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EDEXCEL AS AND A LEVEL HISTORY: QUESTIONS BY TOPIC

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991

AS and A Level History · Paper 3 · Option 38.1

40 questions · 800 marks · Mark schemes included

Pearson Edexcel AS (8HI0) and A Level (9HI0) History, June 2016 - June 2025

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HOW TO USE THIS BOOKLET

Questions are grouped by specification sub-topic; within each sub-topic they run from the lowest mark tariff to the highest.

Click any heading or question row below to jump straight to it.

On every question page, click ANSWER in the top-right corner to jump to its mark scheme.

Diagrams, graphs, tables and data are printed exactly as they appeared in the original papers.

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QUESTIONS

40 questions · 800 marks · grouped by sub-topic, lowest tariff first



ASPECTS IN BREADTH

THE STATUS AND CONDITION OF THE PEASANTRY

8 questions in this sub-topic · 160 marks · lowest tariff first



-
- 7** How far do you agree that the Emancipation Decree of 1861 was the most significant change in the lives of the Russian peasantry in the years 1855–1964?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



-
- 7** How accurate is it to say that Russian leaders did little to encourage the peasantry to remain on the land in the years 1855–1991?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



-
- 7** 'Stolypin's reforms (1906-11) were more successful than all other attempts to improve the condition of the peasantry in the years 1861-1991.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 7 'The move towards larger state farms after 1945 caused the greatest damage to the status and condition of the Russian peasantry in the years 1861–1991.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



-
- 7** How significant was the concession of peasant plots (1932) in attempts to improve the condition of the peasantry in the years 1855–1991?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



- 7 'The most significant cause of peasants leaving the land, in the years 1855–1972, was action taken by Russian governments.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



-
- 7** 'In the years 1855–1979, the introduction of the NEP was the most significant action taken by government to improve the status and condition of the Russian peasantry.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



-
- 7** 'In the years 1855–1991, communist governments were the most effective at improving the condition of the peasantry.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN BREADTH

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND FOOD SUPPLY

8 questions in this sub-topic · 160 marks · lowest tariff first



- 8 'The Tsars and the communists were unsuccessful in improving agricultural production in Russia in the years 1861–1991.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 8 To what extent did Russia take advantage of modern inventions and ideas to improve agricultural production in the years 1861–1991?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 8 How significant were the policies introduced by Stalin in attempts to boost agricultural productivity in Russia in the years 1861-1991?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 8 'Russian leaders deserve great credit for their attempts to provide sufficient food to feed the population in the years 1861–1979.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 8 'The import of western grain (1872–79) was the most important turning point in attempts by Russian governments to feed the people in the years 1861–1991.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 8 'Of all the initiatives taken by Russian governments to improve agricultural production, in the years 1861–1991, collectivisation was the greatest failure.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 8 To what extent were food shortages in Russia, in the years 1861–1979, a consequence of the failure of government agricultural policy?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



- 8 'The drive to modernise under Stalin was the key turning point in attempts to boost agricultural productivity in Russia in the years 1855–1979.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

ALEXANDER II AND THE REFORM OF RUSSIA, 1855-70

4 questions in this sub-topic · 80 marks · lowest tariff first



-
- 3** 'Alexander II's reforms, in the years 1855–70, were inspired largely by Russia's defeat in the Crimean War.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that Tsar Alexander II did little to encourage greater freedom of expression in Russia in the years 1855–70?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** 'The reforms of Alexander II did little to change the political system in Russia in the years 1855–70.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that the reform of the army was the most significant of all the political reforms undertaken by Alexander II in the years 1855–70?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

THE 1905 REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH, 1905-06

4 questions in this sub-topic · 80 marks · lowest tariff first



-
- 3** How accurate is it to say that the position of Tsar Nicholas II was seriously threatened during the 1905 Revolution?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1** Assess the value of the source for revealing the reasons for discontent among industrial workers in Russia in 1905 and their attitude towards the Tsar.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)

Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991

Source for use with Question 1.

Source 1: From the petition carried by industrial workers in St Petersburg on Bloody Sunday, January 1905. It was drafted by Father Georgiy Gapon, a Russian Orthodox priest and leader of a union of factory workers in the city.

Sire, we working men of St Petersburg have come to you for justice and protection. We are impoverished and oppressed like slaves having to bear our bitter condition in silence. Though we have been patient, we are now falling deeper into misery. O Tsar, we have no strength left and have reached that moment when death is better than a continuation of our sufferings. Our request that our employers should look into our needs has been refused. Even the right to discuss our situation has been judged illegal, as has our demand for an eight-hour day. All we asked was to raise workers' wages and for improved working conditions so that we might do our jobs without encountering death. But all these have been condemned by our employers as unlawful, our petition treated as a crime. 5 10

O Emperor, we are human beings only in appearance. In reality we are deemed unworthy of human rights, even of speaking, thinking, meeting to discuss our needs, and taking measures to improve our condition. Anyone who dares lift his voice in defence of the working class is thrown into prison or banished. O Tsar, is this in accordance with God's commandments by which you reign? Is life under such laws worth living? Sire, this is why we are gathered here before your palace walls. Here we await the last available means of rescue. Do not refuse to help us. Demolish the gap between yourself and the people and let them govern the country with you. Consider our demands without anger. It is not lack of respect that encourages us to approach you but our desire to escape from the present intolerable state of things. 15 20

Order without delay that representatives of all classes in the land shall meet together. Let the elections be organised on the principle of universal suffrage so that we may be free to elect who we want. This is our main request and the best way to dress our open wounds. Sire, we speak plainly and candidly to you as our father. Swear that this shall be fulfilled and you will make Russia happy and glorious. Then we will keep your name forever in our hearts, as will our children and our children's children. But if you are not responsive to our petition, we will die here on this square before your palace, for we have nowhere else to go. 25 30



Explain how the making of modern Russia, 1905-1917.

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1 Assess the value of the source for revealing the significance of the changes introduced by the October Manifesto and the attitude of Nicholas II towards these changes.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991**Source for use with Question 1.**

Source 1: From the minutes of meetings of the Council of Ministers, April 1906. The meetings discussed changes proposed to the Fundamental Laws to take into account the promises made in the October Manifesto. Here Nicholas II and his ministers are discussing whether the Fundamental Laws, which had governed Russia since 1833, should continue to describe the Tsar's powers as 'unlimited'.

9 April Meeting

Tsar Nicholas: Since I first read the new draft of the Fundamental Laws, I have been troubled. This conflict within me continues. I have doubted whether I can agree to a limitation of the powers I received from my ancestors. This is the most important point in the whole matter. 5

I issued the October Manifesto and remain firmly resolved to bring it into effect. Yet daily, I am receiving hundreds of letters and petitions from all over Russia and from all social classes. They thank me for the rights granted in October, but plead that I should remain the autocrat of all the Russias. Sincerely, I tell you that if I were convinced Russia wanted me to give up my autocratic powers, I would gladly do it. I know that continuing to describe my powers as 'unlimited' will provoke some agitation, but these attacks will come only from the educated élite, the industrial workers and the newspapers. I am confident that eighty per cent of the Russian people will still support me. 10

Goremykin: I agree – eighty per cent of the people will be displeased by a limitation of the Tsar's powers. 15

Pahlen: I have no liking for the October Manifesto, but it exists. Until it was issued, the Tsar had the unlimited right to issue laws. But since October, Your Majesty can no longer issue laws without the *duma*. Therefore, the word 'unlimited' cannot remain in the Fundamental Laws. 20

Akimov: In October, Your Majesty voluntarily limited his powers. To use the word 'unlimited' at this time would mean creating enemies in the *duma*. 'Unlimited' must be excluded.

Sol'skii: This word must be changed. If you cannot bring yourself to do this, it would be best not to publish the revised Fundamental Laws at all. 25

Durnovo: After the October Manifesto, the monarchy ceased to have 'unlimited' powers. The word must be left out or it will cause opposition in the minds of educated persons, and this will lead to nationwide unrest.

Tsar Nicholas: This is a matter for my conscience and I will decide it. I shall announce my decision later. Let us discuss other things. 30

12 April Meeting

Sol'skii: Your Majesty postponed the decision on the word 'unlimited' at our last meeting. What is your command?

Tsar Nicholas: I have decided to accept the advice of the Council of Ministers. The word 'unlimited' is to be excluded. 35



-
- 3** 'Repression was more effective than reform in dealing with the unrest in Russia in the years 1905–06.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

WAR, REVOLUTION AND BOLSHEVIK POWER, 1914-18

5 questions in this sub-topic · 100 marks · lowest tariff first



- 4 How accurate is it to say that the mistakes of the Provisional Government were largely responsible for the triumph of the Bolsheviks in October 1917?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 How accurate is it to say that the Bolsheviks very successfully consolidated their control over Russia in the years 1917–18?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



Explain how the making of modern Russia, 1905-1917.

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1 Assess the value of the source for revealing the influence of Rasputin in Russia during the First World War and the reasons for the weakening of Tsar Nicholas II's position on the throne.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



Sources for use with Section A.**Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.****Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991****Source for use with Question 1.**

Source 1: From a speech made in the duma by Vladimir Purishkevich, 19 November 1916. Purishkevich was a leading right-wing politician firmly committed to the monarchy. The speech received prolonged applause from all sides in the duma. Shortly after, he helped arrange, and took part in, the murder of Rasputin.

Gentlemen, I mount this platform today in enormous emotional turmoil but there are moments when one must ring the alarm bell from the highest tower. As always, there burns within me an infinite love for my native land and a boundless allegiance to my sovereign. But I clearly see who, and what, is harming Russia and postponing the hour of her victory. 5

What are the real problems in Russia? Here are four propositions. The first is the ridiculous censorship of that which ought not to be censored. The second is the paralysis of the government. The third is sympathy for Germany among elements of the government. The fourth is absolute uncertainty about the future. 10

I say here, from the platform of the state duma, that all these evils stem from dark forces which push incapable men into high posts. These forces come from Rasputin.

These past nights I could not sleep. I lie with open eyes and imagine the series of notes in which this illiterate peasant dictates orders, now to one minister, then the next. And we know that there were instances when the failure to fulfil these orders led to the fall of these powerful men. During the war, I believed that our domestic quarrels should be forgotten. Now I break that peace in order to bring to the attention of the Tsar the thoughts of the Russian people and the bitter resentment coming from the Russian army. This anger has been produced by the Tsar's ministers having been made puppets controlled by the evil genius Rasputin, and by the Empress, who has remained German on the Russian throne and alien to the country and its people. 15 20

If ministers consider their duty above their career then they must go to the Tsar and say that things cannot continue in this way any longer. If you are loyal to your sovereign, if the glory of Russia is dear to you, then go to the Imperial Army Headquarters, throw yourselves at the Tsar's feet and beg permission to open his eyes to the dreadful reality. Beg him to deliver Russia from Rasputin and his followers, both great and small. 25

Gentlemen, we must all plead with the Tsar. Rasputin must be removed as the director of Russia's internal affairs. 30



-
- 3** How far was the failure of the Provisional government a consequence of its decision to continue Russia's participation in the First World War?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



Opinion about the making of modern Russia, 1900-1917

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1** Assess the value of the source for revealing the way in which the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in October 1917 and the immediate priorities of the new government.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



Sources for use with Section A.**Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.****Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991****Source for use with Question 1.**

Source 1: From a proclamation written by Lenin and issued in the name of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, 26 October 1917. The Congress was called under pressure from the Bolsheviks and dominated by Bolshevik delegates. The proclamation was issued shortly after the seizure of the Winter Palace, the seat of the Provisional Government in Petrograd.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is now open. The majority of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers are represented at this Congress. A number of delegates from the Peasants' Soviets are also present.

It is the will of the vast majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants in Russia that this Congress now takes power into its own hands. This action has been confirmed by the victorious uprising of the workers and soldiers that has recently taken place in Petrograd. The Provisional Government has been overthrown. The majority of the members of the Provisional Government have already been arrested. Therefore, this Congress decrees that power shall pass immediately to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, which will now be responsible for guaranteeing revolutionary order throughout Russia.

The Soviet government will soon propose an immediate ceasefire on all battle fronts and offer a genuine, democratic peace to all the nations involved in the war. It will protect the rights of the soldiers by introducing complete democracy in the army. It will establish workers' control over production. It will ensure that bread is supplied to the cities and other vital necessities to the villages. The Soviet government will also guarantee the right of self-government to all the nationalities inhabiting Russia.

This Congress calls upon all the soldiers in the trenches to be vigilant and firm. Congress is confident that the army will be able to defend the revolution against the attacks of the imperialists until such time as the new government succeeds in concluding a democratic peace with all countries. The new government will do everything to supply all the needs of the army, funded by the requisition of the property and the taxation of the upper classes. It will also improve the condition of soldiers' families.

Soldiers, actively resist Kerensky* and his supporters! Already, Kerensky and others are attempting, by deceit, to persuade troops to attack Petrograd. Some of these soldiers have already abandoned him but be on your guard!

Railroad workers! Stop all troop trains dispatched by Kerensky against Petrograd!

Soldiers and workers, the fate of the revolution and the fate of the democratic peace is in your hands!

Long live the revolution!

*Kerensky – the head of the Provisional Government, July–October 1917



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

KHRUSHCHEV AND DE-STALINISATION, 1956-64

5 questions in this sub-topic · 100 marks · lowest tariff first



-
- 3** How accurate it is to say that Khrushchev significantly increased the freedom of the people of Soviet Russia in the years 1956-61?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)



- 4 'Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system, in the years 1956–61, were introduced largely to help secure his own position as leader of the USSR.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



Opinion about the meaning of modern history, 1955-1956

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1 Assess the value of the source for revealing the changes introduced in the USSR following the Twentieth Party Congress (1956) and the strength of the opposition to these changes in the Communist Party.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991**Source for use with Question 1.**

Source 1: From a decree issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 29 June 1957. The decree was issued ten days after attempts by leading members of the CPSU to remove Khrushchev and reverse the course of de-Stalinisation.

In recent months, the Communist Party has been doing tremendous work to carry out the historic decisions of the Twentieth Party Congress. This work has been intended to raise living standards, to re-establish party unity, to eliminate abuses of revolutionary law, and to relax international tensions. Every Soviet citizen can see that notable progress has been made. However, the anti-party group, led by Molotov, Malenkov* and Kaganovich**, has opposed the Party line and has used anti-party and factional tactics in an attempt to influence the Party's most important policies. 5

These actions were deliberate. In recent years, the Party has been determined to attempt to rectify the errors created by the personality cult. Yet the anti-party group, now fully revealed to all, has been offering constant opposition to the course demanded by the Twentieth Party Congress. For example, this group attempted to oppose peaceful co-existence with states with different social systems, and the relaxation of international tension. It opposed enlarging the powers of the Soviet republics in economic and cultural matters. It also sought to frustrate the reorganisation of industrial management that was introduced to strengthen Soviet industry. All this is evidence of high-handed unconcern for the vital interests of the masses. 10 15

Comrade Molotov, as minister of foreign affairs, has hindered, in every way, the implementation of measures intended to strengthen world peace. For example, he was against normalising relationships with Austria and Japan, and against attempts to build contacts between the leaders of the USSR and other countries. 20

The Central Committee has been patient in attempting to correct the errors of the anti-party group, hoping that they would fall into line. But they are still restricted by out-of-date ideas and attitudes, and have become divorced from the life of the Party and the country. In starting this struggle within the Party, the anti-party group has sought to return the Party to those methods of leadership that were condemned at the Twentieth Party Congress. By attempting to change the policy of the Party by factional conspiracy, they are also directly acting against the rules drafted by Lenin himself in 1921. 25 30

Even though the anti-party group has now admitted the harmful nature of their activity and have agreed to uphold the Party's decisions, the Central Committee unanimously resolves to expel this group from the Party.

*Malenkov – a member of the Presidium, the leading policy-making body in the USSR, who had been forced to resign as Prime Minister in 1955

**Kaganovich – Deputy Prime Minister and a member of the Presidium



Opinion about the making of modern Russia, 1955-1956

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1** Assess the value of the source for revealing Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 and the aims of de-Stalinisation.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991**Source for use with Question 1.**

Source 1: From the 'secret' speech delivered by Nikita Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 25 February 1956. In March 1956, the Central Committee ordered that it should be read and discussed at thousands of local party meetings.

In the Central Committee's report to this Congress, quite a lot has been said about the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual. The Committee believes that it is against the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics like those of a god. Such a belief about Stalin was cultivated among us for many years. As yet, not everyone fully realises the harmful consequences of this cult of the individual: that it destroyed the principle of collective leadership and led to the accumulation of immense power in the hands of one person. Therefore, the Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to make evidence about this matter available to this Congress. 5 10

Stalin did not act through persuasion and patient cooperation with people but by demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed him was doomed. Many party leaders and party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism. Stalin originated the concept of 'enemy of the people.' It made possible the use of the cruellest repression against anyone who, in any way, disagreed with him. Usually, the only proof of guilt actually used was the 'confession' of the accused himself. This was against all rules of legal practice. As subsequent investigations have proven, 'confessions' were often acquired through physical and mental torture. This led to many entirely innocent individuals becoming victims. 15 20

Comrades! The cult of the individual distorted both party work and economic activity. It violated internal party and Soviet democracy, creating an unproductive administration that encouraged the covering up of failures. Due to the numerous arrests, many workers began to fear all that was new, showing less initiative in their work. Stalin's death has enabled us to free ourselves of the harmful practice of the cult of the individual. Only then could the creative activity of the masses grow again. 25

In future, the Central Committee will continue to insist upon Leninist principles of leadership, from the bottom to the top of the Party. It will restore the principle of collective leadership, and follow the written rules of our party. It will fight individuals abusing their power. The evil caused as a result of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected. Long live the victorious banner of our party – Leninism! 30

- 4 How accurate is it to say that Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system, in the years 1956–61, were completely successful?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

GORBACHEV AND THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM, 1985-91

6 questions in this sub-topic · 120 marks · lowest tariff first



Option 38.1: The Making of Modern Russia, 1855–1991

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1** Assess the value of the source for revealing the reasons for the launch of Gorbachev's reform programme in 1985 and the problems it encountered.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)

Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 38.1: The Making of Modern Russia, 1855–1991

Source for use with Question 1.

Source 1: From a speech made by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 27 January 1987. The speech was reported on the following day in both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, two of the official newspapers of the Soviet State.

Today there is a need to state once again what we mean by *perestroika*.

Perestroika means overcoming stagnation and accelerating the economic development of the Soviet Union. Our strategy is to harness the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution within a planned economy, and to realise the full potential of socialism. *Perestroika* means the development of democracy and the encouragement of initiative and independent activity. It means the expansion of *glasnost* in all sections of society. *Perestroika* means restoring and developing Leninist principles. It means introducing economic methods of management everywhere, rejecting the dictatorial issuing of orders, ensuring full economic accountability, and encouraging innovation and enterprise. *Perestroika* means the ever fuller satisfaction of the Soviet people's desire for good working, living, recreational, educational and medical standards. In other words, it is a thorough renewal of all aspects of the country's life.

The time has come to begin the drafting of new laws guaranteeing *glasnost*. These should give working people a real opportunity to express their opinion on any question. I regret that we continue to encounter not only hostility towards criticism but also instances of persecution for it and the outright suppression of critical statements. Frequently this assumes such dimensions and scope that the Central Committee has had to intervene in order to restore truth and justice, and to support honest people who back the interests of the cause. I have already had occasion to speak out on this question, and matters are being corrected slowly. Take the articles in the central press for January alone and you will see that persecution for criticism is anything but a rare phenomenon. In this respect, the efforts of the media to develop critical attitudes in our society must be supported. We say that Soviet society should have no areas closed to criticism. The matter in question is to deepen democracy and achieve the more effective and more active participation of voters in all election campaigns.

- 4 'The major cause of the downfall of Soviet communism by 1991 was the impact of the Afghanistan war.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



Opinion about the making of modern Russia, 1985-1991

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1** Assess the value of the source for revealing the scale of the alcohol problem in the 1980s and its impact on the USSR.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)



Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991**Source for use with Question 1.**

Source 1: From the minutes of a meeting of the Politburo, 4 April 1985. The Politburo was the supreme policy-making body in the USSR. Here, Mikhail Solomentsev, a member of the Politburo appointed by Gorbachev, is presenting the recommendations of a commission established in 1983 to investigate the alcohol problem in the USSR.

The commission proposes a comprehensive approach to this pressing problem ensuring annual cuts to the volumes of vodka and other strong liquor which are produced. We also need to increase alcohol prices to decrease demand and think it reasonable to increase the age at which you can buy alcohol to 21. This would improve the health of the people during the most critical period of their physical development. It is extremely important that we forbid the sale of alcohol to those about to be drafted into the army, and to young servicemen, as this will help improve discipline in the armed forces. Fines are to be strengthened and other punishments will be introduced, for example, end-of-year work bonuses and holiday vouchers will be removed from those guilty of alcohol abuse. Also, they will be pushed further back on the waiting list for apartments. 5 10

I would like to emphasise that these proposals reflect the opinion of the people and of the Party. The proposals were received with support everywhere they were discussed. Those consulted expressed serious concern about the spread of drunkenness and of its enormous economic, moral and social damage. Comments included, 'Our youth is decomposing from vodka' and 'drunkenness has taken over our country'. Letters received from Moscow and Novosibirsk in Siberia, in support of the proposals, contained thousands of signatures. In surveys conducted in various regions, up to 74% of respondents selected 'drunkenness' in reply to the question, 'Which problem concerns you most?'. 15 20

The growth of alcohol abuse leads to enormous problems, costing up to 60 billion roubles a year. 9.3 million drunks were picked up from the street in 1984 and over 12 million were punished for crimes associated with drink. Over 13 000 sexual assaults and 29 000 robberies were attributed to alcohol in 1984, both considerably higher in number than in 1983. 25

In short, the damage has assumed such acute proportions that we must take radical and urgent measures. Alcohol is a more dangerous enemy to us than disease, hunger or war. The sobering up of our people, starting with our youth, is essential in our struggle for Communism. We must show the world how the soviet system solves these sorts of problems. 30



- 4 To what extent was Boris Yeltsin responsible for the failure of Gorbachev's attempts to modernise the USSR in the years 1985–91?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 To what extent was economic stagnation in the USSR the reason for the introduction of Gorbachev's reform programme?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



- 4 To what extent was the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991 due to factors beyond Gorbachev's control?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



MARK SCHEMES

official Pearson Edexcel mark schemes



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far the Emancipation Decree of 1861 was the most significant change in the lives of the Russian peasantry in the years 1855-1964. Arguments and evidence that the Emancipation Decree of 1861 was the most significant change in the lives of the Russian peasantry in the years 1855-1964 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Decree gave full citizenship rights to over 20 million serfs on private estates and allowed them, for example, to marry without consent for the first time • The Decree allowed peasants to buy the land they cultivated from landowners on long-term loans facilitated by the government • It encouraged the development of a market economy in contrast to the largely subsistence agriculture that prevailed before • In the following decades there was a rise in the volume of grain sold at market, an increase in rural employment and investment, and peasant holdings rose to over a fifth of the land in Russia. Arguments and evidence that the Emancipation Decree was not the most significant change in the lives of the Russian peasantry and/or that other developments were more important in this period should also be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Decree did not change the fundamental mindset of the peasantry or break the power of the <i>mir</i> which continued to exercise a conservative influence over free movement, organisation and production • The size of the redemption payments also prevented the widespread emergence of the market economy – plots remained small, cultivation techniques backwards and efficiency low • Stolypin's attempts to break the power of the <i>mir</i> in the years 1906-11 could be argued to have had a greater effect in changing the lives of the peasantry • The policies of the communists before 1941 including the Land Decree, the effects of war communism and the NEP, and enforced collectivisation (the 'second serfdom') saw the lives of most peasants fundamentally altered • The various attempts to improve Soviet agriculture after the end of the Patriotic War, including the reduction of taxes on private plots and peasant households. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that Russian leaders did little to encourage the peasantry to remain on the land in the years 1855–1991. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that Russian leaders did little to encourage the peasantry to remain on the land in the years 1855–1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The burden of redemption payments after 1861 was so onerous that the peasantry was encouraged to leave the land for the industrial cities in large numbers • Emancipation resulted in smaller plots and the best land being reserved to the nobility – 'land hunger' was a major feature of peasant life which the Tsars and Provisional Government did little to address • War Communism and collectivisation led to the deaths of millions – Stalin's ideological desire to create an industrial proletariat and the demand for industrial labour during the Five Year Plans further weakened the peasantry • The trend to the <i>sovkhoz</i>, especially after 1945, turned the peasantry into waged labourers directly employed by the state, further eroding their independence and status • Prices paid to the collectives ensured that rural living standards remained low in comparison with the industrial workers and did not encourage peasants to remain – by the 1960s, 75 per cent of peasants were defined as living in poverty. Arguments and evidence disagreeing with the statement that Russian leaders did little to encourage the peasantry to remain on the land in the years 1855–1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • That many started to benefit from a profit-driven agriculture encouraged by emancipation can be seen in the emergence of the <i>kulaks</i> during the late nineteenth century • The establishment of the Peasant Land Bank, the eventual abolition of redemption payments and Stolypin's reforms, all sought to encourage the peasantry to remain on the land in the last decades of Tsardom • The Land Decree and New Economic Policy are both examples of policies that attracted peasants back to the land in the early revolutionary years • The concession of peasant plots in 1932 and Khrushchev's reforms to agriculture in the mid-1950s, which reduced taxation on farming profits, were attempts to incentivise the peasantry to remain • The increased size of the peasant plots allowed by Brezhnev and Gorbachev's decision to allow again the private ownership of land are later examples of government attempts to encourage the peasantry. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that Stolypin's reforms (1906-11) were more successful than all other attempts to improve the condition of the peasantry in the years 1861-1991. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that Stolypin's reforms (1906-11) were more successful than all other attempts to improve the condition of the peasantry in the years 1861-1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stolypin's removal of the power of the <i>mir</i> over the peasantry allowed the enterprising to consolidate their strips, invest in modern farming techniques and bring more produce to market for profit • Through the Land Bank he encouraged hundreds of thousands of peasants to buy their land while a programme of education and information helped increase the efficiency of their holdings • Stolypin freed up more state-controlled land for purchase and encouraged settlement in areas opened by the Trans-Siberian Railway like Siberia, so addressing the long-standing land hunger of the peasantry • Stolypin ensured that the cancellation of redemption payments, promised during the 1905 Revolution, was enacted in 1907 immediately boosting peasant spending and investment • His success can be evidenced by the numbers leaving the <i>mir</i> and buying their own land, the decline in rural unrest, the increase in grain production, and the rising amounts the peasants both saved and paid in state taxes. Arguments and evidence disagreeing with the statement that Stolypin's reforms (1906-11) were more successful than all other attempts to improve the condition of the peasantry in the years 1861-1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The success of Stolypin's reforms was partial and short-lived – the numbers leaving the <i>mir</i> tailed off quickly, inefficient methods of cultivation remained predominant and the reforms languished with his death and the onset of war • With its far-reaching social and economic effects, the Emancipation Decree of 1861 can be considered as a more successful attempt to improve the condition of the peasantry during the nineteenth century • The Land Decree and New Economic Policy are both examples of policies which, at least temporarily, improved the condition of the peasantry in the early revolutionary years and rival Stolypin's reforms • Collectivisation brought some improvements for some of the peasantry, e.g. greater social provision, while Khrushchev's reforms in the mid-1950s reduced taxation on farming profits and improved peasant incomes • The concession of peasant plots in 1932, the increased size of the plots allowed by Brezhnev, and Gorbachev's decision to allow private ownership of land are other examples of improvements to rival Stolypin's reforms. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that the move towards larger state farms after 1945 caused the greatest damage to the status and condition of the Russian peasantry in the years 1861-1991. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the move towards larger state farms after 1945 caused the greatest damage to the status and condition of the Russian peasantry in the years 1861-1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:



- Following the relative relaxation of the collective system during the war, the move towards *sovkhozy* after 1945 was unwelcome – it began a new era of intensive state control and the further reduction of peasant independence
- The peasant plots allowed since 1932, and expanded during the war to just under 5% of all cultivated land, were strongly discouraged after 1945 – this severely restricted peasant incomes which had come to rely on them
- The re-imposition of the primacy of the MTSs and the introduction of ideologically-driven Instructor Groups, as part of an attempt to re-impose political control over the peasantry, were deeply resented
- Khrushchev continued the trend towards *sovkhozy* after 1953, introducing new measures to discourage the private plots, which included stiffer punishments for neglecting duties on the collective farms
- The spread of the *sovkhozy* continued into the 1970s despite having little effect on agricultural production – by the mid-1960s, peasant poverty was such that they were allowed state benefits for the first time.

Arguments and evidence disagreeing with the statement that the move towards larger state farms after 1945 caused the greatest damage to the status and condition of the Russian peasantry in the years 1861-1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:

- There was some improvement to peasant conditions in the 1950s despite the move towards larger state farms, e.g. higher prices paid by the state and lower taxes relieved some pressure on their standard of living
- The attempt to control the peasantry politically through larger state farms abated in the 1950s – the Instructor Groups were abolished in 1957 and some decision-making was devolved back to them
- The redemption payments introduced under the Edict of Emancipation in 1861, also the imposition of the control of the *mir*, were major setbacks suffered by the Russian peasantry under the Tsars
- War Communism was hugely damaging for the peasantry following the hope introduced by the Land Decree in 1917, forcing them to surrender their grain and exposing them to the brutality of the police state
- Forced collectivisation from 1928, following the relative freedoms allowed under the NEP, was a significant blow for the Russian peasantry leading to the loss of their independence and millions of deaths
- Gorbachev publicly recognised the limitations of the *sovkhozy* and the damage done to peasant status by the mid-1980s, even though his plans to re-introduce private ownership did not happen before the fall of the USSR.

Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of the concession of peasant plots (1932) in attempts to improve the condition of the peasantry in the years 1855-1991. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the concession of peasant plots (1932) was significant in attempts to improve the condition of the peasantry in the years 1855-1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The concession of private plots enabled peasants to supplement their diet, being unwaged following collectivisation and reliant on the rations allotted by their collective farms • The private plots gave the peasants an incentive to work and, as restrictions were relaxed, to sell produce at market to improve their standard of living • Under the Charter of 1935, peasant plots were allowed to grow in size and the range of livestock permitted was extended, both helping to improve the condition of the peasantry • The role of peasant plots increased during the Second World War, eventually making up almost 5% of cultivated land in the USSR, and was essential to maintaining the condition of many peasants • Khrushchev's reduction in taxes on peasant plots in 1953 was an implicit admission of their vital role in the USSR – they continued to be important to the condition of the peasantry until communism's fall in 1991. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that the concession of peasant plots (1932) was significant in attempts to improve the condition of the peasantry in the years 1855-1991 and/or that other developments were more significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Private plots were always an embarrassment for the government and they were subject to periods of strong discouragement (e.g. post-1945, in the early 1960s) that temporarily stunted the condition of the peasantry • The abolition of serfdom in 1861 was highly significant in raising the condition of the peasantry, freeing them to own property and build up family farms • Stolypin's reforms after 1906 improved peasant conditions by allowing them to opt out of the <i>mir</i> and consolidate their land holdings into more efficient units • In the early Bolshevik years, the Land Decree of 1917 sanctioned the widespread peasant ownership of land, while the NEP created the conditions in which many peasants were able to prosper • The Khrushchev reforms of the mid 1950s, e.g. the reduction in taxes and other costs on the collectives, were significant in raising the standard of living of the peasantry • Changes under Brezhnev, e.g. allowing the peasants access to social security and pensions, helped improve the condition of the peasantry. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that the most significant cause of peasants leaving the land, in the years 1855-1972, was action taken by Russian governments. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the most significant cause of peasants leaving the land, in the years 1855-1972, was action taken by Russian governments should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Emancipation Decree (1861) had several unintended consequences that encouraged peasants to leave the land, e.g. the land allocated to many was often of poor quality or too little to live on • The size of the redemption payments introduced by the Emancipation Decree, and the overbearing influence of the <i>mir</i> enshrined by emancipation, were factors driving peasants from the land • The imposition by the Tsarist government of Land Captains from 1889, with powers to control and discipline peasants, was deeply resented and drove many into the cities • Stolypin's reforms, which encouraged the consolidation and modernisation of agriculture, released many from the land, especially the poorest who could not afford the costs associated with it • The punitive actions taken against the peasantry by the communists in the 1920s and 30s, e.g. during War Communism and collectivisation, encouraged millions of peasants to leave the land for industrial cities • The government's favouring of wage-paying <i>sovkhozy</i>, which intensified after 1945, together with the failure of initiatives to address rural poverty during the 1960s and 70s, continued to drive peasants from the land. Arguments and evidence countering the statement that the most significant cause of peasants leaving the land, in the years 1855-1972, was action taken by Russian governments should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Government actions sometimes prevented the peasantry from leaving the land, e.g. after Emancipation, the <i>mir</i> was given the power to control the numbers leaving, while the communists introduced internal passports • Actions taken by Russian governments sometimes encouraged peasants to remain or even attracted former peasants back to the land, e.g. the Land Decree of 1917 and the effects of the NEP • Rural over-population in the late nineteenth century (Russia's rural population more than doubled between 1860 and 1914) created a land hunger that drove many peasants from the land • The climate and soil conditions in many areas of Russia meant that farming was often a thankless occupation - climate events contributed to regular 'hungers', e.g. the famine of 1891-92, that drove peasants to leave • Improvements to internal communications throughout the period, e.g. the railways during the nineteenth century and roads during the post-war years, created means for the peasants to leave more easily

	• Russia's industrialisation throughout the period, e.g. in Moscow and the Donbas, attracted many peasants with the promises of higher wages, 'modernity' and freedom from rural constraints. Other relevant material must be credited.
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7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1855-1979, the introduction of the NEP was the most significant action taken by government to improve the status and condition of the Russian peasantry. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that in the years 1855-1979, the introduction of the NEP was the most significant action taken by government to improve the status and condition of the Russian peasantry should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The communist government boosted the status of the peasantry by ending requisitioning, allowing the peasantry to regain their standing as free agents, and make their own choices on what to grow and what to market • The NEP allowed peasants to sell surplus food on the open market, encouraging them to produce more and, after paying the government's new taxes, to prosper by their own efforts • The NEP abolished food rationing and controls on the movement of agricultural goods between the countryside and cities – this boosted the market for peasant produce and allowed them to become richer • The NEP encouraged the growth of small businesses, shops in particular, giving peasants an incentive to grow more, to make cash profits and to spend on goods that raised both their condition and status. Arguments and evidence countering the view that, in the years 1855-1979, the introduction of the NEP was the most significant action taken by government to improve the status and condition of the Russian peasantry should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By boosting agricultural production, the NEP resulted in a fall in farm prices in the mid-1920s, affecting peasants' incomes – a simultaneous rise in the price of consumer goods also stymied their condition and status • Falling prices encouraged many peasants to withhold their goods from the market, or sell to middlemen, incurring the wrath of some Bolsheviks and hastening the end of the NEP after only five years • Despite the introduction of the NEP, the vast majority of Russian farms were still dominated by the <i>mir</i>, using strip-farming and archaic methods – consequently, its ability to boost peasant conditions and status was limited • The Emancipation Decree (1861) was significant in improving the condition and status of the peasantry, abolishing controls over their lives and enabling many to become prosperous, independent farmers • By attempting to break the power of the <i>mir</i> and encourage the growth of consolidated farms, Stolypin's reforms (1906-11) helped boost the condition and status of the peasantry • The concession of peasant plots (1932), their expansion during the Second World War and their further encouragement under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, helped improve the condition and status of the peasantry • Changes under Brezhnev, e.g. allowing the peasants access to social security and pensions, helped improve the condition of the peasantry. Other relevant material must be credited.

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7	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1855-1991, communist governments were the most effective at improving the condition of the peasantry. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that that, in the years 1855-1991, communist governments were the most effective at improving the condition of the peasantry should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • One of the first acts of the communists, the Land Decree (1917), was effective in improving the condition of the peasantry, transferring ownership to those who worked the land and abolishing rents • Lenin's NEP allowed peasants to sell surplus food on the open market, encouraging them to produce more and, after paying the government's new taxes, to profit from their enterprise • Collectivisation, from 1928, brought some improvement to the condition of the peasantry by providing access to social facilities, e.g. childcare, and to better machinery and fertilisers, thus increasing yields • The peasant plots, introduced in 1932, were effective in allowing peasants scope to improve their own condition, enabling them to eat better and to profit from the sale of their surpluses • Khrushchev's reforms boosted the condition of the peasantry, e.g. by raising farm prices, and reducing taxes and costs borne by the collectives • Brezhnev abolished internal passports in 1966, allowing many peasants the opportunity to seek better conditions elsewhere; also, peasants were granted access to welfare benefits and pension schemes. Arguments and evidence countering the view that, in the years 1855-1991, communist governments were the most effective at improving the condition of the peasantry should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The early measures taken by the communists, like the Land Decree and NEP, were temporary, pragmatic policies whose effects on peasant conditions were, at best, fleeting • Peasant conditions were damaged enormously by enforced collectivisation during which millions were killed – amendments to the collective system, like the move towards <i>sovkhozy</i> after the war, were also negative in effect • Gorbachev's decision to dismantle collectivisation and reintroduce private ownership of the land, taken in 1985, was, in part, a tacit admission that conditions for the peasantry had not been improved by communism • Tsar Alexander's Emancipation Decree (1861) was highly effective in improving the condition of the peasantry, abolishing controls over their lives and enabling many to become prosperous, independent farmers • The founding of the Peasant Land Bank in 1883 and the abolition of redemption payments in 1906 were effective measures taken by a Tsarist government to improve peasant conditions • By attempting to break the power of the <i>mir</i> and encourage the growth of consolidated farms, Stolypin's reforms (1906-11) were effective in boosting the condition of many peasants under Nicholas II. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the Tsars and the communists were unsuccessful in their attempts to improve agricultural production in Russia in the years 1861-1991. Arguments and evidence that the Tsars and communism were unsuccessful in improving agricultural production under should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Emancipation under Alexander II was supposed to help boost production by the creation of a market economy for food but the conservatism of the <i>mir</i> and the size of redemption payments limited its effectiveness • Agricultural policy under Alexander III and Nicholas II was stymied by their concerns for a quiescent and loyal peasantry rather than for modern and efficient production • The failure of Russian agriculture to produce sufficiently under the Tsars is demonstrated by the periodic famines before 1914 and the shortages encountered during the War which contributed to the February Revolution • The effects of the civil war and war communism badly affected production while the policy of collectivisation, primarily ideologically-inspired, led to a further collapse and the famine which killed over 10 million • Khrushchev conceded in 1953 that collectivisation had failed – attempts to colonise the 'Virgin Lands' to boost output failed due to poor technical knowledge and the 'maize mania' which contributed little • By the 1980s, the USSR was dependent on imports of grain from the USA and Australia and the most productive sector of agriculture was still individual peasant plots rather than the collective farms. Arguments and evidence that attempts to improve agricultural production under the Tsars and communism were successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Production did rise following the Emancipation Decree, if slowly and inadequately for the needs of the country, and the foundations of a functioning market were established • Stolypin's reforms of 1906-11 were a genuine attempt to overcome the weaknesses of Russian agriculture, notably backwards technology and the conservatism of the <i>mir</i>, and helped boost the creation of a kulak class • The NEP temporarily reversed the collapse which had occurred during the Civil War and following an initial fall, collectivisation did at least see production recover to pre-1913 levels before the outbreak of war • The concession of peasant plots outside the collective system was successful in encouraging production. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which Russia took advantage of modern inventions and ideas to improve agricultural production in the years 1861–1991. Arguments and evidence that Russia did take advantage of modern inventions and ideas to improve agricultural production in the years 1861–1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The establishment of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1891 sought to encourage modernisation, e.g. tractor and fertiliser use grew in the years before 1914 • Stolypin's attempts to encourage the consolidation of peasant land holdings to make production more efficient laid a promising foundation for a modernised agriculture in Russia • The development of the railway network in the late nineteenth century enabled the fast and cheap movement of agricultural produce to markets whether internal or external • Collectivisation was intended, at least in part, to overcome backwardness and introduce modern inventions and ideas to Russian agriculture – it saw the increased use of American tractors as well as those domestically produced • Khrushchev's agricultural reforms included heavy investment in tools, tractors and fertilisers during the Virgin Lands scheme and the introduction of strains of corn thought suitable to the USSR during 'Maize Mania' • Brezhnev imported western fertiliser technology in an effort to boost production and also invested in modern storage and refrigeration facilities. Arguments and evidence disagreeing with the statement that Russia took advantage of modern inventions and ideas to improve agricultural production in the years 1861–1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Controlled by the conservatism of the <i>mir</i>, peasant agriculture remained very largely medieval throughout the Tsarist period • The destruction of the <i>kulaks</i> by the communists removed the most entrepreneurial of the peasantry, those most likely to experiment with modern ideas and techniques • The much-promised modernisation during collectivisation during the 1930s was patchy and superficial – Stalin was obsessed with tractor production at the expense of other improvements but many were of poor quality • Soviet agriculture was subject to the whims of leaders whose knowledge was imperfect, hence Stalin's faith in Lysenkoism or the grand plans of Khrushchev that often operated counter to modern scientific norms • Investment in agriculture under communism remained low and what was spent was often not spent wisely, e.g. the opening of the Virgin Lands failed partly because of the lack of modern storage facilities and all-weather roads. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of policies introduced by Stalin in attempts to boost agricultural productivity in Russia in the years 1861-1991. Arguments and evidence that the policies introduced by Stalin were significant in attempts to boost agricultural productivity in Russia in the years 1861-1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Mass collectivisation was a genuine attempt to modernise an historically-backward agricultural system of which previous attempts at reform had all failed • After an initial decline, grain output did recover by the time of Stalin's death while collectivisation remained central to agricultural production until the fall of communism in 1991 • Stalin's policies saw concerted attempts to introduce mechanisation into Russian agricultural production, e.g. unprecedented resources were committed to 'tractorisation' and the number of machines increased markedly • Stalin understood that science was a basis for increasing productivity in the light of Russia's climatic conditions and had some success, e.g. Vilyam's '<i>travopolye</i>' system helped improve soil recovery in some areas • The introduction of peasant plots in the 1930s helped improve agricultural production by incentivising agricultural workers – the idea was extended by Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Arguments and evidence that the policies introduced by Stalin were not significant in attempts to boost agricultural productivity in Russia in the years 1861-1991 and/or that there were other significant factors in its improvement should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Collectivisation led to a collapse in agricultural production during the 1930s and extensive famine – it took decades for output to recover to pre-1914 levels and grain imports were necessary from the 1960s to the 1980s • Stalin's preference for pseudo-science did not improve production and deflected from other measures, such as increased fertiliser production or infrastructure improvements, which would have had greater effect • The Emancipation Decree, the development of the railway network and Stolypin's reforms in the years 1906-11, all had an effect on agricultural production in the Tsarist period • Brezhnev imported western fertiliser technology in an effort to boost production and also invested in modern storage and refrigeration facilities – agricultural investment increased massively in the 1960s • Gorbachev acknowledged Stalin's failure to improve agricultural output by his plans to reform the collective system in the 1980s. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that Russian leaders deserve great credit for their efforts to provide sufficient food to feed the population in the years 1861-1979. Arguments and evidence agreeing with the statement that Russian leaders deserve great credit for their efforts to provide sufficient food to feed the population in the years 1861-1979 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Despite the centuries-long backwardness and legendary conservatism of the Russian peasant, the Emancipation Decree was an attempt to encourage the development of commercial agriculture and food production did increase • Stolypin deserves credit for his attempts to increase agricultural productivity through his reforms of 1906-11 in the face of a rising population, increasing urbanisation, the pressures of climate and stiff resistance from the <i>mir</i> • Creditable attempts were made in the early communist years to incentivise the peasantry to produce more food and reduce its tendency to hoard – the NEP was vital given the USSR's initial isolation from the west • Collectivisation can be seen as a genuine attempt to end Russia's agricultural failings by modernising rapidly - despite huge resistance and the human cost, greater self-sufficiency was eventually achieved • In the 1950s, Khrushchev made ambitious and creditable attempts to boost production by expanding into the Virgin Lands, also by experimenting with new strains of cereal like maize • Brezhnev deserves credit for at least recognising food shortages despite record investment in agriculture – the import of grain from the west, starting in 1972, helped keep the population fed. Arguments and evidence disagreeing with the statement that Russian leaders deserve great credit for their efforts to provide sufficient food to feed the population in the years 1861-1979 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The financial burdens of Emancipation actually discouraged food production - the number of farms that were not able to produce a surplus doubled between 1861 and 1900 and a 'bread crisis' helped destroy the Tsarist system in 1917 • Both Tsarist and Communist governments encouraged the export of grain to help pay for the import of industrial technology, contributing to extreme privation, e.g. during the famines of 1891-92 and the early 1930s • The survival of the Bolshevik regime necessitated War Communism which, through grain requisitioning and the use of terror against the most productive peasants, led to the collapse of Russia's capacity to produce food



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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The supply of food in the first decades of communism could only be maintained by favouring urban workers at the expense of other social groups, and by tolerating a catastrophic famine which killed millions• The politically-driven system of collectivisation failed to produce sufficiently throughout the years 1928-79 – though cheap bread was usually available, the variety of the Russian diet suffered and there was regular hunger. |
|--|--|

Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that the import of western grain (1972-79) was the most important turning point in attempts by Russian governments to feed the people in the years 1861-1991. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the import of western grain (1972-79) was the most important turning point in attempts by Russian governments to feed the people in the years 1861-1991 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Brezhnev's decision to import grain from the USA in the 1970s was a major turning point as it implicitly conceded the failure of the Soviet system to feed the Russian population, despite many attempts at reform • The import of grain, which rose steadily in the 1970s, was an important turning point because it helped convince younger and upcoming Soviet leaders of the need for fundamental agricultural change, e.g. Gorbachev • Brezhnev's decision was significant because its rising cost affected the wider Soviet economy, e.g. revenue from the sale of oil to pay for the grain was lost to other reform programmes intended to help feed the people. Arguments and evidence opposing the statement that the import of western grain (1972-79) was the most important turning point in attempts by Russian governments to feed the people in the years 1861-1991 and/or that there were other more important turning points should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The import of grain from abroad, including the US, was not new and had not marked a turning point in the past, e.g. in the early 1960s when Khrushchev had cut the military budget to pay for it • The import of grain by Brezhnev did not lead immediately to reform of Soviet agriculture – not until the late 1980s did Gorbachev propose changes to the collective system and these remained unfulfilled in 1991 • The Emancipation Decree (1861) was a major turning point in attempts to feed the people by incentivising the peasantry and encouraging the growth of commercial farming in Russia • Stolypin's attempt to increase agricultural productivity through his reforms of 1906-11 was an important turning point, especially in their encouragement of a '<i>kulak</i>' class of prosperous peasants • The NEP (1921) was a turning point by re-introducing market reforms into Russian agriculture in an attempt to produce more food for the Russian people after the privations of War Communism • Collectivisation was a major turning point – it was a genuine attempt to increase production by modernising Russian agriculture, organisationally and technologically, within a generation • Khrushchev's creditable attempt to boost production during the 1950s was a turning point in attempts to reform the collective system, e.g. by expanding into the Virgin Lands, experimenting with maize. Other relevant material must be credited.



Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that of all the initiatives taken by Russian governments to improve agricultural production, in the years 1861-1991, collectivisation was the greatest failure. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that of all the initiatives taken by Russian governments to improve agricultural production, in the years 1861-1991, collectivisation was the greatest failure should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By destroying the <i>kulak</i> class of peasant, forced collectivisation destroyed the most productive, efficient and entrepreneurial class of Russian farmer, contributing greatly to the USSR's inability to produce more food • In the process of collectivisation, many peasants slaughtered their livestock, and destroyed buildings, tools and machinery – this affected the productivity of Russian agriculture for years after • The concession of private plots in 1932, and the manner in which they consistently outperformed the collective farms in productivity, was a measure of collectivisation's failure • By the outbreak of war, grain production in the USSR had barely recovered to levels witnessed before collectivisation, while on many other counts, e.g. the production of meat and dairy goods, the situation was far worse • The import of western grain, which began in the 1960s and became annual in the 1970s, was an explicit admission of the failure of collectivisation to provide for the needs of the USSR • Gorbachev's decision to introduce market reforms into Russian agriculture in the late 1980s, which would have allowed the break-up of the collective farms, demonstrates the scale and longevity of collectivisation's failure. Arguments and evidence countering the statement that of all the initiatives taken by Russian governments to improve agricultural production, in the years 1861-1991, collectivisation was the greatest failure should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Collectivisation did help to accelerate the modernisation of Russian agricultural practice with the greater use of machinery and fertilisers, and more up-to-date scientific knowledge • Attempts to improve agricultural production under the Tsars, e.g. the extension of the railway network from the 1860s, largely failed and did not prevent crises such as the disastrous famine of 1891-92 • Stolypin's attempt to increase agricultural productivity stalled badly and had little serious impact – his 20-year 'wager on the strong' was effectively abandoned as a failure after less than 10 • Stalin's encouragement of Lysenkoism, in an attempt to increase agricultural production in Russia, was an embarrassing failure • Khrushchev's attempt to reform agriculture during the 1950s, e.g. by expanding into the Virgin Lands and experimenting with maize, cost a great deal and failed to make any lasting improvement to production. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which food shortages in Russia, in the years 1861-1979, were a consequence of the failure of government agricultural policy. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that food shortages in Russia, in the years 1861-1979, were a consequence of the failure of government agricultural policy should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Emancipation Decree and Stolypin's reforms failed to modernise Russian agriculture sufficiently to avert major food shortages, e.g. the famine of 1891-92, the shortages of 1916-17 • Collectivisation, and the speed with which the process was undertaken, massively decreased Russia's agricultural production and triggered the famine of 1932-33, during which millions perished • The failure of Stalin's agricultural policies (e.g. his attachment to Lysenkoism, the shortages of fertilisers and technology) contributed to the continued prevalence of queues outside food stores especially in towns • Khrushchev's taste for large, inefficient state farms (the <i>sovkhozy</i>) and his costly but failed schemes to improve agricultural production (e.g. the Virgin Lands Scheme) led to the need to import western grain in the early 1960s • Brezhnev's inability to question the efficacy of collectivisation and the wasting of record levels of agricultural investment in the 1960s, led to the need to import western grain regularly in the years 1972-79. Arguments and evidence countering the view that food shortages in Russia, in the years 1861-1979, were a consequence of the failure of government agricultural policy should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Regular food shortages were a consequence of many hundreds of years of backwardness in Russian agriculture (e.g. strip farming, outdated technology), which prevailed in much of Russia before collectivisation • Food shortages during this period were a consequence of difficult climate conditions and weather in many parts of Russia, e.g. a short growing season and regular droughts led to frequent poor harvests • The massive increase in Russia's population during these years (e.g. a rise of over 50% in the second half of the nineteenth century) outstripped the many productivity improvements made by government policy • Food shortages were often a consequence of political decisions rather than agricultural, e.g. selling grain abroad to pay for industrialisation, joining the First World War, 'War Communism', collectivising at breakneck speed • Some agricultural policies during these years were notable successes in combating food shortages, e.g. the improvements made as a consequence of increased rail investment under the Tsars • During some of this period Russia was self-sufficient in food, even if the range and quality was limited, and shortages were averted, e.g. during the early 1950s. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997

Question	Indicative content
8	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the drive to modernise under Stalin was the key turning point in attempts to boost agricultural productivity in Russia in the years 1855-1979. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the drive to modernise under Stalin was the key turning point in attempts to boost agricultural productivity in Russia in the years 1855-1979 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's decision to abandon the NEP and enforce collectivisation was a major turning point, being the first systematic and centrally-imposed attempt to improve agricultural production across Russia • Stalin's drive to modernise was a key turning point because it abolished the ineffective system of small-scale, often subsistence, farming that had prevailed in Russia for centuries, in favour of efficient, large-scale farms • Stalin's agricultural policies were an important turning point because of the widespread introduction of modern technology to boost output in Russia, most notably tractors and combine harvesters • Stalin's drive to modernise was a significant turning point by its attempt to introduce scientific rigour and up-to-date knowledge to improve agricultural productivity, e.g. the more effective use of fertilisers • Stalin's drive to modernisation was a key turning point because it successfully increased grain yields in Russia from the mid-1930s onwards and kept the Russian population fed during the Second World War. Arguments and evidence countering the view the drive to modernise under Stalin was the key turning point in attempts to boost agricultural productivity in Russia in the years 1855-1979 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Stalin's drive to modernise was not a key turning point because so much of its programme was unrealised or ineffective, e.g. the number of tractors was underwhelming, 'Lysenkoism' was, ultimately, a failure • Stalin's modernisation was not a significant turning point because, in some respects, it was counter-productive, e.g. the destruction of the <i>kulaks</i> removed the most productive farmers in Russia and yields initially fell • Stalin's policies were not a turning point in agricultural productivity because its concentration on grain production was realised at the expense of the production of other foods, e.g. meat, potatoes, fruit • Emancipation of the serfs (1861) was a major turning point in attempts to boost agricultural productivity because it created a larger class of independent, entrepreneurial farmers driven by profit to produce more • Stolypin's reforms (1906-11) were a key turning point as they began the break-up of the <i>mir</i> and launched widespread commercial farming in Russia • Khrushchev's drive to boost productivity (through the Virgin Lands and 'maize mania') was a significant turning point because it sought to introduce advanced ideas from the west to boost yields • The decision made to import western grain (1972-79) was a major turning point as it was a tacit admission that collectivisation had failed to feed the population and led to a reappraisal of agricultural policy under Gorbachev. Other relevant material must be credited.



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Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far they agree with the statement that Alexander II's reforms, in the years 1855–70, were inspired largely by Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that Alexander II's reforms, in the years 1855–70, were inspired by Russia's defeat in the Crimean War should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Alexander, whose first major action as Tsar was to sign the Treaty of Paris, realised that autocracy's future depended on avoiding another such humiliating defeat – the price of this was a programme of limited reform • Defeat clearly implied the need for change in the military, which had performed poorly during the war, thus Dmitri Milyutin was able to push through his reforms against aristocratic opposition • The war highlighted Russia's vulnerability in comparison with its Great Power rivals – this boosted the position of the 'westernisers' at court • The loss of over 400,000 men, who died mostly off, rather than on, the battlefield, led to condemnation of Russia's general disorganisation and corruption and to calls for promotion of the more able and qualified. Arguments and evidence that Alexander II's reforms in the years 1855–1870 were inspired by factors other than Russia's defeat in the Crimean War should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The demand for western-style reform in Russia was of long-standing and certainly preceded the Crimean War, e.g. the aims of the Decembrists in 1825 • Tutored by liberals and more widely travelled than his predecessors, Alexander may have been expected to embrace reform regardless of defeat in the war – a reaction to his father's conservatism was also a factor • An intellectual climate favouring reform was present in mid-century Russia thanks to 'westernisers' such as Kavelin and Chicherin – though semi-legal, Herzen's Russian Free Press was also influential • Alexander was heavily influenced by liberal ministers around him notably the Milyutin brothers, Zamyatnin and Golovnin – even his aunt, Grand Duchess Elena, held reformist discussion parties at the Mikhailovsky Palace • The emancipation of the serfs, which destroyed the feudal nature of Russian society, created the need to reform the operation of the army, legal system and local government. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Tsar Alexander II did little to encourage greater freedom of expression in Russia in the years 1855-70. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that Tsar Alexander II did little to encourage greater freedom of expression in Russia in the years 1855-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Alexander remained an autocrat at heart, believing unlimited free expression to be dangerous – this was particularly seen in Poland following the rising of 1863 and more widely after the attempt on his life in 1866 • The government clamped down on student criticism both before and after the University Statute, e.g. the banning of 'The Bell' in 1861 and the reaction following the assassination attempt by a former student in 1866 • The new press regulations did not totally remove censorship and periodicals were still shut down for the barest criticism of the regime, or even just for helping to encourage a climate of criticism, e.g. 'The Russian Word' in 1866 • Though the <i>zemstvo</i> statute was thought by many to encourage free expression, numbers were restricted to less than half of provinces and they were not allowed in areas thought to be problematic to the autocracy • Alexander's choice of a conservative education for his son and heir, personified by Pobedonostsev, helped ensure that any greater freedom of expression he had encouraged was strongly curtailed after his death. Arguments and evidence against the view that that Tsar Alexander II did little to encourage greater freedom of expression in Russia in the years 1855-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Alexander was significantly more relaxed about free expression than, for example, his father and his son - this, plus his numerous reforms, helped create the climate in which people could discuss Russia's future openly • The University Statute of 1863 freed higher education from censorship, building on his earlier abolition of restrictions introduced by his father, and gave encouragement to critics of the autocracy within the universities • The new press regulations of 1865 relaxed state censorship, which now came into effect after publication, giving the 'generation of the 1860s' scope to explore the boundaries of free expression • The introduction of the <i>zemstvo</i> statute in 1864 allowed former serfs to be represented on them and to speak freely – the schools and libraries set up by the <i>zemstvos</i> helped facilitate the growth of free expression

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Many, notably the <i>raznochintsy</i> created by the spread of <i>zemstvos</i>, hoped that this reform would lay the foundations of a system of representative democracy, perhaps leading to the institution of a national assembly. |
|--|--|

Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the accuracy of the statement that the reforms of Alexander II did little to change the political system in Russia in the years 1855-70. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the reforms of Alexander II did little to change the political system in Russia in the years 1855-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Alexander did little to loosen his autocratic powers during these years and Russia remained a repressive state dominated by the rich and powerful • Alexander's reforms to local government did not weaken the control of the nobility in their localities, e.g. under the <i>zemstvo</i> statute of 1864, 70% of the members of the provincial <i>zemstvos</i> were nobles • The government repressed student criticism of Tsardom both before and after the University Statute of 1863, e.g. the reaction following the assassination attempt on Alexander by a former student in 1866 • The new press regulations of 1865 did not totally remove censorship and periodicals were still shut down for the barest criticism of the autocracy • The municipal statute of 1870 created city dumas that were dominated by the wealthiest taxpayers, while important powers, e.g. control of the police, remained with central government. Arguments and evidence opposing the statement that the reforms of Alexander II did little to change the political system in Russia in the years 1855-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Alexander fully understood the need for reform of Russia's political culture following the Crimean War • The <i>zemstvo</i> statute allowed former serfs to be represented and to speak freely – the schools and libraries set up by the <i>zemstvos</i> helped facilitate the growth of freer political expression • The relaxation of censorship in the University Statute, and new press regulations, allowed a greater critical examination of autocracy in Russia than ever before • Together with the <i>zemstvo</i> statute, the municipal statute fostered a wider degree of political engagement in Russia and provided evidence that active representative bodies could change people's lives for the better • Alexander's reforms helped create a spirit of political change in Russia, e.g. the 'generation of the 1860s', and the belief that further reform was possible, even the introduction of a national assembly • The reforms of 1855-70 laid the foundations for greater political change in the longer term rather than within his own lifetime, e.g. the emergence of both revolutionary and reformist political movements in the early 1900s. Other relevant material must be credited.

3	8–12	• Demonstrates understanding of the source material and shows some analysis by selecting key points relevant to the question, explaining their meaning and selecting material to support valid inferences • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to explain or support inferences as well as to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and explanation of utility takes into account relevant considerations such as nature or purpose of the source material or the position of the author. Judgements are based on valid criteria but with limited justification.
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Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the position of Tsar Nicholas II was seriously threatened during the 1905 Revolution. Arguments and evidence that the position of Tsar Nicholas II was seriously threatened should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Defeat in the Russo-Japanese war was a major national humiliation and focused critical attention on the failings of autocracy • Bloody Sunday led to widespread outrage from many sections of Russian society and reflected especially badly on Nicholas personally • The absence of the armed forces in the Far East at the start of 1905 left Nicholas exposed and vulnerable • The scale of unrest was massive and prolonged - serious opposition occurred amongst the middle classes, peasants, industrial workers, elements of the armed forces and national minorities well into 1906 • The severity of Nicholas' position is indicated by the fact he was forced, belatedly and unwillingly, into the major concessions suggested by Witte, notably the October Manifesto. Arguments and evidence that the position of Tsar Nicholas II was not seriously threatened in 1905 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include • Though unrest was serious, there was little attempt to co-ordinate the actions of those in revolt or to focus discontent on the demand to end Tsardom • The influence of revolutionary groups on events was slight thanks partly to the repressive policies of the previous 25 years • Disunity among those groups opposing the Tsar can be seen following the issue of the October Manifesto – this generally satisfied liberals who then supported the suppression of the industrial workers by military force • Concessions to the peasants, e.g. over redemption payments, were successful in lessening opposition in the countryside • The loyalty of the armed forces, itself guaranteed by pay increases and a reduction in the period of military service, eventually allowed the government to regain control. Other relevant material must be credited.



1.

Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.

Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for revealing the reasons for discontent among industrial workers in Russia in 1905 and their attitude to the Tsar. Bloody Sunday is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware both of its causes and significance as part of the events of 1905.

The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inference:

- Written by a leader of a union of factory workers in St Petersburg in 1905, it should be fully informed of their condition and attitudes though, in a petition hoping to persuade, there may be a tendency to exaggeration
- As an Orthodox priest, Gapon is likely to be portraying the condition of the people accurately, though the close links between Church and the autocracy may lead him to moderate his criticisms
- The tone is clearly reformist and therefore does not represent the views of the revolutionaries who, although outlawed, had significant support among the industrial workers at this time
- While this represents the views of many in St Petersburg, it may not reflect the position in the rest of industrial Russia – likewise, dated in January 1905, it may not reflect the mood of workers throughout the year.

The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source:

Reasons for discontent among the industrial workers in Russia in 1905:

- The source suggests their dissatisfaction with working conditions ('eight-hour day', 'workers' wages', 'working conditions...death')
- It suggests an air of desperation amongst the workers ('impoverished and oppressed...in silence', 'no strength left...death is better', 'die here...nowhere else to go')
- It provides evidence that their employers refuse to recognise their unions ('Our request...refused', 'right to discuss...illegal', 'condemned...a crime') thus a direct approach to the Tsar is their only hope of improvement
- It implies, through their demands for union representation and political rights, that discontent has been amplified by their lack of a say in the laws that affect them ('representatives...shall meet', 'universal suffrage').

Their attitude towards the Tsar:

- The pleading tone of the petition and the repetitions of 'Sire', 'O Tsar' and 'O Emperor' do not suggest any threat to Nicholas's position and hint that, if fully appraised of their situation, he would intervene to help them
- Though they demand elections and, by implication, an end to autocracy, their tone suggests respect ('rule the country with you', 'we speak...our father', 'keep your name...our hearts')
- The desperation of the pleas and the size of the crowd may suggest a greater threat to come should Nicholas refuse to consider reform.



Question	Indicative content
	Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source for an enquiry into the discontent of industrial workers in Russia in 1905 and their attitude towards the Tsar. Relevant points may include: • Russia's industrial revolution created an impoverished and unprotected proletariat subject to low wages, working hours of up to 15 per day, dangerous working conditions and dirty and cramped housing • Trade unions were illegal, however the St Petersburg Okhrana had begun to encourage them as a means of controlling revolutionary activity and, as an informer as well as an organiser, Gapon was part of this process • The Bloody Sunday protest took place during a wave of unrest in St Petersburg ignited by the Russo-Japanese War and the victimisation of union members – over 150,000 workers were on strike at the time • The death of around 200 unarmed protesters on Bloody Sunday destroyed the faith of many in Nicholas and Tsardom, triggered prolonged unrest and led to major political concessions. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997

1.

Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.

Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing the significance of the changes introduced by the October Manifesto and the attitude of Nicholas II towards these changes. The October Manifesto is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of its significance and of Tsar Nicholas' attitude towards it.

1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences:

- The source is an official minute of government meetings and ought to record accurately what was said in them
- The meetings took place six months after the October Manifesto was issued and at the time that decisions about its implementation could no longer be delayed
- The tone and language of the Tsar's ministers are firm yet restrained and tactful, as would be expected from those addressing one who was both an autocratic sovereign and a stubborn man.

2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source:

The significance of the changes introduced by the October Manifesto:

- The source suggests that the changes introduced are extremely significant by limiting the Tsar's previously autocratic powers ('but plead...autocrat of all the Russias.', 'Until...unlimited right to issue laws')
- The source provides evidence that the October Manifesto has promised to establish a parliament in Russia with which the Tsar must now share legislative responsibilities ('since October...without the *duma*.')
- It suggests that the Manifesto is significant because it has stirred expectations among the Russian people that now must be satisfied ('To use the word...enemies in the *duma*.', 'The word...nationwide unrest.').

The attitude of Tsar Nicholas towards these changes:

- The source claims that Nicholas is still committed to the Manifesto ('firmly resolved...into effect.') but provides evidence that he is unwilling to surrender his autocratic powers ('If I were convinced...gladly do it.')
- The source indicates that Nicholas believes that the majority of the Russian people do not support the changes ('eighty percent') and that he believes the rest are merely troublemakers ('agitation...newspapers.')
- The source suggests that Nicholas' attitude with regard to the autocracy is out-of-step not only with 'the educated élite' in Russia but with his own ministers, only one of whom supports him
- The source suggests that Nicholas accepted the changes reluctantly ('I have decided to accept...Council of Ministers.') and with a heavy heart ('troubled...conflict within me').



Question	Indicative content
	3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing the significance of the changes introduced by the October Manifesto and the attitude of Nicholas II towards these changes. Relevant points may include: • The October Manifesto promised Russians some civil rights (e.g. of conscience, speech and assembly) together with a state <i>duma</i> elected by universal manhood suffrage, all unprecedented in Russian history • The Manifesto was only agreed by the Tsar due to the scale of the unrest that threatened him during the 1905 Revolution, and at the urgings of his uncle, Grand Duke Nicholas, and Prime Minister Sergei Witte • Nicholas was deeply conservative in outlook and convinced that the people saw him as their 'father' – he could not believe, nor understand, that they would wish such sweeping reforms to the political system • Partly because of Nicholas' attitude, the changes promised in October were watered down in practice, e.g. he retained the right to call and dismiss the <i>duma</i> at will, and to veto its proposals.

Option 38.2: The making of Modern China, 1860-1997



Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that repression was more effective than reform in dealing with the unrest in Russia in the years 1905-06. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that repression was more effective than reform in dealing with the unrest in Russia in the years 1905-06, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The repressive measures ordered by Durnovo and Stolypin, following the issue of the October Manifesto, were especially brutal and destructive (over 10 000 killed) and were a major deterrent to continued unrest • The violent closure of the St Petersburg and Moscow Soviets in November 1905, ended the general strike, robbed the industrial workers of leadership and, in effect, ended organised revolutionary agitation • The <i>okhrana</i> and the Black Hundreds were targeted effectively against those that had led calls for radical reform, e.g. students, intellectuals and socialists were arrested in large numbers • Repression was highly effective against the demands of the nationalities for self-rule e.g. over a thousand were summarily executed in, and many more were deported from, the Baltic provinces in 1906 • The exiling (internal and external) of thousands of radicals and revolutionaries, e.g. Trotsky, hugely disrupted the ability of opposition groups to function inside Russia • The limited effectiveness of the October reforms was demonstrated by Nicholas' attitude to, and quick dismissal of, the first duma in April 1906 – in this context, the continued use of repression was essential. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that repression was more effective than reform in dealing with the unrest in Russia in the years 1905-06, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The opposition of the radicals and revolutionaries during 1905-06 was largely spasmodic, uncoordinated and failed to sustain pressure on Tsarism – this lessened the need for repression in ending the unrest • The promise of significant political reform in the October Manifesto was skilfully calibrated by Witte to split middle-class reformers from the revolutionaries, and effectively undermined opposition unity • The promise of civil rights, the extension of the suffrage and the introduction of a truly-representative assembly was hugely effective in reconciling many to Tsarism, e.g. the Octobrists and Kadets • The Act that, in October, reduced and then abolished redemption payments for peasants who had bought their land upon Emancipation, was a major reform that calmed much of the unrest in the countryside • The use of such brutal repression by the government was counter-productive, merely driving opposition underground and creating thousands of new recruits for those groups seeking radical or revolutionary change. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the mistakes of the Provisional Government were largely responsible for the triumph of the Bolsheviks in October 1917. Arguments and evidence that the mistakes of the Provisional Government were largely responsible for the triumph of the Bolsheviks in October 1917 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The decision to continue the war and then differences over the war's conduct weakened the Provisional Government • The Provisional Government alienated many by its limited reforms (notably failing to enact the redistribution of land demanded by the peasants) and by its inability to deal with shortages and falling living standards • Kerensky's mishandling of Kornilov badly damaged the revolutionary credentials of the Provisional Government and allowed the Bolsheviks to re-establish their position following the July Days • Kerensky's attempts to recover the situation in October, by calling elections to legitimise the Provisional Government's rule and acting to suppress the Bolsheviks, came too late and merely helped precipitate their seizure of power. Arguments and evidence that there are reasons for the triumph of the Bolsheviks in October 1917 other than the mistakes of the Provisional Government should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The fall of the Tsar bequeathed a host of serious military and economic problems to the Provisional Government which may have proved insurmountable for whoever took over • The Provisional Government lacked legitimacy due to the circumstances of its creation – challenged from the start by the St Petersburg Soviet, it struggled to assert its authority perhaps through no fault of its own • The weaknesses and mistakes of the revolutionary alternatives to the Bolsheviks, e.g the Mensheviks, played into their hands • The skillful and determined leadership of Lenin enabled the Bolsheviks to profit from the growing unpopularity of the Provisional Government • Trotsky's organisational abilities and his control over the Red Guards were similarly crucial to the success of the Bolshevik coup. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that the Bolsheviks very successfully consolidated their control over Russia in the years 1917-18. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the Bolsheviks very successfully consolidated their control over Russia in the years 1917-18 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Armed force was not only used against the Constituent Assembly but against dissent in the army, the central bank and strikers in the months after the Revolution – this sent a powerful example to others • The establishment of the Cheka in December 1917 was indicative of Lenin's priorities and followed by the use of terror against any individual or group thought to be a threat to the new regime, including the royal family • The Decree on Land postponed a communist solution to the problem of Russian agriculture in the interests of pacifying the peasantry – other concessions were aimed at the nationalities, industrial workers and soldiers • The decision to end the war immediately gave the regime vital breathing space and satisfied Lenin's promises made in April 1917 • By the close of 1918, the Bolsheviks had not only survived, but established a government totally under their own control, which issued laws by decree and could back these up with the support of the Red Army. Arguments and evidence against the view that the Bolsheviks very successfully consolidated their control over Russia in the years 1917-18 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Bolshevik rule in these years barely existed outside the major cities – large parts of the former Empire such as Ukraine were yet to be brought under communist control and anarchy prevailed in many areas • The concessions granted by the decrees of 1917 created immediate problems, e.g. the abolition of officer status proved disastrous for army discipline while the granting of land to the peasantry saw food production collapse • The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was opposed by many even within the regime, and strengthened opposition at home and abroad • Civil War broke out with a wide spectrum of opposition (liberals, monarchists and revolutionaries) in 1918 demonstrating how far the Bolsheviks were from consolidating their power • The rapid deterioration in the economy following the Revolution necessitated the use of terror to guarantee food and fuel distribution, industrial discipline and prices. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.1: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



1.

Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.

Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for revealing the influence of Rasputin in Russia during the First World War and the reasons for the weakening of Tsar Nicholas II's position on the throne. Rasputin is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of his role in the deterioration of Nicholas's popularity.

1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inference:

- The speech was made by a committed Tsarist who is likely to have the interests of the monarchy firmly in mind
- He may tend to exaggeration to make his point in such a public speech
- It was made in November 1916 after over two years of a war, which had put enormous political and economic strain on Russia, and only three months before the February Revolution that overthrew Tsardom
- The emotive language suggests an alarm that was clearly shared widely as indicated by the applause his speech received from all sides in the duma.

2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source:

The influence of Rasputin in Russia during the First World War:

- The source indicates that Rasputin played a very important role in internal affairs, directing the appointment and sacking of government ministers ('dark forces...Rasputin', 'orders...powerful men')
- It indicates that Rasputin was highly influential in the direction of government policy ('dictates orders...one minister, then the next', 'director of Russia's internal affairs')
- It suggests that Rasputin has a close relationship with the Tsarina ('puppets who are controlled by Rasputin...and by the Empress') and that he has many acolytes ('Rasputin and his followers, both great and small').

The reasons for the weakening of Tsar Nicholas II's position on the throne:

- The tone of Purishkevich's speech ('emotional turmoil', 'ring the alarm bell', 'could not sleep') suggests that even the Tsar's strongest supporters were losing faith in his leadership by November 1916
- The speech provides evidence of major political problems ('paralysis of the government', 'absolute uncertainty') and growing anger among the people ('thoughts of the Russian people....resentment...Russian army')
- The source indicates the unpopularity of the Tsarina ('remained German...alien to the country') and suggests that Nicholas is detached from, or oblivious to, his situation ('beg...open his eyes...dreadful reality').

3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source for an enquiry into the influence of Rasputin in Russia during the First World War and the reasons for the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in February 1917. Relevant points may include:

- Rasputin's influence rose with Nicholas's decision to leave St. Petersburg for the front line, leaving the direction of internal affairs in the hands of the Tsarina



Question	Indicative content
	• He contributed to governmental instability by influencing Alexandra to appoint or sack ministers on the basis of their loyalty rather than ability, to the increasing frustration of the Duma • Rasputin contributed enormously to the growing unpopularity of Nicholas and Tsardom, as evidenced by the Okhrana reports in the months before the Revolution • By the end of 1916, with still no sign of an end to the war, mounting casualties and the deteriorating economy were causing rising discontent with Nicholas's leadership both among the elite and ordinary people.

Option 38.1: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far the failure of the Provisional government was a consequence of its decision to continue Russia's participation in the First World War. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the failure of the Provisional government was a consequence of its decision to continue Russia's participation in the First World War should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As a consequence of the Provisional government's decision to continue the war, elections to a constituent assembly were postponed, fatally weakening its legitimacy in the eyes of many Russian people • In continuing the war, the Provisional government was forced to delay reforms that many Russians believed would quickly follow the February Revolution, e.g. land redistribution, so adding to the ranks of its opponents • The Provisional government's decision to continue the war ensured that the economic situation that had caused the February Revolution, e.g. food and fuel shortages, would continue to deteriorate, so contributing to its failure • As a consequence of the decision to continue the war, the Provisional government was closely associated with continued military defeats and their associated losses, e.g. the Kerensky Offensive of June-July 1917 • As a consequence of continuing with the war on the side of the Allies, the government became an easy target for opponents who successfully associated it with the narrative of an unjust and exploitative war • Because of its decision to continue the war, the Provisional government was increasingly unable to deal effectively with rising unrest and opposition at home, whether fomented by Kornilov or the Bolsheviks. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that the failure of the Provisional government was a consequence of its decision to continue Russia's participation in the First World War, and/or that it was a consequence of other factors, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The continuation of the war gained considerable patriotic support for the Provisional government, while the consequence of simply pulling out, the imposition of a 'Carthaginian' peace by Germany, was widely feared • The failure of the Provisional government was the consequence of the disastrous position it inherited from the Romanovs, which any government would have struggled to manage • The failure of the Provisional government was a consequence of having to share authority with the Petrograd Soviet, which stymied its ability to take effective decisions and acted as a focus for increasing criticism • The failure of the Provisional government was a consequence of Kerensky's mistakes as leader, e.g. his misjudgement of Kornilov, his weak response to the gathering evidence of a Bolshevik coup in October • The failure of the Provisional government was a consequence of the acute tactical and organisational skills of Lenin and Trotsky, who were able to build left-wing opposition and then marshal sufficient force to overthrow it. Other relevant material must be credited.

1.

Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.

Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing the way in which the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in October 1917 and the immediate priorities of the new government. The October Revolution and the Bolsheviks in power are named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of them and the context of the source.

1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences:

- Written by Lenin, the source can be expected to reflect the perspective of the Bolshevik party leadership
- Issued in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of power, and before Bolshevik control had been fully established, the proclamation is likely to reflect hopes and aspirations rather than reality
- The tone and language of the source are assertive and urgent, seeking to rally support in an uncertain, and potentially dangerous, situation.

2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source:

The way the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in October 1917:

- The source indicates that the Bolsheviks came to power following the ousting of the Provisional Government from power ('The Provisional Government has been overthrown')
- The source suggests that the Bolsheviks used a degree of coercion in their assumption of power ('victorious uprising', 'The majority of members of the Provisional Government have already been arrested.')
- It provides evidence that the Bolsheviks assumed power in the name of the Soviets rather than in the name of their party alone ('This Congress decrees that power shall pass to the Soviets...throughout Russia.')
- It suggests the Bolsheviks experienced opposition in taking power ('troop trains sent by Kerensky') and that the future of their government was uncertain ('actively resist...supporters.', 'fate...revolution...your hands.').

The immediate priorities of the new government:

- The source suggests that an immediate priority of the new government was to hold on to power ('calls on all the soldiers...be vigilant and firm.', 'Soldiers and workers...in your hands!')
- The source suggests that an immediate priority was to ensure the loyalties of the Russian people and the army ('bread is supplied...vital necessities...', 'supply all the needs of the army...condition of soldiers' families.')
- It indicates that it was a priority to bring an end to Russia's involvement in the First World War ('an immediate ceasefire...a genuine, democratic peace...all nations.')
- It suggests that an immediate priority was to bring about radical political change in Russia ('complete democracy in the army.', 'establish workers' control...production.')

3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing the way in which the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in October 1917 and the immediate priorities of the new government. Relevant points may include:



Question	Indicative content
	• The Bolshevik blueprint for an immediate, workers' revolution was decided upon by Lenin alone against some internal Bolshevik opposition, and was advertised through his April Theses, issued upon his return from exile • To a war-weary population, unhappy at the failure of the Provisional Government to bring about the promises of the February Revolution, the slogan of 'Peace, Bread and Land' was increasingly attractive in mid-1917 • Assuming power in the name of the Soviets enabled the Bolsheviks to pose as the representatives of all workers, soldiers and peasants, rather than simply their own small, and by no means dominant, faction • Following the proclamation assuming power, the Congress of Soviets immediately passed Decrees concerning Peace and Land and established a Council of People's Commissars, dominated by Bolsheviks, to rule Russia.

Option 38.2: The making of Modern China, 1860-1997



Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Khrushchev significantly increased the freedom of the people of Soviet Russia in the years 1956-61. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that Khrushchev significantly increased the freedom of the people of Soviet Russia in the years 1956-61 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • De-Stalinisation, which included the mass release of political prisoners and the exoneration of victims of the purges, opened a debate about the future direction of the USSR, at least within the Party and intelligentsia • By not replicating Stalin's leadership style or use of the terror apparatus (which he reformed), Khrushchev signalled a loosening of state control and a relaxation of the use of fear as a form of mass control • The 'thaw' extended to a relaxation of censorship – disgraced writers and musicians were rehabilitated, some criticism of the regime was tolerated and books by foreign writers were legally published, selling in large numbers • <i>Samizdat</i> material, poetry and literature especially, spread among the young – unofficial street poetry readings began in Moscow and the works of 'bards' like Okudzhava sold widely • Foreigners were allowed into the USSR in unparalleled numbers, e.g. the World Festival of Youth and Students, which opened Russian eyes to the lives enjoyed in the West and spread western music and fashion styles. Arguments and evidence against the view that that Khrushchev significantly increased the freedom of the people of Soviet Russia in the years 1956-61 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The reform of the security apparatus was inspired mostly by Khrushchev's desire to tame the KGB – it remained in place, as did imprisonment without trial and detention in mental hospitals for opposition to the system • The relaxation of censorship only went so far – it was extended largely to critics or victims of Stalin, like Yevtushenko or Dudintsev, but not to those critical of the Soviet system generally, like Pasternak • Criticism of communism remained illegal, dangerous and mostly underground – a crackdown escalated from the late 1950s, e.g. the arrest of those involved in the public poetry readings in Moscow for subversion • Khrushchev's real attitude to free expression can be illustrated by his attack on the Orthodox Church, which culminated in 1961 with the closure of seminaries and monasteries. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system, in the years 1956-61, were introduced largely to help secure his own position as leader of the USSR. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system, in the years 1956-61, were introduced largely to help secure his own position as leader of the USSR should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • There was nothing before Stalin's death to suggest that Khrushchev was a reformer – his unequivocal backing for Stalin's repression suggests that his newfound support for reform was self-interested rather than principled • Though Khrushchev initially opposed Malenkov's liberalisation to help eliminate a rival for power, he then adopted those policies to broaden his support base • It was not sympathy for reform but the threat from Beria as a contender for power, and from the security apparatus Beria had headed, that led Khrushchev to dismantle the gulag system and rein in the secret police • Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin in 1956 helped secure his pre-eminence - a growing number within the party, especially of the younger generation, felt the need to dismantle Stalinism and supported his lead • Rather than genuinely accepting the need for change, reform helped distance him from the past - the 'thaw' extended only to critics of Stalin like Solzhenitsyn rather than critics of the regime more generally, like Pasternak • Khrushchev's enthusiasm for reform petered out once his position was more secure – the 'thaw' ended with a crackdown on writers and the church in the later 1950s and increasing numbers were jailed for their criticisms. Arguments and evidence against the view that Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system, in the years 1956-61, were introduced largely to help secure his own position as leader of the USSR should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Pressure from the camps focused attention on the injustices of the Stalin era, prompting reform – newly-released inmates also added to the new atmosphere by calling for a fresh start

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Khrushchev understood the need to free the government from the bureaucratic inertia, which had built up and promoted decentralisation with the genuine intention of promoting better decision-making in the USSR• His appreciation of the need for economic modernisation led to significant reforms in agriculture and the promotion of the space race to encourage the development of new technology• From a peasant background, Khrushchev was genuinely motivated by the need to improve living conditions, hence his house-building programme launched in 1956 and his launch of the Third Programme in 1961• Openness was a feature of Khrushchev's personality and not contrived for personal ends - this extended to opening the Kremlin to visitors and the USSR to westerners and western influence, e.g. the World Festival of Youth. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p> |
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Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



1.

Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.

Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing the changes introduced in the USSR following the Twentieth Party Congress (1956) and the strength of the opposition to these changes in the Communist Party. The Twentieth Party Congress (1956) and resistance in the party to de-Stalinisation are named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of them.

1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences:

- The source was issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU and therefore reflects party opinion at a senior level from across the USSR
- Issued soon after attempts by leading members of the Communist Party to oust Khrushchev, the decree is seeking to restore his authority, and to discredit and destroy his opposition
- The source is firm in its language and comprehensive in its condemnation of the 'anti-party group', as befits a document likely to be publicised widely in the USSR and across the world.

2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source:

The changes introduced in the USSR following the Twentieth Party Congress (1956):

- The source suggests that major changes in political culture have already occurred as a result of the Congress ('to eliminate abuses...law', 'to rectify errors...personality cult', 'enlarging the powers...republics')
- The source provides evidence that reforms have been made to the economic system in the USSR following the Congress ('the reorganisation of industrial management...industry.')
- The source suggests that a significant change in emphasis in the USSR's attitude to foreign powers has occurred ('to relax international tensions.', 'peaceful co-existence', 'build contacts...other countries.').

The strength of the opposition to these changes in the Communist Party:

- The source indicates that the opposition to change was led by very senior members of the party ('Molotov...Kaganovich') in prominent positions ('minister of foreign affairs')
- The source implies that the 'anti-party group' was working against the tide of opinion in the USSR and that it lacked widespread support ('high-handed unconcern...masses', 'divorced from...Party and country.')
- The source provides evidence that the anti-party group was decisively defeated within the Party in 1957 ('admitted the harmful nature...activities', 'unanimously...this group').

Question	Indicative content
	3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing the changes introduced in the USSR following the Twentieth Party Congress (1956) and the strength of the opposition to these changes in the Communist Party. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev's 'secret speech' at the Twentieth Party Congress roundly condemned the conduct of Soviet government under Stalin, causing both shock and deep fissures in the leadership of the CPSU • At a Presidium meeting on 18 June 1957, Khrushchev's enemies tried to force him to stand down as party leader, but he refused to go and, with the help of Zhukov, mobilised the wider party membership to fight back • Khrushchev's patronage over regional parties and their leaders was crucial to the outcome of a 6-day meeting of the Central Committee, starting on 22 June, at which the anti-party group was routed • The subsequent public humiliation and later expulsion from the CPSU of such powerful figures, confirmed both Khrushchev's undisputed leadership of the Party and the on-going de-Stalinisation of the USSR.

Option 38.2: The making of Modern China, 1860-1997



1. Finding the right level

The first stage is to decide which level the answer should be placed in. To do this, use a 'best-fit' approach, deciding which level most closely describes the quality of the answer. Answers can display characteristics from more than one level, and where this happens markers must use the guidance below and their professional judgement to decide which level is most appropriate.

For example, one stronger passage at L4 would not by itself merit a L4 mark, but it might be evidence to support a high L3 mark, unless there are substantial weaknesses in other areas. Similarly, an answer that fits best in L3 but which has some characteristics of L2 might be placed at the bottom of L3. An answer displaying some characteristics of L3 and some of L1 might be placed in L2.



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the accuracy of the view that Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system, in the years 1956-61, were completely successful. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that that Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system, in the years 1956-61, were completely successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev's attempts to de-Stalinise, following the secret speech in 1956, successfully reformed the Soviet leadership model and greatly moderated malign features such as the cult of personality • Khrushchev tamed the terror network and successfully restored 'revolutionary legality' to the Soviet system, reforming the secret police, ending the use of arrest without trial and moderating the gulags • Khrushchev's decentralisation of power successfully devolved decision-making to lower levels of the Party, encouraging initiative and greater democracy in an attempt to improve efficiency • Khrushchev reinvigorated the Communist Party through his reforms, extending membership and inspiring younger members, e.g. Gorbachev • The 'thaw' introduced by Khrushchev successfully encouraged greater freedom in cultural life and allowed new contacts with the west, promoting understanding and the de-escalation of Cold War tension. Arguments and evidence opposing or modifying the view that that Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system, in the years 1956-61, were completely successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Many of Khrushchev's reforms were means merely to establish his own position against his rivals in the power struggle after Stalin's death, and their success did not extend much beyond this measure • Khrushchev's attempts to reform the Soviet leadership model did not prevent the 'anti-party group' from plotting to reverse his programme, which he only survived with the support of Zhukov and the Red Army • While the terror apparatus was reformed, it was not dismantled and the justice system remained harsh and arbitrary, e.g. the extension of the death penalty, the use of diagnoses of mental illness to jail dissidents • Khrushchev's attempts to decentralise decision-making in the Party largely failed, and the Presidium and Central Committee continued to dominate policy-making to the exclusion of all others • The freedoms of the 'thaw' were limited largely to critics of Stalin, and to intellectuals and artists who did not question the essentials of the Soviet system or push at the limits of Khrushchev's own personal tastes • The limitations of Khrushchev's reforms to the Soviet system can be illustrated by his persecution of organised religion or the failure of his lofty ambitions to improve the lives of the people, e.g. his housing programme. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into reasons for the launch of Gorbachev's reform programme in 1985 and for the problems it encountered. Gorbachev is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of his ideas upon becoming leader of the USSR and of the impact of perestroika and glasnost. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inference: - As the chief architect of the reforms made in the USSR after 1985, Gorbachev is well placed to comment - This speech was made in January 1987, almost 2 years after the programme was announced but before the major economic and political reforms had been enacted - Gorbachev is addressing opponents of his reforms as well as supporters – this speech may be seen as an attempt to assert his authority over the Party - The speech was printed fully in the two major news organs of the Soviet State, suggesting that Gorbachev still had control over the Party and government. - The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: Reasons for the launch of Gorbachev's reform programme in 1985: - The source suggests that perestroika was necessary because of economic failure ('overcoming stagnation') and because the Soviet economic model had failed (the need 'to realise the potential of socialism') - It suggests that a reason for Gorbachev's reforms is because the Soviet Union has failed to provide an adequate standard of living for the Russian people as he is seeking improvements in all areas ('ever fuller satisfaction...standards') - It states that glasnost is necessary to encourage innovation and initiative as well as more modern managerial, scientific and technological practices – this suggests that a rigid interpretation of Leninism has contributed to economic failure. The problems it encountered: - The fact that Gorbachev had to restate so fully the purposes of the reform programme, two years after it was first announced, implies that there was some resistance to it - The speech indicates that the Central Committee has had to intervene to protect supporters of reform, demonstrating opposition to Gorbachev's intentions - The source may suggest that Gorbachev is likely to encounter problems given the scale and ambition of the programme described here and the historic failure of the Soviet system to embrace reform - The source implies, by Gorbachev's need to emphasise that his reforms are entirely consistent with Leninism, that opposition is likely to have arisen from those who believe that such reforms were contrary to communist ideology. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing the reasons for the launch of Gorbachev's reform programme in 1985 and of the problems it encountered. Relevant points may include: - Gorbachev's reforms were introduced as a consequence of the USSR's long-standing failure to match the living standards of the west - They involved the introduction of market reforms into the economy and a loosening of state control over the media and political representation - The reform programme had many unintended consequences which Gorbachev and his allies struggled to control, e.g. the need to support failing state enterprises exposed to the market, increasing criticism of one-party rule from the media and the demand for independence from the nationalities - Gorbachev encountered consistent opposition from within the Party, partly ideological and partly due to self-interest, culminating in Yanayev's attempted coup in August 1991.
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Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the major cause of the downfall of Soviet communism by 1991 was the impact of the Afghanistan war. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the major cause of the downfall of Soviet communism by 1991 was the impact of the Afghanistan war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The war was prolonged and costly and prevented leaders from paying attention to, and investing in, the sort of social and industrial investment that may have helped sustain support for the Soviet system • By bringing an end to détente and prompting the escalation of US military spending, the USSR was forced into an arms race that its stagnating economy could not support, so contributing to its downfall • The war stimulated internal criticism of the Soviet system from grieving families, war veterans and supporters of reform, e.g. funeral protests, street demonstrations and the popularity of <i>samizdat</i> publications • The withdrawal further highlighted the historic failures of communism leading to demands for change and greater openness – by seeking to respond to these demands, Gorbachev laid the foundations of the Soviet collapse • By demonstrating the weaknesses of the Red Army, the war encouraged those demanding independence from the USSR in other Soviet republics, prompting them to be bolder as <i>perestroika</i> developed. Arguments and evidence against the view that the major cause of the downfall of Soviet communism by 1991 was the impact of the Afghanistan war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • A series of ineffective leaders who resisted reform created a demand for political change, which eventually proved impossible to control and led to a disintegration of the Soviet system • The long-term failures of industry and agriculture to produce efficiently and provide a decent standard of living for the Soviet population contributed enormously to the downfall of Soviet communism • Hostility towards Russian dominance within the USSR, and resentment at periodic crackdowns such as in the Baltic states, contributed to the rapidity with which the republics seceded from the Soviet bloc • Gorbachev's hope of being able to reform the USSR politically and economically within the communist system was, at best, unrealistic – the consequences of his programme accrued opposition from many quarters • The financial cost of the Chernobyl disaster had a major economic impact – this failure in the prestigious Soviet nuclear programme also focused attention on the general failings of the USSR. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



1. Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.

Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for revealing the scale of the alcohol problem in the 1980s and its impact on the USSR. Though the author is not named in the specification, the alcohol problem is and candidates can be expected to be aware of its impact in the USSR during the 1980s.

1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inference:
 - As the alcohol problem is being discussed by the Politburo, it is clear that it is considered an issue of major importance in the USSR
 - The fact that the person presenting the report was appointed to the Politburo by Gorbachev suggests that concerns about alcohol were shared by the leader of the USSR
 - The urgent tone and language of the report indicates the seriousness with which at least some of the Soviet leadership viewed the alcohol problem
 - As the person presenting the report of the commission, Solomentsev may be driven to exaggeration to ensure that its wide-reaching recommendations are agreed.
2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source:

The scale of the alcohol problem in the 1980s:

- The comprehensive range of measures proposed ('annual cuts...produced', 'increase alcohol prices...decrease demand', 'increase the age...to 21') suggests that alcohol was a major problem in the USSR
- The major punishments being considered ('fines...strengthened', 'removal...bonuses and holiday vouchers', 'pushed further back...apartments') suggest that alcohol abuse was widespread
- The responses to the commission, both geographically and by amount ('thousands of signatures', '74% of respondents'), suggest alcohol was considered a serious problem by the Soviet people.

Its impact on the USSR:

- The source indicates that alcohol was having a particularly damaging effect on the young ('improve the health...physical development', 'youth is decomposing', 'starting with our youth') and the army
- It provides evidence that alcohol was causing significant economic ('enormous economic') and social damage to the USSR ('over 12 million punished for crimes...alcohol')

Question	Indicative content
	- The source implies a more fundamental threat to the communist system if the USSR cannot deal with the alcohol problem ('essential in our struggle for Communism', 'we must show the world...these problems'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source for an enquiry into the scale of the alcohol problem in the 1980s and its impact on the USSR. Relevant points may include: - As one of the few cheap and easily-available consumer goods on sale, the USSR had one of the highest per capita rates of consumption in the world – this was accompanied by widespread and increasing abuse - The impact of alcohol abuse on economic productivity, on crime and on the army in Afghanistan, helped convince Gorbachev that the whole Soviet system was failing and in need of fundamental reform - The Dry Law introduced by 'Comrade Orange Juice' in May 1985 was widely resented by those that drank moderately while having little impact on problem drinking – the production of illicit <i>samogon</i> remained high - The clampdown on alcohol from official sources led to a collapse in the government's revenues of up to a fifth, which contributed enormously to the financial difficulties suffered by the USSR in the late 1980s. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997

Question	Indicative content

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which Boris Yeltsin was responsible for the failure of Gorbachev's attempts to modernise the USSR in the years 1985-91. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that Boris Yeltsin was responsible for the failure of Gorbachev's attempts to modernise the USSR in the years 1985-91 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Yeltsin was able to establish himself as a more radical, and more popular, alternative to Gorbachev in the turmoil of the late 1980s • Gorbachev's hopes of being able to modernise the USSR gradually, and within the existing communist system, were severely hindered by Yeltsin's criticisms, starting at the Central Committee meeting in June 1987 • Gorbachev's strong personal dislike for Yeltsin distracted him from the modernisation programme - his attempts to discredit his rival backfired, further weakening his leadership and legitimacy as a reformer • Yeltsin's criticisms weakened Gorbachev in the eyes of communist hardliners unused to public attacks on Soviet leaders, and redoubled their commitment to end the reform programme and turn back the clock • By 1989, Yeltsin's electoral gains were such that Gorbachev no longer had credibility as a moderniser - he was widely viewed as trying to save himself and the tainted Soviet system instead • Yeltsin's role in the failure of the August coup in 1991 allowed him to fully eclipse Gorbachev, destroy the credibility of the CPSU and precipitate the dissolution of the USSR. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that Boris Yeltsin was responsible for the failure of Gorbachev's attempts to modernise the USSR in the years 1985-91 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Yeltsin was himself a moderniser and was promoted through the CPSU by Gorbachev, who believed he was an ally – the major policy difference between them was over the pace and extent of reform, not reform itself • Gorbachev's attempts to modernise the USSR economically and politically at the same time, whilst retaining the existing Soviet system, were over-ambitious and unlikely to succeed • Gorbachev failed because he lacked the political skill to manage both the modernisers, demanding full market reforms and western freedoms, and the conservatives, who resisted any major changes to the existing system • The modernisation programme took place against a background of major problems in the USSR that made its success unlikely, e.g. economic stagnation, the aftermath of the Afghanistan war, the alcohol problem • Gorbachev's reforms failed because of their economic impact on the Soviet people (e.g. double-digit inflation, food rationing) and bad luck (e.g. the impact of the Chernobyl disaster)

	• Other individuals contributed to the failure of modernisation, e.g. Sakharov, a radical reformer, and Ligachev, a hard-line opponent of reform. Other relevant material must be credited.
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Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which economic stagnation in the USSR was the reason for the introduction of Gorbachev's reform programme. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that economic stagnation in the USSR was the reason for the introduction of Gorbachev's reform programme should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By 1985, the annual growth of the Soviet economy had slipped below one percent – Gorbachev referred to an 'Era of Stagnation' when proposing his reforms • Reforms to the economy were introduced to address living standards that continued to lag well below those in the west and unease about the failure of the Soviet system to deliver on its ideological promises • Gorbachev introduced <i>perestroika</i> because, bound by the inflexibility of the command economy, the USSR was failing to maintain technological parity with the west, e.g. in computer science and nuclear technology • Economic reform was introduced because of the stagnating Soviet economy's dependence on oil exports to fund its spending – when oil prices fell, the USSR suffered significant fiscal problems • <i>Perestroika</i> and <i>glasnost</i> were introduced to address the persistent inefficiency and indiscipline of Soviet managers and workers, e.g. without accountability to the market, much of what was produced was useless • Reform was introduced because little attempt had been made to improve the performance of the economy since Khrushchev – Gorbachev argued that his reforms could breathe new life into the Soviet economic system. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that economic stagnation in the USSR was the reason for the introduction of Gorbachev's reform programme should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The reform programme was introduced because of a general feeling of decline in the USSR, political and social as well as economic, e.g. the alcohol problem – as Gorbachev said, 'we can't go on living like this' • <i>Glasnost</i> was introduced to address increasing unrest, e.g. over the effects of the war in Afghanistan, and Chernobyl, and convince the Soviet people that communism could embrace criticism and a degree of democracy • Gorbachev introduced <i>perestroika</i> and <i>glasnost</i> in response to the growth of nationalism in several SSRs in the hope of forestalling separatism, e.g. the growing anti-Soviet sentiment in the Baltic republics • <i>Glasnost</i> and <i>perestroika</i> were introduced with an eye to convincing the West that the USSR posed no immediate threat, hopefully enabling it to reduce its crippling military spending and commitments in eastern Europe • The reforms were introduced because of Gorbachev's background and personality - from the post-Stalin generation of leaders, he truly believed he could reform society and the economy within the Soviet system. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997



4	13–16	• Analyses the source material, interrogating the evidence to make reasoned inferences and to show a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion, although treatment of the two enquiries may be uneven. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying some understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and applied, although some of the evaluation may be weakly substantiated. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement.
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