prussia and so was in a position to reflect with some authority on the impact of the candidature on relations with France • The letter was intended to put on record a conversation held earlier with King William I and appears candidly to reflect his opinion of the candidature • The tone of the letter suggests that Bismarck may have been exaggerating the impact of the acceptance of the candidature in order to persuade the king to agree. 2. The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: • It provides evidence that the acceptance of the Hohenzollern candidature would have a direct impact on relations with France ('it is desirable to have, located on the other side of France,') • It claims that the acceptance of the Hohenzollern candidature would strengthen Prussia's position in relation to France ('position of strength...political interests that the Prince should accept') • It suggests that Bismarck may have hoped to use the Hohenzollern candidature to manipulate future relations with France ('serve...interests', 'conflicting interests...neighbours'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: • The geographical position of Spain meant the acceptance of the Hohenzollern candidature would place Prussian interests on two borders with France, so potentially changing the dynamics of their relations • Having initially declined the throne, a move welcomed by King William I, Prince Leopold was then encouraged to change his position by Bismarck who hoped to use the situation to, at least, unsettle the French • Bismarck used the acceptance of the Spanish throne to manipulate the events leading to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, in particular, the situation regarding the Ems Telegram.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c 1830–70



Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into Prussia's relationship with the other German states after the defeat of Austria in 1866. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It implies that Prussia intends to take complete political control of northern Germany ('the relationship...should be made as tight as possible', 'unconditional control over our own military forces and... other states') - It claims that South Germany should be treated more favourably than North Germany ('favourable, light') but suggests that it expects South Germany to act in Prussia's interest ('need only a clear assurance') - It suggests that Prussia has some concerns about the future actions of the South German states ('never be tempted by foreign Powers or into a hostility....') - It indicates that Prussia hopes that pre-existing organisational structures will be utilised across Germany to strengthen the economy ('economic interests... assured through common institutions already in existence.'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The source was written by Bismarck who was the driving force in Prussian policy at the time - The source was written in January 1867 and so gives immediate insight into the development of Prussia's relations with other German states in the context of the defeat of Austria in 1866 - The dispatch was written to the Prussian representative in Bavaria, one of the four major South German states, and so is likely to give a candid outline of Prussia's intentions in regard to the policies to be pursued. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - The annexations and federalisation of the north, in the wake of the Seven Weeks' War, meant that many in the north were openly wary of Prussian intentions and Prussia was determined to consolidate its strength there - As far as King William and Bismarck were concerned, the North German Confederation was a Prussian entity and Bismarck ensured that it was run as such - In 1867, there was the potential for south German states to ally with Austria, or even France, in any dispute with Prussia - South Germany benefited economically from the Prussian-led <i>Zollverein</i>, and, in 1867, they agreed to continue membership of, and were represented formally in, the newly-created <i>Zollparlament</i>.

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the responsibility for the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: • The lecture was given by an expert in international and European matters from outside of either France or Prussia, so Sumner could probably be expected to comment from an initially objective position • The source was delivered in a public forum, and the date possibly suggests that the lecture was intended to inform a public audience about the ongoing events in a foreign country in a time of limited mass media • The critical tone and language used by Sumner against France ('monstrous <i>blunder-crime</i>') suggests a one-sided view of events. 2. The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: • It initially indicates that the peace between the two countries may have been shattered by uncontrollable events ('suddenly and unexpectedly, circumstances changed ...forces of new technology...telegram') • It claims that French actions were gratuitous and unjust ('what right did France', 'France was plainly acting unjustifiably', 'it was none of its business') • It implies that French arrogance was wholly responsible for the outbreak of the war ('selected its own grounds for war.') with Prussia playing virtually no part at all ('Bismarck...country home...King enjoying...Ems.') • It indicates that France blamed the outbreak of war on Prussia ('the affair of the Ems telegram'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: • Relations between France and Prussia had steadily been breaking down since 1866, as each felt that the other threatened its security and each desired to be the dominant influence in Europe • The French felt that the Hohenzollern Candidature was a direct threat to the security of France. Prussian royalty on the throne of Spain would mean Prussian influence on the French border to the south and the east • France had been preparing militarily for a potential future war with Prussia. The French leaders felt that the wording of the Ems Telegram could be used to kick-start a war popular with the French masses • In October 1870, it was not yet clear the extent to which Bismarck had manipulated the wording and use of the Ems Telegram to incite France.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether military strength was responsible for the Prussian success in unifying Germany in the years 1862-71. Arguments and evidence that military strength was responsible for the Prussian success in unifying Germany in the years 1862-71 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Prussian military reforms in the early 1860s strengthened the Prussian army • Unification was the result of a series of short victorious and decisive wars against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870-71) • The military planning of the Prussia General Staff allowed for the swift mobilisation of Prussian forces e.g. the use of railways in the Austro-Prussian War • The use of modern military technology and weaponry e.g. the breech-loading needle gun and Krupp artillery were decisive against the Austrians and the French. Arguments and evidence that military strength was not responsible for the Prussian success in unifying Germany in the years 1862-71 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Military mistakes by both Austria and France contributed to Prussian success at the battles of Sadowa (1866) and Sedan (1870) • Bismarck's diplomacy and use of realpolitik was more instrumental in advancing the cause of Prussia e.g. The Treaty of Prague (1866) • Prussian success was underwritten by its economic strength and leadership of the Zollverein • Prussian success was due more to the favourable international situation at the time e.g. Britain's underestimation of Prussian strength and policy of isolationism. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider the importance of Prussia in the <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution to German unification. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The writer is a participant in the discussion and, as heir to the Prussian crown, has a vested interest in the outcome of the debate • It is unclear whether the diary was intended for publication or was a private record of events; if private it provides evidence of the perceived importance of Prussia from both its own rulers and from other states • The tone suggests that the Crown Prince is writing a generally dispassionate account. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the importance of Prussia in the <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution to German unification: • It suggests that Bavaria did not want the new German unified state to be seen as a Prussian Empire ('Bavarian representatives had not wished to permit the title of 'Emperor of Germany') • It indicates that Bismarck understood that Prussia could not claim outright to be the dominant force in Germany ('He showed that the expression...signified... power that we did not in any way possess') • It provides evidence that the Prussian king, and to some extent the Crown Prince, was dissatisfied with the role which Prussia would have to accept ('...displeased the King...'; 'So, alas, we had to submit'; '...only a shadow empire...') • It indicates that the King was determined that Prussia would maintain control over the army ('...he would not hear of an 'Imperial Army'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Bavaria had been instrumental in suggesting that Prussia lead the newly proposed unified German state but was determined that the role of the southern states in the ongoing Franco-Prussia war would be acknowledged • Bismarck, with the support of William, from 1862 had been working towards a Prussian-dominated <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution • It was the Prussian king who proclaimed the new 'German Empire' but it did not appear to bring Prussia the prestige associated with previous rulers of a 'united' Germany, e.g. Barbarossa or the Holy Roman Emperor • A single 'Imperial Army' was not created with the Prussian army becoming the dominant force and owing allegiance to the Emperor, as King of Prussia, not the Empire, in time of war; an Imperial Navy was established.

Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 2. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The Constitution was the official ratification document of the newly formed German Empire • It was produced by the ministers of the twenty-five founding states of the German Empire (a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution) and outlines the agreements made through negotiation • The Constitution outlined the political structure, along with the rules and regulations, by which an agreed <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution would be governed. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the importance of Prussia in the <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution to German unification: • It indicates that the German Empire was perceived as a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution rather than a Prussian expansion by its reference to the North German Confederation and the 4 major southern German states • It provides evidence that the Prussian ruler held a great deal of power despite his nomenclature (...the head of the federation shall be the King of Prussia...represent the Empire in international affairs...) • It provides evidences that Prussia was the dominant state ('Prussia, 17 votes') • It indicates that Prussia had to work within the confines of the federal organisation ('imperial laws take precedence over state laws') • It hints that Prussia might be able to use the Constitution to further its own interest ('with the exception of a response to an attack'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • The negotiations for the creation of the German Empire were dominated by Prussia and the southern German states; by 1871 the North German Confederation had in reality become subservient to Prussia • In reality as German Emperor the Prussian king was head of the imperial government, the civil service and the armed forces and behaved as an Emperor of Germany • Prussia covered two-thirds of the federation territory and made up 60% of the population; Prussia and the Empire shared government ministers including Bismarck as Prussian Foreign Minister and Imperial Chancellor • In the years 1862-1871, Bismarck had been able to use the aggression of other countries to engage in a defensive war to further Prussian expansion e.g. Franco-Prussian War 1870-71.

Question	Indicative content
	Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • At the time of Source 3 the Franco-Prussian War was still being fought out, so Prussia was still reliant on the southern states, by the time the constitution was finally agreed a peace treaty was being negotiated • Neither source makes any mention of Austria as a potential member, indicating that by 1871 Germany would be united under a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution with Prussia as the most important state • Source 4 is the official articulation of the debates being referred to in Source 3; it is clear that Prussia was forced to accept the concept of a German Empire but that William gained more power than he expected.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830-70**



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of Bismarck's contribution to the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866. Arguments and evidence that suggest Bismarck contributed significantly to the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bismarck's contribution was as the engineer of a master-plan going back to 1862 by which Austria was drawn into war with Prussia e.g. use of the Polish Revolt (1863-4), war with Denmark (1864) and Gastein (1865) • Bismarck used his political skills to take advantage of the opportunities afforded him, in the years 1862-66, both to build Prussian strength and fundamentally undermine Austria • Bismarck used diplomacy to isolate Austria from potential allies in a war against Prussia e.g. the Biarritz meeting with Napoleon III (October 1865) • Bismarck determinedly laid the groundwork for war in 1865-66 by provoking Austria into aggressive actions, thus allowing Prussia to enter the Austro-Prussian war as the offended nation • It was Bismarck's insistence on moderate peace terms with Austria that brought the Seven Weeks' War to a swift end, and led to the complete withdrawal of Austria from German political affairs in the Treaty of Prague. Arguments and evidence that counter/limit the significance of Bismarck's contribution to the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Prussian victory over Austria was the result of long-term underlying economic and political factors of which Bismarck merely took advantage e.g. Austrian relative decline going back to 1848-49 • Bismarck was unsuccessful in either persuading or pressurising many of the north German states to side with Prussia against Austria, so widening the initial conflict and providing Austria with allies • Austria's diplomatic isolation was as the result of a favourable international situation e.g. Britain's non-interventionist policy • It was the quality of the leadership, planning and armaments of the Prussian army that secured such a swift and decisive victory over the Austrians. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the significance of the Ems Telegram in the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. Arguments and evidence that the Ems Telegram was significant in the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Ems Telegram was the key trigger event in the outbreak of war; war broke out five days after the release of the amended telegram • Bismarck purposefully used the telegram to create tension/deliberately provoke war between France and Prussia; it brought to a head rivalry which had emerged after the Prussian defeat of Austria in 1866 • The publication of Bismarck's amendments to the original version led to a popular clamour for war in both Prussia and France, so creating an unstoppable momentum towards war • The French declaration of war on Prussia, as a direct response to the publication of the Ems Telegram, brought the southern German states into the war on the side of Prussia. Arguments and evidence that the Ems Telegram was not significant/had limited significance in the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Ems Telegram was not the fundamental cause of the outbreak of the war; there were more fundamental causes, e.g. the European balance of power, Prussian aggrandisement • The underlying cause was the long-term enmity between Prussia and France stretching back long before 1866 • Bismarck's use of the Ems Telegram was merely opportunistic; he could/would have used any favourable situation to increase tension at the time • It was the French who chose to be offended and Napoleon III's responsibility for the declaration of war. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the process of German unification, in the years 1862–71, resulted in the creation of an enlarged Prussia rather than a unified Germany. Arguments and evidence that the process of German unification, in the years 1862–71, resulted in the creation of an enlarged Prussia should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The process of unification was achieved through a series of Prussian military victories, particularly against Austria (1866) and France (1870–71) • Bismarckian diplomacy carried out in the years 1862–71 was carried out in the name of Prussia rather than Germany • The North German Confederation was essentially created through the forced annexation of the northern states during the Austro-Prussian War • In 1871, the new German state was a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution to German unification which excluded the large German-speaking state of Austria • The army remained essentially the Prussian Army organised by the Prussian General Staff • The new German state was dominated in all aspects of its governance and administration by Prussia; the German Emperor was always to be the King of Prussia. Arguments and evidence that the process of German unification, in the years 1862–71, resulted in the creation of a unified Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The majority of the German-speaking, and German identifying states, made up the new German Empire in 1871 • At each stage of the process, there was a 'legal' union of German-speaking states with the federation increasing in size • Bismarck promoted the forces of German nationalism during the process, e.g. war with Denmark (1864), political compromise post-1866, war with France (1870) • The new German state had a common language and German nationalists emphasised common historical and cultural markers, e.g. Frederick Barbarossa, folk tales • The new German Empire was organised as a federal structure with a German Emperor, in which each individual state had significant rights; it was not intended to be an extension of Prussia. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1862–71, Bismarck was the master-planner of German unification. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1862–71, Bismarck was the master-planner of German unification should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bismarck's 'iron and blood' speech (September 1862) suggested that Bismarck had a 'design' for fulfilling greater German unity through Prussian influence • Bismarck is believed to have told Disraeli (1862) that it was his intention to go to war with Austria, end the German Confederation and create a <i>Kleinsdeutschland</i> solution • 'Bismarckian diplomacy' created foreign relationships advantageous to Prussia, e.g. Russian neutrality (1863–66), French goodwill (1865), Austrian (1866) and French isolation (1870) • Bismarck engineered three major wars in order to achieve Prussian dominance in Germany – war with Denmark (1864), war with Austria (1866), war with France (1870). Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1862–71, Bismarck was not the master-planner of German unification, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bismarck was an opportunist taking advantage of situations as they arose, e.g. Polish Revolt (1863), rapidity of the Austrian defeat (1866), vacancy for the Spanish throne (1868) • Bismarck was merely taking advantage of underlying factors that made Prussian dominance over Germany inevitable in the long-term, e.g. Prussian economic growth, the <i>Zollverein</i>, the decline of Austria • Unification came about because of Prussian victories on the battlefield engineered by von Moltke and von Roon; the military viewed Bismarck's interference as a liability in the final stages of the war with France (1870) • Bismarck was fortunate to be operating in a favourable international situation in which major powers, such as Britain and Russia, did not consider Prussia a threat to the European balance of power • In 1870 it was French diplomatic blunderings on the part of the Empress Eugenie and Gramont which provoked the crisis that led to the Franco-Prussian war. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the main reason Prussia was able to defeat Austria in the Seven Weeks' War (1866) was Prussian military strength. Arguments and evidence that the main reason Prussia was able to defeat Austria in the Seven Weeks' War (1866) was Prussian military strength should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The staff and organisational reforms of von Moltke and von Roon had created a more effective, modernised and mobile army than that of Austria • The Prussian army used the Prussian railway network to mobilise troops and deploy troops effectively • The Prussians were equipped with modern breech-loading Dreyse needle guns • The Prussian general staff devised and implemented an effective strategy against the Austrians. Arguments and evidence that Prussia was able to defeat Austria in the Seven Weeks' War (1866) due to other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Austrian military deficiencies; Austria and its allies outnumbered Prussia and its allies but lost five times as many men • Bismarck's diplomatic preparations for war; France was neutralised by the Biarritz agreement (1865) and Italian support gained by a military alliance (1866) • The favourable broader international situation; Britain was unable and unwilling to intervene in a land war in Europe and Russia no longer viewed Austria as its natural ally • Prussian economic strength; it was the economic development of Prussia in the 1850s that provided the Prussian military with the means to carry out the victory. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant the role of Napoleon III was in the breakdown of relations between Prussia and France in the years 1866-70. Arguments and evidence that the role of Napoleon III was significant in the breakdown of relations between Prussia and France in the years 1866-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Relations were soured by Napoleon III's resentment of Prussian gains in the aftermath of the Austro-Prussian war and the loss of French prestige • Napoleon III's attempt to purchase the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg from the King of Holland created hostility with Prussia and a German nationalist outcry • Napoleon III appointed a fiercely anti-Prussian politician, Gramont, as Foreign Minister in May 1870 • It was Napoleon III's decision to declare war on Prussia on 19 July 1870. Arguments and evidence that the role of Napoleon III in the breakdown of relations between Prussia and France in the years 1866-70 was limited/other factors were more significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • It was the Prussian army generals who provoked the Luxembourg Crisis • It was the Empress Eugenie and French government ministers rather than Napoleon III, who was unwell at the time, who engineered the controversy surrounding the Hohenzollern Candidature • It was Bismarck who manipulated the relationship with France in the years 1866-70 in order to provoke a conflict, which would lead to German unity; Bismarck purposefully amended the Ems Despatch • Popular feeling in both Prussia and France influenced the breakdown in relations; German nationalists condemned French expansionism and the French government reacted to populist negativity towards Prussia. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that it was the Prussian defeat of Austria in 1866 that was the decisive turning point in the process of German unification in the years 1862-71. Arguments and evidence that it was the Prussian defeat of Austria in 1866 that was the decisive turning point in the process of German unification in the years 1862-71 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The defeat of Austria and the terms of the peace meant that German unification would probably take the form of a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution • The emphatic victory over Austria ensured that Prussia was now the dominant economic and political state in Germany • The defeat of Austria allowed Prussia to annex Austria's north German allies and to bring the remaining independent north German states into a North German Confederation • Austrian defeat forced the four independent southern German states to consider and enter into a defensive military agreement with Prussia • The Austrian defeat strengthened Bismarck's hand domestically with the National Liberals and diplomatically in his dealings with France. Arguments and evidence that the Prussian defeat of Austria in 1866 that was not the decisive turning point in the process of German unification in the years 1862-71 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In 1866, non-Austrian Germany was still divided into a patchwork of political states, with independent rulers, made up of Prussia and the North German Confederation states and four southern German states • The rulers of the southern German states were still resolutely determined to remain independent • In 1866, Prussia was not yet in a position to threaten war directly with France; this was the situation most likely to lead to a union of all the German states in defence of Germany • It was the appointment of Bismarck in 1862 which was the decisive turning point, e.g. Bismarck's involvement in the three 'wars of unification' • It was only the declaration of war against France and its defeat in 1870-71 that guaranteed the final steps in the process of German unification. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how successful Bismarck was in overcoming Prussia's political problems in the years 1862–66. Arguments and evidence that Bismarck was successful in overcoming Prussia's political problems in the years 1862–66 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bismarck's appointment itself provided strong government that stabilised the constitutional crisis of 1860–62, and restored the reputation of, and support for, a king who had been on the brink of abdication in 1862 • Bismarck was able to implement reforms to the army by by-passing the Prussian parliament and financing the reforms through direct taxation • Bismarck successfully directed Prussian domestic politics without constitutionally approved budgets from 1862–66 • In 1866, Bismarck was able to compromise with the National Liberals over voting rights and the military budget in return for support for his proposals for a North German Confederation. Arguments and evidence that Bismarck was not successful in overcoming Prussia's political problems in the years 1862–66 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bismarck's initial policy in 1862 of some compromise with the liberal parliament in Prussia resulted in disapproval from William I • Bismarck was in open confrontation with parliament and the Prussian constitution from his appointment until the Prussian victory in the Seven Weeks' War, e.g. divisions over the Indemnity Bill (1866) • Prussia remained in a situation of political unease, with many of the ruling class believing that revolution was a possibility • The weaknesses of Bismarck's domestic policy were masked by the success of his foreign policy, e.g. improved relations with Russia, war with Denmark. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the main reason for Prussia's success in unifying Germany, in the years 1866–71, was the favourable international situation. Arguments and evidence that that the main reason for Prussia's success in unifying Germany, in the years 1866–71, was the favourable international situation should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In the years 1866–71, the major European powers were generally more concerned with the international situation in the Near East than with German nationalism or the dangers of Prussian expansionism • Napoleon III's foreign policy ambitions led to France's neutrality in the Seven Weeks' War being agreed at Biarritz in 1865 • In 1870 none of the other major powers were able, e.g. Austria, or willing, e.g. Britain, to intervene in the Franco-Prussian War • There were few obstacles presented by the European powers to the creation of the German Empire under Prussia, e.g. Austria had been excluded by the 1866 defeat, Britain was disinclined 'to meddle' and France humiliated. Arguments and evidence that that there were other reasons for Prussia's success in unifying Germany, in the years 1866–71, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • It was Bismarck's <i>realpolitik</i> that gained major advantages for Prussian ambitions, e.g. the manipulation of the Ems Telegram • Prussian success was based on the strength of its economic underpinning, e.g. Prussian industrialisation, the <i>Zollparlament</i> • Prussian success was based on its military strength, e.g. von Moltke's military planning and Krupps' provision of armaments contributed to victory in the Seven Weeks' War and the Franco-Prussian War • The increasing acceptance of Prussian dominance in Germany from both German nationalists, e.g. support from the National Liberals, and other German states, e.g. alliance with the southern states in 1870–71. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that France was more responsible than Prussia for the breakdown in relations between Prussia and France in the years 1866-70. Arguments and evidence that France was more responsible than Prussia for the breakdown in relations between Prussia and France in the years 1866-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The French popular reaction to Prussian gains, in the aftermath of the Austro- Prussian War, soured relations between the two nations, causing Napoleon III to look to reassert French prestige • Napoleon III's attempt to purchase the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg from the Kingdom of Holland created hostility with Prussia • Empress Eugénie and French government ministers were responsible for engineering the controversy surrounding the Hohenzollern candidature • Napoleon III's appointment of the fiercely anti-Prussian politician, Gramont, as Foreign Secretary in May 1870 increased tensions; Gramont gave Benedetti the instruction to approach William I at Ems in July 1870 • It was the decision of Napoleon III to declare war on Prussia on 19 July 1870. Arguments and evidence that Prussia was more responsible than France for the breakdown in relations between Prussia and France in the years 1866-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From 1866, Bismarck purposefully allowed the more positive relationship between Prussia and France, that had been negotiated in 1865 to ensure French neutrality in the Austro-Prussian War, to lapse • Bismarck looked to provoke France into a war that would lead to German unification; the need to defend Germany from France would see the Northern Confederation unite with the southern German states • It was the Prussian army generals' and Bismarck's manipulation of the press that provoked the Luxemburg Crisis • German nationalists created an atmosphere of hostility, particularly in the Rhineland border regions, which led to sustained antagonism with France • Bismarck deliberately amended the Ems Despatch to create the impression that the Kaiser had snubbed the French over the resolution of the Hohenzollern Candidature, and so triggered war in July 1870. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which Bismarck was responsible for shaping the process of German unification. Arguments and evidence that Bismarck was responsible for shaping the process of German unification should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bismarck furthered German unification by harnessing the influence of Prussia, e.g. 'blood and iron' speech on becoming Minister President • Bismarck engineered the three major wars – against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870) – that led to the unification of Germany • Bismarck's diplomacy created the international environment in which German unification could be achieved without foreign intervention, e.g. gaining French goodwill in 1865 but establishing French isolation in 1870 • Bismarck exploited many of the opportunities for the advancement of German unification which occurred in the period after 1861, e.g. vacancy for the Spanish throne (1868). Arguments and evidence that Bismarck was not responsible for shaping the process of German unification should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • A lack of significant industrial development in Austria in relation to Prussian industrial development, meant that Prussia could take advantage of the economic and political situation in Germany in the 1850s and 1860s • The development of the <i>Zollverein</i> as an economic unity provided a blueprint for unification under Prussia • It was the impact of army reforms, combined with a strong military performance on the battlefield, that was responsible for Germany's unification through Prussian military victory and its consequences • The international situation in the 1860s was favourable for the creation of a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> solution to German unification, e.g. Britain and Russia saw Imperial France as a greater threat than Prussia to the balance of power. Other relevant material must be credited.

2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the most significant consequence for Prussia of the defeat of Austria was Prussian territorial expansion. Arguments and evidence that the most significant consequence for Prussia of the defeat of Austria was Prussian territorial expansion should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The annexation of the north German states that had fought in the war on the side of Austria created a continuous Prussian state stretching across the European continent from France to Russia • The expansion provided Prussia with the extra resources and manpower to further consolidate its economy and develop its position as a major European power • The Schleswig-Holstein question that had brought political instability to northern Germany was ended through Prussia's formal annexation of the two Duchies • The consolidation of Prussian territory meant that France now viewed Prussia more as a likely adversary than as a future ally. Arguments and evidence that there were other more significant consequences for Prussia of the defeat of Austria should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Treaty of Prague removed the influence of Austria over Germany, so paving the way for Prussia to lead a unified <i>Kleindeutschland</i> • The defeat led to the creation of a North German Confederation, which included Saxony, dominated by Prussia; this Confederation would become the blueprint for Prussia's eventual leadership of the German Empire • Austrian defeat forced the four independent southern states into a defensive alliance with Prussia that would potentially give Prussia security in any future war with France • The success strengthened Bismarck's political position by enabling him to develop a relationship with the newly formed National Liberals that would become the basis of support for future Prussian policies. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that, in the years 1866–67, Prussia achieved complete domination over Germany. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1866–67, Prussia achieved complete domination over Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The defeat of Austria, and the subsequent Treaty of Prague, acknowledged that Prussia was now the preeminent German power, with <i>de facto</i> dominance over a <i>Kleindeutschland</i> and recognised as such internationally • Prussia annexed the majority of the northern German states that had fought with Austria in the Seven Weeks' War • Prussia dominated the North German Confederation, initially as a military alliance (1866), and, in 1867, as a fully-constituted federal state, with a Prussian head of state and Chancellor • In 1867, Prussia created a formal <i>Zollparlament</i> for decisions concerning the <i>Zollverein</i>, which included representatives from the southern German states. This effectively established German economic unity under Prussia • Prussia signed a series of military treaties with the south German states (August 1866) in which Prussia guaranteed the security of southern Germany • Bismarck's rapprochement with the National Liberals brought their support across the German states in the advancement of Prussian interests. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1866–67, Prussia did not achieve complete domination over Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In the immediate aftermath of the 1866 war, there was immense resentment and anger in the annexed states over Prussian actions. This resonated in the representative bodies of the Confederation and <i>Zollverein</i> • The North German Confederation was a federal not a unitary state, and the rulers of the independent states, e.g. Saxony, were determined to retain their independence and influence • The <i>Zollparlament</i> unexpectedly proved to be a source of challenge to Prussian dominance, particularly from representatives of the southern states • The four major southern states of Germany remained governmentally independent, providing the potential for a rival German power bloc • The National Liberals found it difficult to gain support for their desire for a full <i>Kleindeutschland</i> unification and German regionalism, particularly in the Catholic South, remained suspicious of Prussian influence. Other relevant material must be credited.