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EDEXCEL AS AND A LEVEL HISTORY: QUESTIONS BY TOPIC

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997

AS and A Level History · Paper 3 · Option 38.2

40 questions · 800 marks · Mark schemes included

Pearson Edexcel AS (8HI0) and A Level (9HI0) History, June 2016 - June 2025

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 Piccadilly Business Centre, Unit C, Aldow Enterprise Park
Blackett Street, Manchester, M12 6AE

HOW TO USE THIS BOOKLET

Questions are grouped by specification sub-topic; within each sub-topic they run from the lowest mark tariff to the highest.

Click any heading or question row below to jump straight to it.

On every question page, click ANSWER in the top-right corner to jump to its mark scheme.

Diagrams, graphs, tables and data are printed exactly as they appeared in the original papers.

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QUESTIONS

40 questions · 800 marks · grouped by sub-topic, lowest tariff first



ASPECTS IN BREADTH

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: INDUSTRY, MINING, MANUFACTURING AND TRANSPORT

8 questions in this sub-topic · 160 marks · lowest tariff first



-
- 9 How far do you agree that the first Five-Year Plan (1953–57) was the most successful initiative taken to improve industry in China in the years 1860–1997?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)



-
- 9 How accurate is it to say that transport improvements were the most important factor in the growth of Chinese industry in the years 1860–1997?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)



-
- 9 'The greatest encouragement given to Chinese industry, in the years 1860-1997, came under the communists.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)



Explain some of the making of modern China, 1897–1997.

- 9 How accurate is it to say that technological innovation in the digital age was the most successful boost given to Chinese manufacturing in the years 1897–1997?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)



-
- 9** 'Chinese mining and manufacturing developed steadily throughout the years 1860–1997.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)



-
- 9 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1860–1978, Chinese governments largely failed in their attempts to improve internal communications?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)



-
- 9 How accurate is it to say that, in the years 1860–1978, Chinese governments largely failed to develop mining and manufacturing?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)



- 9 'The Great Leap Forward (1958–61) was the most important turning point in the development of China's economy in the years 1860–1997.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN BREADTH

IDEAS, INDIVIDUALS AND INFLUENCES IN ECONOMIC GROWTH

8 questions in this sub-topic · 160 marks · lowest tariff first



10 'The development of the Chinese economy, in the years 1897–1997, was entirely dependent on influences and ideas introduced from abroad.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)



10 'Mao Zedong was the most successful individual in promoting economic growth in China in the years 1860–1997.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)



10 In promoting the growth of the Chinese economy in the years 1860-1961, how significant were the ideas of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s and 1870s?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)



10 To what extent were the ideas behind the Great Leap Forward the most significant change in Chinese economic thinking in the years 1860–1997?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)



10 How significant was the role of Sung Tzu-wen (TV Soong) in the promotion of economic growth in China in the years 1860–1997?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)



10 'In the years 1860–1997, the most successful ideas promoting economic growth in China were Chinese adaptations of western ideologies.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)



10 'Deng Xiaoping was by far the most successful individual in the promotion of economic growth in China in the years 1860–1997.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)



10 'Throughout the years 1860–1997, the application of western technologies was always important to Chinese industry.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND REFORM, 1860-70

6 questions in this sub-topic · 120 marks · lowest tariff first



5 To what extent did increasing foreign intervention benefit China in the years 1860–70?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



Option 2018: The making of modern China, 1860-1911

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** Assess the value of the source for revealing the arguments of those in favour of adopting Western ideas in China during the 1860s and the nature of the opposition they faced.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



Option 38. 2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997**Source for use with Question 2.**

Source 2: From Prince Gong, *Reports Concerning the Tong Wen College*, presented to the Emperor in 1861, 1865 and 1866. The College was established to educate young men in foreign languages and learning, who would then go on to assist in the improvement of China's international position. Prince Gong was uncle to the Emperor and head of the Grand Council.

1861 Report

Last year, we laid before the throne a statement of new measures made necessary by the events of the recent war. We stated that knowledge of foreign nations is essential and requested your Majesty's officials find those acquainted with foreign languages and send them to the capital. The governor of Canton 5
reported that there was no man he could recommend. In Jiangsu, one candidate came forward but he was by no means fully knowledgeable. This explains the long delay in our plan. We are convinced that, to know the state of other nations, we must first understand their language and customs. This is the 10
only way to protect ourselves from becoming the victims of tricks and deceit and yet China has not one man who possesses the right knowledge. Therefore, we must find suitable foreigners. 15

1865 Report

The students have made fair progress but being young and imperfectly acquainted with their own language, their time is unavoidably split 15
between Chinese and foreign studies. Should we also require them to study mathematics and science we fear that it would be too much for them. The machinery of the West, its steamers and its firearms, is all based on mathematical science. We fear that, with only a limited knowledge of 20
such things, we will not be successful. We therefore proposed an additional department be established to teach mathematics and engineering to those having previously gained a degree in Chinese learning. This, and only this, will assure the growth of the power of the empire. No sooner were these proposals made than they became a target of bitter attack by mandarins of the old 25
school. How regrettable that men of such intelligence should be forced by national bigotry to reject any sympathy with the civilisation of the West!

1866 Report

In last year's proposals, we were motivated solely by the belief that to introduce the arts without the sciences would be useless. Our critics argue that such action is not urgent or that it would be disgraceful to China to become 30
a pupil of the West. However, not only do the nations of the West learn from each other but Japan has recently sent men to England to learn their language and science. When a small nation like Japan does this, what could be a greater disgrace for China to keep to her old traditions and never wake up?



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-
- 5** How significant was the role of foreign missions and missionaries in the growth of anti-western feeling in China in the years 1860-70?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** 'The most important consequence of the Treaty of Tianjin, in the years 1860–70, was the growth of British influence in Shanghai and the Yangtze valley.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



5 'Foreign language schools had little impact in China in the years 1860–70.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** To what extent was the Tianjin Massacre of 1870 a consequence of the terms of the Treaty of Tianjin (1860)?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

REFORM, THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE BOXER REBELLION, 1894-1900

5 questions in this sub-topic · 100 marks · lowest tariff first



- 6 'China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 mainly because of the complacency of its political and military leaders.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



-
- 5** 'The Boxer Rebellion was caused mainly by the mistakes of China's leaders in the years 1898–1900.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



Option 2020: The Making of Modern China, 1900–1911

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** Assess the value of the source for revealing the nature of the Boxer Rebellion and the extent of the threat it posed to foreigners in China.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997**Source for use with Question 2.**

Source 2: From Luella Miner, *A Prisoner in Peking*, published 1900. Miner, an American missionary, kept a diary of her experiences during the siege of the Legation Quarter of Peking (Beijing) in 1900, at the height of the Boxer Rebellion. The Legation Quarter was the area of the city occupied by foreign diplomats and other foreign residents.

15 June

About 10 o'clock the most horrible noise began outside the city wall. It was a mass of Boxers going through their rituals, burning incense, and chanting, 'Kill the foreign devils! Kill the Christians! Kill! Kill! Kill!'. They shouted other things but I could only distinguish the word, 'Kill!'. There may have been twenty to fifty thousand voices, not all Boxers, swelling that mad crowd. This went on for two or three hours. 5

Our defences have been extended to include all the surrounding streets. There is barricade within barricade of barbed wire or bricks, and all passers-by are challenged. If only we had a machine gun we would feel quite safe! This morning, ten Americans and twenty Russians went to the cathedral where the Boxers were looting and murdering. They killed seventy Boxers and took Catholic refugees to safety near the British Legation. 10

18 June

We are now effectively cut off from the world and may have to endure this situation for many days. No couriers can be found to carry mail out of the city. The Boxers are ordering that the Legation Quarter be destroyed. Over seventy of us American missionaries now live, eat and sleep in one little church. We are now leaving most of the tins of meat for the men who are watching and fortifying outside. Apparently, the railroad station at Tianjin* has been attacked by a vast number of Boxers, who were beaten back by the westerners with great slaughter. 15 20

14 August

At last our ears have heard the sweet music for which we have been listening for two months – the artillery of the relief army coming up the road from Tianjin! Our salvation is at hand! Last night was an awful one. There were at least six distinct Boxer attacks and almost incessant firing between these attacks. They seemed determined to use this last chance to wipe us out. Our defenders returned fire freely, because now they are not afraid of exhausting their ammunition. Just after two o'clock this afternoon we saw the first men of the relief army marching up the streets of the Legation Quarter. For the rest of the day the troops came streaming in, Indian and British soldiers and, most welcome of all, our American boys. 25 30

*Tianjin – a port city 120km from Peking that remained free of Boxer control



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-
- 5** How important was the attitude of Empress Cixi in the development of the Boxer Rebellion in the years 1898–1900?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



Opinion about the making of modern China, 1894–1911

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** Assess the value of the source for revealing China's position following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95 and the aims of the Japanese government in China at this time.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997**Source for use with Question 2.****Source 2:** From the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 17 April 1895.

China grants to Japan, for all time, the full sovereignty of the following territories:

(a) The southern portion of the province of Liaoning.

(b) The island of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, which lie to the west of Taiwan.

5

The inhabitants of these territories, who so wish, shall be free to sell their property and leave within two years of the ratification of this Treaty. After this, those who have not left shall be considered to be Japanese subjects.

China also recognises the full and complete independence of Korea. In consequence of such independence, the payment of taxes by Korea to China shall cease.

10

China agrees to pay to Japan reparations of 200 million Kuping taels*, the full sum to be paid in eight instalments. The last instalment shall be paid within seven years of the ratification of this Treaty. Interest at the rate of five per cent per year shall be paid to Japan on any unpaid parts of this sum.

15

China agrees to conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Japan to regulate trade between the two nations. This treaty shall be similar to those treaties that have been agreed between China and the European Powers. Until this treaty is signed, the Japanese government, its officials and all Japanese subjects and businesses, shall be granted most favoured nation status by China.

20

China agrees, within six months, to open four more cities to the trade, manufactured goods and residence of Japanese subjects. Steam vessels under the Japanese flag shall be allowed to transport passengers and cargo on the Yangtze River and on other rivers and canals. Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in any kind of industry in all the open cities and ports of China, and shall be allowed to import into China all kinds of machinery.

25

As a guarantee of the strict observance of the articles of this Treaty, China consents to the continued occupation by Japanese soldiers of the city of Weihaiwei, in the province of Shandong. Weihaiwei shall be evacuated by Japanese forces provided that China pays the first two instalments of the war debt and agrees the treaty of commerce and navigation.

30

Upon the ratification of this Treaty, all prisoners of war shall be freed and the complete evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completed within three months.

35

*200 million Kuping taels – a sum worth about £25 million in 1895



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Source 1 from: <https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/first-bolshevik-decrees/first-bolshevik-decrees-texts/assumption-of-soviet-power/>

Source 2 from: <https://www.taiwanbasic.com/treaties/Shimonoseki.htm>



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE WAR WITH JAPAN, 1931-41

4 questions in this sub-topic · 80 marks · lowest tariff first



Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** Assess the value of the source for revealing the causes of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's) response to it.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997

Source for use with Question 2.

Source 2: From a speech made by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to Chinese leaders, 17 July 1937. The clash between Japanese and Chinese soldiers known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident had occurred on 7 July.

Just when China was making every effort to preserve peace and to secure internal unity, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident burst upon us. Our nation has been thrown into a state of deep indignation. The consequences threaten our very existence. Therefore, I want to take this opportunity to make clear some significant points.

5

First, I feel strongly that, if we are to meet this crisis, we must realise the position we are in. We are a weak nation. Peace is absolutely essential for national reconstruction. It is for this reason that for the past few years we have tried hard to maintain peace in spite of all the injustice and suffering that has been our lot. But there is only one thing to do when we reach the limit of our endurance: we must throw every ounce of energy into the struggle for our national existence. We should realise that the only way we can secure peace after war has begun would be complete surrender, which would mean the complete annihilation of our race. Only a determination to commit ourselves completely can bring us victory. Should we hesitate, we shall tumble into an abyss from which there will be no hope of escape.

10

15

Second, there may be people who imagine that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was a sudden and chance event. But for the past month, there have been statements coming from the other side, either through the press or diplomatic channels, which indicated that something was imminent. The night before the incident occurred, various reports were circulated stating that the Japanese were going to abandon the Tanggu agreement. From this, it can easily be seen that this was not a sudden or accidental development. Rather we must realise that the other side has been most careful in its plans against us and that peace, therefore, cannot easily be secured. At this moment, the only way to maintain peace would be to allow the Japanese army to come and go freely in China. No country with the slightest element of self-respect could possibly accept such humiliation.

20

25

Therefore, we hope for peace but do not seek it at all costs. We prepare for war but we do not want it. Only our united efforts can save the nation. When you return home, pass on this message to the people. I am counting upon you.

30



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-
- 5** 'The main reason for China's successful resistance to Japan, in the years 1937–41, was the support of the USA.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)



Opinion about the making of modern China, 1900-1950

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** Assess the value of the source for revealing the reasons for the actions of the Japanese army at Nanjing in 1937 and the scale of the violence committed by the Japanese in the city.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997**Source for use with Question 2.**

Source 2: From the final judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, December 1948. The Tribunal was established in April 1946 by 11 countries, including China, the USA, the USSR and Great Britain. It tried 28 Japanese leaders for their actions during the war in East Asia. Here the judgement of the Tribunal is describing the Japanese attack on Nanjing in 1937.

When General Matsui was appointed Commander of the Japanese forces in China, he was already considering an attack on Nanjing. On 8 October 1937, he issued a statement in which he said:

‘Our all-conquering bayonets will soon be unleashed! Our divinely-inspired mission is to protect Japanese residents and interests, and to punish the Chinese people and their government in Nanjing.’ 5

After the fall of Shanghai in November 1937, Matsui issued a new order. It stated that, as Nanjing was the Chinese capital, its capture was an event of international importance and that it should demonstrate Japan’s military power to all of China. 10

The Japanese demand for the surrender of Nanjing was ignored by the Chinese government, but the city fell on 13 December. After this, eyewitnesses reported Japanese soldiers swarming through Nanjing using unlimited violence, including rape and murder. The Japanese killed men, women and children without provocation or excuse, until the streets were littered with bodies. They committed various other atrocities. Captured Chinese soldiers were killed in groups by machine gun fire along the banks of the Yangtze river. The Japanese also stole everything they wanted from the people. Residential and commercial buildings were looted then burned, and their contents taken away in trucks. This continued until approximately one-third of Nanjing was completely destroyed. 20

Estimates indicate that, in the first six weeks of the occupation, over two hundred thousand Chinese civilians and captured soldiers were murdered in Nanjing. At the time, Japanese diplomats in the city admitted that, ‘the army was determined to make it bad for Nanjing.’ They suggested that foreign missionaries in Nanjing should attempt to publicise the atrocities to the people of Japan. Then, the diplomats said, the Japanese public would force their government to curb the army. 25

General Matsui made a triumphal entry into Nanjing on 18 December. He declared, ‘now that the Japanese flag is flying over Nanjing, the rebirth of the East is just beginning.’ Matsui remained in the city for over a week but took no effective action to stop the killings. When the General returned to Japan in March 1938, he was rewarded for his ‘good services’ in China. 30

Therefore, the actions of Japanese soldiers in Nanjing cannot be excused as acts which temporarily got out of hand when a stubbornly-defended city surrendered. Consequently, General Matsui is found guilty of war crimes and sentenced to death. 35

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Acknowledgements:

Source 1 from: A Source Book for Russian History By George Vernadsky © Yale

Source 2 from: Documents on the Rape of Nanking By Timothy Brook © University of Michigan Press, December 1999



- 6 'The outbreak of all-out war in 1937 was largely due to the weak response of Jiang Jieshi's government toward Japan since 1931.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1958-69

3 questions in this sub-topic · 60 marks · lowest tariff first



- 6 How accurate is it to say that the Sino-Soviet split, in the years 1958-69, was caused mainly by ideological differences?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 6 To what extent did the relationship between China and the Soviet Union change in the years 1958–69?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 6 To what extent was the breakdown in relations between China and the USSR, in the years 1958–69, due to the personality of Chairman Mao?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



ASPECTS IN DEPTH

CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER DENG, 1978-97

6 questions in this sub-topic · 120 marks · lowest tariff first



Option 2: The making of modern China, 1900–1949

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** Assess the value of the source for revealing the nature of relations between China and the United States in the years 1979–97 and the reasons for closer co-operation between them.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997**Source for use with Question 2.**

Source 2: From a speech made by Jiang Zemin at Harvard University, November 1997. He made this speech during a visit to the United States following a period during which relations between China and the USA had worsened.

The Chinese people have always admired the American people for their pragmatic attitude and creative spirit. My visit to IBM, AT&T, and the Bell laboratory* yesterday gave me some first-hand knowledge of the latest successes in modern science and technology. Today's rapid development in science and technology is bringing about an increasingly greater impact on global political and economic patterns and on people's social life. In our cause to further open up and achieve modernisation, we have spared no efforts in learning from all the fine cultural achievements of the American people. 5

Friendship and co-operation between our two peoples are of great importance to the world. The United States is the most developed country. China is a country with 1.2 billion people. Its stability and rapid development is of vital importance to the stability and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. China holds a huge market and great demand for development, and the United States holds advanced science and technology, as well as enormous material force. The economies of the two countries offer much to each other. China's potential market, once combined with foreign advanced technology and capital, will produce many opportunities. China and the United States share broad common interests and shoulder common responsibility on many important questions which are crucial to human survival and development. These include maintaining world peace and security, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, protecting the environment and combating international crime. All these provide an important basis for further developing friendly relations and co-operation. We should settle our differences properly so as to reach the goal of promoting mutual understanding, broadening common ground, and building a future together. 10 15 20 25

During my current visit, I had a deep exchange of views and reached broad agreement with President Clinton on the future development of China-US relations. We both agree we should work hard to build a constructive strategic partnership orientated towards the twenty-first century. I hope that in the cause of building our own countries and promoting world peace and development, younger generations in China and the US will understand each other better, learn from each other, and strive for a better future. 30

* IBM, AT&T, and the Bell laboratory – three leading American science and technology businesses



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- 6 How accurate is it to say that China's relationship with the rest of the world improved massively in the years 1978–97?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



- 6 'Disagreements over Hong Kong's form of government seriously hindered negotiations between China and Britain about the return of Hong Kong.'

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



Option 38.1: The making of modern China, 1900–1997

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** Assess the value of the source for revealing China's policy regarding the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule and the relationship between China and Britain in the mid-1980s.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997

Source for use with Question 2.

Source 2: From remarks made by Deng Xiaoping to visitors from Hong Kong at a meeting in Beijing, 3 October 1984. Here he is commenting on the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, which had recently been agreed. The Declaration covered the terms by which Hong Kong would be returned from British to Chinese rule in 1997.

I believe Hong Kong has a bright future. Among you here today are people with different political views. Your presence shows that you all favour the agreement reached between the Chinese and British governments. We all wish to maintain prosperity and stability in Hong Kong up until 1997 and after. With our joint efforts, I am sure our goal will be achieved.

5

Some people are worried that, once elderly men like me are no longer around, China's policy may change. But I should like to assure you that China's policy will not change. Acting in good faith is a Chinese tradition, not something invented by my generation. In the agreement with Britain, China has stated that no change would be made for 50 years and we mean it. No doubt, 50 years after 1997, China's leaders will still handle matters in Hong Kong in an open-minded way. So, don't worry, there won't be any changes. Besides, not all changes are bad. If there are any changes, they will only be changes for the greater prosperity and development of Hong Kong.

10

Hong Kong will continue to be administered by people in Hong Kong — that will not change. The administrators will be elected by the people there and then confirmed by the Central Government in Beijing. They will not be imposed by the Central Government. Of course, some of these administrators should be on the Left politically, but as few as possible. In this way, people from different sectors of society will be satisfied. So long as our compatriots in Hong Kong unite and choose good political figures to administer the territory, they should not be afraid.

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With regard to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, we know that we shall abide by it, and we are also convinced that the British will do the same. When I talked with some British businessmen, I said I hoped that certain problems would not arise in Hong Kong during the transition period. One problem raised was that British businesses might set a bad example by withdrawing capital from Hong Kong. When I talked with the British government, I listed our concerns, and they expressed their willingness to cooperate with us on them.

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Therefore, I hope that our compatriots in Hong Kong will unite to safeguard the prosperity and stability of the territory. This will contribute to a smooth transfer of government in 1997.

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Source 1 from: <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/?s=source+anti-party+group>

Source 2 from: <https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/maintain-prosperity-and-stability-in-hong-kong/>



Q6

6 To what extent did China's relationship with the USA improve in the years 1979–97?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)



Options cover the making of modern China, 1900–1957

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2** Assess the value of the source for revealing China's position in international affairs in the early 1980s and the aims of its foreign policy.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860–1997**Source for use with Question 2.**

Source 2: From comments made by Deng Xiaoping at a meeting with Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 21 August 1982. The comments were reported widely, both in China and abroad, in the following weeks.

China is a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Everyone can trust China. China means what it says. We do not play political games. China has principles. First, we oppose the domination of world affairs by the superpowers. Second, we wish to safeguard world peace. Third, we are eager to strengthen unity and cooperation with other Third World* countries. 5

Opposition to the domination of the United States and the Soviet Union and safeguarding world peace are of special significance to the Third World. For many years, the superpowers have taken advantage of conflicts between Third World countries in order to achieve their own objectives. These countries and their peoples have become the real victims of superpower domination. For this reason, it must be the Third World that leads opposition to the domination of the superpowers and safeguards world peace. Following the Second World War, a positive factor in international politics has been the rise of the Third World. Third World membership of the United Nations has increased. Third World political influence has risen considerably. Therefore, the days are gone when two superpowers decide the destiny of people all over the world. 10 15

As for China, our strength is limited, as is our role. Many people believe that China holds a special position in the Third World. We say that China is just another member of this Third World, and as such, should look after its own interests. China hopes for peace more than anything else. We need to develop the country and shake off our backwardness. The primary task we have in modernising China is to create greater prosperity by the end of this century. If we can accomplish this, we will be in a much better position. Therefore, we cherish the hope for a peaceful international environment. War would hinder our plan and the needs of people all over the world, particularly in the Third World. Should some nation impose war on us, we are not afraid, and our plans will simply be postponed for a number of years. But we shall resume economic construction after any war ends. 20 25

At present, our domestic situation is fairly good. The Chinese people are wholeheartedly concentrating on economic development. Our foreign policy supports this magnificent goal. Although this objective may seem modest to some people, we hail it as a magnificent achievement. 30

*Third World – a name given to countries of the developing world, mostly in Africa, Asia and South America



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Source 1 from: *The cult of the individual - part 5*, By Nikita Khrushchev, © The Guardian News & Media, April 2007

Source 2 from: *China's Foreign Policy 1982* - Marxists.org



MARK SCHEMES

official Pearson Edexcel mark schemes



Question	Indicative content
9	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) was the most successful initiative taken to improve industry in China in the years 1860-1997. Arguments and evidence that the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) was the most successful initiative taken to improve industry in China in the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Though its contents were not published until 1955, the Plan appeared to exceed the majority of its targets by 1957 • Almost 600 new industrial plants were constructed, enabling electric power production to triple and steel to quadruple – China's annual growth rate grew to over 9% • Emphasis was placed on the development of cities in the interior, like Wuhan and Xi'an, which were transformed into industrial centres and so encouraged the transfer of the population from the countryside to the towns • Large-scale projects like the Nanjing Bridge portrayed a new and modern image to the rest of the world. Arguments and evidence that the First Five-Year Plan was not the most successful initiative taken to improve industry in China in the years 1860-1997 and/or other initiatives were more successful should also be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Plan made China dangerously dependent on the USSR – over 150 factories and 10,000 Soviet experts had to be paid for by raiding peasant savings and requisitioning food • Though the Plan was officially deemed a success, the centralised Soviet model was abandoned during the Great Leap Forward • It may be considered that developments in the later Qing Empire as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement, or the establishment of the National Resources Commission under Chiang Kaishek, were as successful • The reforms introduced under Deng Xiaoping, for example the introduction of Special Economic Zones in 1980 and the Town and Village Enterprises in 1984, were very successful in boosting China's industrial growth. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
9	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that transport improvements were the most important factor in the growth of Chinese industry in the years 1860–1997. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the transport improvements were the most important factor in the growth of Chinese industry in the years 1860–1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • China's vast size made the improvement of transport essential to the efficient movement of both raw materials and labour on the one hand, and for easy access to internal and external markets on the other • Good communication links were especially necessary for the transport of food from the countryside to enable industrial cities to develop and grow • River and coastal navigation was improved, e.g. the creation of the Chinese Merchants Steam Navigation Company in 1872 and improvements made to the Grand Canal in the 1930s and the 1950s • The railway network was expanded from 9000 km in 1911 to over 70,000 km by 1997 – significant investment was undertaken by the Japanese and by Chiang Kai-shek before the communists hugely developed the network • The road system was developed after 1949 from roughly 80,000 km to over 800,000 km by the later 1980s with all villages connected to the national network • The number of internal air routes expanded in the 1980s with freight traffic growing massively – by 1986 China had over 100 airports that could accommodate the largest transport planes. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the improvement of internal communication was not important to the growth of Chinese industry in the years 1860–1997 and/or that there were other significant factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Improvements were slow and patchy for much of the period, e.g. no major railway or road building took place before 1900 and the significance of rivers and canals was largely ignored by all governments until the 1980s • Even though the rail and road networks were gradually developed, older technology stymied their effectiveness, e.g. steam locomotives remained in the 1990s while the domestic truck industry grew only slowly from the 1950s • Significant industrial development took place when internal communications were still largely undeveloped, notably the porcelain and textiles industries during the nineteenth century • Other developments were as important as transport in the growth of Chinese industry, e.g. the foundation of modern banking and commerce in the early 1900s and the introduction of a unified currency in the 1930s • Government policy initiatives greatly boosted industrial development, e.g. the boost to heavy industry given by the Five Year Plans in the 1950s and 60s and the introduction of Special Economic Zones in the 1980s. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
9	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that the greatest encouragement given to Chinese industry, in the years 1860-1997, came under the communists. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the greatest encouragement given to Chinese industry, in the years 1860-1997, came under the communists should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The first Five Year-Plan appeared to exceed the majority of its targets by 1957 enabling the construction of hundreds of new industrial plants - steel production quadrupled and coal doubled • Transport improvements and electrification under the communists benefitted the growth of industry, e.g. the extension of railways in the west during the 1960s and large-scale hydroelectric projects • The market reforms introduced by Deng after 1978 significantly boosted industrial development - tax incentives and subsidies in the Special Economic Zones attracted high levels of foreign investment • The Town and Village Enterprises scheme allowed for the reintroduction of private enterprise and proved particularly successful in encouraging light industry and the production of consumer goods by the 1990s. Arguments and evidence countering the statement that the greatest encouragement given to Chinese industry, in the years 1860-1997, came under the communists should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The industrial record of the communists was inconsistent and prone to major shifts in policy, e.g. the move from centralised industrial planning under the Five Year-Plan to the commune-based model of the Great Leap Forward • Communist policies during the Great Leap Forward significantly hindered industrial growth and took years to recover from, e.g. inefficient backyard furnaces • Transport improvements under the communists were patchy until the 1980s whilst electrification was slow to reach large areas of the country and was hampered by inefficient vanity projects like the Yellow River Dam • Industrial production grew in the later Qing Empire owing a great deal to foreign investment and the adoption of western technology in Treaty Ports like Shanghai • The development of the railway network under the Guomindang and the introduction of a unified currency in the 1930s were significant encouragements given to Chinese industry before the communists • The boost given to industry by the Japanese in the occupied north-west after 1931 was significant, e.g. the investment of over \$1b in mining and industry and the construction of the South Manchuria Railway. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
9	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that technological innovation in the digital age was the most successful boost given to Chinese manufacturing in the years 1897-1997. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that technological innovation in the digital age was the most successful boost given to Chinese manufacturing in the years 1897-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The technological co-operation agreed with the USA, started by Deng's visit in 1979 and confirmed by Jiang's in 1997, was hugely important in the growth of Chinese manufacturing following the isolation of Mao's later years in power • The establishment of Special Economic Zones in 1980, which encouraged foreign firms to invest in China, prompted the growth of native technological firms like Lenovo, founded in 1984, and ZTE founded in 1985 • Increasing domestic demand for technological goods, thanks to the growing disposable wealth of the Chinese people, boosted industry, e.g. Skyworth started making televisions in Shenzhen in 1988 and grew rapidly • Telecoms was particularly important for the growth of Chinese industry – after Motorola started to produce pagers in the Tianjin SEZ in 1991, the network was provided by China Unicom, a state-owned enterprise founded in 1994 • Thanks, at least partially, to the boost given to Chinese manufacturing by firms such as Hytera, which began producing radio technology in 1993, annual industrial growth in China reached rates of over 20% in the 1990s. Arguments and evidence countering the statement the statement that technological innovation in the digital age was the most successful boost given to Chinese manufacturing in the years 1897-1997, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Even in the digital age, the growth of Chinese manufacturing was powered largely by companies producing goods other than technology, e.g. steel, cotton goods, footwear and plastics • Though the technology sector did grow fast after 1979, it was hampered by a relatively poor domestic market and a lack of the infrastructure necessary to support its products, e.g. a limited TV network • Developments in the later Qing Empire, e.g. the effects of the May Fourth Movement or the establishment of the National Resources Commission under Jiang, were successful in encouraging manufacturing before the 1980s



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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The boost given to manufacturing by the Japanese in the occupied north-west after 1931 was successful, e.g. the investment of billions of dollars in industry and the construction of the South Manchuria Railway• The attempts of the communists before 1979 certainly succeeded in boosting heavy industry, notably the first Five-Year Plan. |
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Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
9	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that Chinese mining and manufacturing developed steadily throughout the years 1860-1997. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that Chinese mining and manufacturing developed steadily throughout the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: - Industrial production grew throughout the later Qing Empire, owing a great deal to foreign investment and the adoption of western technology in treaty ports like Shanghai - The establishment of the National Resources Commission, under Chiang Kai-shek, successfully encouraged the growth of mining and manufacturing in the years 1932-49 - The boost given to manufacturing by the Japanese in occupied Manchuria after 1931 was significant, e.g. the investment of billions of dollars in industry and infrastructure - The first Five-Year Plan (1953-57) gave an enormous boost to Chinese mining and manufacturing, e.g. almost 600 new factories were built, enabling electric power production to triple and steel to quadruple - The market reforms introduced after 1978 significantly boosted mining and manufacturing in China - tax incentives and subsidies in the Special Economic Zones attracted high levels of foreign investment - The Town and Village Enterprises scheme proved particularly successful in encouraging light industry and the production of consumer goods during the 1990s. Arguments and evidence opposing the statement that Chinese mining and manufacturing developed steadily throughout the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: - For most of the late nineteenth century, industrial development was faltering and patchy in China, and often subject to official disapproval, e.g. the years between 1885 and 1895 - For much of the early twentieth century, the development of mining and manufacturing was stymied by internal political instability and foreign threat, and much of China remained industrially undeveloped - As late as the 1930s, over 70% of Chinese manufacturing output was still traditional, i.e. small-scale and crafts based, in sharp contrast to the modern, cotton-producing mills of Shanghai - The Great Leap Forward (1958) badly disrupted the progress of mining and manufacturing made during the first Five-Year Plan, e.g. the failure of the backyard furnaces, the disruption of the food supply to the cities - The Cultural Revolution brought an end to the economic reforms of the early 1960s and distracted the Chinese people from the importance of economic development for over a decade



	Deng's reforms proceeded only gradually until the mid-1980s, due to fear of potential political opposition, and the pace of development only picked up thereafter. Other relevant material must be credited.
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Question	Indicative content
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9	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) was the most important turning point in the development of China's economy in the years 1860-1997. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) was the most important turning point in the development of China's economy in the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Great Leap Forward was an important turning point in the growth of industry in China as it signified the abandonment of exclusively-foreign economic ideology in favour of that tailored to Chinese conditions • The Great Leap Forward was an important turning point because it was aimed at making China self-sufficient in industry and agriculture and no longer dependent on outsiders for inspiration, technology or resources • The Great Leap Forward was a major turning point because, for the first time, it sought to mobilise all the Chinese population, including the peasantry, in support of economic growth • It was an important turning point because of its stress on commune-based economic activity, rather than simply city-based heavy industry, an idea later developed by Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s as the TVEs. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) was the most important turning point in the development of China's economy in the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Great Leap Forward was not an important turning point because it turned rapidly into a colossal failure, e.g. 'back-yard furnaces' and appalling famine, and was quietly abandoned in the early 1960s • The Great Leap Forward was not an important turning point as it did not end China's reliance on foreigners for inspiration, technology or resources, e.g. Deng's courting of US computer technology companies in the 1980s • The founding of the Self-Strengthening movement during the 1860s was a major turning point as it was the first time China had sought to imitate its western rivals in economic development • The rejection of traditional values suggested by the May Fourth Movement (1915-24) was a significant turning point, marking the full embrace of western scientific and economic ideas • The launch of the First Five-year Plan (1953) was an important turning point as it sought to apply Marxist ideology to the development of China's economy • The launch of the Four Modernisations by Deng in 1978 was a major turning point as it began an era of unprecedented economic growth driven by free market thinking ('capitalism with Chinese characteristics'). Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
10	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the development of the Chinese economy in the years 1897-1997 was entirely dependent on influences and ideas introduced from abroad. Arguments and evidence that the development of the Chinese economy did entirely depend on ideas and influences introduced from abroad should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Later Imperial economic reforms owed a great deal to foreign influence, e.g. the establishment of an Imperial Bank in 1897 and the Ministry of Commerce in 1903 • Though primarily cultural in orientation, the May 4th Movement encouraged the adoption of western scientific ideas and the rejection of traditional Chinese thought • China's communist leaders imported Marxist-Leninist ideas of economic development as demonstrated by the Soviet influence over the First Five-Year Plan and the collectivisation of agriculture • The reforms of Deng Xiaoping after 1978 (the 'Four Modernisations') were heavily influenced by western ideas and relied on scientific and technological knowledge imported from abroad. Arguments and evidence that the development of the Chinese economy was not entirely dependent on influences and ideas introduced from abroad should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Chinese manufacturing was already well-established by the time foreign intervention accelerated during the late nineteenth century e.g. the silk and porcelain industries • There were attempts to limit foreign influence, notably Chiang Kai-shek's repatriation of 17 foreign concessions and the recovery of Chinese customs duties in the 1930s and the money used to improve communications • The economics of the Great Leap Forward were Chinese in origin and a rejection of the Soviet model used in the First Five-Year Plan, e.g. the idea of 'backyard furnaces' • 'Dengism' was claimed to be an adaptation of western capitalist thought to suit Chinese conditions – 'socialism with Chinese characteristics.' Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
10	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that Mao Zedong was the most successful individual in promoting economic growth in China in the years 1860–1997. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that Mao Zedong was successful in promoting economic growth in China in the years 1860–1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As leader of China from 1949–76, Mao was largely responsible for the attempted economic transformation of the country • Mao presided over a massive fall in inflation in the years 1949–51 through expenditure cuts, tax rises and currency reform – this boosted economic growth • Mao's initial determination to modernise China on the Soviet model through the First Five Year Plan gave an enormous boost to industry in China – the economy grew annually by 9 per cent in the years 1953–57 • The Great Leap Forward mobilised the whole of the country in an effort to modernise – some sectors saw impressive initial growth while works to control flooding and encourage irrigation had long-term economic benefits • Mao's encouragement of locally-led, commune-based production during the Great Leap, although not initially successful, helped inform the model on which the growth of the economy after his death was based. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that Mao was not successful in promoting economic growth and/or that other individuals were more successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Mao can be criticised for putting idealism and ideology before practical economic considerations, e.g. the speed and manner of collectivisation led to a fall in agricultural production and contributed to eventual famine • The first Five Year Plan made China over-reliant on expensive Soviet support while the gross inefficiencies of the Great Leap Forward actually led to a decline in industrial production across most sectors by the early 1960s • The Cultural Revolution, largely Mao's attempt to restore his position following the economic failures of the Great Leap, stymied the renewed economic growth encouraged by the reforms of Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi in the early 1960s • Self-strengtheners, such as Li Hongzhang and Sheng Xuanhuai, were important to the modernisation of the Chinese economy in the later imperial years, notably the establishment of a commercial and financial infrastructure • TV Soong contributed significantly to development during the republic as Finance Minister and founder of the China Development Finance Corporation • Following Mao's death, the Chinese economy grew enormously under the influence of Deng Xiaoping's 'Four Modernisations'. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
10	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of the ideas of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s and 1870s in promoting the growth of the Chinese economy in the years 1860-1961. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the ideas of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s and 1870s were significant in promoting the growth of the Chinese economy in the years 1860-1961 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s and 70s promoted the importance of economic growth for the protection of China's international position following defeat in the Opium Wars • Reforms promoted by key Self-Strengtheners, like Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong, strongly encouraged the growth of a modern financial and commercial infrastructure in China, essential to economic development • The movement encouraged the use of western scientific ideas and the employment of western technologists and engineers for the first time in China, all of which encouraged economic growth • Their achievements included the establishment of mines and factories, the formation of the first joint stock company in China, the building of railways and work to introduce a national telegraph and postal service • The legacy of the promotion of economic growth by the Self-Strengtheners in the 1860s and 70s continued to be felt in later decades, e.g. the work of Sheng Xuanhuai in founding a modern banking system in the 1890s. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the ideas of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s and 1870s were not significant in promoting the growth of the Chinese economy in the years 1860-1961 and/or that other individuals or movements were more successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The ideas of the Self-Strengthening Movement in the 1860s and 70s merely attempted to promote sufficient economic growth in order to defend the Confucian order rather than create a western-style economy • Their work was largely confined to the coastal cities and had little effect on Chinese thinking more generally – opposition at court, from the likes of the Empress, ensured their influence was challenged and limited • The May Fourth Movement was significant in the promotion of western-style economic growth in the early twentieth century • TV Soong contributed significantly to economic development during the republic as Finance Minister and founder of the China Development Finance Corporation • The Marxist models introduced by the communists in the 1950s, e.g. the first Five-Year Plan and the subsequent Great Leap Forward, were significant for China's economic growth. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
10	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which the ideas behind the Great Leap Forward were the most significant change to Chinese economic thinking in the years 1860-1997. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the ideas behind the Great Leap Forward were the most significant change to Chinese economic thinking in the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • This was the first attempt during this period to adapt communism to China's peculiar situation - this foreshadowed other major reforms like Deng's later 'communism with Chinese characteristics' • By rejecting the central planning system essential to the Soviet model, the Great Leap Forward was highly significant, creating a permanent schism in communist economic thinking, which had major international consequences • The Great Leap Forward was driven partly by the understanding that raising the incomes of the rural poor was essential to the creation of a modern industrial economy – this became fundamental to CCP reforms in the 1980s • The emphasis during the Great Leap Forward on commune-based initiatives, e.g. the backyard furnaces, helped inspire the creation of similar locally-driven enterprises like the Town and Village Enterprises of the 1980s • Essential to the Great Leap was the need for local infrastructure improvements to enhance economic growth – flood control and irrigation works, like those of 1957-58, remained a priority after it was abandoned. Arguments and evidence contradicting the view that the ideas behind the Great Leap Forward were the most significant change to Chinese economic thinking in the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Rather than being a significant change, the ideas of the Great Leap Forward were still state-imposed, driven largely by ideology and reliant on a significant measure of coercion, the same as other CCP initiatives before and after • The results of the Great Leap Forward were disastrous and, in order to rescue the Chinese economy, the 'NEP'-like reforms of Liu and Deng again looked elsewhere for inspiration, e.g. the peasant plots of Soviet eastern Europe • The western-inspired reforms introduced under the Qing dynasty following the unequal treaties, facilitated by the creation of a capitalist commercial infrastructure, were a significant change in China's economic thought

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The May Fourth Movement was significant in the promotion of modern science and technology as part of China's economic thought in the early twentieth century, rejecting Confucianism and using Japan as inspiration• The Marxist model introduced by the communists in the early 1950s, e.g. the first Five-Year Plan, was a highly significant change in China's economic thought• The economic liberalisation of the 1980s and 1990s, adapting a western economic model to the strictures of a communist political model, was a significant change in Chinese economic thought. |
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Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
10	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the significance of the role of Sung Tzu-wen (TV Soong) in the promotion of economic growth in China in the years 1860-1997. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the role of Sung Tzu-wen (TV Soong) was significant in the promotion of economic growth in China in the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As a leading government minister under Chiang Kai-shek, and governor of the Bank of China, Soong undertook many reforms to encourage economic growth in China, e.g. the abolition of the internal tariff, the <i>Likin</i>, in 1931 • Soong was educated in the USA, experienced in international finance and committed to the introduction of western capitalism across China – as the brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek, he had influence at the highest level • Soong helped create a modern financial infrastructure in China giving confidence to domestic savers and foreign investors, e.g. the regulation of the banking system, the creation of bond and stock markets in Shanghai • Soong was instrumental in the creation of a number of national bodies that channelled capital to business in the promotion of economic growth in China, e.g. the China Development Finance Corporation (1934) • As Finance Minister, Soong boosted government revenue through anti-corruption and tax avoidance programmes and was able to balance the budget – this gave further confidence to business investors. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that the role of Sung Tzu-wen (TV Soong) was significant in the promotion of economic growth in China in the years 1860-1997 and/or that other ideologies and individuals were more significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Soong's influence in national economic affairs was relatively brief (1928-33) and his measures did not noticeably improve the performance of China's economy, e.g. rates of growth remained sluggish • Soong was unable to tackle fundamental problems that prevented economic growth in China, e.g. the enormous burden of military spending, massive corruption, the underdevelopment of education and healthcare • The western-inspired reforms introduced by the Self-Strengthening Movement in the Qing dynasty, e.g. Sheng Xuanhuai's foundation of a modern banking system, were a significant boost to economic growth • The Marxist model introduced by Mao in the early 1950s was significant in promoting China's economic growth, e.g. under the first Five-Year Plan China's economy grew at a hitherto unprecedented rate • Deng's adoption of 'capitalism with Chinese characteristics' following Mao's death, was greatly significant to China's economic growth – this was the foundation of China's transformation in the 1980s and 90s. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
10	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1860-1997, the most successful ideas promoting economic growth in China were Chinese adaptations of western ideologies. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that, in the years 1860-1997, the most successful ideas promoting economic growth in China were Chinese adaptations of western ideologies should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • From the 1860s, the Self-Strengtheners, who sought to influence the Imperial government to adopt western capitalism within Chinese traditions, helped stimulate economic growth • Both Li Hongzhang and Shen Xuanhuai had some success in developing the western-style business model within the constraints of late Imperial China, e.g. the establishment of the Imperial Bank of China in 1897 • Mao's adaption of the Soviet economic model to Chinese circumstances during the Great Leap Forward had some successes, e.g. commune-based initiatives helped inspire the Town and Village Enterprises of the 1980s • Deng's modernisation of the Chinese economy after 1978 was an unashamed adaptation of western capitalism within the political framework of Chinese communism, and was hugely successful • Inspired by the native idea of <i>xiaokang</i>, Deng unleashed enormous economic growth in China and a fundamental western-style modernisation of large swathes of the country in the 1980s and 1990s. Arguments and evidence countering the statement that, in the years 1860-1997, the most successful ideas promoting economic growth in China were Chinese adaptations of western ideologies should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The attempts of the Self-Strengthening movement to adapt western economic ideas to Chinese circumstances in the late nineteenth century, failed to promote sustained economic growth • The wholesale adoption of western capitalism during the Republican era had some success, e.g. the reforms of TV Soong • The successful first Five-Year plan (1953-57) entailed the imposition of a centralised planning model driven by heavy industry, wholly imported from, and directed by, the USSR according to Soviet principles • The attempts to adapt the Marxist model to Chinese circumstances under the second Five-year plan was a disaster, causing widespread famine and a collapse in industrial production, e.g. the back-yard furnaces • Deng's adoption of 'capitalism with Chinese characteristics' had serious downsides, e.g. the failure to address economic inequality, the dilution of Chinese culture with western norms. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
10	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that Deng Xiaoping was by far the most successful individual in the promotion of economic growth in China in the years 1860-1997. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that Deng Xiaoping was by far the most successful individual in the promotion of economic growth in China in the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Inspired by the native idea of <i>xiaokang</i>, Deng unleashed enormous economic growth in China and a fundamental western-style modernisation of large swathes of the country in the 1980s and 1990s • Agriculturally, Deng broke up the communes established under Mao, returning most of the land to family units by 1983 – the result was a massive increase in production and greater peasant prosperity • The Town and Village Enterprises encouraged small-scale manufacturing in rural areas, partly funded by the state and partly through private investors – this facilitated economic growth throughout China • Deng's Special Economic Zones allowed foreign technology companies to produce microchips and mobile phones through Chinese companies – they generated huge growth and employed many thousands • Deng's governments placed great emphasis on the development of heavy industry as well as the high-tech and consumer industries – mining and heavy manufacturing both grew significantly • Between 1978 and 1997, economic growth in China averaged 10% per annum, enabling many Chinese people to embrace a lifestyle unthinkable during the previous one hundred years. Arguments and evidence countering the statement that Deng Xiaoping was by far the most successful individual in the promotion of economic growth in China in the years 1860-1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Deng's adoption of 'capitalism with Chinese characteristics' had serious downsides, e.g. economic inequality between individuals and regions increased, the exploitation of cheap labour by foreign companies • From the 1860s, both Li Hongzhang and Shen Xuanhuai had some success in developing economic growth within the constraints of late Imperial China, e.g. the encouragement of textile and arms production • The reforms of TV Soong during the Republican era had some success, e.g. the establishment of a financial and commercial infrastructure conducive to a capitalist economy • Mao's relationship with the USSR enabled the launch of the First Five-year Plan in 1953, which was hugely successful in establishing a heavy industrial base in China • Mao's adaption of the Soviet economic model to Chinese circumstances during the Great Leap Forward had some successes, e.g. commune-based initiatives helped inspire Deng's Town and Village Enterprises of the 1980s. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
10	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, throughout the years 1860-1997, the application of western technologies was always important to Chinese industry. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that, throughout the years 1860-1997, the application of western technologies was always important to Chinese industry should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Qing government encouraged the use of western technology in the drive for industrial growth, e.g. the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company used steam vessels from 1872 in a boost to domestic production • Western technologies, e.g. in textile production, were applied from the 1860s, helping to foster industrial growth, especially in cities like Shanghai • The railway network was developed steadily, first by the Qing, also by the Republican government, the Japanese in Manchuria and the Communists after 1949, helping to boost industrial development • The launch of the First Five-Year Plan (1953) saw the introduction into China of western technologies, especially in metallurgy and engineering, that facilitated rapid industrial growth • Mao embraced western technology in the development of nuclear arms, spawning the development of the nuclear industry in China – this grew rapidly in the 1980s • Following the Cultural Revolution, Deng's government invested heavily in modern communications from the west to improve connectivity and hence industrial growth, e.g. high-speed trains, the electricity network • Deng's Special Economic Zones allowed foreign technology companies to produce microchips and mobile phones through Chinese companies – they generated huge industrial growth and employed many thousands. Arguments and evidence countering the statement that, throughout the years 1860-1997, the application of western technologies was always important to Chinese industry should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The use of western technologies under the Qing was patchy, at best, and there was significant resistance to it that limited industrial growth, e.g. the first stretch of railway in China was dismantled following unrest • During the 1800s, industry in China was still largely traditional in its production methods, and the use of western technology was unknown outside the major cities – industrial growth was reduced as a result • Political and economic uncertainty during the 1920s and 1930s stymied the widespread use of western technologies supporting industrial growth, e.g. the telegraph network built by Americans shrank during the 1930s • Mao's shifting priorities following the Revolution were often not conducive to the application of western technologies to industrial growth, e.g. during the Cultural Revolution, both were hugely neglected. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which increasing foreign intervention benefited China in the years 1860-70. Arguments and evidence that increasing foreign intervention did benefit China should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The increased intervention of foreign powers following the Treaty of Tianjin certainly boosted the economy – exports rose and there were attempts to build up the cloth and steel industries • The establishment of the Maritime Customs Service in 1861 ensured an increasing revenue stream for the Chinese government from tariffs on foreign trade, used at least partly to fund improvements to communications • Foreign military strength helped the Chinese in the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion and the presence of British, French and German forces was also important in deterring Russian advances in the north and west • Foreign ideas also encouraged those who sought Chinese modernisation, e.g. the leading figures in the Self-Strengthening Movement like Li Hongzhang. Arguments and evidence that foreign intervention did not benefit China should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Foreign intervention remained unwelcome to China's leaders having been forced on them by defeat in the Opium Wars - there remained enormous philosophical and cultural barriers and a reluctance by many to embrace foreign influence • Hostility towards Christian missionaries throughout the 60s, culminating in the Tianjin massacre in 1870, illustrates the fact that many Chinese people did not believe foreign intervention was beneficial to China • Foreign economic influence was mostly confined to the Treaty Ports and along the Yangtze – elsewhere, thanks to the reluctance of Cixi's government to embrace change, life went on as normal • Even in areas open to foreign influence, such as Shanghai, economic progress was slow, conducted largely for the benefit of outsiders who took their profits elsewhere and was dwarfed by that in contemporary Japan for example • Intervention by foreign powers was largely exploitative and in their own colonial interests – the interests of the Chinese, whether economic, political, religious or cultural, were of much less importance. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing the arguments of those in favour of adopting Western ideas in China during the 1860s and the nature of the opposition they faced. Opening Up China to Foreigners is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of the debate among the elite over the extent of foreign influence in China. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences: • The reports come from the 1860s at a time when the debate between those accepting of greater Western influence and their opponents was made more acute by China's defeat in the second Opium War • Prince Gong was central to the most important decisions taken in China at the time – an uncle to the Emperor and a central figure in the coup of 1861 as well as head of the Grand Council • Ostensibly progress reports, the tone of some of the comments makes clear the philosophical differences within the Chinese court and are more accurately read as an argument or manifesto for change. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: The arguments of those in favour of adopting Western ideas in China during the 1860s: • The source states that a better knowledge of the languages and customs of foreign nations is essential to prevent China being taken advantage of by foreign powers ('protect ourselves...tricks and deceit') • It provides evidence that knowledge of Western science is essential to preserve and enhance China's power status ('the machinery of the West...mathematical science', 'assure the growth...empire') • It implies that should China reject Western ideas it may fall prey to near neighbours that it has traditionally looked down upon ('Japan has recently...language and science'). The nature of the opposition they faced: • The source identifies senior bureaucrats at court as a centre of opposition to the modernisers ('mandarins of the old school') • The source suggests that resistance was based on China's long-standing belief in its own superiority, hence the need to protect her 'old traditions' ('national bigotry', 'disgraceful...pupil of the West') • The fact that the call for teachers has yielded such poor results may suggest a wider obstruction of the modernisers outside the capital ('governor of Canton...fully knowledgeable', 'long delay...our plans') • The fact that Gong has to argue his point of view so forcefully, despite his elevated position, suggests that there may be considerable opposition to the adoption of Western ideas elsewhere at court.



Question	Indicative content
	Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing the arguments of those in favour of adopting Western ideas in China during the 1860s and of the nature of the opposition they faced. Relevant points may include: • Defeat in the second Opium War forced China to open further to Western influence and sharpened the debate in elite circles about the country's relationship with the rest of the world • To some, defeat meant that it was vital to adopt some foreign ideas – the Self-strengthening Movement, which emerged in the 1860s, argued for the use of Western military technology at the very least • As a leading moderniser, Gong was a key figure in the establishment of the <i>Zongli Yamen</i> and the <i>Tong Wen Guan</i>, the purpose of which was to 'learn all the good things possible' from the West • To many, including the Dowager Empress and key figures such as Wo Ran, modernisation risked betrayal of China's Confucian traditions – their opposition ensured modernisation was very slow in the 1860s. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how significant the role of foreign missions and missionaries was in the growth of anti-western feeling in China in the years 1860-70. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the role of foreign missions and missionaries was significant in the growth of anti-western feeling in China in the years 1860-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Treaty of Tianjin forced China to allow Christian missionaries freedom of travel throughout the country rather than only the treaty ports – as a result, their presence was inevitably associated with China's defeat and humiliation • Anti-missionary activities by Chinese people were often met with a disproportionate response by foreign powers, e.g. the sending of British warships to Nanjing following an attack on missionaries in 1868 • The implication that the Christian religion was superior to native beliefs was offensive to many Chinese people, as was missionary condemnation of traditional practices such as concubinage and foot-binding • Cultural insensitivity by some missionaries, e.g. dressing in the traditional clothes of the nobility, the church spires that interfered with <i>feng shui</i> or the presence of single women in isolated villages, contributed to Chinese anger • Resentment can be evidenced by the spread of superstitions associating Christians with sexual abuse and murder, and the hundreds of violent attacks on them each year culminating in the Tianjin Massacre. Arguments and evidence that the role of foreign missions and missionaries was not significant in the growth of anti-western feeling in China in the years 1860-70, and/or that there were other reasons for this, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Though a symbol of foreign influence, the impact of the missions was slight, less than 1000 missionaries with fewer than 0.5m converts by 1870 – most Chinese people never came into contact with them • The social and educational impact of missionaries was welcomed by some Chinese people, e.g. famine relief, the provision of orphanages and improved literacy • Anti-western feeling was created, above all, by China's defeat in the Opium Wars and her consequent economic and cultural humiliation by a number of foreign powers • The economic exploitation of China exemplified by the treaty port system, extended in 1860, caused a great deal of anti-western feeling in China • Anti-western feeling was stoked by leading figures at court surrounding Empress Cixi who opposed all attempts to modernise the Chinese economy and society, which were associated with western ideas. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that the most important consequence of the Treaty of Tianjin, in the years 1860-70, was the growth of British influence in Shanghai and the Yangtze valley. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the most important consequence of the Treaty of Tianjin, in the years 1860-70, was the growth of British influence in Shanghai and the Yangtze valley should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Treaty allowed the establishment of four treaty ports on the Yangtze, e.g. at Nanjing and Hankou, the first in the Chinese interior – the British were the first to exploit these • Lower customs duties levied on traded goods in the interior, as a result of the Treaty, enabled the British to expand trade, using steam shipping on the Yangtze to buy tea and porcelain in return for manufactured goods • By cutting out the role of domestic merchants, going more directly to the source of trade, British merchants were able to cut the costs of exports from China and expand the markets available to them • The Treaty stimulated the growth of Shanghai and spawned a significant British population - the city's commercial and industrial infrastructure developed quickly in the 1860s. Arguments and evidence opposing the statement that that the most important consequence of the Treaty of Tianjin, in the years 1860-70, was the growth of British influence in Shanghai and the Yangtze valley should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The opening up of the Yangtze valley to the British was not an immediate consequence of the Treaty, e.g. in the 1860s, the volume of trade was limited by the inability of the Chinese to afford manufactured goods • Britain had already established a major presence in Shanghai after its opening as a treaty port in 1842, and a British population was already firmly established • A major consequence of the Treaty was the further weakening of the idea of Chinese exceptionalism, and the consequent growth of the Self-Strengthening Movement • The Treaty led to the establishment of the permanent diplomatic presence in Beijing of the western powers, and their consequent ability to influence the Chinese government • The Treaty led to an increase in western exploitation of China more generally, e.g. Russia took advantage of the Treaty to expand in Korea and seize Vladivostok • An important consequence of the Treaty was the introduction of western culture more widely within China, e.g. new trading routes in the interior were well trodden by Christian missionaries • Paradoxically, the Treaty strengthened the Qing – reliant on them to fulfil its terms, the western powers moved to prop up the dynasty against its internal enemies, e.g. the defence of Shanghai against the Taiping in 1860.

	Other relevant material must be credited.
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5	17–20	• Interrogates the evidence of the source in relation to both enquiries with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion, • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.
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Sections B and C

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	- Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. - Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. - The overall judgement is missing or asserted. - There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	- There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. - An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. - The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	- There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. - Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. - Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. - The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. - The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	- Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. - Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. - Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. - The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.



Section A: indicative content**Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-91**

Question	Indicative content
1.	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 and the aims of de-Stalinisation. The Twentieth Party Congress and de-Stalinisation are named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of the significance of both. 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences: • As a speech made by Khrushchev, it should give an accurate view of his opinions on Stalin and the future of the USSR • As a speech made in an attempt to persuade his audience of high-ranking communists of the need for momentous change, there may be an element of exaggeration in the claims made • The fact that the 'secret' speech was ordered to be read in party meetings soon after it was given indicates that Khrushchev wanted its contents to be known more widely, both within the USSR and in the rest of the world. 2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin made at the Twentieth Party Congress : • The speech suggests that Stalin abused his position as leader of the USSR by concentrating power in his own hands ('accumulation...one person.', 'absolute submission...opinion', 'Stalin's despotism'.) • The source indicates that Stalin used violent and illegal means to rid the Soviet Union of his opponents ('Whoever opposed him...doomed.', 'cruellest repression', 'physical and mental torture'.) • It claims that Stalin's methods contravened the ethics of Soviet communism ('against the spirit of Marxism-Leninism', 'destroyed the principle of collective leadership') • It suggests that Stalin's leadership stymied the progress of the USSR by creating an all-pervasive culture of fear ('distorted party work...economic activity.', 'an unproductive administration...less initiative'). The aims of de-Stalinisation: • The speech indicates that an aim of de-Stalinisation was to destroy the harmful 'cult of the individual' and restore a more collegiate leadership style ('restore Leninist principles of leadership') • The source claims that, by removing the fear of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment from the people, de-Stalinisation can reinvigorate the fortunes of the USSR ('free ourselves...creative activity') • It suggests that de-Stalinisation will restore proper legal process both within the Communist Party ('follow the written rules of our Party.') and in the USSR more generally ('fight individuals abusing their power.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 and the aims of de-Stalinisation. Relevant points may include: • The speech was based largely on the Pospelov Report, commissioned by the Central Committee following major unrest in the prison camps – it confirmed many serious breaches of 'revolutionary legality' under Stalin



Question	Indicative content
	• Though deeply implicated in Stalin's 'despotism' himself, Khrushchev calculated that the speech would help him outmanoeuvre his rivals in the struggle for pre-eminence, especially Molotov and Malenkov • While there was some backlash to the speech within the party, Khrushchev gained significant support from many members, especially the young, who embraced fully the need for a fresh, de-Stalinised start • The process of de-Stalinisation, energised by the speech, sparked internal economic reform, a major reduction in the apparatus of the police state, and the start of the so-called 'Khrushchev thaw' in cultural life.



Option 38.2: The making of Modern China, 1860-1997

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing China's position in international affairs in the early 1980s and the aims of its foreign policy. Deng Xiaoping and China's growing importance in world organisations are named in the specification and candidates can be expected to have knowledge of them. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences: - As comments made by Deng Xiaoping, the <i>de facto</i> head of the Chinese government, the source will reflect Chinese policy at the highest level - The comments were made in a meeting with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and reported widely in subsequent weeks, indicating that Deng wished his views to be known and discussed - The tone and language of the comments are generally modest and measured, suggesting that Deng wished China to be viewed as a reasonable force in international affairs. - The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: China's position in international affairs in the early 1980s: - The source suggests that, as a member of the UN Security Council, China will act independently of the influence of the USA and USSR, and their allies ('Opposition....Soviet Union.') - The source indicates that China sees itself as a force for peace in international affairs ('safeguard world peace', 'China hopes for peace', 'war would hinder our plan') - The source suggests that as yet, China lacks the economic clout to act as a leading player in international affairs ('our strength is limited as is our role.', 'just another member...look after its own interests.'). The aims of its foreign policy: - The source suggests that an aim of China's foreign policy is to project an image of probity ('China means what it says...has principles.') and strength to the world ('impose war on us...not afraid') - It claims that an aim of foreign policy is to provide a peaceful context for China's economic development ('hopes for peace...backwardness', 'War would hinder our plan') - The source suggests that, as a prominent member of the Third World, China is seeking to play a role in an emerging alternative to the hegemony of the superpowers ('eager to...countries.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing China's position in international affairs in the early 1980s and the aims of its foreign policy. Relevant points may include: - Deng was the architect of an increasingly outward-looking China in the early 1980s, seeking to raise its profile in international affairs, e.g. greater diplomatic ties with the west - China's more assertive role was indicated by its part in UN attempts to isolate the USSR over the invasion of Afghanistan and its refusal to endorse the US-sponsored Kurt Waldheim as UN Secretary-General



Question	Indicative content
	China's foreign policy in the early 1980s was particularly attuned to the interests of the developing nations, e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia, which were less clearly aligned with the USA and USSR.

Section B: indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-91

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement the accuracy of the view that the reform of the army was the most significant of all the political reforms undertaken by Alexander II in the years 1855-70. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the reform of the army was the most significant of all the political reforms undertaken by Alexander II in the years 1855-70, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: - The army reforms were significant in starting to repair Russia's reputation as a European power following the morale-sapping military setbacks of the Crimean War, e.g. the Alma, the fall of Sevastopol - The reforms were significant for creating a better-trained conscript army with a reserve of over 500 000 men, vital in the protection of Russia's borders and the maintenance of internal order - The army reforms were significant for encouraging professionalism (e.g. the replacement of the cadet corps) and for creating greater organisational clarity (e.g. the creation of local military districts) - The reforms were significant for promoting greater fairness and humaneness in Russian life, e.g. the length of conscription was reduced, corporal punishment was restricted - The reforms were significant for encouraging the spread of education in Russia, e.g. the modern curriculum adopted in the new military gymnasiums, the reduction of time in service for those at university. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that the reform of the army was the most significant of all the political reforms undertaken by Alexander II in the years 1855-70, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: - The reforms did not tackle fundamental weaknesses of the Russian army, e.g. aristocratic officers still prevailed over their more professional juniors, corruption and inefficiency were still rife in procuring equipment - The reform of the legal system was far-reaching, introducing western judicial norms into Russia for the first time, e.g. jury trials, an educated and meritocratic magistracy - The <i>zemstvo</i> statute (1864) and municipal statute (1870) were significant for helping to modernise local administration in Russia, and for introducing an element of accountability to elected officials - The reforms made to universities in 1863, together with the new press regulations introduced in 1865, helped foster a climate of freer expression in Russia, and encouraged the possibility of greater democratic reforms. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991 was due to factors beyond Gorbachev's control. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991 was due to factors beyond Gorbachev's control should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In 1985, Gorbachev inherited a stagnant and inefficient economy, unfit to support the vast historic burdens of social and military spending – it would have been almost impossible for anyone to turn this around by 1991 • The political system prevailing in the USSR in 1985 was ideologically-bankrupt, e.g. those behind the 1991 coup – it was fanciful to expect Gorbachev's reforms to overcome this easily • Nationalism in the SSRs, which had been growing for decades before 1985, created a momentum for dissolution of the USSR in the late 1980s that would have been difficult for any Soviet leader to resist • The Afghanistan war, which Gorbachev ended as soon as he was able, was ruinously expensive, accelerated Cold War pressures and weakened belief in the Soviet system still further, helping lead to its collapse • The nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 cost the USSR over £10b to contain and opened up the Soviet system to international scrutiny and ridicule, so further damaging Gorbachev's attempts to save it • Soviet society had become used to full employment and cheap food and housing, which the command economy could increasingly not sustain – alcoholism was another enormous problem almost impossible to solve. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991 was due to factors beyond Gorbachev's control should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Gorbachev's belief that he could reform the Soviet economy and society within the existing Soviet system was naïve at best, a product of personal arrogance and inexperience that quickly undermined him • His own decision to undertake far-reaching structural reform, at the same time as encouraging greater freedom and democracy, triggered economic meltdown and unprecedented criticism simultaneously • Gorbachev's foreign policy appeared off-the-cuff and ill-thought out – his abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine gained him popularity abroad but fuelled separatism in the SSRs • Gorbachev's thin-skinned response to more radical reformers, like Sakharov and Yeltsin, made it appear that he was defending the discredited communist system and lost him credibility and support • Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign compounded his unpopularity, cost the Soviet treasury 17% of its annual revenue and accomplished little • His insistence that <i>perestroika</i> and <i>glasnost</i> should continue to expand in scope despite mounting difficulties, e.g. the creation of the Congress of People's Deputies, merely sparked the conservatives into the fateful coup. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 38.2: The making of modern China, 1860-1997

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that foreign language schools had little impact in China in the years 1860-70. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that foreign language schools had little impact in China in the years 1860-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The School of Combined Learning (<i>Tongwen Guan</i>) was only established in 1862, and taught no more than 200 students every year by the end of the decade • The further schools established in Shanghai and Guangzhou from 1863 taught less than 250 students annually between them, a tiny number in a country as big as China • The impact of the schools in the 1860s was limited by the refusal of leading Manchu families to embrace western-style learning, preferring to prepare their sons for the traditional civil service exams instead • Throughout the 1860s, there remained enormous divisions at court between those convinced of the need for foreign-language education in China, and those deeply opposed – this stymied its spread and impact • The impact of foreign language schools in China during the 1860s remained confined to major, western-influenced cities, and had little or no effect in the rest of China. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that foreign language schools had little impact in China in the years 1860-70 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The need for greater knowledge of foreign languages in China, notably English and French, was acknowledged at the very top of Chinese government and driven by key figures such as Prince Gong • Following the establishment of the <i>Tongwen Guan</i> in Beijing in 1862, further schools were established in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Fuzhou, widening their impact • The introduction of foreign language education at schools at the Jiangnan Arsenal and Fuzhou Dockyard during the 1860s, enabled vital western military technology to be introduced into China • The schools helped open up China to the merits of a broadly-based western education, e.g. subjects such as chemistry and international law were added to the curriculum of the <i>Tongwen Guan</i> in the 1860s • The foreign language schools attracted high-calibre foreign teachers, e.g. Hosea Morse, and Chinese scholars, e.g. Li Shanlan, both of whom had prominent roles in China's later development. Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which the Tianjin Massacre of 1870 was a consequence of the terms of the Treaty of Tianjin (1860). Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the Tianjin Massacre of 1870 was a consequence of the terms of the Treaty of Tianjin (1860) should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By the further humiliation of China, which was powerless to resist the western powers, the Treaty stoked deep resentment among Chinese people, causing repeated violent outbreaks like the Tianjin Massacre • The Massacre was a consequence of the Treaty as the Treaty allowed Christian missionaries to operate in Tianjin from 1860, causing anger by their challenge to Confucianism and Buddhism • The Massacre was a consequence of the Treaty as its terms emboldened some missionaries to contemptuous dismissals of Chinese traditions, e.g. building a church on the site of a razed Buddhist temple in Tianjin in 1869 • The Massacre was a consequence of the Treaty, as its unequal terms encouraged the western powers to use force against protest rather than rein in the missionaries, e.g. the actions of the French in Tianjin in 1870 • The Massacre was a consequence of the Treaty as in Tianjin, anti-western feeling ran particularly high due to the large number of French and English troops stationed there to enforce its terms • By further weakening the authority of the Chinese government, the Treaty created a power vacuum that allowed the gentry to orchestrate increasingly violent anti-missionary activity, as shown at Tianjin in 1870. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that the Tianjin Massacre of 1870 was a consequence of the terms of the Treaty of Tianjin (1860) and/or that it was a consequence of other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Massacre was a consequence of poorly-judged individual actions by Catholic missionaries and French officials in one Treaty port, and its causes should not be linked directly back to the Treaty • The Massacre was caused by the deep-seated suspicions of outsiders in China, dating back centuries, rather than by the consequences of the 1860 Treaty specifically • The Massacre was a consequence of unfounded superstitions circulating among the people of Tianjin, e.g. that the missionaries were using the eyes of children in medicine, rather than of the terms of the Treaty • The Tianjin Treaty had allowed Christian missionaries to do a great deal of good work in China, e.g. famine relief, education provision, and in many places, they were appreciated rather than attacked. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 was largely due to the complacency of its political and military leaders. Arguments and evidence that China's defeat was due largely to the complacency of its political and military leaders should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • A deeply-held belief in Chinese superiority over the Japanese 'dwarves' led to the complacency of the Imperial government, as seen in the failure to deter decades of Japanese designs on Korea • The defeat at Pyongyang in 1894 demonstrates the complacency of the military in not preparing adequately for a Japanese attack • Though modernisation had been urged on the Chinese government by reformers for over 30 years, e.g. the self-strengtheners, it had largely ignored them despite the evident designs of foreign powers • The Chinese army was poorly organised (along ethnic lines), badly led by princely and regional rather than professional commanders, included regiments which still used bows and arrows and suffered from high opium use • The navy suffered from lack of investment and the embezzlement of what funds were available – some shell cases were packed with sand rather than explosives, which contributed to defeat at the Yalu River for example. Arguments and evidence that China's defeat was not largely due to the complacency of its political and military leaders and/or that there were other reasons for the Chinese defeat, should also be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Chinese had prepared defensive lines in Korea indicating that they appreciated the threat of invasion and weren't complacent • A third of China's army of over 1 million men were trained Green Standard troops, a number larger than the entire size of the Japanese army of 270,000 • The navy had benefitted from modernisation under Li Hongzhang and had a force of 30 ships bought from Europe to defend Korea – this indicates that at least some of the criticisms of the self-strengtheners had been heeded • China's defeat could be said to have arisen not so much from complacency than its leaders' deeply-held Confucian worldview which was ill-suited to the imperial politics of the nineteenth century • Japan had embraced thirty years of western-led reform, invested thoroughly in both industry and the military, and had a navy trained by Britain and a conscript army modelled on the French and German • China expected support from foreign governments which had acted hitherto to maintain her geographical integrity, notably Britain and the US – on this occasion they allowed China's defeat. Other relevant material must be credited

Section C: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far they agree with the statement that the Boxer Rebellion was caused mainly by the mistakes of China's leaders in the years 1898–1900. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the Boxer Rebellion was caused by the mistakes of China's leaders in the years 1898–1900 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Attempts by the Emperor in 1898 to assert himself over the Dowager Empress created a serious power struggle at the centre of Imperial power between traditionalists and modernisers before the Rebellion began • The reforms encouraged by the Emperor during the Hundred Days were overambitious – they created powerful opposition, notably in the bureaucracy, so destabilising the throne at a crucial time • The conservative fightback led by the Dowager Empress encouraged conservatives, at court and in the provinces, to support the Boxers' cause • The response of the authorities to the early unrest was confused – some regional officials, used to protecting Westerners against such disorder, suppressed the Boxers while others openly encouraged them • Empress Cixi's eventual decision to sanction the rebellion escalated the spread of violence though could not guarantee sufficient support throughout China for it to be successful. Arguments and evidence that there were other causes of the Boxer Rebellion should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Poverty encouraged the rebellion – drought and famine in the northern provinces plus unemployment caused by reorganisation of the army contributed to the unrest • The longer-term failures of the Qing dynasty, emphasised by the defeat by Japan, caused discontent – Boxer banners originally called for its overthrow before then calling for the defence of the Qing against foreigners • The activities of Christian preachers were a key irritant for the Boxers – the reprisals taken by Germans in Shandong for the murder of two missionaries in 1897 were an immediate trigger for revolt • The long-term exploitation and humiliation of China by foreign powers, emphasised by their attempts to use the defeat by Japan for further advantage, encouraged opposition at court and in the country. Other relevant material must be credited.

2

Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.

Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing the nature of the Boxer Rebellion and the extent of the threat it posed to foreigners in China. Though the author is not named in the specification, the Boxer Rebellion is and candidates can be expected to be aware of its events and consequences.

1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences:

- Written in diary form, it is a contemporary account published very soon after the events it describes, which may enhance its accuracy
- As a Christian Missionary and an American, groups directly targeted by the violence of the rebellion, the author is unlikely to be sympathetic to the Boxers
- The dramatic title, and the fact that it was published so soon after the siege, suggests that it may have been produced quickly in order to take advantage of public interest in these events
- The language of the source is mostly matter-of-fact, though the underlying tone may have been framed to appear stoic to appeal to its likely audience of American Christians.

2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source:

The nature of the Boxer Rebellion:

- The source indicates that the Rebellion was large and well supported ('mass of Boxers...twenty to fifty thousand', 'vast number of Boxers')
- It provides evidence that the Boxers specifically targeted foreigners ('Kill the foreign devils!') and Christians especially ('Kill the Christians!', 'cathedral...looting and murdering', 'Catholic refugees')
- It provides evidence of the violence of the Boxers ('Kill! Kill! Kill!', 'ordering that the Legation Quarter be destroyed', 'wipe us out')
- The source suggests the religious and mystical character of the Boxer societies ('going through their rituals, burning incense and chanting', 'went on for two or three hours').

The extent of the threat it posed to foreigners in China:

- It suggests it was a serious threat by the lengths to which those in the Foreign Legation had to go to defend themselves ('barricade within barricade', 'if only we had a machine gun...safe', 'almost incessant firing')



Question	Indicative content
	- It indicates that the threat was significant as some of the most important foreigners in China were isolated for two months ('effectively cut off from the world'), as does the need for a 'relief army' to break the siege - It suggests, by the ease with which a small number ('ten Americans and twenty Russians') was able to kill larger numbers of Boxers, that once foreign firepower had been mustered, the threat would quickly subside. 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing the nature of the Boxer Rebellion and the extent of the threat it posed to foreigners in China. Relevant points may include: - The Boxers were ancient peasant societies, which were re-invigorated in opposition to China's exploitation by foreigners under the unequal treaties - Boxer societies were quasi-religious, characterised by performance of the martial arts, rituals and incantations – many believed that through these, they would be unharmed by western guns - Empress Cixi decided to back the Boxers in their aims and committed the Chinese army to their support – it assisted the Boxers in consolidating the Peking siege and forced the retreat of a British relief force on 19 June - The Legation siege ended when soldiers of the Eight-Nation Alliance entered Peking in August – the resulting Boxer Protocol significantly weakened the Qing dynasty and strengthened foreign influence.

Section B: indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the importance of the attitude of Empress Cixi in the development of the Boxer Rebellion in the years 1898-1900. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the attitude of Empress Cixi was important in the development of the Boxer Rebellion in the years 1898-1900 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Like many Chinese people, Cixi was genuinely appalled by the economic exploitation of China by foreigners in the late nineteenth century, and sympathised with those like the Boxers who sought to curtail it • Cixi strongly opposed the western-inspired modernisation of China as part of her power-struggle at court with the supporters of the Guangxu Emperor – this encouraged anti-western feeling to grow • In order to re-establish her position of influence following the Hundred Days Reform in 1898, Cixi re-iterated her support for the primacy of Chinese traditions, giving a significant boost to the Boxers • When the Boxers initially attacked the Qing for their failure to protect China from foreigners, Cixi felt she had to support the rebellion to save the dynasty • Cixi issued edicts in defence of the Boxers in 1900 – following the naval attack on Tianjin in June, she declared war on the foreign powers and ordered the Chinese army to act in support of the rebellion. Arguments and evidence countering the view that the attitude of Empress Cixi was important in the development of the Boxer Rebellion in the years 1898-1900, and/or that other factors were more important, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Cixi's declaration of war was not supported by many civil servants and military officers who did not act in support of the Boxers, e.g. General Ronglu disobeyed her order and withheld it from other officers • The behaviour of foreign missionaries was deeply resented in the Chinese countryside and was central to the development of the rebellion, hence the murder of Christians by Boxers in 26 prefectures • A major reason for the development of the Boxer rebellion was resentment at the continuing economic exploitation of China by foreign powers, and their disdain for Chinese customs and traditions • The Boxer rebellion developed because of the divisions at court between those who were pro-reform and those who resisted it – this confused and weakened the government response • The rebellion developed because of poverty among peasants in the Chinese countryside, who became the backbone of Boxer support, e.g. the impact of unemployment and drought in Shandong where the rebellion originated • The rebellion developed because of the spiritual traditions that existed in parts of China, often allied to the practice of martial arts, which helped the anti-western movement to grow and become more militant. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing China's position following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and the aims of the Japanese government in China at this time. The Treaty of Shimonoseki is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to know of its terms and its context. 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences: • As an official treaty entered into by two sovereign nations, it will set out its terms clearly and unambiguously • Agreed immediately following China's crushing defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war, the balance of the terms of the Treaty will be clearly weighted in Japan's favour • The tone and language of the treaty are assertive, framing implied threats to the defeated to encourage compliance. 2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: China's position following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95: • The source suggests that, following the war, China was powerless to resist Japan's demands ('China grants to Japan, for all time...', 'agrees to pay Japan...200 million Kuping taels') • The source indicates that, following the war, China was being forced to concede significant territory to Japan ('China grants...the full sovereignty of...Liaoning...Taiwan...Pescadores') • The source indicates that, following the war, China was being forced to pay 'reparations' to Japan, and to give other significant concessions ('a treaty of commerce and navigation') • The source suggests that Japan was very much dominant in Sino-Japanese relations ('Interest...shall be paid...on any unpaid parts', 'China consents to the continued occupation... city of Weihaiwei'). The aims of the Japanese government in China at this time: • The source suggests that an aim of the Japanese government at this time was to expand its influence in the Far East at China's expense ('full sovereignty...Liaoning...Taiwan,' 'China also recognises...Korea.') • It provides evidence that it was a Japanese aim to expand its economic interests in China ('Steam vessels...passengers and cargo...', 'free to engage in any type of industry...all kinds of machinery.') • The source indicates that an aim of the Japanese government was to secure the same kind of privileges in China as the western powers ('treaty of commerce and navigation...the European powers.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing China's position following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and the aims of the Japanese government in China at this time. Relevant points may include: • The Sino-Japanese war was caused principally by rivalry over which would be the dominant power over Korea – also, Japan was determined to pre-empt Russian designs in Korea and Manchuria

Question	Indicative content
	• The war was a disaster for China as Japan quickly occupied Korea, Taiwan and parts of the Chinese mainland – it highlighted Chinese backwardness and incompetence, and confirmed its long-term decline • Japan used the Treaty of Shimonoseki to assert its position as the principle Asian power in the region, securing strategically-important territory and resources, e.g. the Liaodong peninsula, Korean iron ore • The Treaty was a massive humiliation that plunged China into greater internal turmoil, opinion dividing between those advocating still greater westernisation and those seeking to defend the existing order.

Section B: indicative content**Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-91**



Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing the causes of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's) response to it. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of it. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences: - As a speech by Jiang Jieshi, the head of the Chinese Republic, it can be expected to be well informed of events and reflect the response of a figure at the very centre of Chinese affairs - Made only 10 days after the incident, and as the crisis was escalating, its tone is resolute, seeking both to rally the Chinese people and send a clear message to Japan and the international community - Given the unpopularity of Jiang's policy towards Japan in previous years, the speech to Chinese leaders seeks to justify a strategy that has apparently failed and to ensure he remains head of government. - The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: The causes of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident: - The speech indicates that China is the wronged party and firmly blames the Japanese ('tried hard...in spite of all the injustice and suffering') - The source states that the incident was deliberately planned by Japan ('something was imminent', 'not...sudden or accidental', 'careful in its plans against us') - It implies that the incident is being used by Japan as justification for further aggression against China ('abandon the Tanggu agreement'). Jiang Jieshi's response to it: - It states that China does not want war ('we are a weak nation,' 'we hope for peace') given its internal problems ('peace...national reconstruction') - It implies that China now has little choice but to resist or face the direst consequences ('limit of our endurance', 'struggle for national existence' 'annihilation of our race', 'an abyss...no hope of escape') - It suggests that Jiang's response may have been influenced by the strength of feeling in China caused by the incident ('Our nation...deep indignation') - It indicates that Jiang expects that China will now unite and fight hard ('throw every ounce...struggle', 'commit ourselves completely', 'prepare for war...united efforts'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing the causes of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and for Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's) response to it. Relevant points may include: - Japanese aggression against China escalated throughout the 1930s, e.g. the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the conflict in Shanghai in 1932 and the occupation of Rehe and Hopei provinces

Question	Indicative content
	• Jiang's policy of appeasing the Japanese, both in the hope of defeating his communist opposition and attracting western support, was exemplified by the Treaty Of Tangu in 1933 • Calls for a united front against Japan, from both GMD allies and the communists, increased steadily in the mid-30s – the Xi'an Incident of 1936 put massive pressure on Jiang to reconsider his strategy • Though the origins of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident remain disputed, Jiang had little choice but to commit China to fight – this led to the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War.

Section B: indicative content**Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991**



Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the main reason for China's successful resistance to Japan, in the years 1937-41, was the support of the USA. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the main reason for China's successful resistance to Japan, in the years 1937-41, was the support of the USA should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Japanese expansion in the Far East, in China and then Indochina, unnerved the USA, leading Roosevelt to offer increasing assistance to Jiang from 1940, even though the US was not officially at war with Japan • The USA channelled money into the Nationalist cause from 1940 in the form of credits and loans – it also froze assets in US banks and imposed economic sanctions, which hindered Japan's advance, most notably oil in early 1941 • Indirect support was provided through the training of 'volunteer' pilots, 'The Flying Tigers' – equipped with planes purchased from the US on favourable terms; they were able to challenge Japanese air superiority in China • Increasing US support for the Nationalists in China led Japan's leaders into the belief that a pre-emptive strike on the USA was necessary – the attack on Pearl Harbor led to a formal US declaration of war on Japan • The Nationalists were promised over \$1 billion of material support from the US in 1941, also military assistance and advice – US intervention also forced the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China for deployment elsewhere.

Arguments and evidence against the view that the main reason for China's successful resistance to Japan, in the years 1937-41, was the support of the USA should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:

- US support for the Nationalists came late, after three years of conflict – also US intervention in 1941 forced Japan to escalate their attack in the Far East cutting off crucial Nationalist supply lines through Burma and Malaya
- China's successful resistance to Japan can be credited to Jiang, whose tactics from 1937 were to avoid defeat in the belief that foreign support would eventually be forthcoming, an approach ultimately vindicated
- The structured Nationalist retreat to Sichuan in 1938, which included the evacuation of industry as well as government and the military, established a firm base for Free China to continue the resistance to Japan
- Resistance to Japan was assisted by the Communists, who concluded a 'united front' with the Nationalists, e.g. the '100 Regiments Offensive' in 1940 in the north against the Japanese
- The brutality of Japanese tactics, epitomised by the rape of Nanjing and the tactic of the 'Three Alls', both galvanised Chinese resistance and was key in the world-wide condemnation of Japan's presence in China.

Other relevant material must be credited.



Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing the reasons for the actions of the Japanese army at Nanjing in 1937 and the scale of the violence committed by the Japanese in the city. The rape of Nanjing is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to have knowledge of its causes and its impact. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences: - Produced by an international body representing the major powers, the judgement would come under great scrutiny, and have considerable impact, throughout the world - The judgement was the culmination of over two years of judicial hearings, and based on the testimony of eyewitnesses in Nanjing - As a Tribunal representing those powers who fought against Japan, there may be a tendency to seek a punitive justice to satisfy the demands of public opinion. - The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: The reasons for the actions of the Japanese army at Nanjing in 1937: - The source indicates that the Japanese army had predetermined to act harshly in Nanjing to 'punish' the Chinese people ('all-conquering bayonets...unleashed!', 'determined to make it bad.') - The source suggests that the Japanese sought to make an example of Nanjing because of its political significance ('the capital...demonstrate Japan's military power to all of China.') - The source suggests that the Japanese army was seeking to make an impact outside China by its actions in Nanjing ('an event of international importance') - The source suggests that the actions of the Japanese were partly driven by religious belief ('Our divinely-inspired mission...'). The scale of the violence committed by the Japanese in the city: - The source indicates that the Japanese murdered massive numbers in Nanjing in a short period of time ('six weeks... over two hundred thousand', 'soldiers...in groups', 'streets were littered with bodies.') - It provides evidence of mass looting and the physical destruction of large parts of the city ('contents...in trucks', 'one third of Nanjing was completely destroyed.') - The source suggests that even Japanese diplomats in Nanjing were shocked by the scale of the violence ('publicise in...people of Japan') and that the Japanese would have been also ('would force...army.'). - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing the reasons for the actions of the Japanese army at Nanjing in 1937 and the scale of the violence committed by the Japanese in the city. Relevant points may include: - The second Sino-Japanese war, which broke out in 1937, resulted from Japan's long-standing imperialist ambitions in China – it was termed a 'crusade' in Japan and given cultural and racial justification

Question	Indicative content
	• The Nanjing attack followed that on Shanghai, 'China's Stalingrad', in which Japan suffered 100 000 casualties – though deciding to abandon Nanjing, Jiang Jieshi publicly declared it too would fight to the death • Some Japanese officers encouraged their troops, many poorly-trained reservists, by promising that they could rape and loot at will – as many as 20 000 women were raped in Nanjing during the occupation.

Section B: indicative content**Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-91**



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the outbreak of all-out war in 1937 was largely due to the weak response of Jiang Jieshi's government toward Japan since 1931. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the outbreak of all-out war in 1937 was largely due to the weak response of Jiang Jieshi's government toward Japan since 1931 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Jiang's willingness to tolerate Japanese aggression in Manchuria from 1931 encouraged the Japanese to push further and further in their demands of China • Jiang responded startlingly weakly to the Mukden Incident in 1931, ordering Chinese forces to withdraw without a fight and instead appealing, in vain, to the League of Nations to intervene • The inability of Jiang's government to offer resistance to the occupation of all of Manchuria in 1932 emboldened Japan to believe a full conquest of China was viable, e.g. Jiang refused to support guerrillas in Manchukuo • The pattern of Chinese appeasement was confirmed by Jiang's refusal to mobilise the country to respond to Japan's occupation of Shanghai in 1933 and his meek acceptance of the humiliating Treaty of Tanggu • Jiang's weak response to Japanese aggression after 1931 led to the outbreak of war in 1937 by strengthening the influence of the Japanese military over its government, and emboldening the Kwantung Army • The outbreak of war in 1937 followed a pattern established since 1931, i.e. a staged incident (at the Marco Polo Bridge), followed by a planned military escalation by Japan - only then did Jiang reluctantly declare war. Arguments and evidence countering the view that the outbreak of all-out war in 1937 was largely due to the weak response of Jiang Jieshi's government toward Japan since 1931 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Jiang's reaction to Japanese aggression, which led to war in 1937, was pragmatic rather than weak, e.g. he understood very well Japan's military superiority and knew the need for China to secure foreign support • Jiang was justified in believing that the communists were a greater threat than Japan to the GMD, and to the territorial integrity of China, for most of the 1930s – he declared war in 1937 when this was no longer the case • The outbreak of war in 1937 was due to the concerted, and apparently insatiable, pattern of Japanese aggression against China in the 1930s, spurred on by an extremely aggressive, military leadership • The aggression that resulted in all-out war in 1937 was caused to some degree by economic factors – Japan was weakened by the international depression and needed the raw materials of Manchuria for free • The outbreak of war was due partly to the failure of the western powers to abide by the League of Nations Covenant – Jiang was entitled to expect better, and concluded that appeasement was his least bad option. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that the Sino-Soviet split, in the years 1958-69, was caused mainly by ideological differences. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that the Sino-Soviet split, in the years 1958-69, was caused mainly by ideological differences should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Ideological differences between the leaders of China and the USSR emerged following Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalinism in 1956, e.g. with regard to the uses of terror and importance of cults of leadership • Mao disagreed strongly with Khrushchev's allowance for alternative interpretations of Marxist-Leninism believing in a single model and unified leadership • Mao differed from Khrushchev on the desirability of peaceful co-existence with capitalism taking a more belligerent approach towards western powers, e.g. his attitude to the USA over Taiwan in 1958 and Cuba in 1962 • China's rejection of the Soviet model of economic development in the Great Leap Forward, e.g. the ditching of the heavy industrial approach in the First Five-Year Plan signified a major ideological split • The launch of the Cultural Revolution distanced China further from the USSR in ideology in its rejection of the bureaucratic, top-down model of revolution • The verbal spats between China and the USSR in the 1960s were laced with ideological insults, e.g. Khrushchev's labelling of Mao as a Trotskyist and Mao's accusations against him as a revisionist. Arguments and evidence countering the accuracy of the statement that the Sino-Soviet split, in the years 1958-69, was caused mainly by ideological differences should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Personal animosity between Mao and Khrushchev was a key reason for the split as epitomised in the latter's visit to China in 1958 – Mao was temperamentally unsuited to being a follower rather than a leader • The split was caused partly by a residual antipathy in China towards the foreign exploitation and condescension it had suffered in the previous century – as one of those foreign powers, Russia's interference was still resented • Relations suffered because of the USSR's reluctance to share its nuclear capabilities, by Khrushchev's failure to endorse China's actions against Taiwan and India, and the perceived threat to China of the Brezhnev Doctrine • The border dispute in Xinjiang, dating back to the nineteenth century, was a major cause of tension between the two in the 1960s and led to serious clashes, and the severance of diplomatic relations, in 1969. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which the relationship between China and the Soviet Union changed in the years 1958-69. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the relationship between China and the Soviet Union changed in the years 1958-69 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • China no longer looked upon the Soviet model of communism as inviolate by the late 1960s, e.g. the Cultural Revolution was a conscious rejection of Soviet leadership • China and the USSR divorced economically in this period - the Great Leap Forward greatly reduced the PRC's reliance on Soviet finance and technical expertise, while Khrushchev stopped all economic aid to China in 1960 • China and the USSR increasingly clashed over their views of the outside world during the 1960s, leading to a freeze in relations, e.g. China's harder line with regard to the USA and the Cold War • From messages of fraternal unity in the 1950s, Mao and the Soviet leaders were conducting very public and very personal slanging matches by the mid-late 1960s, accusing each other of major ideological errors • A clear lack of trust developed in the relationship during this period, e.g. Mao was deeply upset by Khrushchev's unwillingness to share nuclear secrets and by the implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine • The degree to which relations had deteriorated was illustrated by the increasing number of border incidents, which escalated into war in 1969. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that the relationship between China and the Soviet Union changed in the years 1958-69 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • China's relationship with Russia was mistrustful, dating back to the Unequal Treaties, e.g. border tensions between the two in Xinjiang and Manchuria, and this did not change markedly after 1958 • Mao's relationship with Soviet leaders was already poor before 1958 due to Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin in 1956 and the launch of 'peaceful coexistence', and this remained the case throughout the years 1958-69 • There were clear economic differences between the PRC and USSR before 1958, e.g. over the cost of Soviet technologies supplied during the First Five-Year Plan - this did not change greatly during the 1960s • Both China and the USSR continued to condemn the USA's escalating involvement in Indo-China, in the same style and for the same reasons, throughout the years 1958-69 • The war in 1969 was brief, and diplomatic relations and Sino-Soviet trade were swiftly re-established - this suggests that Sino-Soviet relations had not changed disastrously during the 1960s. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which the breakdown in relations between China and the USSR, in the years 1958-69, was due to the personality of Chairman Mao. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that the breakdown in relations between China and the USSR, in the years 1958-69, was due to the personality of Chairman Mao should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Mao's arrogance in his condemnation of the USSR, following Khrushchev's decision to 'de-Stalinise' in the mid-1950s, fuelled the breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations • Mao's chauvinistic dismissal of Khrushchev as an intellectual lightweight and as a poor Marxist-Leninist, contributed to the decline, e.g. Mao's behaviour during the Soviet leader's ill-fated visit to China in 1958 • Mao's rash and hot-headed prosecution of Cold War tensions, e.g. his apparent support of a nuclear attack on the USA, put him at odds with Khrushchev's 'peaceful coexistence' and deepened the Sino-Soviet schism • Mao's sense of nationalism regarded the Russo-centric USSR as one of the exploiting powers of the late Qing period – consequently, he chafed at Soviet demands, e.g. over joint naval action in the Pacific, causing friction • Mao arrogantly over-played his hand with his demands on the USSR during the late 1950s and early 1960s, contributing to bad feeling and a decline in relations, e.g. his call for nuclear bomb technology was refused • Mao's ideological over-confidence led to his abandonment of the Soviet economic model in 1958, putting further distance in Sino-Soviet relations – Soviet economic support was ended in the following year. Arguments and evidence countering the view that the breakdown in relations between China and the USSR, in the years 1958-69, was due to the personality of Chairman Mao should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Khrushchev was as capable as Mao of issuing high-handed insults that contributed to the breakdown, e.g. he publicly accused Mao of ideological errors and of naivety in international relations • The USSR contributed to the schism in the late 1950s by insensitivity in its requests made of China, e.g. for radio listening devices on Chinese soil, and for promising, then withholding, nuclear secrets • Events in the early 1960s justifiably heightened fears in China of Soviet hostility, e.g. the USSR's succour of refugees from Xinjiang, its failure to support China unconditionally in its war with India • The Brezhnev Doctrine (1968), which promised Soviet intervention in the domestic affairs in any country where communism was deemed at risk, appeared a direct threat to China in the midst of the Cultural Revolution • The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet War in 1969 was a result more of historic border issues between the two countries than to the personality of Chairman Mao. Other relevant material must be credited.



Section C: indicative content**Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991**



Question	Indicative Content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse the source to consider its value for an enquiry into the nature of relations between China and the United States in the years 1979-97 and the reasons for closer co-operation between them. Jiang Zemin is named in the specification and candidates can be expected to be aware of the nature of Chinese-American relations in the years 1979-97 and of the significance of his visit to the USA in 1997. - The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inference: - As President of China and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang is clearly central to the development of Chinese-US relations - This is a public speech to a university audience rather than private negotiations with politicians, and so he may wish to accentuate the positives in order to appeal to the American public - The speech was made in November 1997, right at the end of the period in question, 18 years after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two - Jiang's visit to the US followed tensions – perhaps both sides had bridges to rebuild. - The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: The nature of relations between China and the US in the years 1979-97: - The source implies the desire for good relations on both sides - Jiang has been invited to America and he states on several occasions his belief that America and China can complement each other rather than be rivals - It indicates the apparent admiration of the Chinese for America and constantly to the desire for dialogue, co-operation and understanding on what are stated to be matters of mutual interest - The source implies throughout that relations are cordial between the two in 1997 though says little about the 22-year period leading up to this - The source states that there remain matters of difference but it does not elaborate on what these are or how serious they might be. The reasons for closer co-operation between them: - The source states that co-operation would be mutually beneficial for a range of both political and economic reasons - It indicates that China is anxious to encourage technological investment from the US which will benefit them both - It indicates that the US will gain strategically from having a more friendly relationship with such a dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region - It implies that they have a duty to co-operate to the world more widely as two of the most important powers in global politics. - Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing nature of relations between China and the US in the years 1979-97 and the reasons for closer co-operation. Relevant points may include: - The US did not formally recognize communist China officially until 1979, instead declaring Taiwan to be the Republic of China - Whatever their ideological differences and America's concerns over human rights in China, both were anxious to build relations given China's increasing strategic importance in the Far East and their mutual distrust of the USSR - Despite closer political and economic co-operation during the 1980s, tensions remained over China's claim to Taiwan (especially during the Reagan and Bush presidencies) - Given the benefits to both nations, relations continued to develop culminating in Clinton's subsequent visit to China in 1998.

Section B: indicative content



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that China's relationship with the rest of the world improved massively in the years 1978–97. Arguments and evidence supporting the statement that China's relationship with the rest of the world improved massively in the years 1978–97 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • As China's priorities switched from defending national security to economic development, its desire for western technological knowledge made it necessary to have better relationships with the rest of the world • Key to improvement was the peace treaty and long-term trade deal signed with Japan in 1978 and China's official recognition by the US in 1979 • China joined the IMF and World Bank in 1980 and played an increasingly prominent role as a member of the UN Security Council, notably not opposing the Gulf War in 1991 • The more outward-looking approach during the 1980s heralded bilateral visits to improve international relations and bolster trade – this included Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin visiting the US • China's growing acceptance can be illustrated by President Clinton's confirmation of Most Favoured Nation Status in 1994 and the smooth handover of Hong Kong by Britain in 1997 • China's closer relationships with its east Asian neighbours, including Japan and South Korea, is illustrated by the formation of ASEAN Plus Three in 1997 – it also built closer ties with the international Non-Aligned Movement. Arguments and evidence countering the accuracy of the statement that China's relationship with the rest of the world improved massively in the years 1978–1997 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • China's rapprochement with the US was driven by its deteriorating relationship with the USSR rather than a general desire to bring decades of mistrust and conflict to a close • China's relationship with the US did not improve massively during the Reagan and Bush presidencies – the status of Taiwan and the suppression of the Tiananmen protests in 1989 were particular stumbling blocks • Relations with Japan were threatened by disputes over the Senkaku Islands and the interpretation of the Sino-Japanese War given in Japanese school textbooks so did not improve massively • China's entry into international organisations did not necessarily improve its standing massively – e.g. criticism for selling nuclear technology despite non-proliferation treaties and for refusing to sign up to free trade agreements. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: Indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855–1991



Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that disagreements over Hong Kong's form of government seriously hindered negotiations between China and Britain about the return of Hong Kong. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that disagreements over Hong Kong's form of government seriously hindered negotiations between China and Britain about the return of Hong Kong should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Negotiations over the return of Hong Kong were characterised by fundamental differences over its future – Britain wanted to guarantee that western freedoms would continue after 1997, China only wanted to regain sovereignty • Although negotiations between China and Britain began in 1982, there was stalemate until 1984 when Deng Xiaoping threatened Mrs Thatcher that the PLA could occupy Hong Kong 'in an afternoon' if he wished • China's promise in the Joint Agreement in 1984 not to alter Hong Kong's 'social and economic systems' for at least 50 years was considered too vague

	to be acceptable to many in Britain, especially in the ruling Conservative Party • In the 1980s and 90s, Britain attempted to forestall negotiations by introducing greater democracy in Hong Kong, e.g. the first direct elections to its Legislative Assembly in 1991 – this was angrily condemned by China • Chris Patten's introduction of further democratic reforms in 1994-95 created still greater hostility and mistrust, and was rejected out-of-hand by China as incompatible with the Joint Agreement. Arguments and evidence opposing the view that disagreements over Hong Kong's form of government seriously hindered negotiations between China and Britain about the return of Hong Kong should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Though there was mistrust over its future government, this did not really hamper negotiations - the reality was that Hong Kong was unsustainable as a British colony when the lease on the New Territories expired in 1997 • Britain's rulers well appreciated that there was no way of defending Hong Kong from attack by China in 1997 – they focused instead on gaining improvements in the Joint Agreement rather than delay the handover • China's publication of the Basic Law of Hong Kong in 1990, which appeared to guarantee the continuation of the capitalist system and basic freedoms for fifty years after 1997, succeeded in mollifying many of its critics in Britain • The CCP overcame British demands for greater democracy by secretly convincing leading Hong Kong businessmen that their interests would be protected after 1997, thus negotiations proceeded without their opposition • Though many in Britain feared for Hong Kong politically, the opportunity for greater access to Chinese markets was a major compensation – there was pressure, therefore, not to prevent the agreement being concluded. Other relevant material must be credited.
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Section C: indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the source to consider its value for revealing China's policy regarding the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule and the relationship between China and Britain in the mid-1980s. The return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule and Deng Xiaoping are named in the specification and candidates can be expected to have knowledge of the negotiations between China and Britain and their context. 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when giving weight to information and inferences: • As remarks made by Deng Xiaoping, China's leader, the source will reflect Chinese policy at the highest level • Made to visitors from Hong Kong, the remarks were likely intended to be reported in Hong Kong and the wider world • The tone of the remarks is friendly and avuncular, seeking to stress the leader's trustworthiness • The timing of the remarks, just after the agreement of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, was intended to reassure public opinion in Hong Kong and Britain about Chinese intentions. 2. The following inferences and significant points of information could be drawn and supported from the source: China's policy regarding the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule: • The source indicates that China will not seek to change the way that Hong Kong is governed after its return to Chinese rule ('Hong Kong...change', 'They will not be imposed...Government'.) • The source suggests that China is committed to the continuance of Hong Kong's existing economic order after 1997 ('maintain prosperity', 'safeguard the prosperity') • The source suggests that China is seeking to reassure the people of Hong Kong of its sincerity to help facilitate the smooth transfer of power ('China's policy...not change', 'good faith', 'we mean it'.). The relationship between China and Britain during the mid-1980s: • The source suggests that the relationship between China and Britain is good enough to conclude an 'agreement' concerning the future of Hong Kong • It suggests that there is a degree of trust between China and Britain concerning the agreement ('we are also convinced that Britain will do the same.') • The source suggests that there is a constructive working relationship between Britain and China over Hong Kong ('I listed our concerns, and they expressed their willingness to cooperate with us on them.').

Question	Indicative content
	3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the value of the source in revealing China's policy regarding the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule and the relationship between China and Britain in the mid-1980s. Relevant points may include: • In a tacit acceptance of Chinese strength and British impotence, the Joint Agreement of 1984 conceded China's claim to Hong Kong and agreed its handover to Chinese rule on 1 July 1997 • In the Declaration, China promised to allow Hong Kong to govern itself as a Special Administrative Region – it also agreed to maintain the existing economic order and legal system for at least 50 years • Though there was criticism in Britain of the agreement, Sino-British relations remained generally good until, at least, the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, e.g. Elizabeth II visited the PRC in 1986.

Section B: indicative content**Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-91**

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which China's relationship with the USA improved in the years 1979-97. Arguments and evidence supporting the view that China's relationship with the USA improved in the years 1979-97 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Relations between China and the USA improved significantly from 1979 as mutual foreign policy aims drew them closer diplomatically, e.g. both sought the means to isolate the USSR and to reduce tensions in east Asia • China and the US greatly improved their relationship from 1979 thanks to their mutually-beneficial economic interests, e.g. Deng needed American computer technology while the USA sought to exploit new markets • The relationship improved significantly as a result of the vast increase in trade between the two, which broke down divisions, e.g. between 1979 and 1985 alone, the value of bilateral trade increased almost seven-fold • That the relationship improved is demonstrated by the cooling of Chinese rhetoric in condemnation of US values, and American support for China's membership of the Security Council and other international institutions • The improvement in the relationship was demonstrated by the success of Deng's visit to the USA in 1979 and Jiang's in 1997. Arguments and evidence countering the view that China's relationship with the USA improved in the years 1979-97 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Because of their ideological differences, relations between China and the USA remained pragmatic rather than close, e.g. relations during the conservative Reagan and Bush presidencies (1980-92) were often difficult • The USA's obligations towards Taiwan were a constant source of friction in the relationship during this period, e.g. the USA continued to trade with, and supply arms to, Taiwan despite the strong objections of the PRC • The two continued to clash over geopolitical concerns in the 1980s and 90s, e.g. the USA objected to China's use of aid to gain influence in the developing world and the help given to those developing nuclear arms • Human rights concerns dogged relationships between China and the US throughout this period, e.g. the USA strongly condemned China's role in Tibet and China's continued support for regimes like that in North Korea • The brutal suppression of the Tiananmen protests (1989) was pivotal in the development of relationships in this period, e.g. rising opposition in the USA to continued co-operation forced partial trade and arms embargoes • Relations cooled in the 1990s when the original reasons for closer ties lessened in importance, e.g. the USSR collapsed, Chinese economic development became self-sustaining. Other relevant material must be credited.

Section C: indicative content

Option 38.1: The making of modern Russia, 1855-1991



2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors: Section A

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	• Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little or no supporting evidence. Concepts of reliability or utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	4–7	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.