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EDEXCEL AS AND A LEVEL HISTORY: QUESTIONS BY TOPIC

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’

AS and A Level History · Paper 2 · Option 2F.2

53 questions · 964 marks · Mark schemes included

Pearson Edexcel AS (8HI0) and A Level (9HI0) History, June 2016 - June 2025

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HOW TO USE THIS BOOKLET

Questions are grouped by specification sub-topic; within each sub-topic they run from the lowest mark tariff to the highest.

Click any heading or question row below to jump straight to it.

On every question page, click ANSWER in the top-right corner to jump to its mark scheme.

Diagrams, graphs, tables and data are printed exactly as they appeared in the original papers.

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14 questions · 244 marks

62

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QUESTIONS

53 questions · 964 marks · grouped by sub-topic, lowest tariff first



KEY TOPIC 1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF APARTHEID, 1948–59

16 questions in this sub-topic · 296 marks · lowest tariff first



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 7.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the views held by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’**Sources for use with Question 2a.**

Source 3: From R.M. Sobukwe, *Future of the Africanist Movement*, printed in *The Africanist* newspaper, January 1959. Sobukwe formally launched the PAC in April 1959. At this time, he was the editor of *The Africanist*. Here he is writing about the differences between the ANC and the PAC.

First of all we differ radically in our conception of the struggle. To us, the struggle is a national struggle. The ANC leadership maintains, in the face of all the hard facts, that ours is a class struggle.

Secondly we differ in our attitude to ‘co-operation’ with other national groups. We believe that co-operation is possible only between equals. There can be no cooperation between oppressor and oppressed, dominating and dominated. That is collaboration, not co-operation. And we cannot collaborate in our own oppression! The ANC leadership, on the other hand, would seem to regard collaboration and cooperation as the same thing. They seem to believe that all that is required for people to be ‘equals’ is that they should declare that they are equals. At the present moment the ANC leadership regards anybody and everybody who is against the Nationalist government (for whatever reasons) as allies. We stand for the complete overthrow of white domination.

Source for use with Question 2b.

Source 4: From Helen Joseph, *Side by Side: the Autobiography of Helen Joseph*, published 1986. Joseph was an anti-apartheid activist who was a founding member of the Congress of Democrats, a radical, white anti-apartheid organisation founded in 1953. Here she is describing the Women’s March against the Pass Laws that took place on 9 August, 1956.

Twenty thousand women of all races, from all parts of South Africa, were massed together, marching against unjust laws, against the hated pass system, against passes for African women. We were women of every race; we came from the cities and the towns, from the reserves and the villages — we came as women united in our purpose to save the African women from the degradation of passes.

Raids, arrests, loss of pay, long hours at the pass office, weeks in the cells awaiting trial, forced farm labour — this is what the pass laws brought to African men: punishment and misery, not for a crime, but for the lack of a pass. We who were African women knew too well the effect of this law upon our homes, upon our children. We who were not African women knew how our sisters suffered.

We would not rest until all pass laws and all forms of permits restricting our freedom had been abolished. We would not rest until we won for our children their fundamental right to freedom, justice and security.



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2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the impact of the pass laws on black South Africans in the years 1948–56?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’

Source for use with Question 2(a).

Source 3: From a speech made by Lilian Ngoyi to a meeting of the ANC Women’s League, 11 November 1956. Ngoyi was the president of the ANC Women’s League. She played a leading role in organising opposition to the introduction of passes for women.

The pass laws are the basis and key feature of the system of oppression and exploitation in this country. They are a method of ensuring cheap labour for the mines and the farms. They are a symbol of slavery that enable insults and humiliations to be directed at Africans by members of the ruling class. It is for these reasons that the ANC has always regarded the pass laws as the principal target of the struggle for freedom. It is for these reasons that African leaders, progressives, Liberals, and even Government Commissions, have repeatedly condemned the pass laws as the source of dangerous racial tensions. It is also why the ANC has chosen to oppose the extension of the pass laws to African women, which is a major issue of national importance.

The issue is perfectly clear. The government has decided that we shall carry passes. Must we accept this decision? Definitely not!



Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From Benjamin Pogrund, *How Can Man Die Better*, a biography of Robert Sobukwe, published 1990. Pogrund was a white liberal South African journalist. Sobukwe was the leader of the PAC. Here Pogrund is commenting on the preparations for the PAC's anti-pass law campaign in March 1960.

In the first week of March, Sobukwe sent circulars to PAC branches throughout the country ordering them to get ready.

On 18 March, Sobukwe called a press conference. Some journalists, including myself, sat with him in a small office. Sobukwe announced that a campaign to end the pass laws would begin on Monday. PAC members were urged to leave their passes at home and surrender themselves for arrest at the nearest police station. The policy of 'no bail, no defence, no fine' would be strictly followed. After serving the expected jail sentences, PAC members would again surrender themselves for arrest. However, some PAC leaders were kept out of the campaign in order to avoid arrest and ensure continuity of leadership.

Members were instructed to conduct the campaign in a non-violent way. If ordered by the police to disperse, they should do so in an orderly manner. They would gather together in small groups so the police could not baton charge them.

The campaign, Sobukwe noted, 'will last until our demands are met.' It was the first step in the PAC's aim to achieve 'freedom and independence' for black South Africans by 1963.

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Source 1 from: www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/india/indianindependence/ww2/ww211/index.html

Source 2 from: <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/indian-independence/profile-chandra-bose/>

Source 3 from: *Speeches that Shaped South Africa: From Malan to Malema* By Martha Evans

Source 4 from: *How Can Man Die Better*, Benjamin Pogrund, Jonathan Ball 2006



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1948–59, little progress was made in challenging apartheid within South Africa?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the role of the National Party government was the main reason why campaigns against apartheid were not successful in the years 1948–59?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 5 'The National Party was able to implement apartheid legislation, in the years 1948-59, because of the weakness of opposition to it.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the impact of the Second World War was responsible for the National Party's victory in the 1948 election?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



7 The Rivonia Trial took place in 1963–64.

To what extent did the methods of the African National Congress (ANC) change in the years 1948–64?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 5 'The system of apartheid was never seriously challenged by the ANC in the years 1948-68.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How far did the National Party succeed in implementing apartheid in the years 1948–59?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 5 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1948–60, the National Party fully implemented the policy of apartheid in South Africa?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



- 5 How accurate is it to say that the Treason Trial (1956–61) was the most significant challenge faced by the anti-apartheid movement in the years 1948–61?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** 'In the years 1948–61, the weaknesses of African nationalism were more significant than the strengths of the National Party in explaining the failure of opposition to apartheid.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 6 How accurate is it to say that the main reason for the implementation of apartheid in South Africa, in the years 1948–59, was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 5 'It was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism that was principally responsible for the election victory of the National Party in 1948.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 6** How far was the National Party's election victory in 1948 the consequence of the growth of support for Afrikaner nationalist ideas?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate attitudes towards the education of black South African children in the 1950s?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a speech made by Hendrik Verwoerd in the South African Parliament, 17 September 1953. Verwoerd was the Minister of Native Affairs and was speaking in favour of the passing of the Bantu Education Act.

When we consider European and Native education, there are certain fundamental educational principles that are common to both. However, when you come to the actual teaching, there are definitely differences. What's the use of subjecting a Native child to a curriculum that is traditionally European? What is the use of teaching Bantu children mathematics when they cannot use it in practice? That is quite absurd. 5

Education must train and teach people in accordance with their position in life. Some Natives have to be trained to be able to serve their people in the higher professions. However, there is a much greater number of Natives who have to find a future in other forms of work. 10

If the Native is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake. We are in favour of the Native's development within his own sphere and in the service of his own people. The Native should be introduced to that idea early on. Should the South African Government spend money creating an ever-increasing number of dissatisfied persons, or should we look for a way of improving racial relations by giving these people the chance of suitable development? 15



Source 4: From Frances Baard's autobiography, *My Spirit Is Not Banned*, published 1986. Baard was a black South African political activist and member of the ANC Women's League in the 1950s. Here she is recalling her involvement with the campaign to oppose the 1953 Bantu Education Act.

We didn't want this bad Bantu Education Act for our children. Our children would only go to school for three hours a day, two shifts of children every day, so that more children could get a little bit of learning without the government having to spend more money. Verwoerd didn't want our children to get a proper education; with this education system, he wanted to deny them opportunities and keep them down. Before 1953, the education was a bit better, Christian missionaries mostly ran the schools, but now all the schools were going to be run by the government. 20 25

In December 1954, at the ANC conference, we rejected this new education plan and started to organise a boycott of government schools. But we couldn't leave the children like that, out of school and learning nothing. So, every morning the children were taken by bus to ANC-organised 'cultural clubs'. We weren't allowed to call them schools because it was illegal to have a school that wasn't registered with the government. 30

When the government saw that all the children were going to these clubs, they started sending the police to arrest the teachers and to intimidate the children and their parents. Some people were afraid and started to send their children back to the government schools. But some of the children didn't go back to those schools for a long time. Some of the 'cultural clubs' stayed open until 1960. 35



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Source 1 from: *The Indian Nationalist Movement 1885–1947*, B. N. Pandey © Macmillan, 1979

Source 2 from: *Indian Politics 1936–42*, R Coupland, © Oxford University Press, 1942

Source 3 from: *Apartheid*, Edgar H Brookes, © Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968

Source 4 from: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/bantu-education-boycott>



KEY TOPIC 2

REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE, 1960–68

9 questions in this sub-topic · 168 marks · lowest tariff first



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the reasons why members of the ANC increasingly engaged in violence after 1961?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From Wilton Mkwayi’s statement made during his trial, December 1964. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and imprisoned on Robben Island. He had been a member of the ANC since 1940 and was an early member of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

The preaching of non-violence, and the patience which the ANC leaders had during the 1950s, did not help us very much.

We felt that the pass laws, Bantu education and low wages could not be abolished if we did not do away with white supremacy. We believed that we could end white supremacy by peaceful means. However, by 1961, it was clear that non-violent means of protest had been closed to my people. Trade unions could no longer function, leaders of the people were banished and, in April 1960, our organisation had been banned. 5

I joined Umkhonto we Sizwe soon after it was formed.

Supporters of the government never fail to remind us that we should struggle for our aims by non-violent methods. It is easy for people to lecture to us that sabotage is senseless and useless, but such people ignore the long history of our non-violent and constitutional struggle. 10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From a speech made by D F Malan, 29 March 1948. Malan was the leader of the National Party. He made this speech as part of the election campaign that resulted in the National Party’s victory in the election two months later.

In South Africa, there is the policy of separation (apartheid). This policy has grown from the experience of the established European population of the country and is based on the Christian principles of justice and reasonableness. The aim of separation is threefold: 15

Firstly, the maintenance and protection of the European population of the country as a pure White race.

Secondly, the maintenance and protection of the indigenous racial groups as separate communities. 20

Thirdly, the encouragement of national pride, self-respect and mutual respect among the various races of the country.

The National Party undertakes to protect the White race properly and effectively against any policy, doctrine or attack that might undermine or threaten its continued existence. At the same time, the party rejects any policy of oppression and exploitation of the non-Europeans by the Europeans. Such a policy would be in conflict with the Christian basis of our national life and incompatible with our policy. 25

The National Party believes that a definite policy of separation between the White races and the non-White racial groups is the only basis on which the character and future of each race can be protected and safeguarded. 30

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Source 1 from: The Indian Nationalist Movement, 1885-1947 By B. N. Pandey © Macmillan, 1979

Source 2 from: <http://dart.columbia.edu/library/tagore-letter/letter.html>

Source 3 from: The Sun Will Rise By Mary Benson © Internat.Defence & Aid Fund, 1974

Source 4 from: Speeches that Shaped South Africa: From Malan to Malema By Martha Evans
© Penguin, 2017



- 7 How far was Vorster's use of police powers responsible for the strengthening of apartheid in the years 1961–68?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 5 'The increasing use of violence by anti-apartheid groups in South Africa, in the years 1960–68, was a reaction to the use of repression by the government.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



- 7 How accurate is it to say that the economic recovery of South Africa, during the 1960s, was the main reason for the strengthening of apartheid in this decade?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the significance of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in March 1961?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From Yusuf Dadoo, *Message from London to the South African People*, published March 1961. Dadoo was a leading member of the South African Communist Party. He had gone into exile in London in 1960 to act as an international spokesman for the anti-apartheid campaign.

The enforced withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth is a resounding victory for our people. It marks an historic step forward in our struggle against apartheid and for democratic rights.

This is a stunning defeat for Verwoerd. The determined stand by the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries is a tribute to their steadfast opposition to racial discrimination. It is also a tribute to the solidarity of the peoples in all their countries with the struggle of the South African masses against apartheid and for freedom.

5

The world is solidly against Verwoerd's racial policies.

We are now engaged in a campaign – to urge economic sanctions through the United Nations; to call upon workers not to handle South African goods; to press upon the British Government to honour the spirit of the Commonwealth Conference decision and not have back-door trade and other deals with the Verwoerd Government; and to work for world-wide isolation of South Africa in the international field.

10

15

This enforced withdrawal opens up vast possibilities for us to make further inroads into the stronghold of racialism and white supremacy built by the supporters of Dr Verwoerd and his Nationalist Party. The people at home in South Africa must redouble their efforts and work with renewed energy in opposing every aspect of Dr Verwoerd's Government. Verwoerd's end is near. The warm rays of Africa's dawn of freedom will soon be felt in our beloved land.

20



Source 4: From a speech made by Robin Turton MP to the British House of Commons during a debate on South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, 22 March 1961.

The event that we are discussing today is a matter of great historical importance and a turning point in Commonwealth history.

South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth is an act of tragedy. My reason for saying this is based on the concept of the Commonwealth. I regard it as a tragedy because a number of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers have misunderstood the nature of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is not, and never has been, an association of Governments. It is an association of peoples. That is why what we are discussing today sets a very dangerous precedent. 25 30

The Commonwealth has driven South Africa out of the Commonwealth because the Commonwealth has criticised South Africa's Government. That is the reason why South Africa has left. I realise the difficulties of the situation. Not one of the Prime Ministers present at the Conference could agree with the methods of apartheid that have been used by the South African Government. I am sure that there is not a single Member of this House who is not equally revolted by the system and methods of apartheid. 35

However, by this decision, we have abandoned the men and women who have looked to the Commonwealth and to this country for their one hope for the future, for the easing of the hardships of apartheid. 40

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- 6 'It was principally the economic recovery that strengthened apartheid in the years 1961–68.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 7 How significant was the Sharpeville Massacre in creating opposition to apartheid in the years 1960–68?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the consequences of the Sharpeville Massacre (21 March 1960)?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a letter written by Helen Suzman to her daughter, who was studying in France, 29 March 1960. This letter was reproduced in Suzman's autobiography (1993) with an additional comment. Suzman was an anti-apartheid MP and a founding member of the Progressive Party in 1959.

I have had eight meetings with all sorts of people to try to find out the truth of the ghastly happenings at Sharpeville. All the evidence points to needless and hysterical shootings by the police. I've got a sworn statement from one of the two white eye witnesses – the only two white people who were there, other than the police. He said that the crowd was good humoured. Even when the shooting started, he didn't quite believe it was really happening. 5

The government's reaction to Sharpeville has varied from defying the world to a sudden change of attitude, when it was announced that no more arrests would be made under the Pass Laws for the moment. Verwoerd is attending the Prime Ministers' Conference in London in May. He wouldn't want any more riots, so has called off the police for now. 10

There have been organised pass burnings, with Luthuli* taking the lead. The ANC is horrified at the success of the PAC campaign and is rushing around calling for a one-day strike. Yesterday was declared a day of mourning by the ANC; Johannesburg was like a dead city. Just how successful the pass-burning campaign will be, I don't know, but I imagine the government will have to modify the pass system. 15

Suzman's later additional comment:

I was incorrect. The Pass Laws were soon reinstated.

*Albert Luthuli – president of the ANC



Source 4: From an article written by Aggrey Klaaste, published in the *Sowetan* newspaper, 26 October 1988. Klaaste was a black South African journalist and editor.

I am 48 years old and have lived through 40 years of National Party rule. It has been a dreadful experience. I have lived through three historic turning points in the country's history, including Sharpeville. As a journalist, I have been somewhere near the centre of events. 20

After Sharpeville, a pattern was established that would be repeated in the coming years. After the first shock of the tragedy, we were provoked into uncontrollable anger, which was then ruthlessly suppressed by the State. 25
The aftermath of the tragedy saw the banning of the ANC and PAC and the systematic destruction of almost all political dissent.

Day after bitter day, we opposed the government by writing and speaking of the evils of apartheid. Unwittingly, we were reinforcing the deep, but ineffective, anger in the hearts of black South Africans. I am not saying there was anything wrong in that. It was a natural reaction, but we were planting the seed for the next explosion. 30

Meanwhile, white communities were being told a different story. They were made to believe that everything was under control. The government and its media reinforced this view. Even those whites who had been close to the black struggle gave themselves a silent hug of comfort. The people were told repeatedly that the few radicals who had inflamed a gullible black population had been defeated. 35

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Acknowledgements:

Source 1 from: *The Indian Nationalist Movement 1885-1947*, By Bishwa Nath Pandey © MacMillan, 1979

Source 2 from: <https://archive.org/stream/towardfreedomthe000770mbp#page/n107/mode/2up/search/chaury>

Source 3 from: *In No Uncertain Terms*, By Helen Suzman, © Mandarin, 1994

Source 4 from: *South African Despatches*, By J Crwys-Williams, © Ashanti Publishing, 1989



-
- 5** How significant was the threat posed to the South African Government by African nationalists in the years 1961–68?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



KEY TOPIC 3

LACK CONSCIOUSNESS, SOWETO AND CHALLENGES TO APARTHEID, 1968–

14 questions in this sub-topic · 256 marks · lowest tariff first



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the importance of international sporting boycotts against apartheid in the late 1970s?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From *The Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport*, 14 June 1977. This was better known as the Gleneagles Agreement. It was unanimously approved by the Heads of Government of all the Commonwealth countries who attended the meeting.

The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil. The Heads of Government reaffirm that apartheid in sport is an abomination. Sporting contacts with countries practising apartheid in sport encourages the belief that they are prepared to condone this repulsive policy. They reaffirm their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcome the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within that campaign. They accept that it is their urgent duty to combat vigorously the evil of apartheid by withholding support for, and by discouraging contact or competition with, sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa.

5

10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From a speech made by Colin Eglin in the South African Parliament, 17 June, 1976. Eglin was a leading anti-apartheid politician. At this time he was leader of the Progressive Reform Party, which was the main opposition party in Parliament. Here he is speaking about the Soweto Uprising on the day after it began.

I am sure the Members of this House are filled with shock, although perhaps not with surprise, except for those who deluded themselves into believing that race relations have never been better. It appears that a disturbance which commenced as a scholars' demonstration, developed from there into a riot against authority by people blind with hatred and resentment against the system. Last night it degenerated into looting, thuggery, violence and murder.

15

I believe it is our responsibility as legislators to give serious consideration to the root causes of the potential violence and conflict in our country. We trust there is going to be a thorough inquiry into the events and the handling of the situation which will sift out the conflicting eyewitness accounts. Where it is necessary to act to maintain order, that should be done with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum use of force. We hope that in the inquiries we shall not merely look for scapegoats and the Government will not indulge in the superficial exercise of blaming everything on so-called activists. We believe that the implications of what took place in Soweto yesterday are far too serious for all of us for either a one-sided or a superficial explanation.

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You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the events that led up to the Soweto Uprising in June 1976?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From a statement made by Dan Montsisi to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 22 July 1996. This was set up after the ending of apartheid so that victims of human rights violations could give testimony about their experiences. Here Montsisi is discussing events in Soweto in June 1976. At the time he was a high school student and was one of the organisers of the march that took place on 16 June 1976.

On the 13th of June we met and formed an action committee. We decided that we had got to explore the possibility of coming up with demonstrations in order to indicate and display our displeasure regarding the enforcement of Afrikaans as the language used for teaching. We had quite a number of student activists in my school who were able to participate quite actively in informing the students in the area. 5

When we met finally on the 15th of June in order to inform the students about the day, there was a lot of enthusiasm and excitement among students because they were not going to let Afrikaans ruin their future. So on the placards, they had to condemn Afrikaans and, at the same time, make known their displeasure about apartheid government in general. 10

On the 16th we met in my school immediately after assembly. The teachers were not informed.

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From the United Democratic Front's Declaration of Independence, 20 August 1983. This declaration was adopted at the first mass rally of the organisation, which was attended by 10,000–15,000 people.

We, the freedom-loving people of South Africa, say with one voice to the whole world that we cherish the vision of a united, democratic South Africa based on the will of the people. We will strive for the unity of our people through united action against the evils of apartheid and all other forms of exploitation. We stand for the creation of a true democracy in which all South Africans will participate in the government of our country. We stand for a single, non-racial, South Africa with no Bantustans and Group Areas. We say all forms of oppression and exploitation must end. 15 20

We say no to the new constitution which will create yet another undemocratic constitution in the country of our birth. We say no to the Koornhof* laws which will deprive more and more African people of their birthright. We say yes to the birth of the United Democratic Front on this day. 25

We resolve to stand together in our common struggle and commit ourselves to work together to mobilise all organisations – women's, students', religious, sporting and other community organisations – and trade unions under the common banner of the United Democratic Front.

*Koornhof – the Cabinet Minister responsible for implementing Botha's reforms to the apartheid system in the years 1982–84



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- 6 How significant was the role played by leading individuals in challenging the apartheid policies of the National Party in the years 1968–83?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 How far did external pressures on the National Party weaken its control over South Africa in the years 1974–83?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948-94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate responses to the death of Steve Biko?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948-94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a report in the *Rand Daily Mail* newspaper, 14 September 1977. The *Rand Daily Mail* was a liberal, anti-apartheid newspaper published in English.

Mr Biko is the twentieth person to die in Security Police custody in eighteen months. Mr James Kruger, the Minister for Justice, issued a statement yesterday. It is not customary for the Minister to comment on the death of a detainee, nor is it usual for details to be given concerning a detainee's illness and doctors' visits. It seemed as though the Minister was trying to prevent any anticipated outcry about Biko's death. 5

The statement raised more questions than it answered. The notion of a hunger strike, so out of keeping with Biko's response to persecution, was itself bizarre, and inevitably recalled other unlikely police explanations, as when Solomon Modipane* died after having 'slipped on a bar of soap'. 10

Taking the story at its face value, how could a hunger strike of only six days by a person in good health and normal weight so speedily have resulted in death? That was quite incredible. And why, if nothing could be found physically wrong with him, was Biko examined by so many doctors, and removed to a hospital? The public could only suspect that the police version of a hunger strike was an attempt to shift the blame for the death onto the detainee himself. 15

*Solomon Modipane – a political activist who died in police custody in 1969

Source 4: From a radio broadcast by the South African Broadcasting Corporation, 16 September 1977. This broadcast was intended for overseas audiences. The South African Broadcasting Corporation reported the official line on apartheid taken by the National Party.

The death of Mr Steve Biko while in detention appears to be receiving wide publicity but before people begin to condemn the police, it is necessary to consider the facts of the situation and not all of these have been disclosed as yet. Mr Biko, who can be regarded as a leader among certain radical black elements in the country, was arrested in mid-August. From 5 September he refused meals and threatened a hunger strike. A number of doctors visited Biko in the following days. 20

Should Mr Biko's death be the result of suicide, it would fit into a pattern that has become common among detainees in South Africa. Numerous detainees who have been detained following communist training and indoctrination, have testified that they receive specific instructions to commit suicide rather than divulge information to the police. The result is that in the past eighteen months seven detainees have died as a result of hanging and three others have jumped from the windows of high buildings. Police say it is virtually impossible to stop a man determined to commit suicide from doing so and, in any event, the suicides are sometimes totally unexpected. 25 30

To their critics, the police point out that so far a court of law has never established that the police have been responsible for torturing or killing a single detainee, although all cases are thoroughly investigated. 35

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- 8 How accurate is it to say that the 1976 Soweto Uprising did not threaten the system of apartheid?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 7 How accurate is it to say that the 1976 Soweto Uprising was significant in strengthening opposition to apartheid in the years 1976–83?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 6 'Internal opposition was more significant than external pressures in weakening the position of the National Party in the years 1974–87.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the significance of the Soweto Uprising?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From Nelson Mandela, *Message from Robben Island after the Soweto Uprising*, written 1977. This letter to the people of Soweto was smuggled out of prison on Robben Island. The letter took more than two years to reach the ANC in exile, who later published it.

The rattle of gunfire and the rumbling of armoured vehicles since June 1976 have once again shown the real face of apartheid.

In the midst of the present crisis, while our people count the dead and nurse the injured they ask what lies ahead? We can expect nothing from our rulers. They are the ones who give orders to the soldier crouching over his rifle. Our rulers will move along the fixed paths of vague promises, minor changes to apartheid and the constitution, massive arrests and detentions. The verdict of 16 June is loud and clear: apartheid has failed. Our young people were at the forefront of this 1976/77 wave of unrest. 5

Both within and beyond our borders, the prospects of victory grow bright. The first condition for victory is black unity. Every effort to divide our people must be prevented. Our people – African, Coloured, Indian and democratic Whites – must be united into a single massive and solid wall of resistance, of united mass action. 10

The revulsion of the world against apartheid is growing. The world is on our side. The UN and the anti-apartheid movement continue to put pressure on the racist rulers of our country. Every effort to isolate South Africa adds strength to our struggle. 15

Unite! Mobilise! Fight on!

Source 4: From Allister Sparks, *The Mind of South Africa*, published 1990. At the time of the Soweto Uprising in 1976, Sparks was assistant editor of the *Rand Daily Mail* newspaper, a liberal English-language publication.

A new generation of black students, inspired by Steve Biko's ideas, accused their elders of having been too weak. Why had their elders tolerated apartheid for so long? Why had they not been more militant? Move over oldies. 20

16 June 1976. It was a Wednesday morning, sunny and bright. A column of youngsters came marching by. They were confronted by a small group of armed white policemen. An officer shouted to the students to halt. The students jeered and waved their fists. Tear gas was fired, some rocks were thrown, and then the police opened fire with live ammunition. 25

By nightfall, Soweto was ablaze. Before it ended, the violence had spread to 160 different communities. Within a week 176 people were dead, within a year more than 600. The uprising lasted seventeen months before it was finally crushed in another wave of repressive action, with the government banning twenty-two Black Consciousness organisations. By the end of 1977, Biko was dead, his movement was outlawed, thousands of young activists were in prison, and 14,000 people had fled the country for exile abroad. 30

The Soweto riots served as a warning that something had better be done to make life more bearable in the ghettos. So, reforms were introduced to allow home ownership and commercial development. The search began for a constitutional formula that could include urban blacks as well as the 'Coloureds' and 'Indians' for whom there were no separate homelands. 35

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Source 1 from: <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1920/jul/19/punjab-disturbances-the-case-of-general>

Source 2 from: <https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GRA1920112.2.36>

Source 3 from: Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress By Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr.
© Oxford University Press, 1991

Source 4 from: The Mind of South Africa By Allister Sparks © Heinemann, 1990



-
- 6** How accurate is it to say that the ANC was successful in opposing apartheid in the years 1968–83?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 6 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1968–83, the power of the National Party was seriously undermined?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1974–83, opposition to apartheid was strengthened?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 7 How significant were domestic challenges in undermining the power of the National Party in the years 1968–83?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 6 How accurate is it to say that opposition to apartheid was strengthened throughout the years 1968–83?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



KEY TOPIC 4

REFORM, CRISIS AND THE END OF APARTHEID, 1984–94

14 questions in this sub-topic · 244 marks · lowest tariff first



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into attitudes towards international sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From an article written by Desmond Tutu in the *New York Times* newspaper, 16 June 1986. Tutu was a leading anti-apartheid campaigner. At this time, he was Archbishop of Cape Town and had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984. Here he is discussing sanctions against South Africa.

A clear message resounds in recent surveys in South Africa in which more than 70% of blacks supported sanctions against the Government. Blacks are saying: ‘We are suffering already. To end it, we will support sanctions, even if it causes more suffering.’

To whom is the international community willing to listen? To the victims of apartheid or to those who benefit from apartheid? I would be more impressed with those businesses who want to remain in South Africa if they said, honestly, ‘We are concerned for our profits,’ instead of the excuses that the businesses are there for our benefit. We don’t want you. Please do us a favour: get out and come back when we have a democratic and fair South Africa. 5 10

There has been progress, but we do not want apartheid improved. We do not want apartheid made comfortable. We want it dismantled.

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From a speech made by Hendrik Verwoerd to the South African Parliament, 3 February 1960. This speech was made by Verwoerd in reply to Harold Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech to the South African Parliament.

The tendency in Africa for nations to become independent, and at the same time to do justice to all, does not only mean being just to the black man of Africa, but also to be just to the white man of Africa. 15

We call ourselves European, but actually we represent all the white men of Africa. They are the people who brought civilisation here. They made the present developments of black nationalists possible by bringing them education, by showing them this way of life, by bringing in industrial development, by bringing in the ideals which western civilisation has developed. 20

We white men in this southernmost portion of Africa, have such a stake here that this is our only motherland. We have nowhere else to go. We settled a country that was bare, and the Bantu came into this country and settled certain portions for themselves. It is right to grant the fullest rights to those people whose forefathers settled in South Africa. But similarly, we believe in balance, we believe in allowing exactly those same full opportunities to remain within the grasp of the white man who has made all this possible. 25

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You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into the importance of a new constitution for South Africa in 1993?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From a speech made by FW de Klerk, 10 December 1993, while accepting the Nobel Peace Prize. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with Nelson Mandela for their work in ending apartheid.

The new South African constitution is now being debated in Parliament.

I believe that this constitution provides a reasonable framework of agreements and rules, of checks and balances, which are necessary for peace in our complex society. It ensures full participation in all aspects of life for all South Africans. It does not discriminate in any way on the basis of colour, creed, class or gender. It contains all the major safeguards which all our communities will need to maintain their respective identities and ways of life. It also provides adequate guarantees for the political, social, cultural and economic rights of individuals. 5

What is taking place in South Africa brings hope to all South Africans. It opens new horizons. It has the capacity to unlock the tremendous potential of our country and our region. 10

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom, the Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, published 1994. Here Mandela is discussing what happened after the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960.

The shootings in Sharpeville provoked national turmoil and a government crisis. Outraged protests came in from across the globe. For the first time, the UN Security Council intervened in South African affairs, blaming the government for the shootings and urging it to initiate measures to bring about racial equality. Share prices fell rapidly, and capital started to flow out of the country. South African whites began making plans to emigrate. Liberals urged Verwoerd to offer concessions to Africans. The government insisted that Sharpeville was the result of a communist conspiracy. 15 20

The massacre created a new situation in the country. In spite of the poor quality and opportunism of their leaders, the PAC rank and file displayed great courage. In just one day the PAC had moved to the front lines of the struggle and Robert Sobukwe* was being hailed as the saviour of the liberation movement. We in the ANC had to make rapid adjustments to this new situation, and we did so. 25

We announced a nation-wide stay-at-home for March 28th. The country responded magnificently as several hundred thousand Africans obeyed the call. Only a truly mass organisation could co-ordinate such activities, and the ANC did so. Rioting broke out in many areas. The government declared a State of Emergency. 30

*Robert Sobukwe – founder of the PAC



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Source 1 from: <https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20091023083219/http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/india/indianindependence/ww2/ww23/index.html>

Source 3 from: https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1993/klerk-lecture_en.html

Source 4 from: Nelson Mandela, 'Long Walk to Freedom', Little Brown & Co, 1994



You should start the answer to part (a) on page 11.

2 (a) Study Source 3 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

Why is Source 3 valuable to the historian for an enquiry into Nelson Mandela's hopes for the future following his release from prison in 1990?

Explain your answer using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(8)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to ‘rainbow nation’**Source for use with Question 2(a).**

Source 3: From a speech made by Nelson Mandela shortly after he had been released from prison, 11 February 1990.

Our struggle has reached a decisive moment. We call on our people to seize this moment, so that the process towards democracy is rapid and uninterrupted. We have waited too long for our freedom. We can no longer wait. Now is the time to strengthen the struggle. It is only through disciplined mass action that our victory can be assured.

5

We call on our white fellow citizens to join us in creating a new South Africa. The freedom movement is a political home for you too. We call on the international community to continue the campaign to isolate the apartheid regime. To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of ending the process towards the complete removal of apartheid.

10

Our march to freedom is irreversible. We must not allow fear to stand in our way. Universal suffrage in a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa is the only way to peace and racial harmony.

Source for use with Question 2(b).

Source 4: From the memoirs of Helen Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms*, published 1994. Suzman had been an anti-apartheid South African MP in the years 1953–89. Here she discusses the work she did as a member of the Independent Electoral Commission, which organised and monitored the 1994 elections.

I do not believe that any of us realised the enormity of the task that had to be completed within four months.

15

To begin with, there had been no voter registration and thus no Voters' Roll was available to the Commission. An estimated 22 million people were finally considered eligible to vote, of whom 16 million were black and therefore totally inexperienced in the procedures to elect a National Parliament. Many new voters were illiterate and lived in remote rural areas where voter education would be extremely difficult.

20

As the election day drew closer, the Commission had over 300,000 people on its staff, many of whom were totally inexperienced and had to be trained quickly. While there was inefficiency, many accusations, such as allowing fraudulent voting practices to take place, were grossly exaggerated.

25

Over 9000 polling stations had to be set up. I made extensive tours of inspection during the three days of voting. A great number of members of the security forces had to be deployed to ensure the election was carried out without violence or intimidation. They did this task with absolute fairness.

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Source 1 from: <https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20091023071319/http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/india/indianindependence/indiapakistan/partition4/index.html>

Source 2 from: *Witness to an Era*, By Frank Moraes, © Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973

Source 3 from: http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1990/900211_release.htm

Source 4 from: *In No Uncertain Terms*, By Helen Suzman, © Mandarin, 1994



- 8 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1984–89, the South African government's use of force was responsible for it maintaining its control?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the problems facing South Africa in the transition of its system of government in the early 1990s?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From *The New York Times* newspaper, 3 July 1992. Here it is reporting on the breakdown of CODESA talks, 26 May 1992.

In a letter to Nelson Mandela, Mr. de Klerk said the Government would accept a new constitution ratified by 70 per cent of an assembly elected by South Africans of all races. Mr. Mandela was prepared to agree this figure in May, but may find it difficult now, with his allies apparently set on a course of confrontation. Further complicating things, Mr. de Klerk's concession was buried near the end of an angry 31-page letter that accused Mr. Mandela of favouring radicals determined to overthrow white rule by force. The ANC withdrew from the deadlocked negotiations because of what it said was the Government's guilt in aiding supporters of Inkatha* in carrying out a massacre in Boipatong township. Mr. de Klerk said the mounting toll of township deaths should be blamed in large part on the ANC for having failed to prevent the civil wars that have cost thousands of black lives. Much of the angry language appeared to be directed toward the international audience whose favour both sides have fought to win.

*Inkatha – Inkatha Freedom Party, a South African political organisation that promoted Zulu nationalism



Source 4: From a statement made by Amnesty International to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 4 February 1994. Amnesty International is an international organisation that promotes human rights. In the 1960s, Amnesty International did not regard Nelson Mandela as a prisoner of conscience because of his links to violence.

The hopes for the new South Africa will never be achieved if those who seek to participate in the 1994 elections become victims of illegal executions, deliberate killings, torture or arbitrary detention*. The present government bears the greatest burden of responsibility for this through its control of the security forces. 15

In some areas, violence and fear – whether the fear of violent attack or the fear of arbitrary detention and torture – are casting deep shadows over the prospects for a free and fair election. In 1993, according to the South African-based Human Rights Commission, at least 4,364 people died in incidents of political violence and through acts of terrorism. Nearly 90 per cent of these deaths occurred in Natal and in the townships on the East Rand near Johannesburg, where the political conflict between supporters of the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party is most intense. Amongst last year's victims were political leaders at national, regional and local level, trade unionists, and peacemakers, who were targeted for assassination by their political opponents, or by members of the security forces. 20
25
30

In many of these situations, the role of the security forces has been highly questionable. It has ranged from the direct involvement of the police in 'death squad' killings and participation in Inkatha Freedom Party attacks on African National Congress supporters and trade unionists in Northern Natal, through South African Police Internal Stability Unit involvement in arbitrary detentions, torture and murders. 35

*arbitrary detention – imprisoned without just cause

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- 6 How accurate is it to say that P W Botha's attempts to reform the system of apartheid, in the years 1983-89, were a complete failure?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the use of international sanctions as a means of achieving change in South Africa in the 1980s?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From a speech made by John Carlisle to the British Parliament, 10 July 1985. Carlisle was a Conservative MP and was speaking against a Ten Minute Rule Bill that proposed introducing economic sanctions against South Africa. Ten Minute Rule Bills are used to get issues that are not on the government's agenda debated in the House of Commons.

I will concede that apartheid is a violation of human rights. However, the House has to ask whether the introduction of the Bill will benefit those whom it is intended to benefit - that is, blacks in South Africa. The House must also ask what effect those sanctions would have upon blacks and many other people in South Africa.

5

What those who advocate sanctions do not understand is that sanctions will create an enormous loss of jobs in South Africa. A 20% disinvestment* by the West would see a loss of 90,000 jobs for whites and 350,000 jobs for blacks.

One of the saddest facts about this Bill is that it would halt those reforms that have recently taken place in South Africa. Whilst those reforms are inadequate in terms of Western ideals, we must recognise that there has been reform. By South African standards, the advancement of blacks in South Africa has been considerable over the past five to ten years.

10

This Bill and disinvestment would undoubtedly increase violence in South African society. The violence in that country is perpetrated by the ANC and others who would, of course, welcome disinvestment.

15

Even Bishop Tutu** has questioned whether disinvestment would have any effect.

* disinvestment – a reduction in investment

**Bishop Tutu – an internationally famous anti-apartheid activist



Source 4: From a press statement made by Bishop Desmond Tutu in Johannesburg, 2 April 1986. Tutu was a leading black South African clergyman who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his anti-apartheid activities in 1984.

Nothing in South Africa, or very little, has changed without pressure from international communities. The sports policy changed only as a result of the sports boycott. I have called upon the international community to exert political, diplomatic, but above all, economic pressure on the South African government in order to persuade it to go to the negotiating table with the authentic representatives of all sections of our society. I have said, for blacks, that this would mean those representatives who are in jail or in exile. 20 25

Most Western countries have rejected economic sanctions because we are told that they would hurt blacks most of all. I hope that those who use this argument will just drop it quietly and stop being so hypocritical. Over 1,200 blacks have died since August 1984. Blacks are killed mainly by the security forces, almost as if they were flies. I have heard hardly a squeak from the whites who claim they are concerned for black suffering. 30

I have no hope of real change from the government unless they are forced. We face a catastrophe and only the action of the international community, by applying pressure, can save us. Our children are dying. Our land is burning and bleeding and so I call upon the international community to apply punitive economic sanctions against this government. 35

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- 6 How accurate is it to say that the main obstacle to a new political settlement in South Africa, in the years 1991-94, was opposition from white South Africans?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that the impact of international sanctions was the main reason for the ending of apartheid by 1991?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 7 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1984–90, the National Party maintained its control of South Africa?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that the role played by Nelson Mandela was the main reason that a new political settlement was reached in the years 1989–94?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the importance of F W de Klerk in the process of dismantling apartheid in 1990?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From F W de Klerk, *The Last Trek – A New Beginning, The Autobiography*, published 1998. Here he is recalling the speech that he made to the South African Parliament, 2 February 1990, in which he announced his decision to unbanned opposition groups and free Nelson Mandela.

I awoke with a sense of destiny. I knew that my speech would begin a new era. I could not be sure of the success of my government's initiative. The test would be the reaction of the media, the leaders whom we wanted to involve in negotiations, the international community and the public.

Half my speech would be in English and half in Afrikaans – but I decided to make the announcements that I knew would have the greatest local and foreign impact in English. 5

When I made the most important announcements in the speech, there was clear support and excitement from the ranks of the National Party, the Democratic Party and the members of the Coloured and Indian chambers. The only dissenting voices came from the Conservative Party. 10

I had achieved my objective of convincing both friends and foes that the National Party had made a fundamental policy shift.

The one matter that had raised the greatest expectations, and that I had deliberately played down in my speech, was the release of Nelson Mandela. It was crucially important that the fundamental decisions we had taken should not be overshadowed by an announcement on Mandela's release. 15

During my first meetings with Mandela after his release, we accepted one another's integrity. We realised that we both bore the responsibility for ensuring that there would be a negotiated settlement and we were both committed to carrying it out. 20



Source 4: From Hugo Young, *Frontiers of a New Land*, published 1990. Young was a journalist for the left-leaning British newspaper, *The Guardian*. He wrote this report following a visit to South Africa three months after Mandela was released.

I was sceptical of British claims that a meeting between President de Klerk and Mrs Thatcher* in June 1989 was of crucial importance. A week in South Africa showed me its importance. Thatcher explained to de Klerk that she couldn't keep up her anti-sanctions position for ever. Unless there was some reform, South African society would only be sustainable using armed force. De Klerk had the courage and intelligence to get the message. 25

De Klerk's shift in policy has not been a vast political risk. It has its white supporters. Moving to end apartheid is a relief to a lot of modern Afrikaner politicians, who are now prepared to confess that they have been unhappy with it for years. 30

De Klerk has finally wiped out the ideology of white supremacy. Some people are naïve enough to think that this automatically means the agreed end of white domination. That's far from certain.

De Klerk says that constitutional apartheid will soon be entirely eliminated. My reporting shows that actual apartheid, petty or grand, is far from gone. The promises about the laws remain to be fulfilled in practice. However, this modest start, with little given away, has already done a lot for South Africa's image. Its status as an outcast nation is ending. 35

*Mrs Thatcher – the British prime minister

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Acknowledgements:

Source 1 from: https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/df06517b-babc-451d-baf6-a2d4b19c1c88/e50f8653-465e-43a3-b3d2-e14e417b7809/Resources#9cab15ba-130d-44d6-8844-1b048ad619c6_en&overlay

Source 2 from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3022514.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5187_SYC-5188%2Ftest&refreqid=fastly-default%3A088a40d1196a72916329d3d027c94f11

Source 3 from: *The Last Trek - A New Beginning, The Autobiography* By F W de Klerk © Macmillan, 1998

Source 4 from: *Altered State: South Africa* By The Guardian © Fourth Estate, 1990



- 6 How significant was the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in enabling a political settlement to be reached in South Africa in the years 1989–94?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 8 How accurate is it to say that the impact of international isolation on South Africa was the main reason for Botha's decision to negotiate in the years 1985–89?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



MARK SCHEMES

official Pearson Edexcel mark schemes



Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the views held by the PAC in 1959. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It provides evidence of the ways in which Sobukwe believed that the PAC differed from the ANC, e.g. the PAC believed in a 'national struggle' whereas the ANC believed in a 'class struggle' - It indicates that the PAC would not co-operate with other groups as this was seen as 'collaboration' - It suggests that the PAC will pursue a single aim relentlessly – 'we stand for the complete overthrow of white domination'. - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - It is a contemporary publication produced by the founding leader of the PAC and might be expected to reflect his views closely - It was published in a newspaper of which Sobukwe was editor, so he could say what he wanted - The PAC itself was formally launched only three months after this article; its purpose may therefore have been to attract support away from the ANC. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - The PAC emerged as a response to the Freedom Charter of the ANC which they believed was a rejection of the vision of South Africa for Africans - The PAC objected to the ANC's inclusion of other groups in the protest movement such as the Indian Congress and the Communist Party of South Africa - Many younger Africans joined the PAC because they wanted immediate change and felt frustrated by life in the townships and the lack of progress being made by the ANC. This goes some way to explain the direct calls to action being expressed in the source.



Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into attitudes to the Pass Laws in the 1950s. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The author has a very clear position on the Pass Laws – she is a founding member of a radical, white anti-apartheid organisation. The source therefore only presents one perspective on attitudes to the Pass Laws - Joseph does, however, claim in the extract that she is speaking for 'women of every race' - The language of the piece suggests that Joseph is very much concerned by the social injustice of the Pass Laws, e.g. 'unjust', 'degradation', 'punishment and misery'. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It indicates that 'twenty thousand women of all races' took part in the Women's March, suggesting that there was opposition to the Pass Laws across all groups in South Africa - It suggests that a key reason for opposition to the Pass Laws was the negative impact it had on African men, e.g. 'arrests, loss of pay', thus indicating the likely attitude of black men to the Pass Laws - It suggests that not everyone opposed the Pass Laws; their implementation was supported by the government which was responsible for the 'raids, arrests...trial'. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - The Pass Laws in some form had been in existence since the 19th century for men, but were extended to the whole country and to women by two laws in 1952 (Native Laws Amendment Act and Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act) - By forcing black Africans to carry a pass, it was possible to restrict their movements, so the pass came to symbolise the whole system of oppression to those who opposed apartheid, not just the Pass Laws - The women who marched on August 9 1956 presented a petition against the Pass Laws which had been signed by 100,000 people, suggesting widespread opposition - August 9 has been celebrated as National Women's Day in South Africa since 1994, suggesting the huge significance attached to this particular event.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence



Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the impact of the pass laws on black South Africans in the years 1948–56. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It claims that the pass laws were responsible for many of the evils of apartheid that impacted on black South Africans ('basis and key feature') - It suggests that the pass laws were responsible for the exploitation of black South Africans in order to benefit the ruling class ('a method of ensuring cheap labour for the mines and the farms.') - It suggests that the extension of the pass laws to women was significant for the ANC because this acted as a rallying call for ANC opposition ('major issue'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - As a leading member of the ANC Women's League, Ngoyi is in a good position to understand the significance of the pass laws - Ngoyi's involvement in opposition to the pass laws demonstrates that she appreciates the problems linked to them - Its arguments are often well-reasoned and appear based on evidence ('even Government Commissions'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - The pass laws enabled restrictions on the movement of black South Africans, and, as such, came to represent the oppression that was experienced by them in all walks of life - The extension of the pass laws to women in the 1950s was responsible for an increase in opposition to them - Support for opposition to the pass laws in the years 1948–56 was significant, e.g. 100,000 people signed the petition that was presented at the Women's March, August 1956.



Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into how the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was organised in early 1960. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - As a South African journalist who attended the initial meeting, Pogrund was in a good position to comment on the organisation of the PAC - Pogrund appears to be quoting the words of Sobukwe directly, giving authenticity to his comments - As Pogrund was a liberal journalist, he was likely to see the actions of black South Africans in a sympathetic light - As the biographer of Sobukwe, it can be expected that the author will represent him and his organisation in a sympathetic way. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It suggests that the planning for the anti-pass campaign was well organised and working to a schedule ('sent circulars', 'called a press conference.') - It implies that there was a hierarchy within the PAC during its campaigning ('PAC members were urged', 'some PAC leaders were kept out of the campaign') - It implies that the main approach to be taken in the forthcoming anti-pass law campaign was laid down explicitly by the PAC ('instructed') - It argues that the PAC saw the anti-pass law campaign as part of a larger campaign, with the underlying aim of achieving "freedom and independence'...by 1963.'. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - The PAC was firmly rooted in Pan-Africanist ideas about the role to be played by black South Africans in campaigning for change - The PAC wanted to develop a more confrontational style of direct action than was being pursued by other organisations - The PAC had mobilised a considerable amount of grass roots support for its approach, so that its campaigning would be well supported.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1948-59, little progress was made in challenging apartheid within South Africa. Arguments and evidence that it is accurate to say that, in the years 1948-59, little progress was made in challenging apartheid within South Africa should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Regulations and laws governing the practical daily implementation of apartheid were extended over this period of time, e.g. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 1949, Pass Laws Act 1952, making it even harder to challenge apartheid • The application of apartheid policies in both urban areas (e.g. Group Areas Act 1950) and rural areas (e.g. Bantu Authorities Act 1951 and Bantu Self-Government Act 1959) • The strength of the government in suppressing opposition hindered their ability to challenge apartheid e.g. the arrest of 156 leading members of the Congress Alliance after the publication of the 1956 Freedom Charter Arguments and evidence that it is not accurate it is to say that, in the years 1948-59, little progress was made in challenging apartheid within South Africa should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The passage of new apartheid legislation led to the development of a mass opposition movement as it encouraged many who had not previously been opposed to join opposition groups, e.g. rural opposition to the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act • Mobilising of large numbers in support of some campaigns e.g. East London in the Defiance Campaign of 1952 • Some campaigns experienced some degree of success e.g. the women's campaign against the extension of the Pass laws to women in 1956 slowed down the process. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the role of the National Party government was the main reason why campaigns against apartheid were not successful in the years 1948-59. Arguments and evidence that the role of the National Party government was the main reason why campaigns against apartheid were not successful in the years 1948-59 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The range of apartheid legislation to cover all aspects of life that was implemented in this period, e.g. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages (1949), Group Areas Act (1950), Bantu Education Act (1953) • The strategic implementation of legislation in the face of opposition, e.g. passes for women were introduced first in remote areas and then to more vulnerable urban working women • The implementation of legislation to restrict opposition groups and their ability to act, e.g. Criminal Law Amendment Act (1953) • Arrests of leaders and members of opposition groups, e.g. 8,000 arrests during the Defiance Campaign, 156 arrests of leading signatories of the Freedom Charter. Arguments and evidence that the role of the National Party government was not the main reason why campaigns against apartheid were not successful in the years 1948-59 and/or other factors were more important should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Divisions between nationalists over the most effective tactics to be followed when engaging in opposition to apartheid • Divisions between nationalists regarding the role to be played in the organisation by whites, e.g. ANC and PAC • The focus of the ANC was on the circumstances in the towns rather than in the rural areas so there was a lack of coordination amongst the nationalist groups in this period • Divisions between the more elite leadership and the mass support in some organisations, most notably the ANC, e.g. in Sophiatown the ANC seemed more concerned with rights of property owners than tenants. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the National Party was able to implement apartheid legislation, in the years 1948–59, because of the weakness of opposition to it. Arguments and evidence that the National Party was able to implement apartheid legislation, in the years 1948–59, because of the weakness of opposition to it should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • There was no single unified black opposition group to apartheid in 1948 • Black opposition groups were divided on the basis of ideology, race, class, region and with different views of the future which weakened their ability to oppose apartheid legislation • The ANC was divided internally, and hence weakened, during the 1940s, between a cautious leadership and a more activist young membership. It also represented an educated elite rather than a mass membership • The co-operation between the ANC and others in the Congress Alliance during the 1950s ended with the creation of the PAC in 1958 thus further weakening potential opposition • Lack of co-operation between black and white anti-apartheid groups in challenging the implementation of apartheid. Arguments and evidence that the National Party was able to implement apartheid legislation, in the years 1948–59, because of other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The strength of the National Party in suppressing opposition, e.g. 1950 Communist Party banned, 1956 arrests of 156 members of the Congress Alliance and the length of the judicial process • Apartheid policy was implemented by leading members of the National Party, e.g. Verwoerd, with considerable enthusiasm, using it to defend their political position • The National Party was able to build on and develop previous legislation, which gave their actions the appearance of legitimacy • The National Party increased its support in this decade and was able to use its position to insert its supporters into key roles in the military, police and bureaucracy which strengthened the administration of apartheid • The development of apartheid legislation was incremental, gradually being extended to cover more areas of life, and marginally different in its application to different racial groups. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the impact of the Second World War was responsible for the National Party's victory in the 1948 election. Arguments and evidence that the impact of the Second World War was responsible for the National Party's victory in the 1948 election should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The United Party supported Britain during the Second World War; this was an unpopular position with some parts of the white electorate who transferred their support to the National Party in 1948 • The needs of a wartime economy had led the United Party to relax some of the segregationist policies, giving rise to white discontent that would be exploited by the National Party • Greater rights for blacks in wartime contributed to increased political consciousness that found expression in post-war strikes, which in turn increased white unease, leading to an upswing in National Party support. Arguments and evidence that the impact of the Second World War was not responsible for the National Party's victory in the 1948 election and/or it won the election for other reasons should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Broederbond was founded in 1918 and the OB (Ossewabrandwag) in 1938; both contributed to the polarisation of white opinion that contributed to the National Party victory • The National Party adopted an explicitly 'Afrikaners First' policy, including fielding no English candidates, which appealed strongly to Afrikaner voters • The United Party was divided between its liberal and conservative wings at the time of the election, weakening its effectiveness • The weighting of the political system towards rural votes resulted in the National Party winning more seats than the United Party, although its share of the popular vote was lower. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which the methods of the African National Congress (ANC) changed in the years 1948–64. Arguments and evidence that the methods of the African National Congress (ANC) did change in the years 1948–64 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In the late 1940s and 1950s, the key methods used by the ANC were civil disobedience and non-violence; in 1961 the ANC announced its adoption of armed struggle • The increasing restrictions placed on the organisation, culminating in the banning of the ANC in 1960, had radicalised many younger members who wanted to engage in more revolutionary activities • By founding a separate military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, in the wake of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, a shift in strategy was signposted • There were increasing visits made overseas by the ANC leadership to bring the issues to a wider international audience and elicit their support. Arguments and evidence that the methods of the African National Congress (ANC) did not change in the years 1948–64 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The methods used by the ANC reflected what was possible in the light of government attitudes, e.g. in the 1950s peaceful protest was allowed, but from 1960 the restrictions on peaceful protest grew • Armed uprisings, e.g. 1957 in the northern Transvaal, had taken place before 1960, so violence was not a new strategy post-1960 • High profile campaigns aimed to achieve mass support for the demands of the organisation, e.g. 1950 the Defiance Campaign and 1961 'stay at home' campaign • Women played a prominent role within the membership of the organisation throughout the period. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the system of apartheid was never seriously challenged by the ANC in the years 1948–68. Arguments and evidence that the system of apartheid was never seriously challenged by the ANC in the years 1948–68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The implementation of apartheid legislation in the 1940s and 1950s and the strengthening of separate development in the 1960s demonstrate the failure to challenge the system • The threat from the ANC was diminished by divisions over how to achieve an ending to apartheid, e.g. the split with PAC, and over the methods to be used, e.g. whether to engage in violence after 1960 • Many leading members of the ANC were imprisoned and isolated on Robben Island, especially following the Rivonia Trial, e.g. Mandela and Sisulu, so that they could not communicate with other members of the ANC • Leading members of the ANC were in exile from 1960, e.g. Tambo, so that there was no real leadership within the country to organise a challenge to the system of apartheid • The state of emergency declared in 1960, followed by the banning of the ANC shortly afterwards, limited its ability to organise opposition to the system of apartheid • Effective use of police powers by the National Party across the period limited the ability for opposition to flourish and challenge the system of apartheid • The increased economic prosperity of the 1960s reduced opposition to apartheid and hence support for the ANC. Arguments and evidence that the system of apartheid was seriously challenged by the ANC in the years 1948–68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The ANC was responsible for developing a mass movement that protested the system and engaged in a range of protests, e.g. the Defiance Campaign, that posed a serious challenge to the system • The ANC worked with other anti-apartheid organisations in South Africa in the 1950s to effectively protest the system and gather support, e.g. the campaign against the Pass Laws, the Freedom Charter • The ANC exploited the repression they faced in the 1960s under apartheid to garner international support, e.g. Tambo addressed the UN, which contributed to a serious challenge to the system. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the National Party was successful in implementing apartheid in the years 1948-59. Arguments and evidence that the National Party was successful in implementing apartheid in the years 1948-59 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In the aftermath of the National Party's election victory in 1948 a range of apartheid laws were passed and enforced, e.g. the Mixed Marriage Act (1949), the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) • The use of the 1950 Population Registration Act to define people according to racial groups so that the system could be effectively implemented • The use of the 1950 Group Areas Act to remove people forcibly from their homes, e.g. Sophiatown, and impose geographical segregation of the races • The use of education policies to promote segregation, e.g. 1953 Bantu Education Act (schools), 1959 Extension of University Education Act (universities) • Disenfranchisement of non-whites who had access to the political system had been achieved by 1956. Arguments and evidence that the National Party was not successful in implementing apartheid in the years 1948-59 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The need for black workers on farms and in urban areas meant there could never be absolute separation of the races • The rise of opposition campaigns to the system of apartheid that attracted considerable support making implementation more difficult, e.g. the Defiance Campaign • The Homelands policy did not result in anything close to a majority of South Africa's black population living in these areas. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that, in the years 1948-60 the National Party fully implemented the policy of apartheid in South Africa. Arguments and evidence that it is accurate to say that, in the years 1948-60 the National Party fully implemented the policy of apartheid in South Africa should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The National Party developed, and extended much more fully, legislation that was already in existence when they came to power in 1948 • The National Party implemented a comprehensive package of new apartheid legislation, e.g. race laws, education laws, pass laws, Group Areas Act • The National Party manipulated the political and legal system to enact the policy of apartheid, e.g. 1951 Separate Representation of Voters Act • The National Party passed legislation designed to involve African leadership in the implementation of the policy so that it could be fully enforced, e.g. Bantu Authorities Act • Opposition to the policy of apartheid was suppressed by the National Party, e.g. arrests of leading Congress Alliance members and the Treason Trial. Arguments and evidence that challenges the view that it is accurate to say that, in the years 1948-60 the National Party fully implemented the policy of apartheid in South Africa should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:
	• The National Party wanted to ensure the legislation they enacted was constitutional, so they took a gradualist approach to implementing apartheid, which was not fully complete by 1960 • Further apartheid legislation continued to be passed after 1960, e.g. Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act (1968), Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970) • The pass laws failed to achieve their aim of keeping Africans out of the cities; between 1946 and 1960, the African urban population doubled • The growth of anti-apartheid organisations and the campaigns that they engaged in, e.g. the Defiance Campaign, anti-pass law protests at Sharpeville, suggest the policy had not been fully implemented. Other relevant material must be credited.



5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and



Level	Mark	Descriptor
		substantiating the overall judgement. The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.

Section A: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate attitudes to the actions of General Dyer in Amritsar. Source 1 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a speech making a proposal, the author will clearly support the subject of that proposal - As the House of Lords voted for the proposal, the content of this speech can be seen to reflect the views of a majority of that part of Parliament - The tone of the speech shows that its author is in sympathy with Dyer and is critical of those who attended the meeting at the Jallianwala Bagh - Some of the evidence presented has come directly from Dyer. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about attitudes to the actions of General Dyer in Amritsar: - It implies that Dyer should have been supported for his actions because of his past record ('distinguished') and his views of his need for action at the time ('rely upon...acted honestly') - It provides evidence that Montagu believed Dyer's actions to be 'a terrible error' - It suggests that some viewed Dyer's actions as being justified by the actions of Indians ('criminals of the worst type', 'open defiance') - It claims that Dyer's actions were crucial to the defence of India ('all would have been lost.'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Dyer was criticised for only ordering proclamations to be read warning against meetings, which meant that not everyone had heard them - The Jallianwala Bagh was a public park, so there were women and children in it at the time of the massacre. The Hunter Committee recorded the deaths of 41 boys and 1 baby - Dyer was relieved of his command, but no other action was taken against

Question	Indicative content
	him. Source 2 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - The <i>Grey River Argus</i> was a New Zealand paper that could provide an outside view on the actions of Dyer - The tone of the article makes it clear that it is critical of both Dyer's actions and the Hunter Committee Majority report, which it perceives as insufficiently damning of Dyer's actions - The report is published late in 1920 and has therefore had the time to reflect on the various stages of reactions to events in the Punjab as they developed through 1920. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about attitudes to the actions of General Dyer in Amritsar: - It provides evidence of the actions taken by Dyer at the Jallianwala Bagh - It suggests that the Majority report was insufficiently critical of some of the actions taken by Dyer ('weak criticism', 'defend the use of... punishment.') - It indicates disagreement over whether India was on the verge of rebellion, and hence whether Dyer's actions could be justified on that basis - It provides evidence that the British government was highly critical of Dyer's actions, both in the massacre and in the broader regulations imposed, suggesting a genuine moral outrage. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The Hunter Committee was set up by Montagu in the aftermath of the massacre in order to establish what had happened in Amritsar - Under martial law, salaaming Europeans and the crawling order had been established. These were designed to humiliate Indians - There was a belief that Dyer had prevented a wider rebellion in the Punjab, e.g. the letter written by the 'Ladies of the Punjab', and that he had 'saved' India. Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Source 1 is supportive of the actions of General Dyer, whereas Source 2 is critical of them - Source 1 implies that India was on the verge of rebellion, arguing that the situation in the region required action, whereas Source 2 overall appears to deny this, whilst indicating some disagreement on the issue - Source 1 is focused primarily on Dyer's actions at the Jallianwala Bagh, whereas Source 2 has a broader view of his actions elsewhere in Amritsar as well as those in the Jallianwala Bagh - Both Source 1 and Source 2 demonstrate that there was not a single unified attitude to Dyer's actions in Amritsar, but that there was considerable

Question	Indicative content
	disagreement.



Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948-94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the significance of the Soweto Uprising. Source 3 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a message from Mandela to the people of Soweto, this would have carried great weight about the views of the leadership of the ANC towards the Uprising - Mandela was in prison at the time, so his source of information for what was happening in Soweto was likely to be those who had been arrested and imprisoned on Robben Island - The tone and language of the message shows that its purpose was to motivate those who were opposing and campaigning against apartheid. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the significance of the Soweto Uprising: - It suggests that events in Soweto demonstrated the failure of the National Party to make any meaningful changes to apartheid ('vague promises, minor changes') - It indicates the importance of the young in challenging apartheid through the events at Soweto ('Our young people were at the forefront of this 1976/77 wave of unrest.') - It suggests optimism for the future success of opposition to apartheid ('prospects of victory grow bright.') - It implies that events in Soweto have outraged international opinion and brought it more firmly onto the side of the anti-apartheid movement ('The revulsion of the world'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The campaign grew swiftly, encompassing many more young people, who were prepared to use violence against property to make their views known - The images of the dead child, Hector Pieterse, had a profound impact on both white liberal domestic opinion and international opinion regarding apartheid, e.g. UN Resolution 392 - Although the ANC was not directly involved in the organisation of the events that led to Soweto, it was strongly involved in the campaign that followed.



Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a South African journalist, the author would have a good understanding of the events that he is describing - As the assistant editor of a liberal newspaper, the author is likely to be sympathetic to the position of black South Africans - Statistical evidence is provided to support the comments about the extent of the impact of the Uprising. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the significance of the Soweto Uprising: - It claims that the importance of the Black Consciousness Movement in influencing the young was crucial to the events at Soweto ('inspired by Steve Biko's ideas') - It provides statistical evidence demonstrating the wide-ranging impact of the unrest ('176 people were dead') - It implies that the government took advantage of the situation to repress opposition ('thousands of young activists were in prison') - It implies that longer-term, the government recognised the need to be more conciliatory in its approach ('reforms were introduced') - It suggests that the government was prepared to use whatever response would be most effective in ameliorating the situation – both repression and conciliation were employed. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The development of the Black Consciousness Movement had begun in the 1960s and had a significant impact on the attitudes of young black people towards apartheid - The ANC was strengthened as many of those who fled joined the ANC in exile - The continuing instability weakened the government economically and led to changes, e.g. long-term leases for urban blacks (late 1970s), changes to the structure of the constitution (early 1980s). Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Source 3 appeals to the emotions, being designed to raise morale, whereas Source 4 is a more measured account of the aftermath of events - Both Source 3 and Source 4 are agreed about how the Soweto Uprising demonstrated the significance of the role of young people in the opposition to apartheid - Both sources are agreed that the government responded by a mixture of repression and concession, although Source 3 is more critical of the nature of the concessions than Source 4.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the impact of the salt <i>satyagraha</i> (1930) was more significant than the impact of any other civil disobedience campaign in the years 1920-42. Arguments and evidence that support the view that the impact of the salt <i>satyagraha</i> (1930) was more significant than the impact of any other civil disobedience campaign in the years 1920-42 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As there was a government tax on salt, it was an ideal single issue on which to challenge British rule. Gandhi provided the date at which he would start to break the law to maximise attention for his actions • The march to the sea was supported by a significant number of marchers, e.g. the day before it set off, Gandhi addressed a crowd of 10,000. Support for the campaign came from across the social spectrum • Thousands of Indians broke the law by collecting salt along the coastline. 60,000 arrests were made, straining the ability of the government to control events • The campaign was devolved to provincial committees, which prevented potential divisions and made it hard for the authorities to halt the campaign • The British response to the raid on the Dharasana Salt Works garnered international attention that was critical of British actions • The march and all elements of the <i>satyagraha</i> were reported on by international journalists, e.g. Webb Miller, which gained international support for the campaign. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that the impact of the salt <i>satyagraha</i> (1930) was more significant than the impact of any other civil disobedience campaign in the years 1920-42 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The 1920-22 <i>satyagraha</i> had a more significant impact because it began the process of a genuine mass movement, which the salt <i>satyagraha</i> built upon • The 1920-22 <i>satyagraha</i> was more significant because it established the principles on which Gandhi operated, e.g. filling the jails to make India ungovernable, and the salt <i>satyagraha</i> merely extended this approach • The 1942 Quit India campaign was more significant as it was a direct challenge to the Raj, and would make any compromise difficult • The 1942 Quit India campaign was seen by the British as more of a challenge as they took pre-emptive action against the leaders, rather than reacting to events. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether Gandhi's poor political skills were the principal reason for the failure of the Second Round Table Conference in 1931. Arguments and evidence that support the view that Gandhi's poor political skills were the principal reason for the failure of the Second Round Table Conference in 1931 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Gandhi was the sole representative of Congress, and he claimed to speak for all Indians. In so doing, he alienated other Indian representatives from across the spectrum, e.g. Ambedkar, Jinnah, Singh • Gandhi was unable to build a consensus with the other Indian representatives about separate electorates, which he opposed, and this undermined any possibility of agreement amongst the Indian nationalists • Gandhi could not build bridges with those representing the Muslim interests in order to reach agreement on how power should be balanced in a new constitution • Gandhi did not always take account of the opinions of other groups, e.g. his claim that the interests of the Untouchables were met by his presence was not accepted by Ambedkar • As Gandhi supported <i>purna swaraj</i>, he could not accept any recommendation that involved dominion status and was not prepared to compromise on this. Arguments and evidence that Gandhi's poor political skills were not the principal reason for the failure of the Second Round Table Conference in 1931 and/or other factors were more important should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • It was Congress that was responsible for the decision to send only Gandhi to represent them at the Second Round Table Conference • Gandhi was merely representing the position of Congress when he denied the desirability of separate electorates • The 'Young Hooligans' had begun to influence Congress and Gandhi's thinking, and were making more radical demands • The political context in Britain was less favourable to making concessions than it had been at the time of the First Round Table Conference; a sympathetic Viceroy, Secretary of State and Government had all changed • There were divisions amongst those who were representing India – both nationalists and the princely states were represented • Jinnah's tactics were to play various groups, including the British government, off against one another in order to achieve his own aims. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the Treason Trial (1956-61) was the most significant challenge faced by the anti-apartheid movement in the years 1948-61. Arguments and evidence that support the view that the Treason Trial (1956-61) was the most significant challenge faced by the anti-apartheid movement in the years 1948-61 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The arrest of 156 leading members of the anti-apartheid movement on treason charges sent out a signal that the government was prepared to deal harshly with opponents of apartheid • The proceedings were very drawn out, restricting the leadership of organised opposition groups for a significant period of time, e.g. the defendants could not attend or speak at any meetings • The trial threatened the ability of the anti-apartheid movement to support the demands of the Freedom Charter • Some of those accused went into exile, so the anti-apartheid movement lost some of its domestic leadership, e.g. Tambo • The trial demonstrated how serious the National Party was in attempting to deal with the anti-apartheid movement within South Africa. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that the Treason Trial (1956-61) was the most significant challenge faced by the anti-apartheid movement in the years 1948-61 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The trial demonstrated the multi-racial nature of the anti-apartheid movement, strengthening support for it • The gradual removal from the trial of individuals accused was humiliating for the government • The trial attracted international attention and contributed to the increasing international climate of support for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa • The strengthening of the National Party through the implementation and codification of apartheid from 1948 onwards was a more significant challenge to the anti-apartheid movement • Disagreements over strategy and the involvement of whites in the anti-apartheid movement led to the founding of the PAC – this was a more significant challenge as the anti-apartheid movement was now divided • The 1960 state of emergency was a more significant challenge because it strengthened existing police powers and outlawed public meetings, creating real difficulties for the opponents of apartheid • The passing of the Unlawful Organisations Act was a more significant challenge as it drove anti-apartheid groups underground and made it more difficult for them to operate effectively. Other relevant material must be credited.



5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. - The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the reasons for the failure of the Simla Conference (1945). Source 1 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - It was written by Lord Wavell who, as the Viceroy, was a leading participant in the Conference and would have been well-informed about its proceedings - It was an immediate reaction to the failure of the Conference, written only one day after it had ended - The tone of the source appears to be objective and balanced, with criticisms of both Congress and Muslim League representatives - Given that it was subsequently circulated to the Cabinet as a secret document, its contents were clearly deemed to be reliable by the British government. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the failure of the Simla Conference (1945): - It provides evidence of the limitations of leading individuals ('Gandhi...not capable', 'Jinnah...narrow-minded'), suggesting that these limitations have resulted in failure to reach agreement - It argues that the immediate cause of failure was 'Jinnah's inflexibility' - It implies that Congress' claim to 'represent everyone' was responsible for creating a level of mistrust amongst Muslims that made reaching agreement virtually impossible. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: 21 Indian political leaders represented the range of views and opinions of Indians at the Simla Conference; such divergence was always going to make reaching agreement difficult - Communal divisions were long entrenched within Indian society, having been reinforced by the British policy of 'divide and rule' - As Congress claimed to represent all Indians, it refused to concede that the Muslim League should nominate all Muslim members of the Executive Council. Source 2 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - The evidence used by the author appears to have been derived from publicly available sources, such as press reports - The piece was produced specifically for an organisation that was interested in understanding the problems of the region - The author is likely to offer an objective view of events as an outsider



Question	Indicative content
	- The tone of the piece seems more critical of the role of the Muslim League than that of Congress in the failure of the Conference. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the failure of the Simla Conference (1945): - It implies that the approach by the British government is responsible for insufficient concessions to enable agreement ('opposition from some officials', 'did not contain any hint of an increase') - It argues that Congress was unhappy with some parts of the proposals ('In 1942, this had been the crucial issue'), suggesting that they would oppose the proposals again - It argues that the central responsibility lay with Jinnah ('demand is difficult to justify.') - It indicates that Wavell 'took all blame upon himself' for the failure of the Conference. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The major change proposed at Simla was the composition of the Executive Council, which was to provide parity to Hindus and Muslims and to be all Indian, apart from the Viceroy and commander-in-chief - Jinnah was committed to the view that the Muslim League should be responsible for the nomination of all Muslim members of the Executive Council and was not prepared to shift on this - Wavell wanted to avoid recriminations and leave the door open for future agreement, so did not openly blame either Congress or the Muslim League for the failure of the Conference. Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Source 1 provides an insider view of the reasons for failure, whereas Source 2 provides an outsider view - Source 1 provides a more balanced assessment of the responsibility for failure, identifying issues with both Congress and the Muslim League. Source 2 is less critical of Congress - Both Sources agree that Jinnah's response was responsible for triggering the failure of the Conference.

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the importance of F W de Klerk in the process of dismantling apartheid in 1990. Source 3 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - It will be well informed about the work done by de Klerk as it was written by him - It presents de Klerk's actions in a positive light - It uses optimistic and hyperbolic language to emphasise the significance of the events that are being discussed. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the importance of F W de Klerk in the process of dismantling apartheid in 1990: - It suggests that the prime mover in the process of dismantling apartheid was de Klerk ('sense of destiny.', 'my speech') - It claims that de Klerk's speech (2 February 1990) began the process of dismantling apartheid ('begin a new era.', 'fundamental policy shift.') - It implies that most South Africans supported the decisions made to move towards dismantling apartheid ('The only dissenting voices came from the Conservative Party.') - It acknowledges the role of Mandela in the process ('both bore the responsibility'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - De Klerk had been pursuing a new course since he had taken over from Botha in 1989 - De Klerk had been negotiating with Mandela in order to organise his release from prison and reach a negotiated settlement; this involved the dismantling of apartheid - De Klerk had not consulted with the South African Parliament – he simply announced the freeing of Mandela and the unbanning of opposition parties. Source 4 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - It was written very shortly after the events, so was an immediate response to these specific events - As a British journalist, the author will not be subject to South African censorship, as his report would be published in Britain - The content reveals some balance in reporting the actions taken by de Klerk.



Question	Indicative content
	2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the importance of F W de Klerk in the dismantling of apartheid in 1990: • It argues that Thatcher played a role in making de Klerk aware that apartheid could not continue ('she couldn't keep up her anti-sanctions position for ever.') • It recognises that de Klerk understood the importance of making changes in South Africa ('courage and intelligence') • It suggests that de Klerk was enacting changes that many South Africans supported ('white supporters.', 'unhappy with it for years.') • It implies that de Klerk's motivations were not necessarily altruistic ('little given away...done a lot'), but may have been motivated by a desire to improve South Africa's international reputation. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Western leaders, such as Thatcher, who had been seen as political allies of the apartheid regime, were now pressurising de Klerk to end apartheid • Many white South Africans did not want to continue with apartheid because they feared that it would result in civil conflict – they were looking for an alternative future • De Klerk did not implement his ideas with great haste. Formal negotiations did not begin until May 1990. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Source 3 provides an insider's view of events, whereas Source 4 provides an outsider's view • Source 3 emphasises the importance of de Klerk in the process, whereas Source 4 looks at a wider range of influences • Both Sources acknowledge that de Klerk did play a key role in beginning the process that led to the dismantling of apartheid • Both Sources agree that many whites were now supportive of a policy that would dismantle apartheid.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the 1920-22 non-cooperation campaign was the most important influence on the growth of nationalism in the years 1914-22. Arguments and evidence that support the view that the 1920-22 non-cooperation campaign was the most important influence on the growth of nationalism in the years 1914-22 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The nature of the campaign encouraged mass support from across the social spectrum, moving support for self-government beyond just the educated groups that had previously supported it • The methods used were non-violent, but went beyond the strategies of the past and, by opening up a new kind of politics, it appealed to a wide cross section of Indian society • The role played by Gandhi made him of pivotal importance in the development of, and support for, the nationalist message • In the early stages of the campaign, both Hindus and Muslims supported its tactics, strengthening the nationalist campaign • The initial successes of the campaign, e.g. the boycott of the visit by the Prince of Wales, attracted further support for the nationalist cause. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that the 1920-22 non-cooperation campaign was the most important influence on the growth of nationalism in the years 1914-22 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Congress split over Gandhi's decision to call off the campaign in 1922, undermining the growing strength of nationalist feeling • Communal divisions and the accompanying violence that emerged during the campaign, e.g. Moplah, weakened the development of nationalism • Mass arrests meant that much of the local leadership of the nationalist movement was not available to develop further support • Cooperation between the ANC and the Muslim League during the First World War, e.g. the Lucknow Pact, was significant in advancing the nationalist cause • The impact of the First World War, in encouraging Indians to demand the rights that they were being denied, was of great significance in the growth of nationalism • The treatment of Indians by the British, e.g. Rowlatt Acts, Amritsar and its aftermath, generated a great deal of anger that was a significant factor in the growth of nationalism. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 made fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain. Arguments and evidence that support the view that the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 made fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Indian participation in government at the highest levels increased. In 1919, only 3 civilian members of the Imperial Executive Council were Indian; in 1935, the Viceroy's Executive Committee had more Indians • There was a shift of decision making from central government to provincial government in order to enable more Indians to participate in the decision-making processes • The role of provincial governments was expanded under each act, so by 1935, the provinces controlled almost everything except defence and foreign policy • Each act extended the franchise; to about 6 million voters by the 1919 Act and to 35 million voters in direct elections after the 1935 Act • There was a view that each act involved Britain in making concessions that would ultimately lead India to full self-government • The impact of the 1935 Act on the princes represented a diminution of their power, thus fundamentally changing their relationship with Britain. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 made fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Britain, in the form of the Viceroy, still had overall control over Indian affairs • The continued use of separate electorates in both acts meant that Britain was still able to influence Indian affairs through the continued use of 'divide and rule' • There were inconsistencies between the two acts, e.g. 1919 introduced dyarchy and 1935 abolished it • Congress opposed the acts on the basis that they did not go far enough and demanded further change • The limited concessions that were made by the acts were insufficient to conciliate the Indian middle classes who were increasingly supportive of the calls of the nationalist movement. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether, in the years 1948–61, the weaknesses of African nationalism were more significant than the strengths of the National Party in explaining the failure of opposition to apartheid. Arguments and evidence that support the view that, in the years 1948–61, the weaknesses of African nationalism were more significant than the strengths of the National Party in explaining the failure of opposition to apartheid should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Internal divisions in the ANC, especially in the 1940s, between a cautious leadership and a more activist young membership, weakened its power to oppose apartheid • Divisions between the opposition groups, e.g. at the end of the period with the split between ANC and PAC, weakened the ability of the opposition to stand united against apartheid • Disagreements over the methods to be used, including the growing use of violence by Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo, after 1960, weakened some of the support for opposition to apartheid • The loss of leading members of the opposition groups, either through arrest, imprisonment or exile, limited their ability to oppose apartheid successfully. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1948–61, the strengths of the National Party were more significant than the weaknesses of African nationalism in explaining the failure of opposition to apartheid should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The National Party government used the instruments of law and order effectively to repress the opposition to apartheid • The effective use of apartheid policy by the National Party to defend their political position • Increased support for the National Party in the 1950s enabled it to strengthen its control over the state and use this as the basis to limit opposition to apartheid • Across the period, the National Party government made effective use of the police to limit the ability for opposition to flourish • The National Party government declared a state of emergency in 1960, and banned opposition groups such as the ANC. This limited the ability of African nationalism to organise opposition to apartheid. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that the main reason for the implementation of apartheid in South Africa, in the years 1948-59, was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism. Arguments and evidence that it is accurate to say that the main reason for the implementation of apartheid in South Africa, in the years 1948-59, was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The growth of Afrikaner nationalism contributed to the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948. The NP was elected on the basis of its commitment to the development of apartheid • At the heart of Afrikaner nationalism was the Dutch Reform Church that believed that black and white people played a different role in God's plan, thereby legitimising and promoting the growth of apartheid policies • Afrikaner nationalists promoted the ideas of <i>swart gevaar</i> and <i>oorstrooming</i>, which justified the use of apartheid to contain the threats that were perceived by white supporters. Arguments and evidence that it is not accurate to say that the main reason for the implementation of apartheid in South Africa, in the years 1948-59, was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism and/or other factors were more important should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Apartheid legislation was already in place before 1948 and the legislation in this period built upon this basis • The NP was elected by only a narrow majority in 1948 and pursued apartheid policies in order to appeal to their electoral base and stay in power • The NP claimed that the implementation of apartheid policies was a sound method of dealing with the social and economic problems caused by the internal migration of black South Africans to the cities • The weaknesses and divisions of the opponents of apartheid in South Africa meant domestic opposition to the implementation of the apartheid legislation was not effective. Other relevant material must be credited.



5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. - The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence**

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the effectiveness of the methods of non-violence advocated by Gandhi in the 1920–22 <i>satyagraha</i>. Source 1 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As the Viceroy of India, Reading would have insights into the ways in which Gandhi's methods had impacted on the Raj - As Reading is reporting to the Prime Minister, he will be focusing on key issues that pertain to the British response to Gandhi's actions - It was written shortly after the ending of the 1920–22 <i>satyagraha</i> and thus is an immediate response to the events of the early 1920s - The tone of the piece appears to be measured and quite neutral. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the effectiveness of the methods of non-violence advocated by Gandhi in the 1920–22 <i>satyagraha</i>: - It implies the methods were effective as they necessitated the arrest of Gandhi - It implies that Gandhi's methods were initially very successful in attracting mass support for the nationalist movement ('influence increased') - It argues that Gandhi's methods had important political consequences, e.g. the effective creation of a new 'political party' - It suggests that Gandhi's methods provided an effective method for resolving divisions in the nationalist movement ('bridge between Hindus and Muslims'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Gandhi had emerged as the dominant nationalist politician by 1920, so his methods were at the forefront of nationalist campaigning - Many aspects of non-violence had the ability to have a significant impact on the functioning of the Raj, e.g. the refusal to pay taxes - Aspects of the non-violence campaign were unrealistic and not going to work, e.g. that lawyers stop practising and school boycotts. Source 2 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a leading member of Congress, Nehru was involved in the campaign, and this would give him access to information about how the campaign was conducted - It is written with some benefit of hindsight, so can reflect on the impact of the effects - Its attitude to Gandhi appears to be somewhat ambivalent in places;



Question	Indicative content
	there are both positive and negative comments about his methods. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the effectiveness of the methods of non-violence advocated by Gandhi in the 1920-22 <i>satyagraha</i> • It argues that Gandhi's interpretation of non-violence would enable its opponents to create the circumstances that would lead to failure, implying that his methods were ineffective • It suggests that there were some doubts emerging about Gandhi's methods, and such divisions might undermine the effectiveness of the campaign ('if Gandhi's arguments') • It implies that the non-violent approach in the 1920-22 <i>satyagraha</i> contributed to the later escalation of communal violence ('the suppressed violence had to find a way out'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Gandhi believed that the events at Chauri Chaura proved that Indians did not yet have the self-discipline that was needed for non-violence to be effective • Gandhi withdrew from public life and returned to the <i>ashram</i> until he was arrested • In the mid-1920s, there were more than 100 communal riots. Sources 1 and 2 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • The Sources present evidence from differing perspectives. Source 1 is from the view of the Raj (the Viceroy) and Source 2 is from a leading member of Congress • Both Sources see the methods as fundamentally failing to achieve their ends • Both Sources point out that the effectiveness of the methods advocated was undermined by divisions within the nationalist movement.

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the consequences of the Sharpeville Massacre (21 March 1960). Source 3 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - It was an immediate response to events, largely being written within a week of the Sharpeville Massacre - As a letter to her daughter, it can be deemed to be providing an accurate view of the author's immediate reaction - The author corrected some of her comments later, increasing the overall assessment provided - The author's position as an MP provided her with access to eyewitnesses to the event. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the consequences of the Sharpeville Massacre (21 March 1960): - It implies that there has been a negative international reaction to these events ('The government's reaction...defying the world') - It suggests that the National Party was concerned with creating a more positive international image to mitigate the impact of these events ('Verwoerd...has called off the police for now.') - It suggests that the divisions between the ANC and the PAC have become even more entrenched ('The ANC is horrified at the success of the PAC campaign and is rushing around') - It claims that the Pass Laws will have to be modified as a consequence of the Sharpeville Massacre, although acknowledges later that this did not happen. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Photographs were taken of the events at Sharpeville and their dissemination at home and abroad added weight to the criticism of the events - The UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning Sharpeville and calling for an end to apartheid - The ANC and PAC continued to organise separately, even when protesting against Sharpeville.

Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a journalist, the author had 'been somewhere near the centre of events' - The author understood the context in which Sharpeville took place having grown up under the apartheid regime - The author can offer valuable insights into black South African reactions to the events at Sharpeville. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the consequences of the Sharpeville Massacre (21 March 1960): - It argues that the Sharpeville Massacre was one of the great 'historic turning points' in South Africa during the author's life - It suggests that Sharpeville created fierce opposition among black South Africans to the apartheid regime ('uncontrollable anger', 'deep, but ineffective anger') - It provides evidence of the government response to the events at Sharpeville, e.g. 'banning of the ANC and PAC' and suggests its use of propaganda ('made to believe') - It claims that the government and the media intentionally misled white South Africans about the nature of the black South African response to Sharpeville. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The NP declared a state of emergency on 30 March, outlawing public meetings and giving the police greater powers of arrest - The Unlawful Organisations Act was passed on 8 April, banning political parties that threatened public order - The NP restricted opposition news reporting, e.g. Myrna Blumberg (<i>London Daily Herald</i>) was arrested (1960), <i>New Age</i>, a South African newspaper, was restricted and finally closed (1962). Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both Source 3 and Source 4 indicate that the Sharpeville Massacre was a momentous event with significant consequences, even though they discuss differing consequences - Source 3 provides an immediate response to the events at Sharpeville, thus dealing with short term consequences, whereas Source 4 is more reflective of the longer-term consequences - Source 4 references the attitudes of liberal white South Africans and the immediate response of Source 3 supports this analysis.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence**

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether, in the years 1928-35, the pressure for constitutional change in India attracted considerable support in Britain. Arguments and evidence that support the view that, in the years 1928-35, the pressure for constitutional change in India attracted considerable support in Britain should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Labour party supported constitutional change, e.g. the decision to send the Simon Commission to India was based on the fear of the Conservative government that Labour would win the 1929 election • The work of Irwin as Viceroy, until 1931, suggests that he was prepared to see changes to India's constitutional position, e.g. Irwin Declaration, Gandhi-Irwin pact • The three Round Table Conferences indicated that the British government was prepared to negotiate constitutional changes with all interested parties • There was significant support for Gandhi when he attended the Second Round Table Conference, especially from the British working class, who saw newsreels of him in the East End of London • Constitutional changes had sufficient support to lead to parliamentary legislation, e.g. the Communal Award (1932), the Government of India Act (1935). The latter act passed with less than 50 MPs voting against it. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that, in the years 1928-35, the pressure for constitutional change in India attracted considerable support in Britain should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The approach of politicians to constitutional change often amounted to the minimum needed to conciliate potential opposition; this did not amount to significant support • The report of the Simon Commission merely reasserted the status quo, indicating a lack of support for change • Viceroy Willingdon's approach, from 1931, indicates less sympathy and support for dealing with demands for constitutional change, e.g. banning Congress and mass imprisonments • The establishment of the India Defence League (1933) by Winston Churchill argued against greater powers for Indians and was supported by about 60 Conservative MPs and 100 peers • Opposition to constitutional change was to be found in newspaper articles, such as the <i>Daily Mail</i>, e.g. 'If we lose India', which contained much 'fake' news, but garnered a wide readership. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that Mountbatten was primarily responsible for the problems associated with the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Arguments and evidence that support the view that it is accurate to say that Mountbatten was primarily responsible for the problems associated with the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Mountbatten was directly responsible for speeding up the timetable for independence, against the wishes of the government, and this contributed to the problems linked to partition • Mountbatten did not believe that an independent state of Pakistan would survive, and so he strengthened India at Pakistan's expense, exacerbating conflict and tensions • Mountbatten displayed a partiality in negotiations for Nehru over Jinnah, e.g. Nehru was given sight of Plan Balkan whilst Jinnah was not • Mountbatten leaked information from the Boundary Commission to Nehru and then exerted influence for its decisions to favour India, e.g. changes in the Punjab boundary, which encouraged further communal violence • Mountbatten ignored the advice of experienced civil servants in the Indian Political Department, e.g. Corfield, regarding the treatment of the princes, when it conflicted with his own views • The Mountbatten Plan made no provision for the Sikhs, although they had previously been promised special consideration. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that it is accurate to say that Mountbatten was primarily responsible for the problems associated with the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Mountbatten inherited a very difficult situation when he became Viceroy, which limited his ability to control events in the Indian subcontinent, e.g. the extent of communal violence • Both Congress and the Muslim League were reluctant to make compromises and both sides were willing to contemplate a large-scale loss of life • Jinnah had been considering partition since at least 1940 (the Lahore Resolution), although he may have been using it as a threat designed to generate greater concessions • Nehru was responsible for making provocative statements that undermined attempts to negotiate, e.g. regarding the Cabinet Mission proposals, and thus contributed to the problems • Jinnah's call for a Direct Action Day, by publicly abandoning constitutional methods, undermined any possibility for compromise and contributed to the problems surrounding partition. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism that was principally responsible for the election victory of the National Party in 1948. Arguments and evidence that support the view that it was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism that was principally responsible for the election victory of the National Party in 1948 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The <i>Broederbond</i> and the OB (<i>Ossewabrandwag</i>) promoted Afrikaner nationalism and, by polarising white opinion, contributed to the National Party victory • The growth of Afrikaner nationalism led the National Party to adopt an explicitly 'Afrikaners First' policy, including fielding no English candidates. This led to support from Afrikaner voters • The growth of Afrikaner nationalism was rooted in white fears of <i>swart kevaar</i> (black threat – especially in economic matters) and miscegenation. Such fears were effectively exploited by the NP • Afrikaner nationalists opposed the United Party's relaxation of segregation to meet war demands. This provided the NP with a popular nationalist platform on which to campaign in 1948. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that it was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism that was principally responsible for the election victory of the National Party in 1948 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many Afrikaner voters had opposed the United Party's decision to support Britain during the Second World War and turned to the NP in 1948 • The United Party was proposing a range of policies that were unpopular with many white voters, e.g. encouraging more immigration from Britain • The United Party became more divided in its views once allied victory had been achieved in the Second World War; this weakened it in the face of the growing support for the NP • There was a widespread belief among voters that the United Party could not deal with the growing unrest in the townships • The NP had developed an effective political organisation with which to campaign in 1948 • The use of a Westminster-style electoral system enabled the National Party to claim a victory, although it had not polled the highest percentage of the popular vote. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how far the National Party's election victory in 1948 was the consequence of the growth of support for Afrikaner nationalist ideas. Arguments and evidence that support the view that the National Party's election victory in 1948 was the consequence of the growth of support for Afrikaner nationalist ideas should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Afrikaner nationalist ideas were promoted by the Broederbond and the OB (Ossewabrandwag), contributing to their growing support and thereby the National Party victory • The National Party was able to effectively exploit white fears of <i>swart kevaar</i> and miscegenation in order to gain growing support • The National Party's opposition to the relaxation of segregation laws by the United Party to meet wartime needs met with support from nationalist Afrikaners • The National Party pursued a nationalist policy of 'Afrikaners First' that was popular with Afrikaners, e.g. no English candidates in the elections. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that the National Party's election victory in 1948 was the consequence of the growth of support for Afrikaner nationalist ideas should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many Afrikaner voters opposed the support of the government for Britain and its allies during the Second World War and this led to them supporting the National Party • The National Party was well organised and effective in its approach to campaigning in 1948 • The electoral system was weighted towards rural seats, and this advantaged the National Party • The use of a Westminster-style electoral system benefited the National Party, even though it did not poll a majority of the votes. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate attitudes towards the education of black South African children in the 1950s. Source 3 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - As a speech made by Verwoerd in his role as Minister of Native Affairs, it is likely to accurately reflect the attitudes of the National Party towards education for black South African children - As a speech made in the South African parliament in support of new legislation, it is likely to present its proposals as having a positive impact - The tone of the speech is a justification for the differential treatment of black South African children. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about attitudes towards the education of black South African children in the 1950s: - It claims that black South African children do not need to use mathematics and therefore do not need to be taught it ('quite absurd.') - It implies a belief by white South Africans that black South African children only need 'to be trained' rather than to have an 'education.' to prepare them for their working lives - It suggests that the government wanted to implement an education system that would prevent challenges to its authority ('ever-increasing number of dissatisfied persons') - It claims that the education system that it is proposing will contribute to improved race relations. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The Bantu Education Act brought all schools for black South African children directly under the control of the state - Verwoerd wanted to increase the number of black South African children accessing education by providing schools for all children; the 1951 census recorded that 24 per cent of black South Africans were literate - Verwoerd was aware that the changing nature of the labour market in South Africa required black South Africans to have certain fundamental skills, such as literacy, numeracy and fluency in English and Afrikaans.

Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - It is written from the perspective of black South Africans, who were directly experiencing the education system - As the author was involved in the campaign against the Bantu Education Act, she can be expected to write with some authority about this campaign and the wider attitudes of black South Africans to education - The tone of the piece is very critical of the government policies on education. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about attitudes towards the education of black South African children in the 1950s: - It rejects the education offered under the Bantu Education Act ('bad Bantu Education Act'), suggesting that there is a desire for a more appropriate system of education - It argues that the standard of education for black South African children has declined as a result of the Bantu Education Act ('Before 1953, the education was a bit better') - It suggests that appropriate education for black South African children is seen as vitally important by black South Africans ('couldn't leave the children...learning nothing.') - It suggests that the 'cultural clubs' were valued as a system of education ('Some... stayed open until 1960.'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The Bantu Education Act implemented a system that was framed in terms of apartheid and offered clearly different opportunities to black South African children and white South African children - The use of boycotts was limited to some urban areas, e.g. Johannesburg, and never involved more than about 7,000 children - Most of the 'cultural clubs' did not provide an effective alternative education - Some of the missionary schools closed as a result of the Bantu Education Act; others were taken over by the state and saw a dramatic change in the content of what was taught, e.g. Adams College. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Source 3 is written from the perspective of the National Party's attitudes, whereas Source 4 is written from the perspective of a black South African activist - Source 3 outlines some of the main thinking that underpinned the Bantu Education Act, whereas Source 4 describes the black South African response to it - While both Sources agree that the Bantu Education Act was going to restrict the education of black South Africans, Source 3 sees this positively, whereas Source 4 sees it negatively.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence



2	3–5	• Demonstrates some understanding of the source material and attempts analysis by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand or confirm matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and with some substantiation for assertions of value. The concept of utility is addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far Vorster's use of police powers was responsible for the strengthening of apartheid in the years 1961-68. Arguments and evidence that Vorster's use of police powers was responsible for the strengthening of apartheid in the years 1961-68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The outlawing of ANC and PAC meant that leading members could be legally arrested. To avoid arrest and imprisonment some fled. This meant opposition to apartheid lacked leadership • 1963 General Laws Amendment Act gave the police additional powers to suppress opposition to apartheid including arrest without charge and solitary confinement. This was extended further by the 1967 Terrorism Act • Apartheid legislation was rigorously enforced e.g. in 1968, there were 700,000 prosecutions under the Pass Laws Arguments and evidence that other factors, not Vorster's use of police powers, were responsible for the strengthening of apartheid in the years 1961-68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The South African economy was growing by about 5% p.a. in this period and the benefits this brought appeased some who might otherwise have opposed apartheid, thereby strengthening the system • The impact of the 1959 Bantu Self Government Act removed many who might have opposed apartheid from the cities and also offered opportunities for the black middle class so that they accepted the system • A less politicised black urban culture was developing based on consumerism, the churches and aspirations for economic improvement • Increased state control over publications and broadcasting muted the voice of opposition and created a positive message Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the increasing use of violence by anti-apartheid groups in South Africa, in the years 1960-68, was a reaction to the use of repression by the government. Arguments and evidence that the increasing use of violence by anti-apartheid groups in South Africa, in the years 1960-68, was a reaction to the use of repression by the government should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The impact of the Sharpeville massacre demonstrated that the National Party intended to maintain white supremacy by the use of force and led anti-apartheid groups to consider alternative strategies • The ANC and the PAC were banned in 1960 which limited their ability to act peacefully and led them to consider the use of violence • The continued use of police and military force against mass mobilisation campaigns, e.g. 'stay at home' campaign May 1961, showed that these sorts of protests would no longer work • The declaration of a state of emergency led to the arrest of leading members of the anti-apartheid opposition so that they were no longer always the key influences on anti-apartheid organisations • The creation of MK and Poqo as the underground military wings of the ANC and the PAC was a response to the arrest of many leaders. Arguments and evidence that the increasing use of violence by anti-apartheid groups in South Africa, in the years 1960-68, was not a reaction to the use of repression by the government should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The failure of non-violent methods of protest in the 1950s to prevent the extension of apartheid legislation • The split between the ANC and the PAC meant that differences in approach began to emerge • The influence of violent liberation movements in other African countries such as Algeria • The influence of individuals such as Mandela, Sisulu and other ex-Youth League organisers in encouraging the move towards more direct forms of action. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the economic recovery of South Africa during the 1960s was the main reason for the strengthening of apartheid in this decade. Arguments and evidence that the economic recovery of South Africa during the 1960s was the main reason for the strengthening of apartheid in this decade should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The impact of economic recovery was a reduction in unemployment amongst black South Africans to less than 10% of the occupied population. This resulted in less overt opposition to apartheid • The development of a prosperous black middle class who did not want to alter a status quo that brought them benefits • Political support for the National government amongst whites increased in the 1960s because of the prosperity of these years; this strengthening of support enabled the further consolidation of apartheid • Economic prosperity encouraged European immigration of skilled workers who ascribed their position to the National government, further strengthening support for it and its policies. Arguments and evidence that the economic recovery of South Africa during the 1960s was not the main reason for the strengthening of apartheid in this decade/other factors were more important should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • South Africa's economic recovery was slower than in other middle income countries so its impact was limited • Use of increased police powers and repressive legislation to limit any opposition to apartheid measures, e.g. 1960 Unlawful Organisations Act which was used to outlaw ANC and PAC • The imprisonment of leading anti-apartheid activists using a range of repressive legislation, e.g. Mandela and Sisulu at the Rivonia Trial • The policy of forced removals weakened the potential for urban resistance to the policies of apartheid. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate the significance of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in March 1961. Source 3 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - The author was a leading South African anti-apartheid campaigner who would have a clear position on the event - The author was in London at the time of the decision and would have access to a wide set of responses - The author was able to write his opinions without concern about his views being censored - The language used makes it very clear that he sees it in a very positive light. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the significance of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in March 1961: - It argues that it was a defeat for the National Party ('stunning defeat') and a victory for the forces of anti-apartheid ('resounding victory') - It provides evidence that it can be used as the beginning of a concerted campaign to oppose apartheid in every area of life ('we are now engaged in a campaign') - It points to the effectiveness of concerted action and suggests that continuing such unity is the way to deal with the apartheid government in South Africa - It implies that its significance could be undermined by western governments continuing to support the South African government ('not have back-door trade and other deals'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Verwoerd attended the eleventh meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in March 1961 to request South Africa's admission to the Commonwealth as a republic from May 1961 - A number of Commonwealth countries opposed South Africa's

Question	Indicative content
	membership because of their apartheid policies; there had been previous discussion of expelling South Africa from the Commonwealth • Some Commonwealth countries threatened to leave the Commonwealth if an exception were made for South Africa • Verwoerd presented these events as a victory because he had withdrawn rather than lose a vote. Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • Turton was presenting an immediate response to South Africa's decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth • As the home of the Commonwealth, a debate about membership in the House of Commons suggests that this was an important issue • Turton's focus is primarily on the constitutional issues for the Commonwealth that surround the decision. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the significance of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in March 1961: • It argues that a number of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth have not applied its rules correctly in relation to their treatment of South Africa ('misunderstood the nature of Commonwealth') • It suggests that the reason for the approach taken by a number of Prime Ministers was their opposition to the system of apartheid • It implies that South Africa had no alternative but to withdraw from the Commonwealth ('the Commonwealth has driven South Africa out') • It argues that the withdrawal from the Commonwealth will have a detrimental effect on the future situation regarding apartheid in South Africa. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • A referendum held in October 1960 on South Africa becoming a republic was narrowly carried and this change of status impacted on South Africa's position in the Commonwealth • Where the Queen was not the Head of State, as in a republic, membership of the Commonwealth was only possible with a unanimous vote of support from all Commonwealth members • The impact of South Africa's withdrawal was to increase South African isolation in the world • Britain continued trading with South Africa and there was little significant change in any aspect of their relationship.



Question	Indicative content
	Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources agree that this was an issue of great significance • Source 3 sees the withdrawal from the Commonwealth as a very positive step, whereas Source 4 sees it as very negative • Source 3 believes it is the first step towards ending apartheid, whereas Source 4 argues it will prevent a loosening of apartheid • Source 3 views the Commonwealth leaders in a positive light, whereas Source 4 sees them as being mistaken.

Section B: indicative content**Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence**



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether, it was principally the economic recovery that strengthened apartheid in the years 1961-68. Arguments and evidence that support the view that it was principally the economic recovery that strengthened apartheid in the years 1961-68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many black South Africans benefitted from the economic recovery, e.g. growth in white collar jobs, rising incomes, so that there was less incentive to challenge the prevailing system • White South Africans saw an improving standard of living that, for many, was linked to the policies of the NP, thus strengthening support for their apartheid policies • The increasing economic dependence on the economically successful South Africa by some adjacent countries, e.g. Lesotho, restricted the ability of the ANC to use these countries as a base for operations • South Africa continued to be able to develop its trading links with established partners, e.g. Britain, US, and with new partners, e.g. Japan. This undermined international criticism for apartheid • The costs of the Bantustan policy were only feasible because the government was able to raise sufficient taxes to finance it as a consequence of the economic recovery. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that it was principally the economic recovery that strengthened apartheid in the years 1961-68. should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • South Africa's economic recovery was based on a limited range of production, mainly mining and agriculture, so it was never securely established, and hence did not strengthen apartheid longer term • Economic recovery increased the requirement for skilled workers in urban areas, which undermined, rather than strengthened, some apartheid measures, such as the Pass Laws • The leadership in the Bantustans, which started opening in 1963, were prepared to work with the government within the apartheid system rather than oppose it, e.g. Matanzima • The imprisonment of leading opponents of apartheid as a result of the Rivonia trial appeared to demonstrate the strengthening of the grip of the NP and of apartheid • Starting in 1963, the government organised a number of bodies – many secret – to coordinate security issues; this enabled the government to limit the opposition to apartheid and strengthen the system • The government increased police powers in the 1960s, which enabled it to strengthen apartheid by controlling the opposition more effectively, e.g. 1967 Terrorism Act. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the Sharpeville Massacre was significant in creating opposition to apartheid in the years 1960–68. Arguments and evidence that the Sharpeville Massacre was significant in creating opposition to apartheid in the years 1960–68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The events at Sharpeville were photographed and the horror expressed at these events reinforced white liberal opposition to the government • It created international outrage at the response to the protest, e.g. the UN passed a resolution condemning the shooting, and contributed to the growing international pressure on South Africa • It encouraged further protests in the immediate aftermath, e.g. 30,000 people marched from Langa to Cape Town • It led both the ANC and PAC to reconsider their strategies for bringing change, and thus contributed to the move to armed struggle by MK and Poqo. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that the Sharpeville Massacre was significant in creating opposition to apartheid in the years 1960–68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Police powers were strengthened under the state of emergency announced after the Massacre and this enabled the state to control potential opposition • A number of key leaders of the ANC, e.g. Mandela, Luthuli, Slovo, were immediately arrested, meaning that their organisational abilities were lost to the opposition movement. Also arrested was Sobukwe of the PAC • The banning of political parties under the Unlawful Organisations Act (1960) meant that there was a loss of organisational structure through which opposition could be expressed. Other relevant material must be credited.

2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors: Section A

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	• Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little or no supporting evidence. Concepts of reliability or utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of the threat posed to the South African government by African nationalists in the years 1961-68. Arguments and evidence that support the view that the threat posed to the South African government by African nationalists in the years 1961-68 was significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Nationalists in South Africa maintained a prominent international profile (e.g. Albert Luthuli won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961), encouraging foreign pressure on the government to continue through the period • Nationalists who fled into exile abroad to avoid arrest (e.g. Oliver Tambo) were significant in maintaining the threat of international pressure in opposition to the apartheid regime • MK threatened the government through its commitment to the selective sabotage of property in the 1960s. This additionally drew attention to the failings of the government • Poqo was prepared to engage in more brutal action than MK, against both property and people, creating an atmosphere of tension and fear that challenged the government • MK and Poqo had the support of some neighbouring African countries that allowed them to train there, e.g. Zambia and Lesotho • Communist regimes, e.g. the Soviet Union, provided financial support and training for MK, thereby increasing the potential threat that it posed. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that the threat posed to the South African government by African nationalists in the years 1961-68 was significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The South African government used its powers of repression effectively to contain nationalist opposition, e.g. the Rivonia Trial, executions of members of MK and Poqo • It was difficult for the nationalist leaders to organise within South Africa; Mandela and Sobukwe were isolated in prison, others had fled, and those who remained could not actively protest • Neither MK nor Poqo had sufficient resources to provide a sustained threat to the South African government • By 1968, the South African government was able to exert economic pressure on some of the surrounding countries, e.g. Lesotho, so that they could no longer be used as bases by MK and Poqo • The successful economic situation in South Africa in the 1960s undercut opposition to the government. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the importance of international sporting boycotts against apartheid in the late 1970s. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It provides evidence of the attitude of the 'Heads of Government' of the Commonwealth and their commitment to action - It suggests that the campaign is on a very wide scale as it is part of an 'international campaign' which also includes the UN - The language of the statement suggests a clear sense of outrage against apartheid ('dangerous sickness', 'unmitigated evil') and the need to act speedily ('urgent'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - It is a statement made by the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, a public announcement that has been agreed - It was passed unanimously which suggests strong support for their desire to isolate South Africa in sporting terms - It was adopted at a time when there was growing international outrage at events within South Africa e.g. Soweto 1976 and the death of Biko 1977. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - There had previously been some restrictions on sport with South Africa e.g. the D'Oliveira affair, the expulsion from international cricket, but these were inconsistent - South Africa had been banned from the Olympic Games since 1964 - This approach had support from the Anti-apartheid Movement which felt it drew international attention to the apartheid issue - Some of the sports that white South Africans played were dominated by Commonwealth countries e.g. cricket and rugby union.

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the Soweto Uprising. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The author is a member of the South African Parliament and will have access to the information that has been provided to Parliament - The author is a leading anti-apartheid politician, which is likely to influence his views - The author appears to give a balanced perspective – there is criticism of both the government and the actions taken by those participating in the rising - The speech is only one day after the rising began, so is an immediate response to those events. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It suggests that such an event was not entirely unexpected ('not with surprise') - It indicates that the fundamental cause of the violence was 'hatred and resentment against the system' - It argues that there are different ways of seeing the events ('conflicting eye witness accounts') - It suggests that the event has a much wider importance ('far too serious'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - Events in Soweto were triggered by the decision to introduce teaching in Afrikaans into schools - There were a number of grievances felt by young people in the townships based on their economic status - The response to the demonstration by the scholars was disproportionate – on 16 June; 23 people were killed on the first day.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence



Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the events that led up to the Soweto Uprising in June 1976. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It provides evidence of planning in the days that led up to the march in Soweto, e.g. 'formed an action committee' - It suggests that the impetus for the action came exclusively from the students ('teachers were not informed') - It provides evidence that the introduction of teaching in Afrikaans was a central concern for those involved in the protest - It implies that the Black Consciousness Movement played a role in mobilising the students ('student activists'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The author of the source was involved in the events leading up to the Soweto Uprising as one of the leaders and was thus in a good position to know what was going on - The author is reflecting on events 20 years later at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and is thus likely to recollect candidly - The development of a chronology of events adds weight to the information provided as it suggests accurate recall of detail. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - The use of the Afrikaans language was seen as promoting the language of oppression. Many teachers in black African schools were not competent in the language - The development of the Black Consciousness Movement had promoted a sense of pride in being black and a belief that blacks had to be responsible for their own liberation - Many aspects of township life had alienated young black Africans, most notably apartheid legislation, poverty and poor education.

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the aims of the United Democratic Front. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - The language of the source is highly inclusive to meet the needs of the varying opposition groups in attendance - No specific author is identified – the Declaration of Independence is adopted by the people attending the mass rally and thus outlines the broad aims of those in attendance - The purpose was to rally support for the fledgling organisation - The number of people attending the rally suggests that there is substantial support for this new organisation. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - The source provides evidence that the UDF desires greater freedoms and rights for all South Africans ('we cherish the vision of a united, democratic South Africa') - The source provides evidence that the UDF stood against the reforms implemented by Botha's government ('We say no to the Koornhof laws') - The source suggests that cooperation between the various groups who oppose apartheid is important ('We resolve to stand together') - The structure of the source suggests a well-organised movement that has a clear plan of action. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - The UDF was launched on the same day that the government planned to launch the tricameral system, which was one of the things that the UDF opposed - Interested groups had been mobilising and planning the launch of the UDF since the start of 1983 - The UDF opposed Botha's reforms using a variety of strategies, e.g. they boycotted the elections to the tricameral parliament.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of the role played by leading individuals in challenging the apartheid policies of the National Party in the years 1968-83. Arguments and evidence about the significance of the role played by leading individuals in challenging the apartheid policies of the National Party in the years 1968-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Candidates should reference at least two individuals. Relevant points may include: • Steve Biko was crucial to the development of a new view of black identity through the Black Consciousness Movement which acted to unify all those who were oppressed by apartheid • Steve Biko played an important role in influencing school and university students to organise through SASO and engage in mass mobilisation campaigns against the regime • Oliver Tambo was the president of the ANC from 1967 and in this capacity directed the actions of the organisation against the regime after his escape from arrest by going into exile • By the late 1970s, Nelson Mandela came to symbolise those held as political prisoners by the apartheid regime in South Africa and acted to unify opposition to the policies of the regime • On the Nationalist side, Botha acknowledged after 1978 that reform of the system was required, although his purpose at this time was to reform in order to preserve white supremacy. Arguments and evidence about the limited significance of leading individuals and/or other factors in challenging the apartheid policies of the National Party in the years 1968-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Leading individuals were often imprisoned by the regime or were in exile because of their position. They were therefore reliant on the mass mobilisation of groups to carry through protests • The role played by the international community in isolating the apartheid regime by e.g. economic and sporting boycotts and international condemnation of events such as the Soweto uprising • The National Party was weakened by internal divisions and scandals, e.g. the information scandal which impacted on its ability to defend its apartheid policies vigorously • The impact of conflict in the countries close to South Africa threatened the authority of the National Party, e.g. Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how far external pressures on the National Party weakened its control over South Africa in the years 1974-83. Arguments and evidence that external pressures on the National Party weakened its control over South Africa in the years 1974-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many of the states surrounding South Africa were achieving their independence at this time, e.g. Angola (1975), Zimbabwe (1980), and had the potential to pose a threat to South Africa and thus weaken the National Party • Concerns that ANC activists and MK were finding sanctuary in states close to South Africa and using these as a base of operations, undermining the National Party's control, e.g. Mozambique • SATIS was launched in 1974 and attracted international support for the Anti-Apartheid Movement, thus putting pressure on governments elsewhere to exert pressure on the National Party's apartheid policy and control • By 1980, the 'Free Nelson Mandela' campaign was operating on a global level, increasing the media interest in the issues and hence putting pressure on the National Party and its policies. Arguments and evidence that external pressures on the National Party did not weaken its control over South Africa in the years 1974-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • South Africa ensured cooperation with neighbouring states by making loans to some of them so that they were economically dependent on South Africa, e.g. Swaziland, Lesotho • Regional agreements were reached, which eased the pressure on South Africa's borders, e.g. Swaziland (1982), and restricted the activities of the ANC • International sporting boycotts were inconvenient for the population, but did not seriously weaken the regime • Overseas investment did not stop as a result of the attention that apartheid was receiving in these years, e.g. \$30 billion was invested by about 2,500 foreign companies. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to shed light on responses to the death of Steve Biko. Source 3 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - It was published within days of the death of Steve Biko, so was an immediate response - The newspaper had a liberal anti-apartheid stance which would influence the way in which it reported the activities of the police - The tone of the source suggests that the newspaper does not accept the view offered by the police of the death of Steve Biko. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about responses to the death of Steve Biko: - It suggests that Biko's death was part of a larger pattern of deaths in custody ('Mr Biko is the twentieth person to die in Security Police custody in eighteen months') - It suggests that the rapidity with which Kruger issued his statement is suspicious and may be an attempt 'to prevent any anticipated outcry about Biko's death' - It suggests that the manner of death claimed for Biko and for another detainee amount to a cover up by the police - It provides arguments to challenge the basis of the report that Biko died whilst on hunger strike. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - Steve Biko was a leading member of the Black Consciousness Movement and SASO. He was banned for his activities in 1973 - Donald Woods had been told by Biko that he would never commit suicide and that any such reports should be treated with suspicion - James Kruger showed very little sympathy for the death of Steve Biko, saying shortly after his death that 'it leaves me cold', i.e. he was not interested in it - The publicity surrounding the death of Steve Biko led to an inquest, although this ruled his death a prison accident. Source 4 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - The broadcast took place shortly after the death of Steve Biko - The South African Broadcasting Corporation always followed the official National Party line, so that is what can be expected in this broadcast - The purpose of the broadcast was to present an official line to an overseas audience to justify what has happened. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the

Question	Indicative content
	following points of information and inferences about responses to the death of Steve Biko: • It claims that there is more information to be revealed and links this to the arrest of Biko, thus suggesting that what happened to him was legitimate • It claims that Biko went on hunger strike and that this was the cause of his death. It claims that suicide was the result of 'communist training' and points to deaths in custody being 'thoroughly investigated' • It claims that Biko was well treated whilst in custody ('A number of doctors visited Biko') • It suggests that the police were engaged in a cover-up as despite the number of suicides, they claim that they 'are sometimes totally unexpected.' 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Biko was an influential political activist who met foreign diplomats and politicians to inform them about the situation that black South Africans faced • Biko's funeral was attended by about 20,000 people, including diplomats from thirteen Western countries • Biko was frequently arrested in the last two years of his life and attempts were made to link him to foreign opposition groups • Peter Jones, who was arrested with Steve Biko, was tortured over a long period. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources appear within a week of the death of Steve Biko, so are immediate responses to his death • The sources reflect different views from different parts of the media about the death of Steve Biko • Both sources claim his death as part of a larger pattern – Source 3 as deaths in custody and Source 4 as suicides • Source 3 blames the police explicitly for the deaths in custody, including Steve Biko, and from Source 4 it can be inferred that the police are responsible for these deaths.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence

Question	Indicative content



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the 1976 Soweto Uprising did not threaten the system of apartheid. Arguments and evidence that the 1976 Soweto Uprising did not threaten the system of apartheid should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Soweto Uprising lacked clear organisation and leadership; as such the threat it posed to the system of apartheid was only of a limited nature • The government was able to suppress the opposition to apartheid that arose during the Soweto Uprising, e.g. by the arrest of many student leaders in order to prevent their continued involvement in organising protests • The government was able to suppress opposition in the aftermath of Soweto, e.g. in 1977, 17 anti-apartheid organisations were banned, including SASO and SASM. Arguments and evidence that the 1976 Soweto Uprising did threaten the system of apartheid should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • 12,000 of those involved in these events left the country to join the ANC in exile and receive military training; this strengthened the ANC in its fight against apartheid • International criticism of the events, which were widely photographed and televised, undermined the National Party's attempts to end its isolation • UN Security Council Resolution 392 was passed only three days later, condemning the South African government and the system of apartheid • White business leaders in South Africa were shocked by the international reaction and began to put pressure on the government to introduce reforms. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the 1976 Soweto Uprising was significant in strengthening opposition to apartheid in the years 1976-83. Arguments and evidence that it is accurate to say that the 1976 Soweto Uprising was significant in strengthening opposition to apartheid in the years 1976-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • More than 12,000 students left South Africa as a result of the Soweto Uprising and joined the ANC in exile, rejuvenating and strengthening the ANC • The international profile of the ANC was dramatically increased, e.g. Oliver Tambo became the first black South African to address the UN in October 1976 • Armed and violent opposition to apartheid by both the ANC and PAC increased in the aftermath of Soweto • Soweto increased liberal opposition within South Africa; support for the Progressive Federal Party increased, becoming the official opposition in 1977 • The international condemnation provoked by the events led to a strengthening of international opposition to South Africa, e.g. the withdrawal of the Polaroid Company 1977. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that it is accurate to say that the 1976 Soweto Uprising was significant in strengthening opposition to apartheid in the years 1976-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Opposition groups linked to the Black Consciousness Movement, e.g. SASO, SASM, and the South African Council of Churches were banned in 1977, thus weakening opposition to apartheid within South Africa • There were mass arrests of those involved in the Soweto Uprising – 4,000 by the end of 1976, so many anti-apartheid leaders were either under arrest or in exile • In the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising, government policy was reassessed and the policy of total strategy was implemented, which made concessions to the opposition. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether internal opposition was more significant than external pressures in weakening the position of the National Party in the years 1974-87. Arguments and evidence that supports the view that internal opposition was more significant than external pressures in weakening the position of the National Party in the years 1974-87 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The development of the Black Consciousness Movement inspired a new generation of young Africans to oppose the regime and its policies • Many within South Africa, both blacks and whites, had been shocked by the events at Soweto and put pressure on the government to modify their policies • The development of trade unions offered opportunities for organisation and action, which had the potential to undermine the position of the National Party, e.g. 1974 Natal textile workers • There was resistance to the implementation of the Bantustans during the 1970s • The founding of the UDF in 1983 offered the basis for a more unified approach to be taken by opposition groups. Arguments and evidence that supports the view that external pressures were more significant than internal opposition in weakening the position of the National Party in the years 1974-87 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many of the states close to South Africa were achieving independence (e.g. Angola 1975, Zimbabwe 1980) and posed a threat to South Africa, and hence the position of the National Party • The MK was based in states close to South Africa and used these as the base for their operations against the South African government; in 1985 137 attacks were launched by MK from abroad • The work of SATIS drew additional attention to the international Anti-Apartheid Movement and contributed to greater international pressure against the use of political imprisonment by the National Party • Economic sanctions were beginning to have a significant impact by the end of the period, e.g. Reagan supported disinvestment, EC sanctions • Sports and cultural boycotts had an indirect impact in undermining the morale of the population and thus weakening the position of the National Party. Other relevant material must be credited.

2	4-7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the ANC was successful in opposing apartheid in the years 1968-83. Arguments and evidence that it is accurate to say that the ANC was successful in opposing apartheid in the years 1968-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • There was significant underground support for the ANC within South Africa, which was harnessed to increase support for opposition to apartheid within the country • The actions of the ANC overseas, e.g. by Oliver Tambo who spoke at the UN, contributed to the galvanising of the international anti-apartheid movement • There was a growing use of successful sabotage against targets of strategic importance by MK, operating as the military wing of the ANC, from 1980, e.g. Sasolburg. Arguments and evidence that it is not accurate to say that the ANC was successful in opposing apartheid in the years 1968-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many of its leading figures were either in prison (e.g. Mandela) or in exile (e.g. Tambo) for much of this period • In the late 1960s and early 1970s, internal divisions in the ANC, and problems in establishing MK guerrilla bases abroad, limited its effectiveness • Many young black South Africans looked to other organisations to express their opposition to apartheid (e.g. SASO), suggesting that the ANC was not successful • Botha's combination of repression and concession had some success in restricting the success of the ANC. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that, in the years 1968-83, the power of the National Party was seriously undermined. Arguments and evidence that support the view that it is accurate to say that, in the years 1968-83, the power of the National Party was seriously undermined should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The influence of Black Power created a new sense of identity amongst young black South Africans that led to a sustained campaign against the power of the National Party • The impact of the Soweto Uprising and the subsequent death of Steve Biko, on both domestic and international audiences, undermined support for the National Party government • By the late 1960s, the global anti-apartheid movement was developing and gathering momentum, contributing to calls for international boycotts, which undermined the power of the National Party • Under Oliver Tambo, the ANC reorganised and became more effective, undermining the message of the National Party • Trade union activity in the 1970s, e.g. 1974 Natal strikes, encouraged more effective organisation amongst groups that had previously not been involved in opposing the power of the state • Internal division and scandal, e.g. the information scandal, undermined the credibility and the power of the National Party. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that it is accurate to say that, in the years 1968-83, the power of the National Party was seriously undermined should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In the four general elections in these years, the number of National Party MPs elected changed very little • The National Party continued to use repression in order to limit challenges to its power • The homeland policy encouraged some African politicians to co-operate with the National Party and helped to strengthen support for the National Party • Under Botha, attempts were made to conciliate opponents and retain power through reform, e.g. some political powers were devolved to black urban councils • Through diplomacy with surrounding states, e.g. 1982 Lesotho, limitations were put on the ANC in exile, thus strengthening the position of the National Party in South Africa. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that, in the years 1974-83, opposition to apartheid was strengthened. Arguments and evidence that it is accurate to say that, in the years 1974-83, opposition to apartheid was strengthened should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The mobilisation of school children in support of the Black Consciousness Movement caused growing numbers to become involved in the opposition to apartheid • The Soweto uprising (1976), and the government's response to it, attracted global attention, strengthening opposition both domestically and internationally • The reorganisation of the ANC revitalised the organisation and strengthened opposition to apartheid • International support for the anti-apartheid movement led to international cultural and sporting boycotts, as well as calls for economic boycotts. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that, in the years 1974-83, opposition to apartheid was strengthened should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Opposition to apartheid was constrained by the use of repressive actions against protesters, e.g. the imprisonment of student leaders after the Soweto uprising • Much of the leadership of anti-apartheid groups was in prison (Mandela), in exile (Tambo) or died in mysterious circumstances (Biko). This made organising the opposition more challenging • The ability of the ANC to organise in neighbouring countries was limited by the government exerting diplomatic pressure on these countries, e.g. agreement with Lesotho (1982) • Opposition was undermined by reforms and concessions from Botha and the NP, e.g. changes to the constitution in the early 1980s. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of domestic challenges in undermining the power of the National Party in the years 1968-83. Arguments and evidence that domestic challenges were significant in undermining the power of the National Party in the years 1968-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The impact of the events at Soweto (1976) shocked many South Africans of all races, and led to increased pressure on the government to change its policies, undermining the position of the National Party • The Information Scandal (1978) weakened the National Party and led to internal divisions within the party • There was widespread resistance to the implementation of the Bantustans in the 1970s and this undermined the policy that the NP was trying to implement • Economic problems at home undermined support for the government from white South Africans, weakening the position of the NP • The UDF was founded in 1983, which unified many of the opposition groups, meaning the NP faced a more cohesive opposition at the end of the period. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that domestic challenges were significant in undermining the power of the National Party in the years 1968-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • International attitudes to South Africa were hardening as the global anti-apartheid movement attracted increasing support, e.g. the Stop the Seventy Tour in the aftermath of the D'Oliveira crisis (1968) • Many adjacent states, e.g. Angola and Zimbabwe, had achieved independence and posed a threat to the government of South Africa • MK based their operations outside South Africa (e.g. Zambia at the start of the period and Mozambique at the end), providing an overseas challenge for the NP to deal with. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that opposition to apartheid was strengthened throughout the years 1968-83. Arguments and evidence that support the view that it is accurate to say that opposition to apartheid was strengthened throughout the years 1968-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Under the leadership of Oliver Tambo, the organisation of the ANC was reunified and restrengthened; this was a crucial element underpinning the overall strengthening of the opposition to apartheid throughout the period • There was growing grass roots support for opposition to apartheid among the young throughout the period, who were galvanised by the Black Consciousness Movement, e.g. through membership of SASM and SASO • The global anti-apartheid movement developed steadily in this period and provided support for a range of boycotts through the period, e.g. sport (Stop the Seventy in cricket) • Opposition was strengthened by the work of significant organisations across these years, e.g. World Council of Churches (1972), Gleneagles Agreement (1977), UN International Anti-Apartheid Year (1978). Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that it is accurate to say that opposition to apartheid was strengthened throughout the years 1968-83 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Opposition to apartheid, both domestic and international, was driven forward by specific events, e.g. Soweto (1976) and the government's reaction to these events, rather than being strengthened throughout • Kaunda removed his support for MK to be based in Zambia, thus making it harder for MK to organise its training, and leading to the ANC's decision to end military incursions • The ANC was divided over the decisions relating to membership taken at Morogoro (1969), with members who wanted the movement to be exclusively African being expelled in 1975 • The South African government used repression to undercut the actions of its opponents, e.g. imprisonment of the Soweto student leaders • Many of the leaders of the South African opposition groups were unable to engage in leadership inside the country, either through imprisonment (Mandela) or exile (Tambo) • Opposition was undermined in the early 1980s through concessions made by Botha's government, e.g. equalising expenditure on education. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into attitudes towards international sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It provides evidence that black South Africans supported sanctions and were prepared to suffer hardships so that sanctions would be successful ('we will support sanctions, even if it causes more suffering') - It implies that links with the South African regime are immoral (less concerned with 'the victims of apartheid' than with 'those who benefit from apartheid') - It suggests the hypocrisy of the attitudes of the international business community ('the excuses that the businesses are there for our benefit') - It provides evidence of economic ('we are suffering') and political ('come back when we have a democratic and fair South Africa') improvements being achieved in the longer term through sanctions. - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The author of the source is a leading anti-apartheid campaigner who is well-known internationally because of his stance and achievements - By writing in the <i>New York Times</i>, the author is ensuring that there will be a wide audience for his views - By citing 'recent surveys' the author suggests that the information provided is accurate. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher opposed sanctions, but Reagan's opposition was vetoed in the US Congress because of support for Tutu's arguments - Governments implemented sanctions during the 1980s, e.g. 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (USA), 1986 banning of iron, steel and gold coin imports (European Community) - Individual companies boycotted trade with South Africa during the second half of the 1980s, e.g. Pepsi.

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into Verwoerd's aims and beliefs in the years 1960–61. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - It is a speech made by Verwoerd himself and as such is likely to represent his views accurately - It takes a defensive tone about the contribution made by whites to the development of South Africa - It was a public speech that was likely to be widely reported both at home and abroad because it was part of an exchange in the South African Parliament with the British prime minister - It was Verwoerd's response to the 'wind of change' speech, which had implied, amongst other things, the necessity of giving political rights to black South Africans. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It suggests that Verwoerd wishes to maintain the status of whites in South Africa ('be just to the white man') - It implies that any improvements that have taken place in South Africa are the result of the contributions and achievements of whites ('the people who brought civilisation here') - It indicates that Verwoerd believed that the rights of black South Africans were protected ('grant the fullest rights'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - At this time Verwoerd was trying to establish his authority within the National Party as a hard-line supporter of apartheid - Macmillan had not provided Verwoerd with a draft of the 'wind of change' speech so that this response was made with no preparation 1960–61 marks the beginning of a hardening of South African attitudes towards the relationship with Britain.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence



Question	Indicative content
2a	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the importance of a new constitution for South Africa in 1993. - The value could be identified in terms of the following points of information from the source, and the inferences which could be drawn and supported from the source: - It indicates that agreement such as that reached through the constitution is essential for bringing an end to violence in South Africa - It provides evidence that the constitution would prevent discrimination in the future - It suggests that the new constitution will have a far-reaching impact on many aspects of South African life - It implies that there have had to be compromises in order to achieve agreement ('maintain ...ways of life'). - The following points could be made about the authorship, nature or purpose of the source and applied to ascribe value to information and inferences: - The speaker is the South African State President and is therefore in a position to understand what the aims of the constitution are - The speaker is receiving the Nobel Peace Prize and is showing how he intends to build on the progress made in developing South Africa - The tone of the speech shows that he takes a positive view on the outcomes that are likely. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information. Relevant points may include: - The constitution was an interim arrangement as there needed to be an election to confirm its terms - The constitution established a multi-party democracy with strong protections for human rights - Both de Klerk and Mandela made concessions in order to get the constitution passed.

Question	Indicative content
2b	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source in relation to an enquiry into the significance of the Sharpeville Massacre. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to selected information and inferences: - Mandela is commenting on decision-making in which he was directly involved when discussing the response of the ANC and is therefore likely to be well-informed about the process - Mandela presents the contribution of the ANC to the aftermath of Sharpeville in a very positive light - Mandela would have a long-term perspective about the significance of the Sharpeville Massacre. - The evidence could be assessed in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences: - It provides evidence that there was extensive condemnation of the Massacre both at home and abroad - It suggests that there were economic consequences of the Massacre for the government ('capital started to flow out of the country') - It suggests that there were divisions in the anti-apartheid movement between the ANC and PAC and that these became more obvious as a result of the Massacre - It provides evidence of the response of the ANC to the Massacre and of the government to the agitation. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of the content. Relevant points may include: - The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 134 criticising the apartheid policies of the South African government that had led to the Sharpeville Massacre - There was a range of activities by various anti-apartheid groups to show opposition to the events at Sharpeville, e.g. march from Langa to Cape Town - The State of Emergency strengthened the powers of the police, e.g. suspended habeas corpus - The State of Emergency was followed by the Unlawful Organisations Act, which banned parties that threatened public order (i.e. ANC and PAC).

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Section B: indicative content**Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence**



2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors

Section A: Questions 1a/2a

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–2	• Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little if any substantiation. Concepts of utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	3–5	• Demonstrates some understanding of the source material and attempts analysis by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand or confirm matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and with some substantiation for assertions of value. The concept of utility is addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and may be based on questionable assumptions.



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that, in the years 1984-89, the South African government's use of force was responsible for it maintaining its control. Arguments and evidence that it accurate it is to say that, in the years 1984-89, the South African government's use of force was responsible for it maintaining its control should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The state of emergency declared in 1985 demonstrated the repressive nature of the control exercised by the government. • Police tactics included the use of mass arrests, imprisonment, kidnapping, interrogation under torture and murder. The police more than doubled in size during the 1980s • Malan, the head of the army and Minister of Defence, used the State Security Council to control the army and police to deal with opposition and unrest. This included secret organisations like the Civil Cooperation Bureau which acted as a death squad • In the townships, vigilante action was encouraged, theoretically to protect councillors, but in practice attacking all opponents of apartheid. Arguments and evidence that it is not accurate it is to say that, in the years 1984-89, the South African government's use of force was responsible for it maintaining its control should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The total strategy included reforms such as the removal of the requirement to carry a pass in 1986 which aimed to make the system more acceptable, and hence improve the control through indirect methods • Negotiations were begun with Nelson Mandela that shows a more conciliatory attitude emerging • The use of force proved to be counter-productive at times e.g. the police shooting of 20 people attending a forbidden funeral of four boys killed by the police at Uitenhage in 1985 led to renewed school boycotts. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to shed light on the problems facing South Africa in the transition of its system of government in the early 1990s. Source 3 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The source is from a foreign newspaper which therefore has more independence as it comes from outside • The source appears to be balanced in its representation of both sides of the talks, criticising both sides at times • The report is based upon both reported statements and written documents produced by both sides. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the problems facing South Africa in the transition of its system of government in the early 1990s: • It provides evidence that both sides used 'angry language' in their dealings which is not conducive to reaching an agreement • It indicates that there were divisions between the ANC and its allies ('a course of confrontation') • It suggests that there were problems in determining the structure of a new South Africa • It indicates that negotiations were being carried out against a backdrop of violence. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • De Klerk's initial approach was a system of power sharing which protected 'minorities' and this went against Mandela's majority rule view • The problems that faced CODESA I and CODESA II which led to each set of talks being suspended • The support given by de Klerk to the Inkatha Freedom Party which was opposing the ANC. Source 4 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The source is a report produced by a highly respected international organisation whose main concern is the promotion of human rights • Amnesty International did not appear to take sides as it had not championed Mandela in the 1960s

Question	Indicative content
	- The report is supported by precise statistical data from within South Africa which suggests that it is based on accurate information as this could be verified. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the problems facing South Africa in the transition of its system of government in the early 1990s: - It indicates that there is wide-ranging violence going on, both within ('arbitrary detention') and outside ('assassination') of the legal system - It provides evidence that the government was complicit in the violence - It provides evidence that the security forces were central to the violence and were using both direct and indirect means to oppose progress towards the ending of the apartheid system - It indicates that fair and free elections could not take place in South Africa at this time. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - In the early 1990s, a total of 14,000 people were killed in politically related incidents - Right-wing extremists, such as the AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) led by Eugene Terreblanche, threatened civil war if majority rule went ahead - Attacks on white civilian targets by the armed wing of PAC – the Azanian People's Liberation Army e.g. 'one settler one bullet campaign.' Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: - Both sources are written from outside of South Africa so are reporting on events from the perspective of people not directly involved - Both sources identify the extent of violence taking place as a major problem that has clearly yet to be resolved - Source 3 deals with the problems surrounding the CODESA talks as well as the issue of violence whereas the focus of Source 4, perhaps unsurprisingly, is on the violence and its links to human rights.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914-48: the road to independence



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that P W Botha's attempts to reform the system of apartheid, in the years 1983–89, were a complete failure. Arguments and evidence that it is accurate to say that P W Botha's attempts to reform the system of apartheid, in the years 1983–89, were a complete failure should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • It led to the alienation of part of the National Party's support and the creation of a breakaway group, the Conservative Party who won sufficient seats to become the official opposition in the 1980s • The creation of the UDF in 1983 was a response to the constitutional reforms undertaken by Botha which aimed to give some racial groups limited political rights • Campaigning by opposition groups clearly had an impact on the implementation of Botha's reforms, e.g. turnout in the tricameral elections was low at only 30% of Coloured voters and 20% of Indian voters • Campaigns across the period clearly demonstrated that Botha's reforms had not conciliated the non-white population, e.g. 1984 Million Signature campaign, 1988–89 actions organised by the Mass Democratic Movement • The need for the authorities to revert to suppression by the end of the period reveals the failure of the policy. Arguments and evidence that it is not accurate to say that P W Botha's attempts to reform the system of apartheid, in the years 1983–89, were a complete failure should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • It was never the intention to genuinely reform apartheid; the National Party's real goal was to maintain the white status quo and this was achieved within these years • There was a relaxation of the implementation of some of the apartheid laws, whilst the Pass Laws were largely abandoned • There was some investment into the upgrading of some of the more important townships, so that some improvement in living standards was seen • Some non-whites did take advantage of the greater political rights that were on offer to participate in the system. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to shed light on the use of international sanctions as a means of achieving change in South Africa in the 1980s. Source 3 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - The speech was made in the British parliament and is therefore evidence of how a British politician viewed the possibility of the use of sanctions - Ten Minute Rule Bills do not necessarily reflect the view point of the British government - The proposal of a Ten Minute Rule Bill demonstrates that there were some politicians in Britain who wished to implement sanctions - The tone of the piece makes it clear that Carlisle opposed sanctions. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the use of international sanctions as a means of achieving change in South Africa in the 1980s: - It states that all South Africans will suffer as a result of sanctions - It suggests that the author feels there would be more progress made by building on reforms rather than implementing sanctions - It provides evidence of the view that the economic impact of sanctions is likely to be significant through the references to unemployment statistics - It claims that the use of sanctions was counterproductive as its impact was likely to be an escalation of violence. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: - The British Conservative party did not support a policy of implementing economic sanctions, preferring to work through negotiation - There were some leading liberal South African politicians who did not support the imposition of economic sanctions because they believed that they would be harmful to poor blacks, e.g. Helen Suzman - The impact of major banks pulling out of South Africa in the mid-1980s triggered a financial crisis. Source 4 - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: - The author of the source is a leading anti-apartheid campaigner whose opinion carries weight - As a general press statement, it was intended to reach a wide audience, both at home and abroad - The tone of the source makes it clear that the purpose of the press statement was to galvanise an international audience to support sanctions. - The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the use of international sanctions as a means of achieving change in South Africa in the 1980s: - It provides evidence of Tutu's view on the importance of sanctions in

Question	Indicative content
	bringing about change • It suggests that the international community was prepared to use political and diplomatic sanctions ('rejected economic sanctions') • It suggests that the impact of economic sanctions would be no worse than the treatment facing black Africans from the security forces • It expresses a strong desire for sanctions to be applied, whatever the costs. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • International pressure for economic sanctions intensified in the 1980s • The US Congress overrode Reagan's veto to implement economic sanctions in October 1986 • The incidence of violence rose rapidly in the mid-1980s, partly as a result of State Security Council policy. Sources 3 and 4 The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both sources agree that the leaders of Western powers were opposed to implementing economic sanctions • Source 3 argues against the use of economic sanctions, whereas Source 4 fully embraces their use as a means of bringing about change • Source 3 states that even Tutu has questioned the validity of sanctions, whereas Source 4, which is Tutu, is calling for the implementation of sanctions.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the main obstacle to a new political settlement, in the years 1991–94, was opposition from white South Africans. Arguments and evidence that it is accurate to say that the main obstacle to a new political settlement, in the years 1991–94, was opposition from white South Africans should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The National Party's reluctance for change is shown by its desire at the CODESA talks to maintain a constitutional veto in the hands of whites that would result in power sharing rather than majority government by the ANC • Mandela did not trust de Klerk, e.g. opening speeches at CODESA and accusations of violence by the police in order to divide black opinion and justify maintaining Nationalist Party control • Right-wing extremists, such as the AWB, engaged in terrorist attacks, bombing public buildings, random shootings of blacks and assassinations, e.g. Chris Hani • Right-wing extremists seemed to have much support for their views within the army and police, e.g. the ease with which the AWB occupied a Johannesburg building in 1993 • The Conservative Party maintained a commitment to apartheid policies and opposed CODESA; by 1991, it was the main opposition party to the National Party, indicating the position of many white South Africans. Arguments and evidence that it is not accurate to say that the main obstacle to a new political settlement, in the years 1991–94, was opposition from white South Africans and/or other factors were more of an obstacle should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The result of the 1992 whites-only referendum was 69 per cent support for continuing with reform, suggesting whites did not oppose a new political settlement • In spite of the violence and political divisions, the political parties worked out an agreement that was reasonably fair to all parties • Neither Mandela nor Buthelezi kept to the agreement made in 1991 to prevent violence in the black communities of Natal and tension and violence between the two groups escalated • Violence by young supporters of the ANC in urban areas, possibly encouraged by Winnie Mandela. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about how accurate it is to say that the impact of international sanctions was the main reason for the ending of apartheid by 1991. Arguments and evidence that the impact of international sanctions was the main reason for the ending of apartheid by 1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The range of international sanctions was having an impact on many aspects of South African life and it was this that made the need to end apartheid urgent • Trade sanctions had widespread support by the international community, e.g. European Community (1985) and US Congress (1986), and this exacerbated the problems facing the South African economy • Specific companies, e.g. Pepsi, and specific sectors, e.g. banking, imposed sanctions that had economic effects, contributing to the ending of apartheid • The 1980 UN cultural, academic and sports boycott made sanctions in these areas more coherent than they had been previously; this increased the effectiveness of this type of sanction. Arguments and evidence that other factors were more important for the ending of apartheid by 1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The failure of the total strategy policy to deal with the problems facing South Africa had led to violence, which was undermining the National Party's control • The role played by Mandela and de Klerk in reaching agreement and bringing an end to apartheid • The impact of the changing balance of numbers between the black and white population made apartheid unsustainable • The influence of the international anti-apartheid movement in bringing attention to the issues and creating media interest, e.g. Mandela's 70th birthday celebrations in London. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that, in the years 1984-90, the National Party maintained its control of South Africa. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1984-90, the National Party maintained its control of South Africa should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The ability of opposition to challenge the government was limited by the fragmentation of the various opposition groups, thus enabling the National Party to maintain control • Opposition groups often directed their actions, with increasing violence, against other opposition groups (e.g. in Zululand and Natal) rather than challenging the government directly • The ability of the government to maintain control by repressing any opposition was aided by an expansion in the security forces – the police, the army and special units • The unbanning of political parties and the decision to free Mandela in 1990, indicate that the National Party was sufficiently confident of its control to believe that such concessions would consolidate its position. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that, in the years 1984-90, the National Party maintained its control of South Africa should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The international anti-apartheid movement continued to exert real pressure on the South African government that undermined its control, especially in the economic sphere • Much of the opposition to the government became more radical in its approach, with violence becoming much more pervasive, and hence more difficult to control • Divisions were emerging within the National Party about the future direction that apartheid should take, undermining its control of South Africa. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether it is accurate to say that the role played by Nelson Mandela was the main reason that a new political settlement was reached in the years 1989-94. Arguments and evidence that the role played by Nelson Mandela was the main reason that a new political settlement was reached in the years 1989-94 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Mandela had clearly expressed his commitment to negotiating towards a new political settlement, even before he had been freed from prison in 1990 • Mandela had the international status and authority to enter into negotiations and to represent the views of a significant portion of the South African population • Throughout the negotiations, Mandela was committed to promoting national reconciliation and to reaching a compromise that would include all South Africans • Mandela acted to calm black discontent with the process, e.g. following the murder of Chris Hani in 1993. Arguments and evidence that the role played by Nelson Mandela was not the main reason and/or there were other more important reasons that a new political settlement was reached in the years 1989-94 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The National Party was looking for a method of dealing with the violence that was escalating in South Africa • International isolation had impacted badly on the South African economy and the National Party wanted to improve its international economic status • De Klerk was as important as Mandela, as he was prepared to release Mandela from prison and subsequently to enter into negotiations to reach a new political settlement • The establishment of CODESA and CODESA II gave a foundation and framework for negotiations for the new political settlement. Other relevant material must be credited.

2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
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Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant the release of Nelson Mandela from prison was in enabling a political settlement to be reached in South Africa in the years 1989-94. Arguments and evidence that support the view that the release of Nelson Mandela from prison was significant in enabling a political settlement to be reached in South Africa in the years 1989-94 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • It marked a symbolic new beginning in the relationship between the NP and the ANC that could be built upon • It marked a change in direction by the NP; it was only possible because of de Klerk's decision to follow a new course, which involved compromise and negotiation, when he came into power • It demonstrated the importance of negotiation in moving forward, as Mandela's release had been brought about by negotiation between him and de Klerk • It enabled Mandela to travel across South Africa, addressing meetings and helping to organise the ANC, which was now a legal organisation. He was elected president of the ANC in July 1991 • Now under Mandela's leadership, the ANC was able to absorb some of the other opposition groups, e.g. the UDF. It now represented a large number of black South Africans and its views had to be taken into account. Arguments and evidence that the release of Nelson Mandela from prison was not significant and/or other developments were more significant in enabling a political settlement to be reached in South Africa in the years 1989-94 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The political settlement was not fully realised until the first genuinely democratic election took place in South Africa in 1994 – four years after Mandela's release • The ending of the Cold War undercut US/UK support for the apartheid regime and put pressure on the NP to resolve the situation • Most white South Africans no longer supported apartheid. They wanted to protect their position, and thought this could best be achieved through a negotiated political settlement, e.g. the 1992 referendum • The NP was concerned about the escalating violence in South Africa and was prepared to engage in any negotiations that would limit the impact of such violence • The leading groups and individuals all remained committed to continuing negotiations and compromise throughout the process, even when talks broke down, e.g. CODESA. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether the impact of international isolation on South Africa was the main reason for Botha's decision to negotiate in the years 1985-89. Arguments and evidence that the impact of international isolation on South Africa was the main reason for Botha's decision to negotiate in the years 1985-89 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Trade sanctions were implemented by some of the western powers (e.g. 1985 European Community, 1986 US Congress) and these impacted adversely on the South African economy • Economic sanctions by global companies, e.g. IBM (1986), were having an adverse effect on the South African economy, so that a way to resolve the problem was required • Economic problems contributed to rising discontent amongst all South Africans. To maintain control, the NP needed to negotiate an agreement that would end its international isolation • International isolation affected South Africa's sporting, academic and cultural life. There was widespread pressure for change from a range of different groups. Arguments and evidence that challenge the view that the impact of international isolation on South Africa was the main reason for Botha's decision to negotiate in the years 1985-89 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From 1985, Mandela was signalling to Botha that he was prepared to negotiate towards a new political settlement; this meant Botha could have some confidence in initiating negotiation • By 1989, it was clear that the 'total strategy' was failing, so Botha was looking for other approaches to dealing with South Africa's problems; a negotiated settlement was an alternative strategy • The state of emergency that existed in South Africa could best be resolved through a political solution – and a negotiated settlement offered the best chance for this. Other relevant material must be credited.